SIR HERBERT BUTTERFIELD, ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE AND MARTIN WIGHT AND THE CRISIS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS : A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT

Christopher Ian Hall

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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

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Abstract

This thesis examines the international thought of Sir Herbert Butterfield, Arnold J. Toynbee and Martin Wight, commonly portrayed in International Relations as 'realist', 'revolutionist' and 'rationalist' thinkers respectively. Their thought is reconsidered in terms of what they each perceived to be a crisis in the international realm. This perception, it is argued, shaped their distinctive understandings of the contemporary and future state of international relations. In contrast to many of their peers, Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight turned to religion and to history to aid their comprehension of the challenges that international crisis posed, and to help them form and articulate their desired practical responses. This thesis explores in detail both the religious beliefs of each man and their understandings of the nature of the past and historical knowledge, seeking to offer a view of the foundations of their international thought. In the second half, their diagnoses of international crisis are explored, and the responses they put forward to ameliorate it. It is argued that Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight are best not understood as 'realist', 'revolutionist' and 'rationalist', and it is asserted that such categories, far from aiding our understanding of the history of international thought, serve to obscure the nature of each man's work in the field.

I, Christopher Ian Hall, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 93500 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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I owe a great debt to Professor Matthew Melko of Wright State University for his kind donation of copies of his correspondence with Martin Wight. These have proved an invaluable source from which I have drawn much. Mr. Daniel Young of Temple University provided copies of some of Wight's unpublished papers for which I am also very grateful. Innumerable librarians, from the Bodleian Library, Cambridge University Library, Royal Institute of International Affairs, British Library Newspaper Archive, National Library of Scotland, Glasgow University, London School of Economics, Edinburgh University and University of St Andrews, have provided assistance. A Major Scottish Studentship from the Student Awards Agency for Scotland sustained me for much of the time this thesis took to write. My greatest debts, financial or otherwise, are to my parents, to Jo and latterly to Paddy.

The following abbreviations are used in the text:

Bull MSS – Papers of Hedley Bull, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Butterfield MSS – Papers of Sir Herbert Butterfield, held in the Cambridge University Library.

Clark MSS – Papers of Sir George Clark, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Curtis MSS – Papers of Lionel Curtis, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Melko MSS – Correspondence between Professor Matthew Melko and Martin Wight, in author's possession courtesy of Professor Melko.

Murray MSS – Papers of Gilbert Murray, OM, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

RIIA MSS – Papers of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, held in Chatham House, London.

Toynbee MSS – Papers of Arnold J. Toynbee, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. All box numbers for this collection are temporary.

Wight MSS – Papers of Martin Wight, held in the British Library of Political and Economic Sciences, London. All box numbers for this collection are temporary.

Zimmern MSS – Papers of Sir Alfred Zimmern, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford.

Contents

I. Introduction

> It is not clear that the turn given to history since 1914 is not one of the most disastrous in world-history.[1]
>
> Butterfield

> The catastrophic nature of history continues – that is simply a matter of looking at the record – but history is a sea-serpent whose back has been broken, even if it seems to us to be thrashing about more violently than ever.[2]
>
> Wight

> If we fail to deal with the present crisis we shall certainly break our present civilisation and it is conceivable that the human race may extinguish itself and the earth remain inhabitable without any human beings remaining to inhabit it.[3]
>
> Toynbee

If the 'short' twentieth century, from the outbreak of the First World War to the fall of Soviet Communism, might be accorded anything so grand as a *leitmotiv*, then it would surely be that of crisis.[4] Contemporaries perceived crisis – general and particular – in politics, economics, society, thought, religion and education, from the 'crisis of reason'

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[1] Herbert Butterfield, 'Commonplace Book' (1950), Butterfield MSS, 520, quoted in Michael Bentley, 'Butterfield at the Millennium: The Sir Herbert Butterfield Lecture, 1999', Storia della Storiografia 38 (2000), p. 17, n. 2.

[2] Martin Wight, 'Christian Commentary', BBC radio talk, 29 October 1948, p. 5.

[3] Arnold J. Toynbee to Lionel Curtis, 16 February 1939, Curtis MSS, fol. 190-1.

[4] The notion of the 'short' twentieth century is taken from Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (London: Abacus, 1995).

with which the century opened,[5] to the 'coming anarchy' that seemed to loom at its close.[6] The 'world crisis' of the First World War,[7] which divided the insecurities of the twentieth century from the stable certainties of the nineteenth, was perhaps, as Kennan suggested, the 'great seminal catastrophe', but many followed.[8] The inter-war years witnessed the 'crisis of parliamentary democracy' and economic calamity;[9] the post-war decades saw recurrent crises of political authority in liberal and totalitarian regimes alike. Socialists perceived capitalism in crisis throughout the century;[10] for conservatives, society, morality and belief were constantly under challenge. International politics after 1945 were little improved: the 'years of crisis' of the inter-war period was supplanted by the 'age of terror', that 'hard and bitter peace' of the Cold War, with its perennial threat of nuclear annihilation.[11] As Denis Brogan observed, capturing the spirit of his times, 'no age has ever been better off for problems to keep it on its toes'.[12]

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[5] J. W. Burrow, The Crisis of Reason: European Thought, 1848-1914 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000).

[6] Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage, 2000).

[7] Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1918 (London: Thornton Butterworth, 1923-31).

[8] George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), p. 164.

[9] Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985).

[10] For one such argument, see Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1976).

[11] Kenneth Ingram, The Years of Crisis: An Outline of International History, 1919-1945 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1946); Leslie Paul, The Age of Terror (London: Faber & Faber, 1950); G. F. Hudson, The Hard and Bitter Peace: World Politics since 1945 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1966).

[12] Denis Brogan, The Price of Revolution (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1951), p. vii.

International Relations (IR) was born with the 'short' twentieth century and bears its scars. The perception of crisis was acute amongst scholars working in the field throughout the twentieth century, a latent anxiety rarely absent from their thought.[13] It is to be found in early liberal manifestos like Lowes Dickinson's The International Anarchy (1926), with its dire warning that 'modern war…has become incompatible with the continuance of civilisation', as much as later works.[14] Even the deeply illiberal, inveterately progressive E. H. Carr was not immune from this anxiety – just the title of his Twenty Years' Crisis (1939) offers ample evidence of that.[15] Post-war work, composed in the shadow of the Cold War, showed no lessening of concern. Our civilisation, wrote Hans Morgenthau in his Scientific Man versus Power Politics (1946), faces 'confusion' and 'cynical despair'; worse, 'it risks being overwhelmed by the enemies from within and from without'.[16] The danger did not pass in the post-war years, but rather deepened, as what Geoffrey Hudson, in 1966, called those 'ravenous creatures' – nuclear weapons – were 'scattered over the earth awaiting their time'.[17] The 'crisis of world politics' was not to pass for two decades to come, if it was at all.

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight shared such anxieties. For them, the course of events since the outbreak of the Great War had shown undeniable evidence of social,

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[13] See the essays in Tim Dunne, Michael Cox & Ken Booth (eds.), The Eighty Years' Crisis: International Relations, 1919-1999 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[14] G. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 1904-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926), p. v. The same idea was voiced by Leonard Woolf, in his Downhill all the Way: An Autobiography of the Years 1919-1939 (London: Hogarth, 1967).

[15] E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to International Relations 1st ed. (London: Macmillan, 1942[1939]).

[16] Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man versus Power Politics (Phoenix: University of Chicago Press, 1965 [1946]), p. 2.

[17] Hudson, Hard and Bitter Peace, p. 8. See also John H. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on International Politics in the Twentieth Century (New York: McKay, 1976).

economic, political, intellectual, and moral crisis. Worst of all, they considered, was the international crisis. The fragility of the relations between states, the constant imminence of conflict, and brutality of modern war all threatened nothing less than the destruction of civilised life. For Butterfield, these were 'times of crisis' only paralleled by the tribulations of the Israelites;[18] Toynbee and Wight perceived a 'breakdown of civilisation',[19] and both thought that it might herald its ultimate demise. They each believed themselves to be witnessing times extraordinary in their calamitous nature. War was ever-present, and ever more destructive; peace more tenuous, rarely lasting and always threatened. Their reactions to this predicament, their understandings of the challenges faced in international relations and the responses required, were distinctive.

In IR, Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight have commonly been considered to have advocated 'realist', 'revolutionist' and 'rationalist' theoretical positions and practical policies respectively.[20] This categorisation, it will be argued in this thesis, does little to convey the complexity and occasional peculiarity of their thought, nor their mutual, if not always powerful, admiration.[21] Neither does it say much about the religious aspect of their thought. Indeed, what marked Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight apart from many of

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[18] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed. (London, G. Bell & Sons, 1949), p. 46.

[19] Wight, 'The World's Churches', The Observer, 22 August 1948, p. 4.

[20] These categories were developed by Wight himself in his lectures on international theory at the LSE in the 1950s. See Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions ed. Gabrielle Wight & Brian Porter (London & Leicester: RIIA & Leicester University Press, 1991).

[21] Butterfield chided his colleagues for ignoring Toynbee and believed he had 'produced germinal stuff' ('Hitting Back', review of Toynbee's Study XII, Sunday Telegraph, 7 May 1961, Butterfield MSS 101/3). Toynbee thought Butterfield's work 'probe[d] human affairs rather deeply' (Toynbee to Butterfield, 2 June 1950, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/T105), and was, in his own eyes', a 'great friend' of Wight (Toynbee to Bull, 18 April 1974, Toynbee MSS 86). Wight considered Toynbee a 'very great' man (Wight to Kyle, 26 July 1954, RIIA MSS 4/TOYN/18), and, even when he disagreed with him, thought Butterfield 'profound' ('History's Theme', review of Butterfield's Christianity and History, The Observer, 23 October 1949, p. 7).

their contemporaries, especially those in the nascent field of IR, was that their writing about international relations – and arguably all of their thought – was strongly influenced by their religious beliefs.[22] Their thought was informed too by particular treatments of history, interpretations of the past and its shape, that have rarely been examined by scholars in IR – religion and history being, in their minds, intertwined. The present thesis addresses both in an attempt to offer a fuller sketch of the foundations of their international thought, of their understandings of the roots of crisis, and the means by which it might be tempered.

Despite a smattering of recent studies, Butterfield and Toynbee have not received the attention in IR that their stature would seem to demand. Wight has been better served, but the meaning and value of his thought remains keenly contested, and studies have tended to concentrate on one or other aspect of his work rather than the corpus as a whole.[23] Such comparative neglect stands in sharp contrast to the extensive treatment of some of their contemporaries, among them Norman Angell, J. A. Hobson, Leonard Woolf, and especially E. H. Carr.[24] This thesis aims to complement such studies and to

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[22] This is not, of course, to argue that there were not others articulating religious interpretations of contemporary international relations. Reinhold Niebuhr and Lionel Curtis both offered such accounts, but there are good grounds for their exclusion from the present study. The context in which Neibuhr's thought might best be located in American, despite the popularity of his work in Britain in the 1930s and 1940s; it would be out of place to consider it alongside three English thinkers. Curtis, on the other hand, was a figure of considerable institutional importance in IR – as a founder of Chatham House – but, in contrast to Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight, was too idiosyncratic a thinker to generate an intellectual substantial following in the field. Niebuhr wrote many books, but Christian Realism and Political Problems (London: Faber & Faber, 1954) offers as good a taste as any. For Lionel Curtis, see his Civitas Dei 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1934-37).

[23] These treatments of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight are discussed in the next chapter.

[24] See, for instance, J. D. B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind (London: Macmillan, 1986), David Long, Towards a New Liberal

remedy this fault. It considers the international thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight in comparative perspective, and in the wider context of the international crisis that all three, and many others, perceived.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a brief account of the lives of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight. Of the three, only Toynbee has yet been the subject of a substantial biographical study, W. H. McNeill's Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life (1989).[25] It is best read alongside his earlier biographical survey in the Proceedings of the British Academy (1977) and his 'Toynbee Revisited' (1992).[26] The latter attempts to clarify a couple of episodes in Toynbee's life, as well as addressing the critical reception the biography received. There are few other biographical accounts to be found. Tangye Lean's 'A Study of Toynbee' (1947) is the best early account of his life, concentrating on his intellectual development; Christopher Brewin's 'Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and Research in a Global Context' (1995), by contrast, is all too often factually inaccurate.[27] The other sources for those in search of accounts of particular periods in

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Internationalism: The International Theory of J. A. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Peter Wilson, Internationalism and the Search for Peace: The International Thought of Leonard Woolf (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). On Carr, see Charles Jones, E. H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), Jonathan Haslam, The Vices of Integrity: E. H. Carr, 1892-1982 (London: Verso, 1999), and Michael Cox (ed.), E. H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000). A host of journal articles, too numerous to mention here, have also been published in recent years.

[25] W. H. McNeill, Arnold J. Toynbee: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[26] W. H. McNeill, 'Arnold Joseph Toynbee, 1889-1975', Proceedings of the British Academy 63 (1977), pp. 441-469; 'Toynbee Revisited', in Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), pp. 171-184.

[27] Tangye Lean, 'A Study of Toynbee', in M. F. Ashley Montagu (ed.), Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1956), pp. 12-38; Christopher Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and Research in a Global Context', in David Long & Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of

Toynbee's life are the essays in McIntire and Perry's edited Toynbee Reappraisals (1989), though it should be noted that they are be no means consistent with each other.[28]

Accounts of the lives and careers of Wight and Butterfield must be pieced together from a much more disparate range of sources: correspondence, papers, and obituaries, as well as the occasional secondary study. The most recent lengthy treatments of Wight's life may be found in Tim Dunne's history of the 'English school', Inventing International Society (1997), and in Scott Thomas' article 'Faith, history and Martin Wight' (2001).[29] In the main, however, both follow the general course of Hedley Bull's earlier study, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', the introductory essay in the posthumous collection of Wight's essays, Systems of States (1977).[30] This is the most fulsome study of his life by a colleague. Although some of the best insights into his thought are to be found in such memorial lectures, given in his honour by friends and colleagues – and latterly by a number of others – there is little information to be found in them on his course of his academic career.[31]

The most extensive treatments of Butterfield's life are those of Maurice Cowling, in his contribution to the Dictionary of National Biography and his three-volume study of

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the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-war Idealism Reconsidered (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 277-301.

[28] C. T. McIntire & M. Perry, Toynbee Reappraisals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).

[29] Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 47-70; Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, history and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English school of International Relations', International Affairs 77:4 (October 2001), pp. 905-930.

[30] Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', in Martin Wight, Systems of States ed. Hedley Bull (London & Leicester: Leicester University Press & LSE, 1977), pp. 1-20.

[31] These are cited and discussed at greater length in the chapter II.

Religion and the Public Doctrine.[32] Alberto Coll's The Wisdom of Statecraft (1985) is a study of Butterfield's international thought – refracted through an American lens – and contains little more than an outline of his career.[33] From a British perspective, the same is true of Dunne's chapter on Butterfield in Inventing International Society.[34] C. T. McIntire's introduction to his edited collection of Butterfield's essays on Christianity and history (1979) is a much more extensive account, drawing as it does on some of his correspondence and unpublished papers.[35] Other notable, though limited, treatments of his life include John Clive's 'The Prying Yorkshireman' (1982) and J. M. Munsey Turner's 'The Christian and the Writing of History' (1987).[36] The following account draws upon these sources, and seeks to add to them.

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[32] Maurice Cowling, 'Butterfield, Sir Herbert' in Lord Blake & C. S. Nicolls (eds.) The Dictionary of National Biography 1971-1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 116-117; Religion and the Public Doctrine in Modern England 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980-2002), pp. 192-250. See also his 'The Sources of the New Right: Irony, Geniality and Malice', Encounter 73:4 (November 1989), p 10.

[33] Alberto Coll, The Wisdom of Statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the philosophy of international politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985).

[34] Dunne, Inventing International Society, pp. 71-88.

[35] Herbert Butterfield, Writings on Christianity and History ed. C. T. McIntire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

[36] John Clive, 'The Prying Yorkshireman: Herbert Butterfield and the Historian's Task', in his Not by Fact Alone: Essays in the Reading and Writing of History (London: Collins, 1989). The essay was originally published in The New Republic. J. M. Munsey Turner, 'The Christian and the Writing of History: Sir Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979), Proceedings of the Wesley Historical Society 46 (February 1987), pp. 1-12.

Three Lives

> I do not think that men make their own lives; and I believe that they come nearest to doing so when they make use of time and chance – when they co-operate with Providence.[37]
>
> Butterfield

> I...if I die this afternoon, will leave nothing but some manuscripts too messy for publication, and some publishers faintly annoyed at my unreliability. Great scholars who never wrote great works are less creditworthy to posterity.[38]
>
> Wight

> Ever since 1915-6, when half my contemporaries were killed, I have felt it odd to be still alive. I have now had fifty-years' bonus-time to do what many of them would have done if their lives had not been cut short.[39]
>
> Toynbee

Arnold Joseph Toynbee was born on the 14th of April 1889. His parents, Harry Toynbee and Sarah Edith Marshall were respectably middle class, though not especially wealthy. He attended prep school in Kent, winning a scholarship – at the second attempt – to Winchester where he excelled in classics. In 1907, he won another scholarship, this time to Balliol College, Oxford, where he read Greats, winning a number of college and University prizes. Such were his talents that he came to the attention not only of college figures like A. D. (later Lord) Lindsay, but also of Alfred Zimmern, then a young Fellow of New College and later an important figure in inter-war international studies, and of

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[37] Butterfield, 'Autobiographical Reflections' (i), Butterfield MSS 7, pp. 36-37.

[38] Wight to Melko, 1 November 1971, Melko MSS, in author's possession.

[39] Toynbee to Cary-Elwes, 26 November 1966, in C. Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience: The Correspondence of Arnold J. Toynbee & Columba Cary-Elwes, Monk of Ampleforth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 471. Toynbee had almost another nine years to live when he wrote this letter.

Gilbert Murray, the Regius Professor of Greek.[40] His gifts were matched by his desire for success; as Toynbee wrote to a friend, in May 1911, on the completion of his Finals:

> As for ambition, with a great screaming capital A, I have got it pretty strong, probably by reaction to Wykehamicalism. But I do want to be a great gigantic historian – not for fame, but because there is lots of work in the world to be done, and I am greedy for as big a share of it as I can get.[41]

This personal drive – combined with his scholarly abilities – was rewarded with a Balliol fellowship in ancient history, which Toynbee took up in October 1912. The experience, however, was unhappy. He did not enjoy the long hours of undergraduate tuition, and within three years, McNeill has noted, 'his affection for Balliol and for the life of an Oxford don [had] evaporated almost as quickly as it had kindled in his breast'.[42] He resigned his fellowship in December 1915. This professional disillusionment came against a background of great dislocation in Toynbee's family life. In late 1909 or early 1910, his father was committed to an asylum, and there he remained until his death in 1941.[43] This cast a dark shadow over Toynbee for the remainder of his life from which he never properly escaped. He feared at the time that the illness was hereditary, and assurances to the contrary – the doctors assured him that overwork was the cause – did not wholly convince him.[44] At around the same time, Toynbee began to woo Rosalind, a daughter of Gilbert Murray, marrying her later that year.[45]

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[40] This brief account is a précis of McNeill's more substantial treatment of his early life, in Toynbee, pp. 1-37.

[41] Toynbee to Darbishire, 11 May 1911, Toynbee MSS 80.

[42] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 37.

[43] Ibid., p. 33. See also Toynbee to Cary-Elwes, 24 January 1941, in Peper (ed.), Historian's Conscience, pp. 81-82.

[44] This initial fear is expressed in Toynbee to Darbishire, 13 June 1913, in Peper (ed.), Historian's Conscience, p. 6. See also McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 32-34.

During his four years at Oxford Toynbee showed himself unwilling to confine himself to the classics, writing on modern Greek policy, the 'Slav peoples', and Nationality and the War (1915), outlining the possible shape of the post-war settlement, as well as three articles on ancient history and literature.[46] A secondment to government work, in May 1915, caused a further upsurge in his literary productivity. Having been adjudged unfit for military service by a family doctor,[47] Toynbee first joined Lord Bryce in producing pamphlets on the Armenian genocide,[48] and later was put to work examining foreign press articles and writing studies of contemporary political issues. Much of this was propaganda, some of which – The German Terror in Belgium (1917), for instance – is rather crude.[49] At the same time, during 1915 and 1916, Toynbee also turned to the future, examining, in a series of articles for the journals Nation, Highway, and the Home-reading magazine, the 'new Europe' that might emerge from the war.[50]

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[45] Toynbee related this romance to Darbishire, 9 March 1913 and 13 June 1913, in Peper (ed.), Historian's Conscience, p. 3-8.

[46] Toynbee, Nationality and the War (London: Dent & Sons, 1915). For the articles, see S. Fiona Morton, A Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 53. Toynbee was also engaged during this period in composing a history of ancient Greece for the Home University Library (commissioned in 1914) a project he did not complete until 1959.

[47] It is almost certainly the case, as McNeill argues, that Toynbee was, in fact, perfectly fit for military service, but was adjudged to be so either at his own behest or that of his wife, Rosalind, who feared, quite justifiably, that he might be killed. See McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 64-70; McNeill, 'Toynbee Revisited', p. 177.

[48] See, for example, Toynbee, Armenian atrocities: the murder of a nation (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1915).

[49] Toynbee, The German Terror in Belgium (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917). See also The German Terror in France (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917) and The murderous tyranny of the Turks (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1917).

[50] These articles are listed in Morton, Bibliography.

It remains unclear for which part of the wartime government Toynbee was working at this time. McNeill writes that in May 1915, Toynbee went to work for a 'government propaganda outfit', but he does not name it, reporting only Toynbee's euphemistic title: the 'Mendacity Bureau'.[51] By 1917, he joined the newly created 'Department of Information International Bureau' (DIIB), an organisation ultimately responsible to the Minister for Information, Lord Beaverbrook. The next year, the DIIB was transformed into another body, the 'Political Intelligence Department' (PID), answerable to the Foreign Office, and nominally headed by Sir William Tyrrell.[52] This move brought Toynbee, along with Allan and Rex Leeper and Lewis Namier – veterans of the DIIB – into contact with Alfred Zimmern and James Headlam-Morley, the latter the *de facto* head of the PID. Later, in 1919, this group was joined by Harold Nicolson and Robert Vansittart.[53] According to one historian of the organisation, 'the single most important task assigned to the PID was to prepare Britain's case for the post-war peace conference'.[54] For Toynbee, this concerned the future of Turkey and Greece; he can be glimpsed in the role, frustrated by the lack of progress, in Nicolson's famous account of the conference.[55]

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[51] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 72.

[52] It should be noted that McNeill maintains that Toynbee joined the PID in May 1917. This seems to be incorrect: Toynbee may well have joined the DIIB that month, but the PID was not created until 1918. Other problems with McNeill's account of Toynbee's period with the PID are noted in G. Martel, 'Review Article: Toynbee, McNeill, and the Myth of History', International History Review, 12:2 (1990), p. 340.

[53] E. Goldstein, 'The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence 1918-1920', Review of International Studies 14 (1988), pp. 276-278.

[54] Ibid., p. 281.

[55] Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London: Methuen, 1964 [1933]), p. 113.

The scale of the task the PID performed was reflected in the paucity of Toynbee's publications for 1918 and 1919.[56] With his appointment to the Koraes Chair of Byzantine and modern Greek history and literature at the University of London – he took up the post in October 1919 – he began again to write in earnest. His tenure of the chair, however, was not without distractions. From the outset he had doubts regarding his suitability for the position, considering that it should 'go to a more active Philhellene than I feel myself to be'.[57] Moreover, his academic interests were only tangential to those of the Chair's sponsors. Toynbee's ambition was to write what he called a history of 'how Rome destroyed the [Greek] world',[58] not to teach modern Greek literature, which he pointedly refused to do. The chair's sponsors quickly came to regret his appointment. The content and style of his teaching were not to the liking of the Principal of King's College, London, the fervent philhellene Ronald Burrows, nor to that of the donors, all of whom seem to have envisaged the post as a means of furthering the cause of a 'Greater Greece'.[59] Toynbee angered the sponsors too by the increasingly critical tone he adopted towards Greece in both his scholarship and journalism in the Manchester Guardian.[60]

By 1923, Toynbee's position had become untenable. In January he and the new principal of King's, Ernest Barker, were for the first time made aware of the specific

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[56] He did publish three pieces during this period, including his inaugural lecture as Koraes professor, The place of medieval and modern Greece in history (London: Vellonis, 1919). See also, 'Russia, Germany and Asia', The Round Table, 31 (June 1918), pp. 526-564; 'The outlook in the Middle East', The Round Table, 37 (December 1919), pp. 55-97.

[57] R. Clogg, Politics and the Academy: Arnold Toynbee and the Koraes Chair (London: Frank Cass, 1986), p. 26.

[58] Toynbee to Darbishire, 5 May 1918, Toynbee MSS 80.

[59] R. Clogg, 'Beware the Greeks: How Arnold Toynbee became a mishellene', Times Literary Supplement, 17 March 2000, p. 14.

[60] See The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: a study in the contact of civilisations (London: Constable, 1922). His Guardian articles are not, unfortunately listed in Morton's bibliography, and I have not been able to trace them.

conditions attached by Burrows and the subscribers to the Koraes chair.[61] In an effort to have them fulfilled, the subscribers committee attempted to vet details of Toynbee's courses and lectures. Finding them not to their liking, the donors made allegations of incompetence and indolence against Toynbee. Despite the support of Barker and Graham Wallas, then Professor of Politics at the LSE, Toynbee finally resigned, a decision effective at the end of June 1924.[62] According to McNeill, despite the controversy and bad-feeling the episode had aroused, Toynbee's resignation did not preclude new offers of employment.[63] Amongst them was a temporary position at the newly created British (later Royal) Institute of International Affairs. There he was to write a Survey of International Affairs in the intervening years since Versailles, a work intended to complement Harold Temperley's history of the conference.[64]

The temporary arrangement quickly became permanent, and, despite the offers of a number of prestigious academic appointments, Toynbee remained at Chatham House until his retirement. In 1925, he assumed the post of Director of Studies, a position that allowed him to oversee all the projects undertaken by the Institute, and took up a chair in international history at the University of London, courtesy of a donation from Sir Daniel Stevenson. Initially, this post required him to return to teaching, a task that Toynbee found distracting.[65] In 1928, his position was renegotiated, and made a research chair with no such responsibilities. Toynbee thus had the freedom to lecture and publish, and he did

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[61] On Barker's involvement, see Clogg, Politics and the Academy, p. 60, and Julia Stapleton, Englishness and the Study of Politics: The Social and Political Thought of Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 114.

[62] On Wallas, see Clogg, Politics and the Academy, p. 66.

[63] McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 119-120.

[64] H. M. V. Temperley, The History of the Peace Conference, 6 vols., (London: Oxford University Press, 1920-24). The Survey ran from 1920-24 to 1977, and were published jointly by the RIIA and Oxford University Press. Toynbee acted as editor until 1955.

[65] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 120.

the latter at a phenomenal rate. Indeed he was, during the late 1920s and 1930s, at the very 'height of his [literary] power'.[66] The annual Survey of International Affairs alone was a massive undertaking, and though supported by a staff of press-cutters and his assistant, Veronica Boulter, Toynbee's achievement in producing these volumes was extraordinary. In parallel, he planned and wrote the first six volumes of A Study of History, published in two sets of three in 1934 and 1939,[67] the work for which he is best known. All the while, he continued to write essays and engage in journalism, both in print and on the radio.[68]

By the late 1930s, increasingly distracted by personal difficulties, contemporary events, and the Study, Toynbee largely relinquished responsibility for the Surveys to Veronica Boulter and a number of specialist authors.[69] The outbreak of war entailed the abandonment of both works, as Toynbee was again pressed into government service. In September of 1938, he was contacted by the Foreign Office and presented with a plan to 'use', as he put it 'Chatham House as an outside auxiliary intelligence office (not propaganda) [Toynbee's underlining]'.[70] A year later, this plan was put into effect, and the Institute was transformed into the 'Foreign Press Research Department' (FPRS) moving from London to Balliol College, Oxford, in the process. Though nominally designed to survey the foreign press, the FRPS soon engaged itself in a much broader range of activities.[71] Little information on these activities can be gleaned from Toynbee's

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[66] Roland Stromberg, 'A Study of History and a World at War', in McIntire & Perry (eds.), Toynbee Reappraisals, p. 144.

[67] Toynbee, A Study of History vols. I-III (London: RIIA & Oxford University Press, 1934) & vols. IV-VI (London: RIIA & Oxford University Press, 1939).

[68] For Toynbee's journalism, see Morton, Bibliography, pp. 75-88.

[69] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 174.

[70] Toynbee to G. N. 'James' Clark, 26 September 1938, Clark MSS 213.

[71] The FRPS was rather controversial, attracting, in its early years, much criticism from the press. Indeed, Rab Butler was so concerned that he acted to deflect attention, and 'kill off the

papers.[72] Those of a colleague and friend, G. N. Clark, however, reveal some details of the FPRS's work, which included the monitoring not only of the foreign press, but also of domestic public opinion, and the drafting of papers on war aims, post-war international organisations and the future of Germany.[73]

By the beginning of 1943, the FRPS had grown to become a considerable organisation, with 177 staff reporting to Toynbee.[74] The Director's own role, or so Lionel Curtis believed, was of great importance: 'to prepare statesmen, in papers short enough for them to read to take momentous decisions, often at short notice'.[75] It is clear from Clark's papers that leading political figures did read the FRPS's work, but how far they influenced policy is difficult to judge. In the summer of 1943, the FRPS returned to London, its personnel augmented by officials from within the Foreign Office, including those of the PID, and became the FO's Research Department, still with Toynbee at its head.[76] He remained in government service until July 1946 when, having a refused a knighthood for this administrative work, he returned to Chatham House.[77] Outwardly this move was a return to the *status quo ante*, but the war years had seen dislocations not only

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idea that [the government was] contemplating producing at Oxford, in remote seclusion, a perfect academic peace plan'. See The Times, 8 February 1940, in Clark MSS 156. The report is on the parliamentary debate to discuss the vote of £55,200 to the Foreign Office to fund the FPRS.

[72] That which can be is detailed in McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 182-184.

[73] G. N. Clark, 'National Unity', unpublished paper dated 5 April 1940; Minutes of 'Committee on War Aims', undated, possibly 1940; Clark MSS 156; 'Questions on which the FPRS and other people in Oxford might be asked to give their views on opinion now current in Britain', undated, possibly 1942, Clark MSS 157.

[74] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 181.

[75] Curtis to Toynbee, 15 February 1941, Curtis MSS 23/19-20.

[76] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 198. On the involvement of the PID, see Toynbee to F. C. James, 7 April 1943, Toynbee MSS 117. This move was controversial, according to David Mitrany. See his The Functional Theory of Politics (London: Martin Robertson & LSE, 1975), pp. 72-74.

in Toynbee's professional life. In 1939, only a month after his mother had died, his eldest son Tony committed suicide. The death of his father, still confined to an asylum, came two years later. As the war went on, Toynbee also became increasingly estranged from his first wife, Rosalind, whom he divorced in 1946.[78] He was remarried that same year to his assistant, Veronica Boulter.

An abridgement assembled by D. C. Somervell of the first six volumes of A Study of History was published that same year.[79] It sold swiftly and at great profit, especially in America.[80] A year later, keen to capitalise on his increasing popularity, Toynbee published a collection of essays, Civilisation on Trial, which met with less spectacular, but still considerable, success. In early 1948, he sought to release another selection of essays under the auspices of the Institute, but it was resisted by Chatham House, partly at the suggestion of Martin Wight.[81] With literary achievement, at least in terms of sales, came attempts to lure Toynbee from Chatham House. In 1946, it was suggested to Toynbee that a position for him could be made available at Oxford. The offer was repeated in 1947, this time with 'the possibility', Toynbee wrote to Ivison Macadam, 'that I might be offered the Regius Chair of Modern History when [F. M.] Powicke retires this summer'.[82] A similar suggestion also came from Cambridge, whose

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[77] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 200.

[78] Ibid., p. 179. Toynbee separated from Rosalind in 1942.

[79] Toynbee, A Study of History abridgement of vols. I-VI by D. C. Somervell (London: RIIA & Oxford University Press, 1946). The remaining volumes were abridged, also by Somervell, in 1957, and published again by the RIIA & Oxford University Press.

[80] See the discussion of the abridgement, and the impact it made, especially in the United States, in McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 211-216.

[81] Osborn to Cleeve, 8 January 1948, RIIA MSS, 4/Toyn/3. It was suggested instead that Wight edit a selection from the Surveys.

[82] Toynbee to Macadam, 31 March 1947, RIIA MSS 4/Toyn/42.

own Regius Chair was to become vacant upon the retirement of G. N. Clark.[83] The University tried hard to secure Toynbee's services: Clark's papers reveal that not only had he and G. M. Trevelyan been mobilised to persuade Toynbee, but also Clement Attlee, whose ultimate responsibility it was to make the appointment, made a personal appeal on the University's behalf.[84]

Despite these and other offers – including one, in 1947, of an appointment at the University of Chicago on a monumental salary of $12,000 a year[85] – Toynbee remained at Chatham House. When he could – and the Rockefeller Foundation was willing to fund it – he visited the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton in an effort to complete his 'Nonsense Book', the Study. He returned too to the Surveys of the war years, though Toynbee's role was greatly diminished. The enormity of the task demanded that the subject be treated thematically, and the writing be done by a group of specialist authors. Toynbee oversaw the whole project in an editorial role, and his written contributions were confined to largely to introductory chapters. This left him able not only to concentrate on the Study but also to lecture and broadcast, exploring themes, as he had done throughout the 1930s, from his *magnum opus*. In September 1954, having reached the age of 65, it was intended that Toynbee retire from both Chatham House and from the Stevenson Chair. He did not do so, however, until the following year, as he sought to complete the wartime Surveys, and even after he left, he retained an office at the Institute.[86]

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[83] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 209.

[84] Toynbee's reaction was ostentatiously modest: 'It is notable', he wrote to Clark, 'I feel, that Attlee should have found time to see one personally about it'. Toynbee to Clark, 11 June 1947, Clark MSS 213.

[85] Tylor to Toynbee, 18 June 1947, Toynbee MSS 39.

[86] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 233.

Toynbee continued to write for the best part of the next twenty years, his prodigious output including a twelfth volume to the Study (1961) that ran to fully 600 pages of close-printed text.[87] In 1956, he published An Historian's Approach to Religion,[88] a version of his Gifford Lectures delivered in Edinburgh in 1952 and 1953. Like a great deal of his later work, especially his lectures and essays, the lectures and book consisted of mainly of ideas explored or introduced in the Study. Besides this he published a number of volumes discussing his extensive travels, some of which drew upon work already presented elsewhere, usually in newspapers, including East to West: a journey around the world (1958), Between Oxus and Jumna (1961), Between Niger and Nile (1965) and Between Maule and Amazon (1966).[89] In the main, these publications were ephemeral, and occasionally derivative. Some of Toynbee's later work, however, was of more lasting and substantive worth. In 1959, Hellenism,[90] the volume originally commissioned in 1914 by Gilbert Murray, appeared. This was one of number of works he was to publish on classical subjects, including Hannibal's Legacy (1965) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his World (1973).[91] Two volumes of biography and reminiscence

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[87] Toynbee, A Study of History, vol. XII (London: RIIA & Oxford University Press, 1961). The eleventh volume was an atlas: Toynbee & E. D. Myers, A Study of History, vol. XI, (London: RIIA & Oxford University Press, 1959).

[88] Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

[89] Toynbee, East to West: a journey around the world (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), Between Oxus and Jumna (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), Between Niger and Nile (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) and Between Maule and Amazon (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

[90] Toynbee, Hellenism: The History of a Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

[91] Toynbee, Hannibal's Legacy: The Hannibalic War's effects on Roman Life (London: Oxford University Press, 1965) and Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his World (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).

also emerged: Acquaintances (1967) and Experiences (1969).[92] By the late 1960s, however, and despite a surge of interest in his work in Japan,[93] Toynbee's appeal had waned and his literary powers were fading. In 1974, he suffered a debilitating stroke, and died a year later, on the 22nd of October, 1975.

Despite Toynbee's erstwhile fame and fortune, even his being made Companion of Honour in 1956, of the three men it was Butterfield who was the recipient of the greatest academic accolades during his career. Born on the 7th of October, 1900, he grew up in Oxenhope, a village near Keighley, in Yorkshire.[94] His father, Albert was a clerk in a local mill and a Methodist lay preacher; his mother Ada Mary, was a (probably lapsed) member of the Plymouth Brethren. As a child, Butterfield was encouraged in his schoolwork in the hope that he could fulfil his father's thwarted ambition father to become a Methodist minister. He did well, winning a scholarship to the Trade and Grammar School in Keighley, and later a Major County Scholarship to Cambridge. By his own reckoning, Butterfield was the first student at the school to have received such an award to go up to an Oxbridge college. This achievement was mitigated, however, by the fact that the scholarship was to read history, a subject for which he claimed to have had little fondness at school. 'I have always hated history', he recalled telling his headmaster at the time, 'and, besides, I can never remember dates'.[95]

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[92] Toynbee, Acquaintances (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) and Experiences (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[93] This is detailed in McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 268-273.

[94] The best short account of Butterfield's early life is to be found in Owen Chadwick, 'Sir Herbert Butterfield', Memorial Address, Great St Mary's, Cambridge, in The Cambridge Review, 16 November 1979, pp. 6-9.

[95] Butterfield, 'Autobiographical Reflections' (i), Butterfield MSS 7, p. 5.

Butterfield's undergraduate years were not without their problems, not least the social discomfort he seems to have experienced at Cambridge. Friendships with the two of History Fellows at Peterhouse, Harold Temperley and especially Paul Vellacott, appear to have offered some solace:

> I was a ruffian from Yorkshire, and my undergraduate friends - in the college debating society, for example - would roar with laughter at my pronunciations of "butter" or "babe". I did not know how to dress, did not know how to judge architecture - did not see buildings - and I remember that he [Vellacott] had to teach me one or two points of table manners. I was an uncouth Methodist local preacher...[96]

Vellacott (1891-1954), to whom Butterfield's dedicated his most famous book, The Whig Interpretation of History, was one of the more unlikely characters to befriend the young Yorkshireman. Seriously wounded in the First World War, Vellacott considered himself 'something of an aesthete', pretending, according to Butterfield, that he had 'never ridden a bus' or been 'north of the Trent'.[97] He published virtually nothing; Butterfield recalled that the 'only paper I heard him read was a somewhat highbrow dissertation on the poetry of Keats'.[98] Despite these eccentricities, Vellacott took to Butterfield, perhaps, as the latter suggested, because their shared aesthetic and historiographical sensibilities overrode social distance.[99]

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[96] Ibid., p. 64.

[97] Ibid., p. 59 & p. 64.

[98] Ibid., p. 59.

[99] Ibid., p. 65. Butterfield wrote that 'in many respects we were at one in our ideals; and this was true even in regard to the study and writing of history. He [Vellacott] appreciated the fact that I could not be content with mere technical history and that I found constitutional studies not entirely satisfying'.

Butterfield's relationship with Harold Temperley was of a quite different nature. Temperley (1879-1939) was perhaps - the possible exception being Charles Webster - the foremost British diplomatic historian of the inter-war period. An impeccable Liberal, he was the author of the classic study The Foreign Policy of Canning (1925), and co-author of the most widely-read textbook on European international history of the period, Europe in the 19th Century (1927).[100] Like many historians of his generation, Temperley's learning was supplemented by practical political, military and administrative experience. He served with the Imperial General Staff during the First World War, and attended the conference at Versailles in this capacity. Butterfield later recalled:

> He liked to tell stories about his connections with the great, and in the twenties he belonged to that group of historians who were bewitched because they were on the fringe of that magic circle of people who govern us - they were consulted on occasion about some region of Europe with which they were particularly acquainted.[101]

Such mild egotism did not diminish Butterfield's affection and admiration for the older man, who seems to have felt a certain sadness that his political, and indeed academic, ambitions were not entirely realised. As he recalled:

> ...there came a time when Temperley told me that he thought it was folly in a historian to play for a connection with government. He gave me the impression, however, of

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[100] H. W. V. Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1925). Butterfield wrote a preface to the second edition, published by Cass in 1966. See also, Temperley's Europe in the 19th Century (London: Longman, Green & Co, 1927).

[101] Butterfield, 'Autobiographical Reflections' (ii), Butterfield MSS 7, p. 54 & p. 59 (these pages being coterminous in the text).

> having made such a play [at becoming politically influential] and came to [be] disappointed.[102]

On the completion of the Historical Tripos, Butterfield was elected a Fellow of Peterhouse in 1923, but continued to work under Temperley's direction. The product of this research was a substantial volume of diplomatic history, The Peace Tactics of Napoleon, 1806-1808 (1929). His first major publication, however, had come five years earlier, and reflected an intellectual concern shared by both Temperley and Vellacott.[103] The Historical Novel (1924) was little more than an extended essay written for the La Bas Prize for 1923, but it introduced a theme to which Butterfield was to return throughout his life.[104] It was, according its author, 'an attempt to discover what contribution the sheer imaginative endeavour of the literary man could make to the actual recovery of the past'.[105] Though Temperley was an avowed admirer of historical fiction,[106] the book was rooted more in Butterfield's early love of historical novels – and especially those of Walter Scott – and his intellectual engagement with Vellacott.[107] Both men were convinced that the writing of history required a form of literary endeavour, 'the artistic side of the historian's work', in Butterfield's words; The Historical Novel was in a sense an attempt to reconnoitre the limits of that dimension of historiography.[108]

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[102] Ibid., p. 46.

[103] Butterfield 'Autobiographical Reflections', Butterfield MSS 7, (i), p. 52 & (ii), p. 15. Temperley was, Butterfield recalled in his 'Autobiography', 'constantly interested in historical fiction', but Vellacott 'had a greater interest in the artistic side of the historian's work'.

[104] Butterfield, The Historical Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1924).

[105] Butterfield, 'My Literary Productions', Butterfield MSS 269/3, p. A.

[106] See, for example, Harold Temperley, Foreign Historical Novels (London: Historical Association, 1929).

[107] Butterfield's love of the historical novel seems to have faded as he grew older. In the 1950s, he noted that 'I imagine that I would find it difficult now to return to Ivanhoe' ('Autobiographical Reflections' (i), Butterfield MSS 7, p. 32).

[108] Butterfield, 'Autobiographical Reflections' (ii), Butterfield MSS 7, p. 15.

Butterfield's interest in the nature of historical writing also found its expression in the work for which he is best known, The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), a brief, elegant, and perhaps misdirected assault upon the whigs' organisation of the historical narrative.[109] From 1931 to 1939, however, he published only the occasional essay, 'History and the Marxian Method' (1933) among them. The paucity of surviving correspondence and papers from this period makes it difficult to establish in what else he was engaged during the inter-war years, and only an outline can be sketched for the period. Certainly, he was interviewed, in 1936, for the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Politics at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, but was rejected on the grounds of his insufficient enthusiasm for the League of Nations.[110] Two years later, in 1938, he lectured on historiography at four German universities, where he presented some of what was to become The Englishman and His History (1944).[111] At the same time, Butterfield worked on two volumes, a biography of Napoleon, published in 1939, and The Statecraft of Machiavelli (1940).[112]

Butterfield appears to have spent most of the war in Cambridge. His observations of the conflict and its aftermath, albeit from afar, shifted his intellectual concerns, and prompted Butterfield to make more public professions of his religious beliefs. He found vent for this in the lectures, delivered in Cambridge in 1948, and afterwards on BBC

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[109] Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (New York & London: Norton, 1965 [1931]).

[110] On this episode, see Haslam, Vices of Integrity, p. 58, and Brian Porter, 'Lord Davies, E. H. Carr and the spirit ironic: A comedy of errors', International Relations 16:1 (April 2002), p.80.

[111] Butterfield, The Englishman and His History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944).

[112] Butterfield, Napoleon (London: Duckworth, 1939); The Statecraft of Machiavelli (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1940).

radio, that became Christianity and History, published the next year.[113] Both the lectures and the book were met with popular acclaim, establishing Butterfield as a something of a sage outside Cambridge and the historical community, and resulting in the book's translation into eight languages by the end of the 1950s. In 1949, these reflections on history were complemented by two more traditional works: George III, Lord North and the People – an offshoot of his continuing work on Fox – and The Origins of Modern Science.[114]

Having failed to gain the Woodrow Wilson Chair in 1936, Butterfield remained a Fellow of Peterhouse. In 1944, he was elevated to a Chair in European History – much to the dismay of E. H. Carr, the beneficiary of Butterfield's early failure in Aberystwyth, who coveted the position and had lobbied G. M. Trevelyan in an attempt to secure it.[115] Butterfield quickly established himself as a figure of considerable influence and power within the Cambridge History Faculty. His administrative skills and adroit handling of the byzantine politics of the University contributed to his election, in 1955, to the Mastership of Peterhouse, a position which he held until 1968. This was followed, four years later, by his appointment as Vice-Chancellor of the University (1959-1961). In 1963, Butterfield was made Regius Professor of Modern History. His reputation within Cambridge was such that Noël Annan, himself an accomplished academic politician and administrator, referred to Butterfield in correspondence as 'the dominant force [in the University] in the whole post-war period', ranking him higher than F. R. Leavis in terms of his impact upon the humanities.[116] This influence, however, came, in Butterfield's eyes, at a cost. Having

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[113] Butterfield, Christianity and History.

[114] On Fox and George III, Lord North and the People 1779-80 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1949) see Butterfield to Trevelyan, 7th of July, 1948, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/T131. See also Butterfield, The Origins of the Modern Science 1500-1800 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1949).

[115] Haslam, Vices of Integrity, p. 111.

[116] Annan to Butterfield, 20th of October, [no year - 1960s?] Butterfield MSS 531(i)/A43.

retired from both the Mastership of Peterhouse and the Regius Chair two years early, he noted, in a letter to Harold Temperley's son, Neville, that 'the "business" life has been too distracting and I want to concentrate on writing, of which I have done precious little...for twenty years'.[117]

Compared to his literary avalanche of the late 1940s, Butterfield's output in the 1950s and 1960s was indeed poor. The majority of his publications were collections of lectures, including Christianity, Diplomacy and War (1953) and International Conflict in the Twentieth Century (1960); the exception being George III and the Historians (1957).[118] The range of his work, however, was remarkable. Butterfield continued to write and lecture on the history of science, historiography, eighteenth century political history, Christianity and history, Acton and Fox. In Man on His Past, his Wiles lectures, delivered at Queen's University, Belfast in November 1954, drew many of these strands together into his finest book of the period.[119] During the 1960s, however, Butterfield was increasingly distracted by another concern: international politics. In 1958, in response to eighteenth months' lobbying from Kenneth Thompson of the Rockefeller Foundation, Butterfield created a committee for the discussion of this topic. Initially, it seems he had not be overly enthusiastic about the project, concerned that he was too involved in administrative commitments as Master of Peterhouse, and sceptical that the right people could be found to join to such a body. His doubts partially allayed by Thompson and Wight, Butterfield's Committee met from 1959 onwards. Its first fruit was Diplomatic Investigations (1966), a volume of essays jointly edited by Butterfield and Wight.

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[117] Butterfield to Neville Temperley, 4th of May, 1968, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/T48.

[118] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War (London: Epworth, 1953); International Conflict in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960); George III and the Historians (London: Collins, 1957).

[119] Butterfield, Man on His Past: The Study of the History of Historical Scholarship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955).

Butterfield himself contributed two of the chapters, as well as contributing to the brief preface co-written with Wight.[120]

These essays, however, amounted only publications that arose from his contributions to the Committee, though he continued to attend its meetings well into the 1970s, and to write elsewhere on aspects of international relations. At a conference at the Villa Serbelloni in Bellagio, in April 1968, for instance, Butterfield delivered a paper exploring the uses to which social scientific methods might be put in the study of international relations.[121] At Gregynog, a year later, he examined what he called the 'moral framework' of international relations, again making reference to recent American scholarship, especially Morton Kaplan's Systems and Processes in International Politics.[122] By this time, however, Butterfield's published output had slowed, and he was unable, as his health declined during the 1970s, to complete the substantial works he intended. To judge by his papers, these included not only a biography of Harold Temperley, but also a major work on the history of historiography, published posthumously as The Origins of History (1981). Butterfield died in Sawston, near Cambridge, on the 20th of July, 1979.

The youngest of the three men considered here, Martin Wight was born on the 26th of November, 1913, the second son of a Brighton doctor, Edward Wight. He attended

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[120] Butterfield, 'The Balance of Power' & 'The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy' in Butterfield & Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory on International Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). According to Dunne, the preface was drafted by Wight, but seems to have been amended by Butterfield (Inventing International Society, p. 105). It was originally intended that Butterfield edit the book alone, but his inaction prompted Wight to assume greater control of the project. See Bull to Wight, 31 January 1964, Wight MSS 233 1/9.

[121] Butterfield, untitled paper given at Villa Serbelloni, April 1968, Butterfield MSS 109/2.

[122] Butterfield, 'The moral framework of international relations', Butterfield MSS 110, p. 5.

Bradfield College in Berkshire, and went up to Hertford College, Oxford, in 1931 to read Modern History. One of the smaller and less fashionable colleges in the University, Hertford nevertheless had two History Fellows of distinction: T. S. R. Boase (1898-1974), later of the Courtauld Institute and President of Magdalen, and C. R. M. F. Cruttwell (1887-1941), Principal of Hertford between 1930 and 1940. Boase was a medievalist and art historian, who during Wight's time at Hertford published a biography of Pope Boniface VIII, and later contributed two volumes to the Oxford History of Art series.[123] Cruttwell's area of interest, on the other hand, was rather different. His two major published works were A History of the Great War (1934) and a volume produced under the auspices of Chatham House, A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World (1937).[124] A failed Conservative candidate for Oxford University in 1935, former soldier and military intelligence officer, Cruttwell was one of the leading university administrators of the inter-war period.[125] Reputed to be a good teacher, Cruttwell's personality - said to be forceful - was not to all undergraduates' liking. Indeed, one student, Evelyn Waugh, 'waged unremitting literary war' on Cruttwell in revenge for his treatment at his erstwhile tutor's hands, naming a series of 'shady or absurd' characters after him.[126] Wight, for his part, seems to have felt more affection for the man, almost writing to remonstrate with Waugh after reading one such slur in the Sunday Times.[127]

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[123] T. S. R. Boase, Boniface VIII (London: Constable, 1933); English Art 1100-1216 (London: Clarendon, 1953); English Art 1800-1870 (London: Clarendon, 1959).

[124] C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Clarendon, 1934); A History of Peaceful Change in the Modern World (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

[125] Anon., 'Cruttwell, Charles Robert Mowbray Fraser (1887-1941), in L. G. Wickham Legg (ed.) Dictionary of National Biography 1941-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 190-191.

[126] V. Cunningham, 'Literary Culture', in B. Harrison (ed.), The History of the University of Oxford vol. VIII (Oxford : Clarendon, 1994), p. 446.

[127] Wight to Pitt, 29 July 1964, Wight MSS 233 7/9.

At Oxford, Wight seems to have become involved with the cause of the League of Nations, becoming, according to Hedley Bull, a 'passionate supporter'.[128] He remained so throughout university; the turning point coming with the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-6, which, as it did for many others, convinced Wight of the League's impotence.[129] Unlike E. H. Carr, who turned from the League to a policy of economic appeasement, Wight instead embraced pacifism, coming under the influence of the charismatic founder of the Peace Pledge Union (PPU), the Reverend Dick Sheppard.[130] An article, published in 1936 in the journal Theology, outlines the reasons for Wight's acceptance of pacifism.[131] His commitment to this cause was intense, as the article illustrated, and Wight played a significant part in its promulgation – he managed, during that year, the movement's famous bookshop on Ludgate Hill.[132] In the winter of 1936, Wight encountered the first three volumes of Toynbee's Study and fell under its influence. This intellectual fascination was swiftly followed, in the spring of 1937, with a meeting with the book's author. For about a year and a half, Wight worked alongside Toynbee at Chatham House, and the two men became friends. [133] At the Institute he contributed to a number of

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[128] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 3.

[129] On Carr's conversion from advocate of the League to its opponent in the wake of the Abyssinian crisis, see his correspondence with Gilbert Murray, especially Carr to Murray, 8th of December, 1936, fol. 142-145, file 227, Murray MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

[130] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 3. Ceadel notes that: 'The Abyssinian affair enabled pacifism to discover a distinct and confident voice because its circumstances were so clear cut: collective security meant war; pacifism meant peace' (Pacifism in Britian, 1914-1945: The Defining of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), p. 191).

[131] Wight, 'Christian Pacifism', Theology 33:193 (July 1936), pp. 12-21.

[132] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 3.

[133] Bull (Ibid.) dates Wight's employment at Chatham House from 1936 to 1938. Wight's correspondence with Toynbee (Wight to Toynbee, 13 October, 1954, Toynbee MSS 86), however, states that Wight joined Chatham House in the spring of 1937.

projects, among them a survey of British imperial policy and an unpublished study of 'Ocean routes: bases and ports' now deposited in the Chatham House archives.[134]

In 1938, having explored, to no avail, the prospects of a position at the LSE,[135] Wight left the Institute to take up a post as a master at Haileybury, the former Imperial Service college. There he taught history, to some effect, it would seem: two of his pupils, Harry Pitt and Denis Mack-Smith, later became prominent academic historians.[136] Wight's position at Haileybury, however, was eventually made untenable by the outbreak of war. On the 11th of May 1940, he applied to be officially recognised as a conscientious objector, justifying his stand on the grounds outlined four years previously in his article on 'Christian Pacifism'. In his application, reprinted in part by Bull, he condemned the war as a 'divine judgment on European civilization for corporate sin', and advocated a return to the methods of 'Calvary and the catacombs' to defeat the Nazis.[137] Wight's reasoning did not convince the authorities. His application was unsuccessful, and this brought the threat of imprisonment. He was 'rescued' by Margary Perham, Fellow of St Hugh's, and Oxford's Reader of Colonial Administration, who offered him a job on a major project examining colonial constitutions.[138] Wight's tenure of this research position,

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[134] See H. V. Hodson (ed.), The British Empire: A Report on its Structure and Problems (London: RIIA & Oxford University Press, 1937). I am grateful to Mrs Mary Bone, Librarian at the RIIA, for the information regarding Wight's work on 'Ocean routes'. Hedley Bull, in 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', states that during this period, Wight also worked on the Surveys, and contributed to Toynbee's Study. No firm evidence is given for this. It is more likely that Wight's involvement with both projects was confined to his second term at Chatham House (1946-49).

[135] Laski to Wight, 26 December 1938, Wight MSS 233 3/9.

[136] Pitt (1923-2000) spent most of his career as a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford. Mack-Smith (1920-) is renowned historian of modern Italy and a Fellow of All Souls.

[137] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 4. An abstract from his application is included in Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 65, note 23.

[138] Bull to Butterfield, 19th of March, 1976, Butterfield MSS 531(i)/ B191.

at Nuffield College from 1941 until early 1946, resulted in no less than three volumes: The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945 (1946), The Gold Coast Legislative Council (1947) and a collection of British Colonial Constitutions (1952), which includes a substantial introduction from Wight.[139]

In 1946, Wight went back to Chatham House where he composed perhaps his best known work, Power Politics.[140] This pamphlet, slight though it was, drew the attention of many, not least the émigré journalist Sebastien Haffner, who suggested to his editor, David Astor, that Wight be employed as a special correspondent for the Observer to cover the inaugural sessions of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1946-47.[141] Astor – who was already aware of his wartime work on African colonial constitutions – agreed. Wight's contributions to the Observer from the UN further enhanced his reputation: so much so indeed, that his return from the United States, Astor offered Wight 'his own editorial chair as an inducement to tempt him away from academe'.[142] Wight, however, refused, and returned to Chatham House,[143] though he did not break his links with Astor or with the Observer. He continued to review for the paper until the late 1960s, and in 1951 contributed to Attitude to Africa (1951),[144] 'the manifesto of the liberal Africanist in England in general but also for the Observer in particular'.[145] The

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[139] Wight, The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945 vol. I (London: Faber & Faber, 1946); The Gold Coast Legislative Council (London: Faber & Faber, 1947); British Colonial Constitutions (London: Clarendon, 1952).

[140] Wight, Power Politics Looking Forward Pamphlet no. 8 (London: RIIA, 1946)

[141] Richard Cockett, David Astor and the Observer (London: André Deutsch, 1991), p. 148.

[142] Ibid., p. 185.

[143] The Times announced his appointment, to the Survey department, on the 28 of February, 1947 (Wight MSS 20).

[144] W. Arthur Lewis, Michael Scott, Colin Legum & Martin Wight, Attitude to Africa (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951).

[145] Cockett, David Astor and the Observer, p. 187.

book appealed to the British government both to recognise the growing tide of African nationalism and to pursue educational, economic and social reform in the colonies as precursors to decolonisation.

Wight's work was also much valued by Toynbee, who had returned from war service to his position as Director of Studies at Chatham House. By March 1947, Toynbee had come to regard Wight as a possible successor, raising the issue with Ivison Macadam of promoting him to Deputy Director at Chatham House with overall responsibility for the Survey.[146] This did not come to pass, but for the next three years Wight continued to work in close co-operation with Toynbee. He produced, during this time, four substantial essays for the Survey for March 1939,[147] as well as a number of lesser contributions to Toynbee's Study, incorporated, in notes and appendices, in volume VII of Toynbee's *magnum opus*.[148] In these scattered notes, Wight showed his theological disagreements with Toynbee – differences that made him revise his appraisal of his Study – and outlined the basic tenets of his faith and its relation to the wider world. These ideas, however, found their most coherent expression in an article entitled 'The Church, Russia and the West' which Wight wrote for the Ecumenical Review (1948).[149]

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[146] Toynbee to Macadam, 31st of March, 1947, RIIA MSS, 4/TOYN/42. Toynbee wrote: 'If Martin Wight turns out as well as we all expect him to do, I think the most effective and economical step would be to promote him rather rapidly to the post of Deputy Director [then held by Veronica Toynbee], and put on him the responsibility of actually getting the work [i.e. the Survey] done'.

[147] Wight, 'Spain and Portugal', 'Switzerland, The Low Countries, and Scandinavia', 'Eastern Europe', 'Germany' & 'The Balance of Power' in A. J. Toynbee & F. T. Ashton-Gwatkin (eds.) Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946: The World in March 1939 (London: OUP & RIIA, 1952), pp.138-150, pp. 151-165, pp. 206-292, pp. 293-365 & pp. 508-532.

[148] These are discussed further, and given full citation, in later chapters.

[149] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', A Ecumenical Review: a Quarterly, 1:1 (Autumn 1948), pp. 25-45.

In 1949, Wight was appointed to a Readership in the Department of International Relations at the LSE.[150] He swiftly established a reputation as an inspirational teacher, albeit one whose approach placed him outside the intellectual mainstream in the department. Indeed, Bull later noted that:

> Intellectually, [Wight's]...commitment to history, and more especially to the search for pattern and design in the grand sweep of universal history, tended to isolate him in a department which was concerned, however tentatively, with the development of International Relations as a social science.[151]

Despite his move to the LSE, Wight's close intellectual and personal association with Toynbee and Chatham House continued; he was a member of the Institute's council from 1952 until 1972, and was asked, in 1954, to edit a *Festschrift* to mark Toynbee's 70th birthday in 1959.[152] The project, like many of his other literary efforts, never came to fruition. A year later it was muted – by Alan Bullock – that Wight succeed Toynbee in the Stevenson chair.[153] Preferring teaching to administration, he declined to put forward his name.[154]

Throughout his time at the LSE, from 1949 to 1961, Wight's publications were, in comparison with those of his wartime work at Oxford and employment at Chatham

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[150] Butterfield seems to have played in part in securing Wight's position. See Manning to Butterfield, 4th of January, 1977, Butterfield MSS 531(ii)/M42. Manning writes of the 'recompense' he feels he owes Butterfield for 'the service you did me, and the school, in helping me to get Martin his Readership'. He continues: 'how well I recall our little conference in the corridor that day'.

[151] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 6.

[152] Wight to Kyle, 26 July 1954, RIIA MSS 4/TOYN/18. This letter details Wight's misgivings as to the desirability of the idea, and speculates on possible contributors.

[153] Bullock to Wight, 9 July 1955, Wight MSS 233 1/9.

House, reduced to little more than a trickle. That which was published, however, reveals to some extent the intellectual concerns of the period. Until 1957, according to Bull, Wight's primary role in the department was the teaching of a course in 'International Institutions'.[155] This work, which, in Bull's view, 'did not greatly interest him', did, however, come to fruition both in publications and in his later work on international theory. 'The Power Struggle within the United Nations' (1956), for instance, outlined Wight's considered, if sceptical, judgements on the efficacy and desirability of that institution.[156] Another paper of this period, presented at a seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in 1958 and published posthumously in 1978, entitled 'Is the Commonwealth a Non-Hobbesian Institution?', testifies to his continued interest in the normative foundations of both Empire and Commonwealth.[157] Wight's reviews - which he wrote for The Observer and International Affairs - and his radio talks on the BBC show broader concerns. Historiography and the philosophy of history were prominent interests, with Wight reviewing works by Sir Keith Hancock, Reinhold Niebuhr, Herbert Butterfield, R. G. Collingwood and Christopher Dawson, as well as a number of others.[158] Wight's own reflections on the subject were captured in his 'What Makes a Good Historian?', a lecture broadcast on the BBC in early 1955.[159] A review of Eric Voegelin's The New Science of Politics, published in July of the same year, reveals a familiarity with

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[154] Wight to Bullock, 17 July 1955, Wight MSS 233 1/9.

[155] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 6.

[156] Wight, 'The Power Struggle within the United Nations', Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs, 33rd session, 1956, pp. 247-259.

[157] Wight, 'Is the Commonwealth a Non-Hobbesian Institution?', Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics vol. XVI, no. 2 (July 1978), pp. 119-135.

[158] These are listed in the bibliography.

[159] Wight, 'What Makes a Good Historian?', The Listener 53:1355, 17 February 1955, pp. 283-284.

the work of Walter Lippmann, Nicholas Berdyaev, Arthur Koestler, Albert Camus, Leo Strauss, and Michael Oakeshott – the latter a colleague at the LSE.[160]

Throughout this period, Chatham House continued to urge Wight to complete a revised and expanded edition of Power Politics, and it is clear from the correspondence that he did make some attempts to do so.[161] The attention that the pamphlet generated, however, created other opportunities. He was asked repeatedly by Hans Morgenthau to spend time as a visiting scholar at Chicago,[162] finally accepting a post intended to cover the latter's absence in the academic year of 1956-57. Once there Wight took up the challenge of writing a series of lectures on international theory to replace those on diplomacy usually given by Morgenthau.[163] These evolved, during the course of the year, into the now famous lectures delivered at the LSE between 1957 and 1960, later reconstructed and published as International Theory: The Three Traditions (1991), a text central to the revived 'English school' in IR.[164] (It is something of an irony that these lectures began life in America.) At Chicago, the lectures were as well appreciated as at

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[160] Wight, review of E. Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction, International Affairs, 31:3 (July 1955), pp. 336-337.

[161] Cleeve to Wight, 29th of September, 1954, RIIA MSS 4/TOYN/18; Cleeve to Wight, 25th of March, 1955, RIIA MSS, 4/TOYN/18. In the latter, the Institute's Research Secretary Margaret Cleeve wrote: 'may we hope for the revised edition of POWER POLITICS by the end of the present vacation? We really should be able to say something definite to enquirers'.

[162] See, for example, the 'standing invitation' offered in Morgenthau to Wight, 14 January 1952, and also Morgenthau to Wight, 20 January 1954, Wight MSS 233 2/9.

[163] Wight to Morgenthau, undated draft (January 1956), Wight MSS 103.

[164] Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions ed. Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter (Leicester & London: RIIA & Leicester University Press, 1991). On the book's importance for the 'English school', see Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. xiii.

the LSE, earning Wight the offer of a full chair in May 1957.[165] This offer was rejected, as was, at about the same time, a chair at the Australian National University.[166]

In 1958, Wight was invited by Herbert Butterfield to join his Rockefeller funded committee on the theory of international politics. This seems to have been a delicate matter for both Butterfield and Wight, as more senior members of the department at the LSE, including Charles Manning, who held the prestigious Montague Burton Chair, were not extended the same offer. Indeed, Wight's involvement with the committee, according to Desmond Williams, who was Butterfield's first choice for membership, 'exposed [him] to the pressures of other people (much less admirable than him) who living in London resent some of our activities'.[167] To Diplomatic Investigations (1966), the volume of British Committee essays he edited with Butterfield, Wight contributed no less than three chapters. 'Why is there no International Theory?' opened the volume, though it had previously been published in the journal International Relations in 1960; the other two were 'Western Values in International Relations', and 'The Balance of Power'.[168]

In 1961, Wight left the LSE to take up a Chair of History at the newly created University of Sussex. Still unconvinced as to the academic merits of IR, he sought thereby to avoid what he saw as a looming succession crisis with Manning's imminent retirement, fearing his own elevation to the chair would lumber him with too many administrative

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[165] Wight to Grodzins, 27 May 1957, Wight MSS 103.

[166] The negotiations over the latter position, which went on during Wight's time at Chicago, are detailed in Wight MSS 32.

[167] Williams to Butterfield, 4th of July, 1960, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W310.

[168] 'Why is there no International Theory?', 'Western Values in International Relations' & 'The Balance of Power' in Butterfield & Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, pp. 17-34, pp. 89-131 & pp. 149-175.

responsibilities.[169] As Professor of History and Dean of the School of European Studies at Sussex, however, Wight could devote himself to the development of the university's curriculum and to teaching. The School itself was arguably the centrepiece of the new university; as Asa Briggs noted, 'from the start, the idea of a School of European Studies had loomed in the minds of the sponsors' of the project.[170] In part, the courses to be taught were modelled on a proposal for 'European Greats' that had been rejected by Oxford in 1947.[171] This had sought, in the manner of classical Greats, to unite within one syllabus the study of history and philosophy with that of literature and language. At Sussex, the idea was revived and extended, and as a consequence, caused much concern amongst those at Oxford who had regretted its rejection twenty-odd years earlier.[172] History, philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, geography and international relations, as well as modern languages, could all be studied within the framework of the School of European Studies. The aim was both to illustrate the 'unity of European history' and to 'combine historical and contemporary interest'.[173] The common thread was intellectual history.

The philosophy behind the curriculum at Sussex that Wight helped to construct was outlined in two pieces published in the 1960s: 'The Place of Classics in a New

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[169] Wight to Fulton, 8 December 1960, Wight MSS 7/9.

[170] A. Briggs, 'Drawing a New Map of Learning', in D. Daiches (ed.), The Idea of a New University: The Experiment in Sussex (London: André Deutsch, 1964), p. 61.

[171] Wight, 'The Place of Classics in a New University', Didaskalos: The Journal of the Joint Association of Classical Teachers, 1:1 (1963), p. 28. See also J. Harris, 'The Arts and Social Sciences 1939-1970', in Harrison (ed.), History of the University of Oxford VIII, pp. 226-227.

[172] Harris, 'The Arts and Social Sciences 1939-1970', p. 227. Rumours of bright students favouring the chance of studying under Asa Briggs at Sussex rather than an out-moded Modern History or PPE course at Oxford 'caused widespread alarm' in the early to mid-1960s, according to Harris.

[173] Wight, 'European Studies', in Daiches, Idea of a New University, p. 110.

University' (1963) and 'European Studies' (1964).[174] Wight published little else in the remaining years of his life. The final two pieces of work that he himself wished to make public were an essay, again in International Relations, on 'International Legitimacy' (1972), and a chapter in the *Festschrift* for Charles Manning, 'The Balance of Power and International Order' (1973).[175] Two posthumous volumes have since appeared: Systems of States and International Theory, as well as a revised and expanded version of Power Politics, a work on which he had continued to work throughout the 1960s.[176] That he did not complete it was as much a function of his perfectionism than of his early death, which occurred suddenly on the 15th of July, 1972.

Conclusion

The work of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight generated both interest and controversy during their lifetimes, and the debate over their intellectual legacies has not yet abated. All three have been the subject of fierce criticism and considerable praise. In the next chapter, their reputations will be examined, with special consideration for the treatments that their thought has received in International Relations. Of concern too is the broader context of the modes of intellectual history in the field, the approaches that are adopted and shaped the collective memory of IR. These are explored with a view to outlining the approach to be taken in what follows. The remaining sections of the thesis explore the foundations of each man's thought, in 'Religion' and 'History', their diagnosis posed by the challenge of international crisis, and the responses they proposed. It is

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[174] Wight, 'The Place of Classics in a New University', p. 29; 'European Studies', p. 106.

[175] Wight 'International Legitimacy', reprinted in Systems of States, pp. 153-173; 'The Balance of Power and International Order', in A. James (ed.), The Bases of International Order: Essays in honour of C. A. W. Manning (London: OUP, 1973), pp. 85-115.

[176] Wight, Power Politics ed. Hedley Bull & Carsten Holbraad (Leicester and London: RIIA & Leicester University Press, 1995 [1978]).

argued throughout that the work of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight should not be considered in anaerobic isolation, in terms of abstract theories. They were affected by the events of their times, by the crisis of international politics that beset the twentieth century, and their thought reflects those profound anxieties.

II. Reputations: Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight in the Intellectual History of International Relations

> ...international theory in its earliest coinage was decidedly two-faced about dialogue. Like Janus, international theory guarded with deserved (yet ultimately damaging) prestige the portals of International Relations by a forward / backward gaze, admitting only the history that confirmed its own powers of narration...[1]

Though comprehensive histories of international thought are few and far between,[2] fragments of intellectual history may be found scattered throughout a much wider range of work in the field. References to the Greek historian Thucydides, to St. Augustine, to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Grotius abound in IR theory, as do compressed – and sometimes also confused – accounts of the development of international thought. Even those who have offered reductionist, scientific approaches to the subject have sought to bolster their arguments with citations of historical 'authorities' or snippets of 'disciplinary' history. The work of the American political economist Robert Gilpin is a case in point, with expositions of a theoretical approach grounded in rational choice theory littered with appeals to Thucydides and many others.[3] Indeed, the extent to which IR theorists have concerned themselves with citing past thinkers and constructing

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[1] James Der Derian, 'Introduction: Critical Investigations', in his edited International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York: New York University Press, 1995), p. 4.

[2] For two such offerings, see F. Melian Stawell, The Growth of International Thought (London: Butterworth, 1929); Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (New York: SUNY Press, 1998).

[3] See his War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) and especially 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 301-321.

accounts of past thought is something of a curiosity, not least in a subject where so much theory is claimed to have a validity that transcends time and place.

Why there should be such a concern with the intellectual history of the 'discipline' is not, however, the subject of this chapter – though pure rhetorical artifice and basic professional insecurity may both be seen to have played their parts. The concern here is rather with the forms of intellectual history that have been prevalent in IR. In the next section, an outline of these various modes in which past international thought have been presented is sketched, as well as the approaches to the history of ideas that inform them. The reputations of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight and their places within the differing intellectual histories in IR are then examined, with a view to establishing how their thought has hitherto been understood. In the last, concluding section, a critique is offered of the predominant contemporary approaches to the history of ideas, and an account of the manner in which this thesis will proceed.

Intellectual History and International Relations

Many mid-twentieth century scholars in the field were deeply vexed by the apparent dearth of 'international theory' in the intellectual history of the West. 'Until very recently', wrote Han Morgenthau in 1970, 'no explicit theory of international relations has existed; nobody even considered the possibility of writing a theory of international relations'.[4] Commenting approvingly on Wight's essay 'Why is there no International Theory?', he observed that, in stark contrast to that of domestic politics, the international realm had not attracted any sustained examination until after the First World War.

[4] Hans Morgenthau, 'The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory', in Der Derian (ed.), International Theory, p. 41.

Various factors, argued Morgenthau, had stifled its emergence. The eighteenth century, he considered, had suffered from a 'philosophic outlook' that considered international relations a mere 'fact of nature', while the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were beset by a 'reformist' inclination that pursued institutional change rather than 'objective, systematic' examination of the international system. Most problematic of all was what he called that 'contingent element in politics that obviates the possibility of theoretical understanding' which had throughout history frustrated attempts at theoretical development.[5] For Morgenthau, the construction of a theory of international relations was thus difficult, and possibly futile. Such doubts as the quantity and quality of pre- and post-First World War international theory, however, were less manifest in the latter quarter of the twentieth century.[6] Indeed, while it may be premature to proclaim the 'dawn of a historiographical turn' in IR,[7] interest in the intellectual history of IR in general, and theory in particular, has grown considerably during these years, and continues to do so. The accounts that have emerged vary, as one might expect, in style, method and content, reflecting wider debates in the study of the history of ideas.

By far the most common – and long-lived – version of the history of international thought portrays a perpetual clash of two 'traditions': 'realism' and 'idealism'. The earliest versions of this historical story date from the inter-war years, and were given voice by thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic and of greatly differing perspectives. The neo-orthodox theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the liberal anti-war activist David Davies, and

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[5] Ibid., pp. 41-43.

[6] Nor, it should be noted in passing, did they prevented Morgenthau himself from co-editing a reader with on eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century international thought. See Han J. Morgenthau & Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), Principles and Problems of International Politics: Selected Readings (New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 1950).

[7] Duncan Bell, 'International Relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn?', British Journal of Politics and International Relations 3:1 (April 2001), pp. 115-126.

socialist historian E. H. Carr, for instance, all offered accounts of the intellectual history of IR that employed the notion of the recurrent conflict of 'realism' and 'idealism'. There were, of course, differences in tone and content: Niebuhr's contrast was between individual 'idealism' and collective 'realism'; Davies' between serene progressive 'idealists' and avaricious conservative 'realists'.[8] It was Carr's account, however, which was to be the most influential in the post-war period.[9] 'The science of international politics', he wrote, came 'into being in response to popular demand' at the end of the Great War, and sought 'to obviate a recurrence of this disease of the international body politic'. 'Wishing' had prevailed over 'thinking'; 'generalisation' over 'observation'.[10] Inevitably, Carr argued, this 'utopianism' was overtaken by 'realism'. The latter had exposed the self-interested nature of 'utopian' premises, revealed the 'relative and pragmatic nature of thought itself', and imposed a more empirical temper upon the 'science' of international politics.[11]

Post-war scholars have been keen to depict not only the inter-war period, but also the wider intellectual history of the subject in terms of a conflict of 'realists' and 'idealists'. Such accounts may be found both in popular textbooks and in other prominent

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[8] Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics (New York: Scribner's, 1952 [1932]), pp. 1-22; David Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships new edition (London: Ernest Been, 1934 [1930]), pp. 119-124.

[9] As Ken Booth has noted, Carr's story has been 'simplified, twisted, and became a myth' ('75 Years on: rewriting the subject's past - reinventing its future', in S. Smith, K. Booth and M. Zalewski (eds.) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 329. A representative 'traditional' account presenting the development of IR in these terms can be found in Hedley Bull's essay 'The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969', in Brian Porter (ed.), The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 30-55.

[10] Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, 1st ed., p. 4 & p. 11.

[11] Ibid., p. 87.

works: Groom and Olsens' edited International Relations Then and Now, for instance, or Kissinger's Diplomacy.[12] In other cases, however, Carr's story of the development of inter-war thought has been overlain with other interpretative frameworks. Some have sought – echoing the work of the historian of science Thomas Kuhn[13] – to portray the intellectual history of IR in terms of 'paradigms', whether in the conventional or the Kuhnian sense of the word.[14] Kalevi Holsti's seminal The Dividing Discipline (1985) offered perhaps the best example of this mode.[15] The 'discipline', he argued, moves progressively (in both senses of the word) through a series of dominant 'paradigms' that shape the ends and means of research and are accepted by general consensus: from 'idealism' to 'realism', 'behaviouralism', and 'globalism'. In Holsti's book, however, this 'paradigmatic' framework is overlain with the neo-Marxist – or, more properly, Gramscian – notion of ideational 'hegemony'.

In his employment of Marxian concepts, Holsti was not alone. E. H. Carr, for instance, drew upon Karl Mannheim's 'sociology of knowledge', another variant of neo-Marxist thought, in his Twenty Years' Crisis.[16] The employment of Gramsci's ideas,

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[12] Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). For a textbook version of the extended 'realist'-'idealist' interpretation, in both senses, see William R. Olson & A. J. R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation (London: HarperCollins, 1991), especially pp. 42-43.

[13] See especially Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996 [1962]).

[14] Kuhn discusses the differences between his notion of a 'paradigm' and common-place usage in Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 23-34.

[15] K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).

[16] On Mannheim and Carr, see Jones, E. H. Carr and International Relations, pp. 121-143. Where Carr departed from Mannheim was on the latter's notion of a free-floating intelligensia capable of transcending historical location and material interest in an effort to understand the true realities of society. In Carr's view, such an élite was undesirable, and would suffer from

however, is more prevalent in contemporary IR. The stronger version of the Gramscian argument links methodological 'hegemonies' with the political strength of the United States. This account finds its most articulate exponent in Robert Cox, whose 'Social forces, states and world orders' (1981) develops a critique of what he called 'problem-solving theory': the form of intellectual enquiry that dominates American IR and that helps to sustain America's international pre-eminence. Accepting the 'prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized', 'problem-solving theory', Cox argued, seeks simply to remedy difficulties which hamper the smooth working of an system in which the United States remains the primary material beneficiary.[17] Weaker versions of this thesis are popular on both sides of the Atlantic; Steve Smith's account of the development of IR, for instance, had strong affinities with that of Cox. For Smith, the 'values' expressed in international thought reflect the structural problems faced by the dominant states in the international system. 'Realism', therefore, offered the instruments to manage America's sudden rise to power in the post-war period'; 'neorealism', the threats it faced in the 1970s.[18]

Alongside the 'realist-idealist', 'paradigmatic' and neo-Marxian approaches sit a number of others. The first is a more sophisticated model of competing traditions. In the work of Wight and Boucher at least three – and in the case of Wight possibly even six or seven – different traditions may be identified in international thought, waxing and waning

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their 'detachment from the masses whose attitude is the determining factor in political life' (Twenty Years' Crisis, 1st ed., p. 21).

[17] Robert Cox, 'Social forces, states and world orders', in Robert Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 88.

[18] Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science', Millennium 16:2 (1987), pp. 198-199. This article, like Holsti's Dividing Discipline, displays a blend of 'paradigmatic' and 'hegemonic' approaches.

throughout the modern period.[19] Donelan has described five such traditions; Nardin and Mapel's edited volume on international ethics identified twelve.[20] These characterisations of the history of international thought are primarily pedagogic in intent: the aim is not so much to describe its historical development as to introduce readers to a variety of intellectual positions. In the introduction to his lectures on the subject, for instance, Wight states that his traditions are an 'experiment in classification, in typology'.[21] In his case, they are, in part at least, what Schmidt has called 'analytical' traditions, *ex post facto* constructions for the purposes of conveying to readers and students the salient features of past international thought.[22] But Wight also made a stronger claim, and asserted that he sought to explore 'continuity and recurrence' and to engage in a 'study in the uniformity of political thought'.[23] In the second half of International Theory, he sought to demonstrate a historical 'trilectic' between his traditions of 'realism', 'rationalism' and 'revolutionism'. Boucher too suggests that portrays both 'ideal characterizations' - no one thinker having fully articulated one or other - and 'dialectically related' patterns of thought.[24] In both cases, the pedagogic categories shade into historical traditions.

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[19] Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions ed. Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter (London: RIIA & Leicester UP, 1996 [1991]); David Boucher, Political Theories in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

[20] Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990); Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel (eds.) Traditions of International Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[21] Wight, International Theory, p. 5.

[22] Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 24-25. For other critical perspectives, see also Jens Bartelson, 'Short circuits: society and tradition in international relations theory', Review of International Studies 22:4 (October 1996), p. 345; N. J. Rengger, 'Discovering Traditions? Grotius, International Society and International Relations', The Oxford International Review 3:1 (1991), pp. 47-50.

[23] Wight, International Theory, p. 5.

[24] David Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 40.

In the past decade, three approaches have challenged the 'traditional', 'paradigmatic' and 'hegemonic' accounts. The first is derived from the work of the Cambridge history of ideas school and the work of Quentin Skinner in particular.[25] Taking his cue from R. G. Collingwood's expositions on the philosophy of history, and employing tools derived from analytical philosophy, these scholars have urged the examination of context in seeking to reconstruct the meaning of historical texts. For Skinner, a writer's intention can be decoded through the 'delineation [of] the whole range of communications which could have been conventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given utterance' of that writer.[26] Attention is thus directed to the linguistic and rhetorical context within which a scholar worked to cast light upon the ideas that he or she sought to convey. Over the past five or so years, Skinnerian ideas have gained considerably more currency in IR, and his version of 'contextualism' has attracted a number of adherents, Alastair Murray, Nicholas Onuf, Jonathan Haslam and Richard Tuck among them.[27] For these scholars, there is a sense that IR is in great need of a 'contextual' revolution. Bell, for instance, has chided IR for being 'blissfully unaware'

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[25] For Skinner, see especially The Foundations of Modern Political Thought vols. I & II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and J. Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 1988). The other leading member of this 'school' is J. G. A. Pocock. See his Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989 [1960]).

[26] Quentin Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding in the history of ideas', in Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, pp. 63-64.

[27] A. J. H. Murray, Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997); Nicolas Greenwood Onuf, The Republican Legacy in International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue like Necessity: Realist Thought in International Relations since Machiavelli (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). Richard Tuck's The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought

of what he considers the 'vastly superior approach for the recovery of the meaning of texts' that has emerged amongst historians of political thought.[28]

Skinnerian ideas have not, however, met with universal acclaim in IR, and nor have they offered the sole alternatives of 'traditional', 'paradigmatic' or 'hegemonic' approaches to the history of international thought. Proponents of a 'discursive' approach are also to be found, drawing their inspiration from the American historian of political thought, John Gunnell. In a series of essays and books published from the late 1970s onwards,[29] Gunnell attacked students of political thought for presenting 'not so much intellectual history as an epic tale, with heroes and villains, which is designed to lend authority to a diagnosis of the deficiencies of the present'.[30] At the same time, he rejected the 'contextualism' of the Cambridge school, arguing that Skinner *et al.* misrepresented the manner in which texts are read.[31] Like Ranke, Gunnell maintained, Skinner seeks through rigorous application of his analytical techniques and method to extinguish the individual, to transcend his own subjectivity in the pursuit of understanding that of a past author.[32] The alternative Gunnell offers has three main components. The first is a recognition of the account of the ontological position of the interpreter that recognises the cultural and historical 'horizon' of the present, a notion derived from the work of Hans-

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and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) is perhaps the finest example of 'Skinnerian' work in IR.

[28] Bell, 'International Relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn?', p. 116.

[29] J. G. Gunnell, 'The Myth of the Tradition', American Political Science Review 72:1 (March 1978), pp. 122-134; Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1979); 'American Political Science, Liberalism, and the Invention of Political Theory', American Political Science Review 82:1 (March 1988), pp. 71-87.

[30] Gunnell, Political Theory, p. 68.

[31] Ibid., p. 104.

[32] Ibid., p. 110.

Georg Gadamer.[33] The second is an acceptance that such limits both restrict and enable, and that textual meaning is disclosed through an interpreter's encounter with the text rather than being simply reducible to that intended by an author. The last – the defining feature of 'discursive history' – is the identification of the well-defined activities and realms of 'discourse' which frame particular traditions of thought.

In The Political Discourse of Anarchy (1998) one of John Gunnell's former students, Brian Schmidt, sought to apply the 'discursive' approach to the intellectual history of the subject. IR, he asserted, is a field of scholarly activity distinguished by its conversations about the notion of 'anarchy', what he termed 'the enigma of politics in the absence of central authority'.[34] Just as Gunnell's earlier work sought to undermine conventional representations of the history of political thought, Schmidt's book was a self-conscious challenge to 'traditional', 'paradigmatic' and 'contextual' accounts of past international thought. He was keen to show that IR, as a field of academic study, did not emerge as a 'idealistic' response to the slaughter of the First World War, but rather has deeper roots in late nineteenth-century American political science. Both the methodological and the historical aspects of his work have been influential. In another recent exercise in the history of international thought, Inventing International Society (1997), for instance, Tim Dunne has rejected contextualist approaches on the grounds outlined by Schmidt in an earlier article.[35] Instead, he claimed to adopt a 'discursive' model, taking the notion of 'international society' as the central topic of intellectual 'conversation' in the English school. Present too, however, are elements of the 'traditional' approach, derived mainly from Wight, from which he adopted the categories

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[33] This idea is pursued most fully in Gadamer's Truth and Method 2nd ed., trans. Joel Weinscheimer & Donald G. Marshall (London: Sheed & Ward, 1989 [In German, 1960]).

[34] Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy, p. 41.

of 'realism', 'rationalism', and 'revolutionism', and what might be termed a 'soft' contextualism.[36]

Many recent works of intellectual history in IR have also adopted this 'soft' contextualism rather than any specific methodological approach. Knutsen's History of International Relations Theory (1992) falls into this category, as does Kleinschmidt's The Nemesis of Power (2000) and Sheehan's study of the idea of The Balance of Power (1996).[37] In all three, there is an attempt made to show how scholars and practitioners developed theories in response to contemporary events and political or philosophical argument; the contexts being much more broadly conceived than the purely linguistic or rhetorical. Moreover, there is a common and self-conscious desire to challenge the notion, suggested by Morgenthau and Wight amongst others, that international theory can rarely be found before the First World War. Others, notably David Long, Peter Wilson, and Lucian Ashworth have sought to disrupt the deeply entrenched negative view of inter-war thought, and to rehabilitate figures dismissed in the post-war period as 'idealists'.[38] None of their studies, however, have offered any substantive reflection on the forms and

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[35] Dunne, Inventing International Society, pp. 1-2. Schmidt's article is 'The historiography of academic international relations', Review of International Studies 20 (1994), pp. 349-367.

[36] I have criticised Dunne's approach to the history of ideas in 'Still the English Patient? Closures and Inventions in the English School', International Affairs 77:4 (October 2001), p. 934.

[37] Torbjörn Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Harald Kleinschmidt The Nemesis of Power: A History of International Relations Theories (London: Reaktion, 2000); Michael Sheehan The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London: Routledge, 1996).

[38] David Long & Peter Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the *Twenty Years' Crisis*: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994); David Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Relations Theory of J. A. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the First 'Great Debate'', Review of International Studies 24

methods of the history of ideas. Indeed, in their quasi-biographical approach they have tended to resemble earlier works, most notably Thompson's Masters of International Thought (1980).[39] Like Thompson also, and, to a lesser extent, disciples such as Michael Smith, they have continued to categorise historical theorists as 'realists' or 'idealists' rather than use the terms employed by those thinkers themselves.[40]

More methodologically self-conscious are post-structuralist writers in the field. Costas Constantinou's On the Way to Diplomacy (1996), for example, draws explicitly upon Michel Foucault's 'archaeological' approach to the history of ideas, and seeks to retrieve 'concealed and forgotten meanings' in Western diplomatic thought.[41] James Der Derian, on the other hand, has drawn upon another aspect of the Frenchman's work, and has provided a 'genealogical' examinations of diplomacy and international theory.[42] In both cases, the authors have moved beyond the investigation of scholarly or political texts to explore the embedded theory that lies within other cultural artifacts. In so doing, Der Derian, like R. B. J. Walker, has been keen to deconstruct the category of 'realism', suggesting not only that it is the dominant rhetorical mode of the late modern period, but

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(Special Issue: December 1998), pp. 1-16; Lucian M. Ashworth, Creating International Studies: Angell, Mitrany and the Liberal Tradition (London: Ashgate, 1999).

[39] Kenneth W. Thompson, Masters of International Thought: Major Twentieth Century Theorists and the World Crisis (Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana State University Press, 1980). See also Thompson's Winston Churchill's World View: Statesmanship and Power (Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), and Fathers of International Thought: The Legacy of Political Theory (Baton Rouge & London: Louisiana State University Press, 1994).

[40] For Smith, see Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

[41] Costas M. Constantinou, On the Way to Diplomacy (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p. xv.

[42] James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

also that there are actually a variety of quite different theoretical 'realisms'.[43] The merits of these post-structuralist and other approaches to the intellectual history of IR are considered further in the final section of this chapter. In the next, the scholarly reputations – past and present – of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight are examined.

Three Reputations

The academic reputations of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight have – as one might expect – waxed and waned over the years. Since his death, Wight has attained almost iconic status in British International Relations, whilst Butterfield and Toynbee have been largely over-looked. This was not always the case: Toynbee was once, in the 1930s, one of the most respected scholars in the field, and so too was Butterfield, in the 1950s at least, an established authority in both Britain and America. These changing fortunes are one concern of this section. The other is the treatment of their ideas in the different modes of intellectual history in IR, and the categories that have been used to understand their theoretical positions.

Little scholarly attention – in IR, history, or any other field – has been devoted to Toynbee's thought in recent years, neglect remarkable in view of the popular fame that achieved in his lifetime.[44] His work is important, however, not solely – or even primarily – because of his passing celebrity. Toynbee's position at Chatham House made him a central figure in British international studies between the mid-1920s and mid-1950s. Not only did this bring him into close contact with most of the leading international relations

[43] James Der Derian, 'Introduction' to his edited International Theory, p. 1. In the same volume, see also his 'A Reinterpretation of Realism: Genealogy, Semiology, Dromology', pp. 363-396, and R. B. J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 1-25.

scholars of his day, from Norman Angell to Alfred Zimmern, it gave him the power to influence what is today termed the wider 'research agenda'. Moreover, through International Affairs and the Survey, and with Chatham House as his platform, Toynbee could give voice to his own ideas, confident that his position lent him an authority beyond that of a mere university professor. He was, indeed, one of the few British scholars writing on IR, then and since, that could claim to be 'public intellectuals'.[45]

Though much of his very early work - on German and Turkish atrocities and Greco-Turkish relations, for instance[46] – was controversial, during the inter-war years his reputation was high in British intellectual circles. The power of his intellect, his academic pedigree, his politics, and a marriage that placed him at the heart of liberal élite all eased the reception of his work in the inter-war years. In the 1920s, the historians H. A. L. Fisher and H. W. C. Davis, the classicist and international theorist Alfred Zimmern, and many other leading liberal lights proffered complimentary reviews of the Survey of International Affairs. His scholarship and diligence was highly praised; his 'sense of proportion', 'accuracy of detail', and 'historical insight' all noted.[47] 'Accurate, fair, sane, in the best sense liberal in outlook' judged the Guardian's reviewer of the 1927 Survey.[48] There were, of course, some voices of dissent. One critic, a J. S. Barnes, wrote to the

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[44] Toynbee's 'fame and fortune' is discussed in McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 205-261.

[45] On the notion of the 'public intellectual', see Mitchell Rologas, Hans Morgenthau: Intellectual in the Public Sphere PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, May 2001, pp. 260-264.

[46] The reception given to his writings on Greco-Turkish relations by the sponsors of the Koraes chair was discussed in the previous chapter.

[47] Alfred E. Zimmern, review of Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1929, International Affairs 10:1 (January 1931), p. 110. See also H. W. C. Davis, review of Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1927: Vol. I The Islamic World, Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 6:6 (November 1927), pp. 382-284; H. A. L. Fisher, review of Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1927: Vol II, Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 8:5 (September 1929), pp. 522-524.

[48] R. T. C. in The Manchester Guardian, 2nd September 1929, Toynbee MSS 16.

Chatham House journal protesting at Toynbee's treatment of Italian foreign policy, and questioning his 'sense of proportion' in terms not dissimilar to those of E. H. Carr ten years later:

> The style of the author [Toynbee] is studiously moderate, but I cannot acquit him of studious impartiality. Just because his style is studiously moderate, his partiality is all the more insidious and misleading.[49]

Toynbee's account of Mussolini's policies, Barnes argued, smacked of 'idealism'. He rambled on: the 'notion' that the Italian was 'bellicose exists only in the minds of anti-fascists and in the brain of certain tender-minded persons who cannot bear that a true word should ever be spoken in public if the truth also happens to be unpleasant or does not conform with an ideal situation of his own imagining which has no relation to reality'.[50]

Such criticisms of Toynbee's writing on international affairs, couched in terms of 'idealism' and 'realism', became increasingly common in the 1930s, with lasting effect on his reputation in IR. He was himself partly responsible for this reception. The Surveys for the 1930s were markedly different in tone to those of the previous decade, his criticisms of states' foreign policies becoming more overt and emotional. In the volume for 1931, dealing with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, Toynbee claimed that the diversity of political and intellectual responses to the crisis would not allow for 'trigonometrical' analysis – one that took account of all views.[51] In changing style, and abandoning the dispassionate mode of early volumes, he revealed more of his own political stance just as

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[49] Letter from J. S. Barnes to the Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 8:5 (September 1929), p. 534.

[50] Ibid., p. 540.

the debate over foreign policy began to become polarised and poisonous. Toynbee made himself a prominent target for criticism, not least for such eager snipers as E. H. Carr, an erstwhile colleague at Chatham House. In 1934, Carr wrote to Toynbee to berate him for his treatment of the Nazis' rise to power in the Survey for the previous year.[52] In 1939, private complaint became public chastisement. In the Twenty Years' Crisis, Carr condemned Toynbee as an airy 'utopian'. The book made fulsome use of rhetorical categories common to the foreign policy debate of the late 1930s, employing 'realism' to characterise those in favour of appeasement, and 'idealism' or 'utopianism' for those – like Toynbee – clinging to their support for the League of Nations.[53]

Carr's argument is familiar enough not to require extensive treatment here. Toynbee, Alfred Zimmern, Norman Angell, Gilbert Murray and others were castigated for the insistence that the League could secure a just and stable international order. For Carr, its failure in the 1930s to prevent conflict merely revealed the 'bankruptcy of the postulates on which it...[was]...based': the 'untenable' assumptions of 'nineteenth-century liberalism'.[54] This creed, he maintained was anachronistic and blinkered, insufficiently 'realist' for the modern age. Lumping 'utopianism' or 'idealism' with naïve progressivism, laissez-faire liberal economics, and international institutionalism, and ascribing these views to set of contemporary thinkers, Carr created a potent account of inter-war intellectual history that subsequent scholarship has found difficult to escape.

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[51] Toynbee, Survey 1931, p. 13.

[52] Carr wrote: 'by trying to make Nazi Germany the central part of the year's events, you have disturbed your balance and destroyed the proper balance', and continued: 'the significance of Hitlerism was purely internal - foreign policy has not changed, unless in certain respects to become milder' (Carr to Toynbee, 18th - 21st June, 1934, Toynbee MSS 16).

[53] This seems to have been a deliberate move on Carr's part. He was certainly aware of the relationship between 'realism' and appeasement: see Twenty Year' Crisis, 1st ed., p. 14, footnote 1.

[54] Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, 1st ed., p. 53.

Indeed, the almost indelible taint of 'idealism' has marked Toynbee's reputation in IR ever since, despite the occasional effort to banish it.

In the 1940s and 1950s, Toynbee suffered too from mounting academic criticism of his historical work, just at the time that his public profile reaching its peak. In Collingwood's posthumously-published The Idea of History (1946), for instance, the 'fundamental principles' underlying in the Study were subjected to a sympathetic but ultimately destructive examination.[55] This mild critique foreshadowed the more caustic attacks from professional historians that greeted the publication of the last volumes of the Study in 1954. Hugh Trevor-Roper and Pieter Geyl were prominent tormentors. They objected to the intrusion of religion into the Study, asserted that its argument was 'untrue, illogical and dogmatic', and condemned Toynbee for setting himself up as a latter-day prophet.[56] A. J. P. Taylor's target, on the other hand, was Toynbee's interpretation of contemporary history, and especially his the account of the origins of the Second World War that appeared in the Surveys. 'The British are always right', Taylor complained in 1958 on the publication of the last of Survey of the war years, 'and everyone else is wrong'. As a parting shot, he added:

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[55] R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History ed. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974 [1946]), p. 164.

[56] Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'Arnold Toynbee's Millennium', Encounter 8:6 (June 1957), p. 17. In his 'Testing the Toynbee System', Hugh Trevor-Roper noted that Toynbee 'compares himself with the prophet Ezekiel; and certainly, at times, he is just as unintelligible' (in M. F. Ashley Montagu (ed.) Toynbee and History (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1956), p. 122). On Toynbee and prophecy, see also Pieter Geyl, 'Prophets of Doom' and 'Toynbee the Prophet' in his Debates with Historians (London: Fontana, 1970 [1955]), pp. 155-170 & pp. 187-210.

> It would be difficult to think of any more useless collection than these eleven ponderous volumes; and the reader groans as he goes through stories which have been better told elsewhere – We can be thankful that it is all over.[57]

In the pages of the Times Literary Supplement, Toynbee's account of international relations also suffered considerable criticism. In 1952, Toynbee gave a series of broadcast lectures for the BBC, published the following year as The World and the West. Prominent was the argument that the West as a whole was responsible for the disasters that had befallen it in the first half of the twentieth-century, for the fearsome challenge that it faced in Soviet Russia, and for the upsurge in colonial nationalism in the post-war period.[58] This account drew a furious response from Douglas Jerrold, who responded with The Lie about the West.[59] When reviewed – by T. E. Utley in the TLS – Toynbee to the opportunity to remonstrate, sparking a long-running dispute to which Martin Wight and the Aga Khan, amongst others, contributed.[60] Central were two issues: Jerrold's implication that Toynbee's views were a 'strategic disaster' for the West at a time when it was faced by such a formidable adversary as Communism, and the idea – indeed, the 'chief fallacy of the age' – that a new, syncretist religion might revive Western civilisation.[61] As the dispute dragged on, the charges against Toynbee widened. In a letter, Jerrold attacked Toynbee's historical method in similar terms to those of Geyl or Trevor-

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[57] A. J. P. Taylor, review of Toynbee (ed.) Survey of International Affairs: The Initial Triumph of the Allies, Manchester Guardian, 17 June 1958, Toynbee MSS 18.

[58] Arnold Toynbee, The World and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1953).

[59] Douglas Jerrold, The Lie about the West: a response to Professor Toynbee's challenge (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1954).

[60] The Toynbee-Jerrold controversy is mentioned, albeit only in passing, in Derwent May's Critical Times: The History of the Times Literary Supplement (London: HarperCollins, 2001), p. 345.

[61] T. E. 'Peter' Utley, 'Counsels of Hope', Times Literary Supplement 2723, 9 April 1954, p. 225 & p. 227.

Roper, prompting a vigorous critique of his approach by Martin Wight.[62] Utley, for his part, concluded that Toynbee was simply a 'bad counsellor' and his historical investigations a poor guide to the future, a position that gathered support with time.

By the mid-1950s, Toynbee's stance on Communism and the means to resist it had come to trouble even those in IR who were friends and supporters. Geoffrey Hudson, Fellow of All Souls, later of St Anthony's, and erstwhile member of the British Committee, had been one of the small circle that had read the drafts of the first volumes of Toynbee's Study, and had reviewed them sympathetically in the 1930s.[63] Twenty years later, Hudson showed signs of considerable disaffection, arguing that:

> Neither admiration for Professor Toynbee's great intellectual gifts nor respect for the high seriousness of his idealism should deter the liberal critic from pointing out that his teaching operates to the advantage of the totalitarian enemy. He is certainly on the side of the angels, but they are hell's angels.[64]

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[62] Wight wrote: 'arbitrary selection and dogmatic assertion are Mr Jerrold's own method of historical discussion, and he shows an old-fashioned positivist belief in "the facts" (i.e. his facts) as something separable from their interpretation' (Letter on 'Counsels of Hope', Times Literary Supplement 2727, 7 May 1954, p. 297). Wight later published a dismissive review of Jerrold's book in International Affairs 30:3 (1954), pp. 352-353, arguing that it 'combines propagandist history with a prodigious capacity for misrepresentation'. He also wrote to Toynbee noting his regret at the whole controversy (Wight to Toynbee, 25 May 1954, Toynbee MSS 86).

[63] G. F. Hudson, 'Professor Toynbee and Western Civilization', in T. S. Eliot (ed.), The Criterion reprinted edition, 15:50 (London: Faber & Faber, 1967 [April 1936]), pp. 441-454.

[64] Geoffrey Hudson, 'Toynbee versus Gibbon', Twentieth-Century 156:11 (November 1954), p. 412. See also 'Professor Toynbee and the West', Twentieth-Century 153:3 (March 1953), pp. 211-218, & 'Professor Toynbee surrenders the West', Commentary 15:5 (May 1953), pp. 469-474.

Suspicions that Toynbee lacked political judgement or sufficient 'realism' lurk between the lines of Hudson's criticisms. Such doubts surface also in the work of Kenneth Thompson, perhaps Toynbee's greatest academic admirer in America apart from his biographer, McNeill. Thompson – who along with his mentor Hans Morgenthau was a self-confessed 'realist' – struggled in three essays in the 1950s on Toynbee to rescue his reputation from the wreckage of the Twenty Years' Crisis. Concentrating on his religious convictions, and arguing – rather unconvincingly – that he displayed the 'same combination of theological absolutism and political relativism' as Reinhold Niebuhr, Thompson made a stolid but ill-fated attempt to install Toynbee in the 'realist' pantheon.[65] His later treatments, including that contained in his doctoral thesis, published in 1985, reprised these themes.[66]

Morgenthau too admired Toynbee, or at least his 'achievement'. Early editions of Politics among Nations (1948) made use of the Surveys and the Study for both empirical and theoretical points,[67] but Morgenthau stopped short of claiming Toynbee for 'realism'. He was, however, willing to defend the Study from 'specialist' critics, and judged that Toynbee's 'Icarean effort...belongs to the ages; his failure belongs to his own and, hence, is ours as well as his.[68] In admiring the spirit of the work and doubting the politics,

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[65] K. W. Thompson, 'Toynbee and the Theory of International Politics', Political Science Quarterly 71 (1956), p. 377. See also his 'Toynbee and World Politics: Democracy and Foreign Policy', Review of Politics 18:4 (October 1956), pp. 418-443; 'Toynbee's Approach to History Reviewed', Ethics 65:4 (July 1955), pp. 287-303;

[66] On 'realism' and 'idealism' in Toynbee's thought, see Thompson, Toynbee's Philosophy of World History and Politics (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), p. 34 & p. 119. Thompson's Masters of International Thought also includes an analysis of Toynbee's ideas, pp. 225-249.

[67] Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 1960), pp. 216-217, p. 258 & p. 356.

[68] Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Toynbee and the Historical Imagination', Encounter 4:3 (March 1955), p. 71 & p. 76.

Morgenthau was joined by another great figure of the mid-twentieth century, Raymond Aron. Recognising Toynbee as a pioneering figure in the field, one of the first to draw the now-familiar analogy between contemporary international relations and the years of the Peloponnesian War, and thus highlighting the importance of Thucydides, Aron made no attempt to cast him as a 'realist' or 'idealist'.[69] Only Reinhold Niebuhr gave serious (published) consideration to Toynbee's overarching theory, taking advantage of it, as Niebuhr acknowledged, in his own work of civilisational history, Nations and Empires (1959).[70]

Amongst younger British writers in the field, however, Toynbee received short-shrift or was simply ignored. F. H. Hinsley's Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1963) made no reference to Toynbee at all.[71] Like W. N. Medlicott's second edition of British Foreign Policy (1968),[72] Hinsley took his history of the inter-war and war years not from Toynbee's Surveys, but from the work of his critics, Carr and Taylor. By the 1960s, indeed, Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis had acquired a considerable hold over the emerging 'discipline' of IR, not least because it chimed with the contemporary denigration of inter-

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[69] Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations trans. Richard Howard & Annette Baker Fox (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966), p. 139. The other scholar to make such a comparison, according to Aron, was Thibaudet. Interest in Thucydides, and in the lessons that his history of the Peleponnesian war might have for contemporary IR, remains high. One recent work exploring this theme is Richard Ned Lebow & Robert E. Kelly, 'Thucydides and Hegemony: Athens and the United States', Review of International Studies 27:4 (October 2001), pp. 593-610.

[70] Reinhold Niebuhr, Nations and Empires: Recurring Patterns in the Political Order (London: Faber & Faber, 1959). There is only one reference to Toynbee in the text, however (p. 7). Niebuhr later wrote to Toynbee with regard to the book: 'you will have noted, I hope, how amply I am indebted to you and how, on every but one point, my interpretation of history is merely an adaptation of your thought' (Niebuhr to Toynbee, 16 July 1959, Toynbee MSS 84).

[71] F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 [1963]).

war international thought.[73] Hedley Bull's contribution to The Aberystwyth Papers (1972) was typical of this mood: 'the "idealists"' he wrote, 'were not remarkable for their intellectual depth or powers of explanation, only for their intense commitment to a particular vision of what should happen'.[74]

From the mid-1970s onwards, a number of more nuanced treatments of Toynbee's work emerged, but none from the field of IR. Curiously, many of these came from writers with few political sympathies with the liberal Toynbee, like Elie Kedourie, a fierce critic of what he styled the 'Chatham House Version' of international history and the politics it encouraged. Though 'Arnold J. Toynbee: History as Paradox' (1974) echoed many of the criticisms of Geyl and others in the 1950s, its author recoiled from outright condemnation. Kedourie's Martin Wight memorial lecture (1978) was even more indulgent, and takes Toynbee's mature religious views seriously, even if he was characteristically robust in their dissection.[75] Maurice Cowling's Religion and the Public Doctrine (1980) also contains a sympathetic chapter on Toynbee and his beliefs. Though the latter are dismissed as 'a sort of pious cement to save civilisation, or a post-liberal mysticism to safeguard the higher thinking', Cowling's account testifies to the important and influential place Toynbee – though a 'spoilt Roman Catholic' – held in British life

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[72] W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy since Versailles 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1968).

[73] Hugh Seton-Watson, for instance, considered the book wholly exceptional when set against the rest of inter-war international historiography, and called it a 'brilliant work of analysis [that] has enlightened generations of students' (Neither War nor Peace: The Struggle for Power in the Post-War World (London: Methuen, 1960), p. 11).

[74] Hedley Bull, 'The Theory of International Politics, 1919-1969', in Porter (ed.), Aberystwyth Papers, p. 35.

[75] Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and other essays (Hanover, NH & London: University Press of New England, 1984); 'Arnold J. Toynbee: History as Paradox', Encounter 42:5 (May 1974), pp. 57-67; 'Religion and Politics: Arnold Toynbee and Martin Wight', British Journal of International Studies 5 (1979), pp. 6-14.

during the 1930s and 1940s.[76] In North America and elsewhere, notably Japan, where world and comparative history have a stronger hold in universities than in the UK, that influence persisted. The sociologist Matthew Melko, for instance, a former research student of Wight at the LSE, endeavoured to carry forward the study of Toynbee's work, as did Carroll Quigley,[77] and a recent book by Arthur Herman reflected the admiration still felt by American scholars.[78] Added to these was a volume of 'reappraisals' edited by the Canadian theologian C. T. McIntire, and Marvin Perry, author of an earlier, brief study of Toynbee's thought.[79]

Yet all of this, not to mention McNeill's biography,[80] published in 1989, has failed to have much impact upon Toynbee's reputation in IR. By his own admission, McNeill's desire to 'redress the balance' and to re-ignite debate over Toynbee's ideas 'failed, at least in the short run'.[81] Indeed, even in the history of Chatham House in the inter-war years published in 1994, where E. H. Carr, Lionel Curtis and Philip Kerr were accorded separate chapters, Toynbee is little more than a ghostly presence, insubstantial

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[76] Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine I, p. 43 & p. xxiv.

[77] Carroll Quigley, The Evolution of Civilizations: An Introduction to Historical Analysis (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1979 [1961]).

[78] See Melko's The Nature of Civilizations (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1969) and Arthur Herman's The Idea of Decline in Western History (New York: Free Press, 1997), pp. 256-294.

[79] McIntire & Perry (eds.), Toynbee Reappraisals; Marvin Perry, Arnold Toynbee and the Crisis of the West (Washington: University Press of America, 1982).

[80] McNeill's biography was not even reviewed by the leading British IR journals. Where it was – in history journals – the reaction was not wholly positive. See Martel, 'Toynbee, McNeill and the Myth of History', p. 345; Gerd Muller, review of McNeill, Toynbee in History and Theory 30 (1990), pp. 381-384; Michael Bentley, in English Historical Review 108:426 (1993), pp. 272-273; James Joll, review of McNeill, Toynbee, in Journal of Modern History 63:2 (June 1991), pp. 362-363.

[81] McNeill, 'Toynbee Revisited', in Louis (ed.), Adventures with Britannia, p. 172.

and fleeting.[82] Since then, only two article-length discussions of Toynbee's work have seen the light of day in IR, by Christopher Brewin and Cornelia Navari.[83] Both are rather half-hearted attempts at rehabilitation that notably avoid the 'realist', 'idealist' or 'utopian' categories. Perhaps as a consequence, in both treatments too there is an absence of connection – Toynbee appears a rather isolated, even idiosyncratic figure, cut off from others labouring in the inter-war years.

Herbert Butterfield has received even less attention from British scholars of IR than Toynbee. In the twenty years that followed his death, no journal article exploring his thought was published,[84] and references to Butterfield in recent writing have, with the occasional exception, been brief, even cursory. Where he is discussed – which is much more often in America than in Britain[85] – the tendency has been to treat him as a 'Christian realist', alongside North American thinkers like Reinhold Niebuhr. It is in this

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[82] A. Bosco & C. Navari (eds.), Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919-1945: The Royal Institute of International Affairs during the Inter-War Period (London: Lothian Foundation Press, 1994).

[83] See Christopher Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee, Chatham House, and Research in a Global Context', in Long & Wilson, Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis, pp. 277-301; Navari, 'Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975): Prophecy and Civilization', Review of International Studies 26:2 (April 2000), pp. 289-301. As Navari noted, the revival of interest in culture and civilisation in IR theory has stimulated some interest in Toynbee, though Samuel Huntington's brief treatment of his ideas is cursory and instrumental. See Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone, 1998), pp. 44-55.

[84] My 'History, Christianity and diplomacy: Sir Herbert Butterfield and international relations', Review of International Studies 28 (2002), pp. 719-736, was an attempted corrective.

[85] The level of American interest in Butterfield is curious, but it is clear that his post-war religious writings had considerable appeal in the US. Indeed, George Kennan is said to have been so impressed by Butterfield's Christianity and History that he sent a copy to President Eisenhower with a 'special injunction to read it' (See John (Adam) Watson to Butterfield, 27 April (no year – 1953 or 1954), Butterfield Papers 531(iii)/W33). Butterfield returned the compliment with an sympathetic review of Kennan's Russia leaves the War: 'Mr Kennan as Historian', Encounter 8:1 (January 1957), pp. 76-80.

guise that he appears in the work of Kenneth Thompson and that of Thompson's former student Alberto Coll, the two men that have offered the most substantial analyses of Butterfield's thought.[86] In The Wisdom of Statecraft (1985), Coll sought to place Butterfield at the centre of the revival of 'that broad and ancient tradition known as political realism' in the 1940s and 1950s.[87] This location of Butterfield's thought has been most influential: the Canadian scholar Roger Epp, for instance, has also portrayed him – and indeed Wight – in these terms.[88] What lends this argument some force is the patent esteem in which Butterfield was held by the self-proclaimed 'realists' of the mid-twentieth century, reflected in contributions from Thompson, Morgenthau and Louis Halle to a volume exploring his thought, published as a posthumous tribute in 1980.[89]

In Britain too the notion of Butterfield as 'Christian realist' has gained adherents, notably Alastair Murray.[90] Tim Dunne, who explored Butterfield's thought as part of a wider study of the 'English school' in IR, also adopted this position. In Inventing International Society, Butterfield appears as both an 'Augustinian realist' and a 'fundamentalist Christian', semi-detached from the mainstream of the 'school', with its discursive focus upon 'international society'.[91] For Cornelia Navari, by contrast, he

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[86] See Thompson, Masters of International Thought, pp. 5-17; Alberto R. Coll, The Wisdom of Statecraft: Sir Herbert Butterfield and the philosophy of international politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985).

[87] Coll, Wisdom of Statecraft, p. 3.

[88] See Epp, The 'Augustinian Moment' in International Politics: Niebuhr, Butterfield, Wight and the Reclaiming of a Tradition', International Politics Occasional Research Paper, no. 10 (Aberystwyth, 1991).

[89] Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), Herbert Butterfield: The Ethics of History and Politics (Washington: University Press of America, 1980).

[90] Murray, Reconstructing Realism, esp. pp. 70-106.

[91] Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 73 & p. 82.

contributed 'not so much [to] an Augustinian as a Machiavellian moment'.[92] Whilst acknowledging Butterfield's religious beliefs, Navari interprets his writing in a 'civic republican' rather than a 'Christian realist' mode. For him, she argues, the mid-twentieth century was

> ...a moment of crisis, in which the Christian order was recast [by Butterfield and others] as a *res publica* and viewed in terms of a dangerous and endangered temporality, whose potential destruction could not be viewed with Christian resignation and whose preservation was seen to depend upon a revised sense of civic virtue and an innovative and creative understanding of power.[93]

Despite the questions that it raises, Navari's interpretation has not found much favour in IR, and the notion of competing traditions of 'realism' and 'idealism' continue to hold sway in treatments of Butterfield's thought.

Even in IR, however, Butterfield's political sympathies have gained more attention than his international thought. Noël (later Lord) Annan's recollections of the post-war intelligentsia have played the most important rôle in this regard, shaping the terms in which his views have been understood.[94] The difficulties with Annan's account have commonly been overlooked. Politically active and personally involved with his subject, he is somewhat less than a disinterested observer. Annan was a persistent public critic of Butterfield from the 1950s onwards; he found the latter's politics objectionable, corrosive of students' minds. In 'Revulsion to the Right' (1955), for instance, Butterfield

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[92] Cornelia Navari, 'English Machiavellism', in her edited British Politics and the Spirit of the Age (Keele: Keele University Press, 1996), p. 109.

[93] Ibid., p. 109.

[94] See especially his Our Age: The Generation that made Post-War Britain (London: HarperCollins, 1995).

was placed at the heart of a 'destructive, cynical, and pessimistic' conservative revival. Preaching that 'hope through political reform was vain and that international politics were and would be, so long as ideological warfare existed, a nightmare' these 'revivalists', in Annan's view, wrought untold damage upon the young.[95] This view of Butterfield was reprised in Our Age, his most oft-read work.[96] Indeed, in that book he went further, hinting darkly of sympathies for Nazism. Butterfield was, he wrote, 'provocative', had advocated a 'separate peace with Germany' in 1943, and 'saw nothing wrong when visiting Dublin as external examiner at the university in going to parties at the German consulate'.[97] Such assertions have tarnished Butterfield's reputation amongst younger – liberal[98] – historians and scholars of IR alike who have neglected the views of other contemporaries, like Richard Wollheim, who 'had no reason at all to think that Butterfield himself is a man of the Right'.[99]

Events have played their part in this respect. The emergence of the so-called 'New Right' in 1970s, with its Peterhouse associations, has stimulated interest in its

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[95] Noël Annan, 'Revulsion to the Right', Political Quarterly 26:3 (1955), p. 212 & p. 218. See also Annan's 'People', Twentieth Century 157:2 (1955), pp. 128-137.

[96] In Our Age, Annan wrote: 'He organized in and from Peterhouse a kind of militant conservatism distinct from the Establishment conservatism of most Cambridge colleges. It was radical, reverent towards Christianity, irreverent towards liberals and scornful of socialists' (pp. 365-366). It is worth noting that Annan's tone in private correspondence was considerably more sympathetic. In one letter he wrote to Butterfield: 'I can't close without saying that how much during my years at Cambridge I have admired you & how affectionately I feel towards you. Those with minds as original as yours don't sometimes exert the influence that one might expect' (Annan to Butterfield, 20th October, no year – (?)1950s, Butterfield MSS, 531(i)/A43).

[97] Annan, Our Age, pp. 530-531.

[98] See, for example, David Cannadine's (unsubstantiated) statement that Butterfield 'regarded Hitler with a neutrality bordering on indifference', in his G. M. Trevelyan: A Life in History (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1997), p. 208.

[99] Richard Wollheim, 'The New Conservatism in Britain', Partisan Review 24: 4 (Fall 1957), p. 556.

intellectual origins and possible progenitors. In the eyes of political opponents of this group – Annan included – Butterfield was the *eminence grise* behind its most vocal members. His influence has detected too by Richard Brent and Reba Soffer behind the 'high politics' school of historiography loosely associated with the 'New Right'.[100] Such ideas have been picked-up by IR scholars. In Dunne's Inventing International Society, for instance, Annan is cited as proof-positive of Butterfield's involvement in the creation of a school of 'militant conservatism'.[101]

More recent treatments of Butterfield's thought have not deviated greatly from Dunne's line that it is representative of 'conservatism' and 'Christian realism'. Kleinschmidt's Nemesis of Power describes Butterfield in these terms, as does Rengger in his work on the 'problem of order'.[102] Buzan and Little, in their International Systems in World History, do discuss his approach to the past, but briefly, and like Dunne argue that Butterfield was more important institutionally than intellectually.[103] Ironically, it is Butterfield's fellow historians that have offered the most incisive critiques of his international thought, if only out of a sense that the subject, more than any other, kept him

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[100] Richard Brent, 'Butterfield's Tories: 'High Politics' and the Writing of Modern British Political History', Historical Journal 30:4 (1987), pp. 943-954; Reba N. Soffer, 'The Conservative Historical Imagination in the Twentieth Century', Albion 27:4 (Winter 1994), pp. 1-17.

[101] Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 71. As Dunne observes in a footnote (no. 7), however, many who knew Butterfield or were associated with Peterhouse are less keen to see him either as a party Conservative or a progenitor of the 'New Right'.

[102] Kleinschmidt, Nemesis of Power, p. 213; N. J. Rengger, International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory? (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 56, p. 62 & p. 183.

[103] Barry Buzan & Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 29.

from troubling 'the editors of learned journals'.[104] Though tending, like the medievalist Sir Maurice Powicke, to conclude that Butterfield's interest in the area was more a 'product of personal strain', and to suggest that his 'message' bordered on the 'prophetic', these interpretations offer a different Butterfield to that portrayed in IR.[105] Maurice Cowling in particular has drawn attention to the extent to which he was disaffected by contemporary international politics. He has highlighted also those aspects of Butterfield's thought that sit uneasily with his portrayal as a 'Christian realist' as IR tends to understand the term: his (short-lived) commitment to unilateral nuclear disarmament being the most obvious example.[106] Ultimately, Cowling dismissed Butterfield's analysis of international relations as 'shallow, Toynbeean and thin', but his interpretation poses something of a challenge to those of IR.[107] So too does the observation of John Vincent that Butterfield sought to make 'international relations, perhaps his deepest interest, come to terms with Christianity', presenting 'national policy' in language of 'sin, temptation, [and] forgiveness'.[108]

While Toynbee and Butterfield have been neglected, the attention that Wight's work has attracted in IR is considerable. His early death in 1972 was, sadly, something of an impetus: former students and colleagues from the LSE were keen to pay tribute and

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[104] G. R. Elton, 'Herbert Butterfield and the Study of History', Historical Journal 27:3 (1984), p. 730.

[105] F. M. Powicke, 'Two Books about History', History 35:4 (October 1950), p. 196. This article reviewed Butterfield's Christianity and History and Marc Bloch's Apologie pour l'histoire, ou métier d'historien. Elton judged Butterfield's message in much the same terms, writing: 'having...acquired the prophetic mantle he was for ever deemed a prophet; and his deep concern for the troubles of his own day drove him increasingly into a distracting search for the use of history and the historian's mind in the solution of current problems' ('Herbert Butterfield', p. 738).

[106] Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine I, p. 249.

[107] Ibid.

[108] John Vincent, An Intelligent Person's Guide to History (London: Duckworth, 1995), p. 61.

reflect on his intellectual legacy. These men – John Garnett, Alan James, Brian Porter, and Hedley Bull among them – formed the core of the British IR community at the time, and looked upon Wight as a mentor and an inspiration. Seeking to emulate or build upon the approach to IR that he had set out in his lectures, they were effusive in their praise of their former teacher, and keen to offer recollections of the man and his thought.[109] Those associated with the 'British Committee on the Theory of International Politics' in its various guises, like Butterfield, Michael Howard, Elie Kedourie, Donald MacKinnon, Kenneth Thompson, and Adam Watson, also produced affectionate reminiscences.[110] From the mid-1980s onwards, moreover, Wight's work came to the attention of a new generation of scholars, only a few of whom have institutional or personal connections with the LSE or with Wight's former students. The publication of a version of his LSE lectures on international theory,[111] in 1991, contributed to this process, as did extraneous influences, not least the revival of 'normative' theory.

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[109] J. G. Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1984); Alan James, 'Michael Nicolson on Martin Wight: a mind passing in the night', Review of International Studies 8:2 (April 1982), pp. 117-124; Brian Porter, 'Patterns of Thought and Practice: Martin Wight's International Theory', in Michael Donelan (ed.), The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978), pp. 64-74.

[110] Many of these were memorial lectures delivered in Wight's honour. See Herbert Butterfield, *Raison d'état*: The Relations between Morality and Government (Sussex: University of Sussex Press, 1975); Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', British Journal of International Studies 2 (1976), pp. 101-116; Michael Howard, 'Ethics and Power in International Politics' (1977), in his The Causes of Wars (London: Unwin, 1983), pp. 49-64; Kedourie, 'Religion and Politics' (1978); D. M. MacKinnon, 'Power Politics and Religious Faith' (1979), in his Themes in Theology: The Three-Fold Cord (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1987), pp. 87-109. K. W. Thompson included Wight in his Masters of International Thought, pp. 44-66, Adam Watson included a brief memoir in the introduction to his The Evolution of International Society: A comparative historical analysis (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 2-4, and Charles Manning wrote one for The Times, 21 July 1972, p. 14.

Wight's early work was given a mixed reception by contemporaries. His writings on colonial constitutions,[112] and the pamphlet on Power Politics, were well appreciated in Chatham House and in the wider liberal élite, and gained Wight a reputation as a serious thinker. The chapters he contributed to Toynbee's Survey of the world in March 1939,[113] however, attracted a more varied response, ranging from extravagant praise to damning criticism. Max Beloff, for one, was impressed, writing: 'no-one in this country who has written on the pre-history of the Second World War since the documents and memoirs began to appear has shown comparable ability and judgement'.[114] In the TLS, an anonymous Elizabeth Wiskemann waxed lyrical over Wight's scholarship and range, noting that at times, he 'out-Toynbees Toynbee in the vastness of the canvasses he chooses'.[115] Others, however, were less admiring, Richard Crossman and A. K. Chesterton among them. The former labelled him a 'theological realist', and argued that Wight assumed 'demonic totalitarianism' to be 'the normal political expression of popular emancipation'. This, he argued, led Wight into a 'modish over-estimate of Hitler'.[116] Chesterton was even more condemnatory: the chapter on Germany, he noted acidly,

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[111] Wight, International Theory.

[112] In the TLS, Sir Kenneth Wheare called Wight's British Colonial Constitutions 'a profound analysis of constitutional development which will be of permanent value to historians, lawyers, politicians and political scientists' (Times Literary Supplement 2678, 29 May 1953, p. 346).

[113] Wight, 'Spain and Portugal', 'Eastern Europe', 'Germany' & 'The Balance of Power', in Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs: The World in March 1939, pp. 138-150, pp. 206-292, pp. 293-365 & pp. 508-532.

[114] Max Beloff, 'Before the War', The Spectator, 30th May 1952, Toynbee MSS 18. For another laudatory review, see G. M. Gathorne-Hardy in International Affairs 28:3 (July 1952), pp. 360-361.

[115] Elizabeth Wiskemann, 'Prelude to War', Times Literary Supplement, 2628, 13th June 1952, p. 387, Toynbee MSS 18.

[116] R. H. S. Crossman, review of The World in March 1939, New Statesman and Nation 31 May 1954, Toynbee MSS 18.

'might have passed muster as a propaganda tract in the late 30's, but is simply not good enough as a serious record of events'.[117]

Crossman's identification of Wight as a 'theological realist' chimes with the recollections of students and colleagues. Donald MacKinnon, for instance, an undergraduate friend at Oxford and later a fellow member of the British Committee, emphasised the eschatological aspect of Wight's beliefs in his memorial lecture; [118] and others, like John Garnett have drawn attention to his 'Christian pessimism'.[119] For Michael Howard, a concern 'with the nature and significance of power in international relations', and his contempt for 'facile Utopianism' marked Wight out from his more idealistic peers.[120] Alan James even went so far as to call him a 'mini-Morgenthau'.[121] Indeed, among both friends and critics,[122] there was – until the mid-1980s at least – a rough consensus that Wight was a 'Christian realist' of sorts. Disillusioned with the failure of the League of Nations, like so many of his generation, Wight had came to express, in the words of Garnett, 'typically Realist view', rejecting 'all ideas of progress towards a more peaceful and just international order'.[123]

Hedley Bull, however, subtly dissented from this view. Having come to know him as a young lecturer at the LSE in the 1950s, and having also attended those famous lectures on international theory, Bull maintained that Wight's position was distinct from

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[117] A. K. Chesterton, 'Chatham House History', Truth, 29 August 1952, Toynbee MSS 18.

[118] MacKinnon, 'Power Politics and Religious Faith', p. 88.

[119] Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics, p. 53.

[120] Howard, 'Hedley Norman Bull', p. 396.

[121] James, 'Michael Nicolson on Martin Wight', p. 118.

[122] Of these Michael Nicolson was certainly the most vigorous and rigorous, whose 'real complaint against Martin Wight is that he made pessimism respectable in British international relations' (The enigma of Martin Wight', Review of International Studies 7:1 (1981), p. 22).

[123] Garnett, Commonsense and the Theory of International Politics, p. 53.

that of 'Christian realism'. In so doing, he employed the latter's own categories of past international thought, 'realism' (Machiavellianism), 'rationalism' (Grotianism), and 'revolutionism' (Kantianism). 'As [Wight] grew older', Bull argued, he shifted away from the first, and moved towards the second, as 'the Grotian elements in his thinking became stronger'.[124] This had, in part, Bull thought, been a consequence of prolonged exposure to Charles Manning, the most senior figure in the IR department at the LSE, and a proponent of the notion of 'international society' central to 'Grotian' thinking. Bull's interpretation has been highly influential, and it is the 'Grotian' or 'rationalist' Wight that predominates in more recent work on his thought.[125] The emergence of this 'new' Wight is also intimately linked to the emergence, during the 1990s, of a self-conscious 'English school' and its re-writing of 'disciplinary' history.

The notion of an 'English school' in IR was first suggested by Roy Jones who, in an article published in 1981, sought both to describe its characteristics and offer a case for its closure.[126] Wight was placed at the centre of this 'school', alongside Charles

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[124] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', in Wight, International Theory, p. xv.

[125] See, for instance, Dunne, Inventing International Society, especially chapter three; Robert H. Jackson, 'Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19:2 (1990), pp. 261-272; A. Claire Cutler, 'The 'Grotian tradition' in international relations', Review of International Studies 17 (1991), pp. 41-65; Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: a Review of the Ethical Claims of International Society', Political Studies 44 (1996), pp 123-135); Richard Little, 'The English School's Contribution to the Study of International Relations', European Journal of International Relations 6:3 (September 2000), pp. 395-422.

[126] Roy Jones, 'The English school of international relations: a case for closure', Review of International Studies 7:1 (1981), pp. 1-13. For a discussion of Jones and Dunne and their differing conceptions of the school and its location, see my 'Still the English Patient?', pp. 931-942.

Manning, F. S. Northedge and Hedley Bull, and a number of former students.[127] The work of this cabal, Jones argued, with their 'common academic provenance' at the LSE, was imprecise, obscure, and philosophically opaque. The charges were many and varied: their notion of 'international society' was 'meaningless'; their claim to maintain the values of a 'classical tradition' of international thought bogus. The 'English school', Jones concluded, was intellectual sterile, it tended to 'scholasticism', and was ripe for closure.[128] This onslaught, however, was met with deafening silence from the (surviving) intended victims. The idea of an 'English school' does not seem to have held any great appeal for Jones' immediate contemporaries; still less its defence. Some, including Hidemi Suganami, located a similarity of approach in the work of LSE-based scholars – whom he termed 'institutionalists' – but, notably, whilst Manning, James, Northedge and Bull were included, Wight was not.[129] In 1988, when Sheila Grader, a former research student at the LSE, did respond to Jones, it was not to defend or justify the 'school', but rather to deny its existence.[130] By this time, however, the notion of an LSE-based 'English school'

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[127] For Jones, the titles of the books published by this group revealed their common concerns: Charles Manning, The Nature of International Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1963); Bull, The Anarchical Society (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977); Robert Purnell, The society of states: an introduction to international politics (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973); Donelan (ed.), The reason of states. To this list might be added, amongst others: E. Luard, Types of International Society (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1976); Bull & Adam Watson (eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[128] Jones, 'The English school', p. 1, 3 & 12.

[129] Hidemi Suganami, 'The Structure of Institutionalism: An Anatomy of British Mainstream International Relations', International Relations 7:5 (1983), pp. 2363-2381.

[130] Sheila Grader, 'The English school of international relations: evidence and evaluation', Review of International Studies 14:1 (1988), pp. 29-44.

adhering to a 'classical' approach and promoting the idea of 'international society' was becoming established amongst a new generation of scholars.[131]

For these new adherents to the 'school', Wight was a key figure. His category of 'Grotianism' or 'rationalism' appealed to those seeking a *via media* between 'realism' and 'idealism', and his historical depth attracted those repelled by the amoral aridity of the neo-realist approach that dominated American IR in the 1980s. Works as different as Andrew Linklater's Beyond Realism and Marxism (1990) and Robert Jackson's Quasi-States (1990) both show evidence of these moods.[132] A volume on Grotius and IR, edited by Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts and published the same year, also drew to the linkage of Grotianism with Wight. The Wight that appeared in these and other works connected to the new 'English school' was, however, very much Bull's Wight. He was, for Jackson, Linklater, and Cutler,[133] a scholar concerned not with 'power politics' but rather with 'international society'. The religious dimension is less prominent too, as if it were merely a private matter and not, as his colleagues and students had observed, an integral part of Wight's wider thought.

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[131] See N. J. Rengger, 'Serpents and doves in classical international theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17:2 (1988), pp. 215-225. In their edited International Society after the Cold War, Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins refer to the LSE as the 'site of International Society's birth' and express a desire to 'build on...[the]...valuable intellectual legacy' of Manning, Wight, Bull and R. J. Vincent (International Society after the Cold War (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1996), p. xi).

[132] Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1990), esp. pp. 8-33; Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty. International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 8.

[133] Cutler, 'The 'Grotian tradition' in international relations', p. 42.

An atheist, Bull had little sympathy or empathy for religion, and though he acknowledged Wight's Christianity, he admitted that 'often felt uneasy about the extent to which Wight's views of International Relations derive[d] from his religious beliefs'.[134] Admiring though he was of Wight's scholarship, this discomfort is evident in the manner in which Bull downplayed the religious aspect of his thought, and in effect 'secularised' Wight. Many have followed Bull in this regard, though not without criticism. Dunne, for instance, acknowledges Wight's faith, and its compatibility with a 'realist' perspective, but the relationship between his religious views and his international thought is assumed to be distant.[135] In Buzan and Little, or Jackson's Global Covenant (2000), the possibility of a relationship is not even suggested. The implication is in all is that the international thought can stand alone from the religious beliefs. Roger Epp has criticised this tendency, and commented on the discomfort which others, including Tim Dunne, clearly feel when dealing with Wight and religion.[136] Cornelia Navari too has drawn attention both to the centrality of Christianity to Wight's wider thought, though she places him squarely in a Machiavellian rather than, as Epp argues, Augustinian 'moment', and to Bull's secularisation of his legacy.[137]

What unites Epp and Dunne, however, and separates them from earlier interpreters like Bull and Jackson, is a concern to uncover what Dunne has called the

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[134] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the theory of international relations', in Wight, International Theory, p. xxiii.

[135] Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 47-70.

[136] Roger Epp, 'Martin Wight: International Relations as a Realm of Persuasion', in Beer & Hariman (eds.), Post-Realism: The rhetorical turn in international relations (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), p. 126. On Wight and religion, see also Scott M. Thomas, 'Faith, history and Martin Wight: the role of religion in the historical sociology of the English school of International Relations', International Affairs 77:4 (October 2001), pp. 905-930.

[137] Navari, 'English Machiavellism', pp. 107-109.

radical or 'normative potentiality' of Wight's work.[138] Both reject the interpretation that casts it as 'realist'; for Epp, the concern for Africa, for the impact and consequences of decolonisation, as well as his interest in 'the diffuse, imprecise domain of culture', marked Wight out from his 'realist' peers.[139] But both also reject the notion that he was a conventional 'rationalist', as Bull and Jackson suggested.[140] Others have also sought – and found – succour for alternative interpretations of Wight's thought. Though casting him as a 'realist' of sorts, Der Derian is keen, along with Epp, to point to the concern for language and representation in Wight's work.[141] Buzan and Little, by contrast, have portrayed him as a methodological pluralist – a blend of positivist, philosophical idealist, and post-Marxist critical theorist – with no firm commitment to any of the three traditions he described.[142] There remains, indeed, much disagreement as to the precise nature of Wight's international thought.

Conclusion

This variety of competing interpretations is in itself a ground for the re-examination of the international thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight. The links between them – personal and intellectual – as well as the contrasting positions that they sometime stuck, suggest that their work might well be fruitfully considered in parallel.

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[138] Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 182. On Epp's view of the 'potential' of Wight's thought, see his 'The English school on the frontiers of international society: a hermeneutic recollection', Review of International Studies 24 (Special Issue, December 1998), pp. 60-61.

[139] Epp, 'The English school', pp. 48-49.

[140] See, for example, the discussion of rationalism and colonialism in Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 60.

[141] See Der Derian, 'A Reinterpretation of Realism', p. 380; Antidiplomacy: Spies, Speed, Terror, and War (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. 24. See also Epp, 'The English school', p. 50.

[142] Little, 'The English School's Contribution', pp. 395-422. See also, for context, Buzan & Little, International Systems in World History, p. 43-47.

How such a study might best proceed, however, remains in question; there is variety too of approaches to intellectual history within and outside IR. The 'traditional', 'paradigmatic', 'hegemonic', 'contextual', 'discursive', 'genealogical' and 'archaeological' methods have been employed, to varying degrees of success. Of them all, the 'traditional' and 'paradigmatic' approaches are the most problematic, offering, as many have recognised, misleading and crude representations of the history of international thought. The notion that the clash of 'realism' and 'idealism' is perennial and inescapable, for instance, is difficult to justify in the light of the evidence. In Walker's words: 'the myth of an eternal tradition almost collapses in the face of sustained historical analysis'.[143] As Long, Wilson and Ashworth – among others – have argued, it is difficult even to detect a dominant 'paradigm' of 'idealism' in the inter-war years.[144] Much the same may be said of post-war 'realism': the chorus of complaints from self-confessed 'realists' at the critical reception of their work strongly suggests a powerful caucus of 'non-realists' were active in IR in the later 1940s and 1950s.[145]

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[143] Walker, Inside/Outside, p. 33.

[144] See the essays in Long & Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the *Twenty Years' Crisis*; Wilson, 'The Myth of the First 'Great Debate'', p. 8; Lucian M. Ashworth, 'Did the realist-idealist debate ever happen? A revisionist history of International Relations', International Relations 16:1 (April 2002), pp. 33-52.

[145] 'For the most part', wrote Thompson in 1960, 'political realism has engendered controversy and debate rather than widespread consensus or agreement' (Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Approach to Foreign Policy (New York: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. vii). He added: 'It is not a mark of popularity to carry the name political realist'. See also Morgenthau's complaint, in the preface to the third edition of Politics among Nations (1960), that he was still being misunderstood – 'criticised', like Montesquieu, 'for ideas one had never held' and for his supposed blindness to moral problems. Such complaints might be dismissed as rhetorical artifice, but occur so frequently as to suggest the 'realists' were more embattled than is often recognised.

Even as pedagogic instruments, the 'traditional' and 'paradigmatic' approaches can be faulted, as Hans Morgenthau recognised. Writing to Thompson on the subject of Wight's 'three traditions', he observed:

> It is hard to see how the legal positivists and Hegel can be classified as Machiavellian and how Burke, Gladstone and Churchill can be made bedfellows with regard to their theories... To call Dulles an evolutionary Kantian and the propounders of Communism and of the Bandung Conference revolutionary Kantians seems to me on the face of it to border on the fantastic. To put Quakers and neutralism into the same category seems to me to be demonstrably erroneous. These categorizations appear, if not downright erroneous, to be greatly overdrawn and, far from adding to our understanding, actually to confuse it.[146]

Such difficulties with the 'traditional' and 'paradigmatic' approaches have resulted in something of a shift in recent writing towards the 'contextual' and 'discursive' methods.[147] Yet here too there are considerable problems. As a 'methodological demand', as Preston King has argued, 'contextualism' may well be a logical impossibility. Just as a text is the context of a paragraph, sentence, phrase or word, so too is a context, when itself the object of examination, a text. For King, this implies that 'if I must legitimate texts by putting them in context, then presumably I must equally legitimate contexts...by placing them in contexts'.[148] In the absence of hard-and-fast criteria by which to distinguish between texts and contexts, the true 'contextualist' would become trapped in

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[146] Hans Morgenthau to Kenneth Thompson, 9 November 1959, Morgenthau MSS, National Library of Congress, Washington. I am grateful to Mitchell Rologas for drawing my attention to this letter, and for providing me with a copy.

[147] See, for example, Haslam, No Virtue like Necessity and Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy.

[148] Preston King, 'Historical Contextualism: The New Historicism?', in his Thinking Past a Problem: Essays in the History of Ideas (London & Portland: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 187.

an ever-expanding hermeneutic circle from which escape would violate the central methodological premise.

The Skinnerian attempt to obviate anachronism in interpretation raises a further difficulty. At root, it relies upon the Rankean assumption that through the application of proper method, the historian's prejudices may be extinguished, and present-mindedness transcended.[149] This in itself, as King notes,[150] is a view with its own context: it is by definition present-minded, a prejudice of particular age. Moreover, as Michael Oakeshott recognised,[151] the texts by which historians can come to understand the past are irrevocably situated in the present. There is no past 'out there' to rediscover, as one might if it were indeed truly a 'foreign country'.[152] Skinner's attempt to provide an unmediated image of authorial intent – to transcend 'anachronism' through methodological rigour – is thus profoundly misguided. Rather, recognition that interpretation of the text can only occur in modes and categories of the present must be the pre-requisite of historical representation: the key claim of Gunnell, taking his ontological cue, as it were, from Gadamer.

Yet Gunnell's own approach – the 'discursive' method – is also open to criticism. The central difficulty lies in the location of the well-defined 'realm' of discourse that he maintained should be the primary focus of the historian of ideas. It may be illustrated by reference to the work of his followers in IR, Brian Schmidt and Tim Dunne. Like Gunnell, both structure their histories, of American international thought and the 'English school'

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[149] On anachronism, see Skinner, 'Meaning and Understanding', p. 34.

[150] King, 'Introduction' to Thinking Past a Problem, p. 6.

[151] Michael Oakeshott, On History and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), pp. 1-48.

[152] This metaphor was employed by David Lowenthal in The Past is a Foreign Country (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

respectively, around an exploration of realms of discourse: in the first, 'anarchy'; in the second, 'international society'. It is far from clear, however, that a discourse about 'anarchy' did constitute the discipline of IR in the nineteenth century, when Schmidt begins his history. Indeed, it could plausibly be argued that until Lowes Dickinson's seminal, though now largely forgotten, International Anarchy was published in 1926, the notion was confined to Americans, and especially to international lawyers. J. R. M. Butler's remark to Butterfield to the effect that the Dickinson's thesis had had a 'bad influence' on IR seems to suggest that discussion of 'anarchy' was not as central to the subject in Britain as Schmidt suggests.[153] Dunne's Inventing International Society displays a quite different flaw. For him, a conversation about the nature of 'international society' defines the limits of a particular realm of discourse: the so-called 'English school'. Yet, whilst discussion of this notion was a peculiar feature of the work of those whom Roy Jones originally labelled the 'English school' in 1981, it was not an idea confined to the LSE or the British Committee.[154] What is problematic for Schmidt and Dunne, while following Gunnell's approach, is the absence of clearly defined discursive realms – in stark contrast to other fields of study, political economy and natural history among them.[155]

There are, then, reasons to suspect the 'contextual' and 'discursive' approaches, as well as the 'traditional' and 'paradigmatic'. This is not to argue, however, that the

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[153] Butler to Butterfield, 11th June, 1950, Butterfield Papers 531(i)/B214.

[154] The phrase is common in the world of 'neo-Grotian' writers in the 1930s like Alfred Zimmern, and appears throughout Georg Schwarzenberger's Power Politics: A Study of International Society 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1951). It was used to by a number of post-war American 'realists', including Morgenthau and Kennan.

[155] In Foucault's The Archaeology of Knowledge trans. A.M. Sheridan-Smith (London: Routledge, 2001), for instance, is a discussion of these nineteenth and twentieth century 'discourses', each distinctive and each self-defined by a range of stipulative criteria and rhetorical strategies. See esp. pp. 64-70.

study of past thought should be neglected for want of a 'method'. Traditions of thought, as Gunnell, Burrow and others have maintained, may be identified, and there is no reason to dispense with the notion or that of the 'paradigm'. It is clear, moreover, that there are themes common to a (loose) 'canon' of thinkers on international relations which can serve as organising devices in exploring their thought, as Brown, Nardin and Rengger suggest.[156] Whilst such organisation can remove thinkers and theories from their historical context, whether linguistic, discursive or material, there is no necessary reason to lament this state of affairs. Contexts, as King has argued, can only serve to illuminate when 'hermeneutic or explanatory problems actually arise'; contextualisation must not be treated as a methodological injunction, rather as a heuristic instrument.[157] Moreover, as Burrow has reminded us, 'it is only an obligation to do history if history is what you claim to be doing'.[158] The criticisms of the Cambridge school are only valid in so far as they apply to histories *qua* histories; texts from the past, as Kenneth Minogue has pointed out, 'can also be used in a non-historical way'.[159]

For Minogue, ideas transcend circumstance: they may have validity or appeal beyond their time and place, and to treat them only historically, as objects of a dead past, is mistaken. Texts, and the ideas they embody, may be interpreted in a variety of contexts. Historical texts may thus be read not merely to undercover authorial intent in the context of their authors' political situation; they may be read to assess their aesthetic value or philosophical coherence. To use one of Oakeshott's distinctive metaphors, texts have

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[156] Chris Brown, Terry Nardin & Nicholas Rengger (eds.), International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 8-18.

[157] King, 'Historical Contextualism', p. 189.

[158] J. W. Burrow, Whigs and Liberals: Continuity and Change in English Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), p. 4.

different 'voices': the reader can listen to, and translate, the one of his or her choosing.[160] In the 'conversation' that goes by the name International Relations, a number of distinctive 'voices' may be heard. The historical, the scientific, the practical and the philosophical 'voices' each vie for the listener's ear – even the poetic mode of speech can occasionally be heard. International thought is concerned with past precedent, technique and ethical content as well as with action, and thus to orient the study of its history towards the form of international practice desired by this or that thinker would be misleading. The concern in what follows is as much with reactions to changing circumstance as it is with the practical implications of those ideas, with the roots of the doctrines as much as the doctrines themselves.

The selection of context determines, to a degree, the manner in which the texts are presented; as such, it represents an intrusion of the subjective into the process of interpretation. There seems little point in disguising this. The choice of 'crisis' as the overarching theme of the present thesis is impressionistic,[161] but nevertheless seems apt. Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight each sensed crisis, feeling as much as thinking that worsening international relations threatened 'civilisation', and setting out to explore the nature of that crisis and the practical means that might be employed to address it. To interpret their thought in this context is to do so on their own terms, to enter, as far as it is possible, into their thought-worlds. Where necessary or desirable, in what follows, other contexts are explored in an attempt to cast light on their beliefs or ideas, and situate them

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[159] Kenneth Minogue, 'Method in intellectual history: Quentin Skinner's *Foundations*', in Tully, Meaning and Context, p. 178.

[160] This notion of 'voices' is taken from Michael Oakeshott, 'The voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind', in his Rationalism in politics and other essays (Indianapolis: LibertyPress, 1991), pp. 488-542.

[161] For Burrow, a 'balanced impressionism' might even be considered a virtue (Crisis of Reason, p. xv).

within contemporary debates. At times too, the approach that has been taken is thematic, to illustrate dominant aspects of their thought.

Chapter III explores the beliefs of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight, examining them in terms of a theme – Providence, Love and Eschatology respectively – emblematic of each man's religious thought. The aim is to present an account of the foundations, sometime hidden, sometimes visible, of their international thought, often recognised to have such a basis, but rarely examined in any detail. Chapter IV deals with their treatment of history: their historical method, their understandings of the shape of the past and of the relationship between the study of history and political practice. Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight all spent all or some of their careers as professional historians, and it was through history, along with religion, that they approached the international realm. Chapters V and VI address their diagnoses of the international crisis they perceived had occurred in the twentieth century, and the palliatives they suggested or implied might resolve it. These chapters are entitled 'challenge' and 'response' – an echo of one of the metaphors Toynbee employed in his Study of History to explain the process of historical change.

III. Religion: Love, Eschatology and Providence

> ...though I do not share Martin's Christian religious faith, I do share his conviction that religion is the most important thing in human life, and consequently I am his fellow heretic from the standpoint which is now prevalent in the non-Communist as well as in the Communist world.[1]
>
> Toynbee

> ...what matters not is whether there is going to be another war or not; but that it should be recognised, if it comes, as an act of God's Justice, and if it averted, as an act of God's Mercy. It is when all our hopes and fears are crushed and ground down to this level of submission to God's will, that our prayers may perhaps have the quality that can even alter history.[2]
>
> Wight

> Nothing is more important for the cause of religion at the present day than that we should recover the sense and consciousness of the Providence of God...a living thing, operating in all the details of life.[3]
>
> Butterfield

Religion animated and bounded the thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight. It underpinned their wider thought: it cannot be treated as a private issue, but rather requires explication and analysis prior to the treatment of their approaches to history and international politics. Their religious views were sometimes public and professed,

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[1] Toynbee to Bull, 18 April 1974, Toynbee MSS 86.

[2] Wight, 'Christian Commentary', p. 5.

sometimes private and suppressed, but were never absent from their minds. The particular form of these beliefs gave these other aspects of their thought distinctive hues, influencing each man's understandings of the nature of human character and the prospects for social and political progress. Their beliefs, moreover, changed over time, and as they did so, caused shifts in other aspects of their thought, not least on international relations. These changes were sometimes radical, and more often subtle.

Their writings of the dark days of crisis, the 1940s, are of especial interest; it is because of these that it is possible to sketch, however imperfectly, their religious convictions. Without them, it would be difficult to establish with anything approaching certainty these very personal aspects of the thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight. Individual consciences are impossible to fathom, but when a need is felt to bear witness, as there was for all three men, it is possible to gauge at least some of their depths. In this chapter, their beliefs are thus explored in terms of themes that seem to have dominated their religious writings. For Toynbee that theme was 'Love'; for Wight, 'eschatology'; and for Butterfield, it was 'Providence'. These themes form the three poles around which the chapter is constructed. The broader context, the theological debates and changing patterns of religious belief among the British intelligentsia in the first half of the twentieth century, requires explication by way of introduction.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, three theological movements were prominent in English Christianity. Two – Anglo-Catholicism and liberalism – may be seen to be broadly 'latitudinarian',[4] and sought to accommodate Christianity to aspects of modern life. The first desired a reconciliation between the fundamentals of Christian

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[3] Herbert Butterfield, 'God in History' [1952] in McIntire, Herbert Butterfield: Writings, p. 4.

[4] For a discussion of this term, see Maurice Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine in Modern England III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. xvi.

belief, as they saw them, and orthodox understandings of the Church with the fruits of the critical scholarship that had, in the previous half-century, helped to undermine traditional understandings of the provenance of Scripture and the authority of the Church. Critical of the political control of the Church that was established at the Reformation, the Anglo-Catholics wished that it was instead 'master in its own house', and committed to the preservation of the sacraments, ritual and symbolism of the Catholic tradition.[5] At the same time, they shared with liberal theologians a willingness to engage with, and often embrace, Biblical criticism and historical research. But where for liberals critical scholarship generated grounds for reform and change to the doctrines and practices of the Church, for Anglo-Catholics, the fruits of modern academic research did not challenge the validity of established theological precepts nor the sacramental and liturgical traditions that went with them.

Alongside Anglo-Catholics and liberals were ranged a variety of Evangelicals. The latter rejected the accommodations made by Anglo-Catholics and liberals with critical scholarship, and adhered to the position that Scripture was 'authoritative and inspired', the literal Word of God.[6] In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as scientific discovery was seen to be threatening the foundations of religion, this robust and uncompromising position held great appeal. At Oxford and Cambridge, evangelical Christianity found its home in the Christian Unions, created in the late 1870s, and initially attracted many students to the faith. Between 1900 and 1920 there was a shift away from evangelicalism. Atheism and agnosticism were increasingly prevalent amongst undergraduates, in part due to their exposure to critical historical method in Greats, History and Divinity, as well as to the comparative study of religion in the work of James

[5] Adrian Hastings, A History of English Christianity 1920-1985 (London: Collins, 1986), p. 52.
[6] Ibid., p. 324.

Frazer and others.[7] At the same time, it should be noted, there was an upsurge in popular and intellectual interest in a range of unorthodox religious and quasi-religious ideas – in various occult arts, for instance, or extra-sensory perception. Many who dismissed Christianity as superstition or worse, like the fervent atheist Gilbert Murray and his daughter Rosalind, later to be Toynbee's wife and convert to Roman Catholicism, dabbled in such areas as 'psychical research'.[8]

The First World War accelerated the trend towards agnosticism that had begun at the turn of the century. There was, understandably, considerable disillusionment with the muscular Christianity of the public schools and Oxbridge that had animated the junior officers who fought and died in such numbers on the Western Front.[9] The abandonment, during the 1920s, of the requirement to attend college chapel, and the growing numbers of non-conformist undergraduates, tutors and professors, changed the religious complexion of the Universities further, undermining the influence of the Anglican establishment. Important too was the lack of what Hastings calls 'outstanding lay believers'. The prominence of the Christian socialist R. H. Tawney was an exception than illustrated the rule, as 'agnosticism' became 'the common ground of almost all first rank intellectuals'.[10] Particularly lacking in leadership were the Evangelicals, whose appeal waned during the 1920s; the liberals and Anglo-Catholics were a little more fortunate. The former claimed

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[7] Hastings argues that Frazer's Golden Bough became 'almost the bible of the 1920s: the book of religion par excellence' (Ibid., p. 223). Wight's verdict on The Golden Bough is worth quoting: 'Frazer, for all his greatness, was deeply ignorant of Christianity' ('God in History', unpublished sermon delivered at Great St Mary's, Cambridge, 4 February 1951, p. 5).

[8] Duncan Wilson, Gilbert Murray, OM 1866-1957 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp. 269-282.

[9] V. H. H. Green, Religion at Oxford and Cambridge (London: SCM Press, 1964), p. 346.

[10] Hastings, History of English Christianity, p. 225.

such figures as William Temple,[11] while the Anglo-Catholics were graced by the Cambridge scholars E. G. Selwyn and Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, two of the contributors to Essays Catholic and Critical (1926), one of the most important products of English theological scholarship in the inter-war years.[12]

The agnostic moment, however, did not last long. 'The central tide of English thought and culture in the 1930s', Hastings has remarked, 'was flowing quite perceptibly in one large direction: from irreligion to religion, from liberal or modernist religion to neo-orthodoxy, and from Protestantism to Catholicism'.[13] There had been hints of this shift in the second half of the 1920s: C. S. Lewis had returned to the Church of England in 1926, and T. S. Eliot followed a year later. Roman Catholicism, rather than Anglicanism, claimed the most converts amongst leading intellectuals in the 1930s, amongst them Evelyn Waugh, Graham Greene, Frank Pakenham and Sir George Clark, and Catholic writers – the historian Christopher Dawson especially – became increasingly influential.[14]

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[11] On Temple, see F. A. Iremonger, William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and Letters (London: Oxford University Press, 1948) and John Kent, William Temple: Church, State and Society in Britain 1880-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

[12] On Hoskyns, see Charles Smyth's introductory essay 'Edwyn Clement Hoskyns', in E. C. Hoskyns, Cambridge Sermons (London: SPCK Press, 1938), pp. vii-xxviii. His thought has been summarised thus by Owen Chadwick: 'He rejected fundamentalist ideas of the biblical evidence. History was history, and minds must be free. He rejected hot methods of evangelism by mission... He suspected the dominant [liberal] divinity of shallowness and undue optimism'. (Chadwick, Michael Ramsey: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 28-29. Though Anglo-Catholicism was a great deal stronger at Cambridge in the 1920s than at Oxford, liberal theology dominated both. Hoskyns remained a somewhat isolated figure in the Cambridge divinity faculty, despite a considerable following among undergraduates.

[13] Hastings, History of English Christianity, p. 289.

[14] Ibid., p. 279. Hastings argues, plausibly, that the converts of the 1930s were attracted to the 'authoritativeness' of Roman Catholicism: 'they found in it a sure framework for spiritual progress, literary creativity and political stability, but also for an ordered and coherent view of

Conversions, and the growing social acceptability of the work of Catholic scholars, illustrated not only a new sympathy form religion amongst intellectuals, but also a wider ecumenism. This was stimulated in part by academic, ecclesiastical and cultural contacts fostered by the League of Nations.[15] It was the League's political failure, however, that encouraged many to turn to religion in general, and to ecumenism in particular. Religion offered an alternative to political means, but there was little agreement as to the form required. While Eliot and Dawson sought a return to a medieval order dominated by an authoritative and authoritarian Church,[16] others embraced 'rejectionist' creeds, urging their followers to focus solely upon the other-worldly.

This 'rejectionism' came in many forms. Perhaps the most important was the neo-orthodoxy emanating from continental theologians, among them Karl Barth. This found its way into British intellectual circles mainly through Hoskyns' 1933 translation of his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.[17] The work of Reinhold Niebuhr and the links created by the burgeoning ecumenical movement also played their part.[18] This latter's message was itself, according to Hastings, Barthian: they sought 'to fulfil the first duty of

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the world to replace the increasing intellectual and ideological confusion evident outside the walls' (pp. 279-280). Dawson had converted in 1914, at the age of 25.

[15] Ibid., p. 305.

[16] See, for instance, T. S. Eliot's The Idea of a Christian Society (London: Faber & Faber, 1939). It was not only Catholic intellectuals who promoted this vision of a Christian society. The thought of V. A. Demant's Anglo-Catholic 'Christendom Group' was also marked by a rejection of secular liberalism, and a belief that Catholic dogma and the medieval social system could solve modern economic problems and restore social harmony (Kent, Temple, p. 151).

[17] Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).

[18] Niebuhr was not a Barthian, but his work may be seen to have accustomed English-speaking audiences to Barth's message. On Niebuhr and on the ecumenical movement, see Alec R. Vidler, The Church in an Age of Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961), pp. 220-221 & pp. 257-268 respectively.

the Church and witness in faith and with independence to the world of sin, modern ideology, and secular tyranny when the [national] Churches could, or would, not do it'.[19] Neo-orthodoxy and ecumenism, however, were not the only products of this mood. Pacifism too was eagerly embraced by many - though in the face of vehement opposition from Barth and other neo-orthodox thinkers - not least because of the efforts of H. R. L. 'Dick' Sheppard, an Anglican clergyman.[20] Whilst the 'Peace Pledge Union', the organisation he created, drew together pacifists both religious and secular,[21] Christians constituted the core of the movement. For them, Sheppard's message struck a chord: war contravened both the letter of the Biblical injunction 'thou shalt not kill' and the spirit of Christ's teachings. The command to affirm a policy of pacifism was thus absolute and binding.[22] Pacifism in this form aroused the ire of many Christians, including William Temple, who denounced it as heresy.[23]

Sheppard's doctrines illustrated some of the broader features of the religious revival of the 1930s and 1940s. They embodied a yearning for reformation, for a return to the pre-Constantinian Church, free of ties to the state – an objective they held in common

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[19] Hastings, History of English Christianity, p. 305. The ecumenical movement, argues Hastings, 'saw themselves as Church over against the world, in a near-Barthian way, different from that of the theologically rose-tinted spectacles and natural/supernatural assimilation of earlier years'. The fruit of the ecumenical movement of the time was the creation of the World Council of Churches in 1938.

[20] The sole study devoted to Sheppard's life seems to be R. Ellis Roberts' hagiographical H. R. L. Sheppard: Life and Letters (London: John Murray, 1942). Information can also be gleaned from Sybil Morrison's 'I Renounce War': The Story of the Peace Pledge Union (London: Sheppard Press, 1962) and from the PPU's website, http://www.ppu.org.uk/learn/infodocs/people/pst_dick.html.

[21] The PPU, as Morrison wrote, was open to all 'agnostics, atheists, socialists, Christians and members of other religions' (Morrison, 'I Renounce War', p. 14). See also Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, p. 222.

[22] Roberts, Sheppard, p. 335.

with the Anglo-Catholics. They had also, at times, a millenarian, apocalyptic undertone that may be located both in earlier reforming movements and in Barthian neo-orthodox theology.[24] Unlike the First World War, the Second served not to undermine belief, but to stimulate it. It was, after all, the war for 'Christian civilisation',[25] and it produced, as one observer noted, a palpable 'counter-drift towards religion'.[26] There was a greater willingness, during and after the war, 'to consider sympathetically, if not embrace, the claims of the Christian religion as a way of life'.[27] For new converts, or those who had recovered their faith, the 'theology of crisis' of Jacques Maritain, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr held great appeal. The popularity of their and others' ideas created the impression of a 'genuine religious revival' during the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s, welcomed by intellectual believers like Willey, and treated with some hostility by secular writers of the Left.[28] The moment, however, was short-lived, and it seems fair to say, with Hastings, that by 1949, the 'revival' had reached its peak.[29]

Brief though the 'revival' was, it should not be represented as a purely neo-orthodox movement. Liberal and modernist theology continued to attract adherents. Though Temple died in 1944, the ideas he expressed in Christianity and the Social Order

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[23] Hastings, History of English Christianity, p. 334.

[24] Ibid., p. 335. Hastings argues that by the time Sheppard died, in 1937, the PPU was beginning to take on the appearance of 'an incipient millenarian cult'.

[25] Churchill used this expression on a number of occasions in 1940. See 'War of the Unknown Warriors', BBC broadcast, 14 July 1940 & 'Their Finest Hour', Speech to the Commons, 18 June 1940, both at http://www.winstonchurchill.org/speeches.html.

[26] Basil Willey, Christianity Past and Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 7 & p. 134.

[27] Green, Religion at Oxford and Cambridge, p. 354.

[28] For a representative treatment of the 'revival' by a Leftist intellectual, see Annan's 'People', pp. 128-137.

[29] Hastings, History of English Christianity, p. 491.

and elsewhere inspired many seeking to create a 'New Jerusalem' in the post-war years.[30] Christian socialism, with its liberal theological core, was the creed of many on the Left now entrusted with the reins of power, not least Clement Attlee. In the realm of international affairs liberal Christianity continued to be influential, not least through the efforts of Margery Perham and Michael Scott on Britain's African colonies.[31] It would be wrong, therefore, to present the post-war 'revival' in terms solely of the work of neo-orthodox thinkers like Barth or Niebuhr. Indeed, it might be more accurate to suggest that their thought modified and tempered indigenous British theological trends without displacing the dominant liberal and modernist views. Alfred Zimmern's Spiritual Values and World Affairs (1939) is illustrative of this process, showing the accommodation that might be made by theological liberals to Barthian or Anglo-Catholic assaults on their supposed Pelagian optimism. Criticising the 'intrusion' of religious language and 'pseudo-religious sentiment' into political debate, Zimmern urged Christians to render unto God and Caesar their proper due.[32] In so doing, he sought to chart a course between the 'extravagant hopes that so many Christians entertained a few years ago' and the 'mood of almost eschatological despair which is as un-Christian as it is unscholarly'.[33] Zimmern's was not a view for which, as we shall see, Wight had a great deal of sympathy. Like Toynbee and Butterfield, he sensed – at times at least – a positive requirement to express political issues in religious categories. In the next three sections, the beliefs that grounded this sentiment are explored, beginning with those of Toynbee.

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[30] Kent, Temple, p. 1.

[31] Hastings, History of English Christianity, pp. 430-433.

[32] Sir Alfred Zimmern, Spiritual Values and World Affairs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1939), p. 63, pp. 64-65 & p. 24.

[33] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

Toynbee and Love

> I believe that the ultimate spiritual reality is Love. In terms of our ancestral Christian religion, I believe in the crucifixion, but not in the Resurrection or the Ascension.[34]

Despite his flirtations with Bergsonian 'intuitionism', Roman Catholicism, and various forms of syncretism, Toynbee's view of religion remained remarkably consistent throughout most of his adult life. At its core was the notion of 'Love': the divine Love of Creator for the created and the reflection of that Love that Toynbee wished to see between his fellow men. Indeed, it is difficult not to see Toynbee's changing religious convictions as variations on the central themes of liberal theology famously parodied by Richard Niebuhr. Toynbee's God was 'without wrath', the kingdom 'without judgement', and Christ without suffering on the cross. As his life went on, religion replaced politics as the vehicle for 'nurture of kindly sentiments, the extension of humanitarian ideals, and the progress of civilisation',[35] though it was balanced with a conviction of the reality of universal sin. Throughout, Toynbee remained formally 'agnostic', disavowing any 'exclusive' affiliation with a particular Church.[36] There were moments when such a move seemed possible: in the late 1930s and early 1940s, he became a Roman Catholic in all but name, and he was content to be identified as a member of the Anglican communion in 1953.[37] Toynbee was not, however, willing to take the final plunge, clinging instead to a

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[34] Toynbee to Henkel, 16 September 1971, Toynbee MSS 128.

[35] H. Richard Niebuhr, quoted in Vidler, Church in an Age of Revolution, p. 21. Philip Bagby summed up Toynbee's religious views as 'pacifist, humanitarian and eclectic – Liberalism reinforced by a personal vision of mystical Christianity' ('Study of Toynbee: A Personal View of History', TLS 2751 (22 October 1954), p. 666).

[36] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 127.

[37] See D. M. MacKinnon's edited Christian Faith and Communist Faith: A Series of Studies by Members of the Anglican Communion (London: Macmillan, 1953) to which Toynbee

deeply idiosyncratic agnosticism, hostile to dogma and doctrine, but mystical and quasi-Christian in expression.

Like Wight, Toynbee was born into the Church of England and educated at a school – Winchester – at which the practice and teaching of the Anglican tradition were prominent. He did not reflect upon this at any length in his autobiographical writings, though in his correspondence with Cary-Elwes there is a reference to his 'ordinary Anglican upbringing at home and school'.[38] In retrospect, Toynbee considered his great-uncle, Harry Toynbee, an 'evangelical tee-totaller, non-smoker and non-swearer', 'low-church Anglican' and 'militant anti-papist', to have had the most profound influence on his early thought.[39] How far Harry actually influenced his nephew is unclear. In McNeill's view, Toynbee was impressed by the puritan disdain for ecclesiastical hierarchy of his great-uncle, and his insistence on 'self-worship' being the central sin of humankind.[40] This is certainly plausible. It is likely, however, that in this regard he was as influenced – probably at second-hand – by the philosophical Idealism of his uncle's generation, especially the theology of T. H. Green, with its emphasis on 'Love' as the 'essential quality of Christianity' and its rejection of dogma and authority in religion.[41]

As an undergraduate, Toynbee 'drifted out' of the Anglican Church,[42] coming to see religion only as 'an important illusion'.[43] His thought, however, remained infused with

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contributed. Toynbee first suggested that Wight write this chapter, but the latter refused. See George Bell, Bishop of Chichester to Wight, 30 August 1950, Wight MSS 233 1/9.

[38] Toynbee, 'The Gulf between the Modern Western Paganism and Catholic Christianity, as it appears to AJT', 5 August 1938, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 19.

[39] Toynbee, Acquaintances, p. 1 & p. 7.

[40] McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 7-8.

[41] Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and his Age (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996), p. 101.

[42] Toynbee, 'Gulf between Modern Western Paganism and Catholic Christianity', p. 19.

religious categories and ideas. Prophets, martyrs and virgins feature prominently in one letter to Robert Darbishire from 1911,[44] and a surviving essay from the same academic year, 'What the Historian does', makes great play of the notion of 'spirit' and ends with a quotation from the Old Testament.[45] The greatest lasting influence on Toynbee's thought during this period came from the work of Henri Bergson; indeed McNeill asserts his encounter with the Frenchman's thought prompted Toynbee's final abandonment of Anglicanism.[46] This may well have been the case. Toynbee was probably introduced to Bergson's work by his erstwhile friend and mentor A. D. Lindsay, who lectured on L'Evolution créatrice (1907) at Balliol in 1910-11,[47] and it is around the same time that he became an agnostic.

Lindsay, for his part, considered Bergson's 'latitudinarian' effort to reconcile Christianity with modern science in very high esteem, and argued that his work offered an 'ideal' philosophical method.[48] The young Toynbee was equally impressed.[49] Writing to

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[43] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 127.

[44] Toynbee to Darbishire 17 May 1911, Toynbee MSS 80.

[45] 'What the Historian does', Toynbee MSS 1, p. 30 & p. 39.

[46] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 36.

[47] Lindsay's lectures were subsequently published as The Philosophy of Bergson (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1911). It is plausible that Toynbee read Bergson earlier than this: the publication of L'Evolution créatrice (Paris: Alcan, 1908; in English: Creative Evolution trans. Arthur Mitchell (London: Macmillan, 1911)) was something of an event. As Kolakowski has observed, the book 'changed the intellectual climate of Europe: its impact was immense' (L. Kolakowski, Bergson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 55).

[48] Lindsay, Philosophy of Bergson p. v.

[49] It is worth noting, however, Toynbee was curiously reticent about acknowledging Bergson's early influence for some reason. In the acknowledgements for the Study, contained in volume X, Bergson is according little space. He is mentioned once, in passing, in a passage on the wartime Foreign Office (p. 227) and once for having 'taught' Toynbee 'that the ideal of the brotherhood of Mankind presupposes a belief in the fatherhood of God' (p. 236). It is notable, however, that

another friend, Robert Darbishire in 1925, during a visit to the United States, he complained of bungled train reservations and a desire to spend his time otherwise engaged:

> ...the project of sitting six hours in that waiting room - instead of reading Bergson on a North Carolinian Mountain Top - was so desperate that I boarded the afternoon train and in due course got the lower berth.[50]

What attracted him to Bergson's thought was the centrality of mysticism. For the Frenchman, mystics were the progenitors of religions and those capable of sustaining their 'dynamism'.[51] They were rare individuals capable of tapping the creative energy - *élan vital* - of life. They were, Bergson argued, 'capable of transcending the limitations imposed on the species by its material nature'.[52] The problem was, he considered, religions became static when ruled by intelligence, that capacity designed to 'utilize matter, to dominate things, to master events'.[53] For Bergson, the exercise of intelligence was a 'defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent to society'.[54] It sprang from fear - for the individual of failure, and ultimately of death, and for society, of dissolution – and brought 'security and serenity', but not moral progress. Without periodical reinvigoration with mystical insights, religions became 'static' and withered.

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the characteristically flowery peroration of Toynbee's section on religion in volume VII ends with a passage reflecting upon Bergson's thought (p. 568).

[50] Toynbee to Darbishire, 23 September 1925, Toynbee MSS 80.

[51] For Bergson, 'religion is to mysticism what popularization is to science'. See Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion trans. R. Ashley Audra & Cloudesley Brereton (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 239.

[52] Ibid., pp. 220-221.

[53] Ibid., p. 162.

[54] Ibid., p. 205 & p. 213.

Such views were congenial to the agnostic Toynbee, convinced as he was (by his Uncle Harry and the ghost of T. H. Green) of the dangers of hierarchy and especially authority. Moreover, he shared with Bergson a fascination for 'exceptional men'. As he wrote to Darbishire in 1911:

> Methinks there are two great classes of people, first the fanatics – prophets, martyrs (and virgins) – who set the task and create the new work – it is the work their soul is in love with: secondly, the great multitude of comfortable men, who perform the immense labour of just keeping going what has been created, which can be done without having one's heart in it at all: and they are the people who marry...and beget children - all of which is advisable for one to do oneself, unless one is right certain that one's of the Platonic hero-type... I have never heard of any man or woman (especially of any woman) who could do both at once, however great he or she was. A gloomy dilemma...[55]

The overtones of Bergsonian philosophy – 'fanatics' creating, the rest 'keeping going that which has been created' – are clearly audible, and they remain so in A Study of History. In volume III, Toynbee returned to this idea. 'The individuals who perform... [the]...miracle of creation', he wrote, 'and who thereby bring about the growth of the societies in which they arise, are more than mere men'.[56] He continued: 'the mystically illuminated Personality...stands to ordinary Human Nature as civilisations stand to primitive human societies'.[57] These 'superhumans' produce creative acts, as Bergson

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[55] Toynbee to Darbishire, 17 May 1911, Toynbee MSS 80.

[56] Toynbee, Study, III, p. 232. It should be noted that there are strong similarities between Toynbee's argument here and that of Lionel Curtis, in his Civitas Dei, p. 281.

[57] Toynbee, Study III, p. 234.

argued, through a 'supreme moment of mystical experience'.[58] Through 'withdrawal', he (for, as we have seen, Toynbee considered there were few 'shes' amongst this group) is 'released for a moment from his social toils and trammels' to enter a 'world of contemplation'.[59] Returning to the social world, however, the 'creative personality' acts to change it. Their creativity precipitates 'social conflict', disrupts the security of static society, often resulting in the persecution of the individual concerned by the comfortable men. Yet in offering formulae – doctrine and ritual – for the masses to follow by 'mimesis', the creative individual nevertheless achieves his aim, changing society and wresting the religion from torpor.[60]

In both his characterisation of the 'creative personality', and in his account of how this 'superhuman' individual acts upon society at large, Toynbee follows closely Bergson's account – in The Two Sources – of the emergence of 'dynamic religion'. But in support of his thesis he draws upon a number of other writers. Most prominent is J. C. Smuts' Holism and Evolution, but most relevant to the present discussion is John Middleton Murry's God,[61] a book that lies firmly within the liberal theological tradition. In a footnote, Toynbee draws attention to the similarities between Bergson's understanding of the creative mystic, and Murry's account of Christ as a 'new kind of man...a new species of the *Genus Homo*'.[62] For Toynbee, Christ was the paradigmatic

[58] Ibid., p. 232. Here, Toynbee quotes Bergson's Two Sources of Morality and Religion.

[59] Ibid., p. 248 & pp. 254-255.

[60] Ibid., pp. 246-247. There are similarities here to Green's notion that, as Richter puts it, 'Christianity was at first the immediate intuition of a small group of uneducated men' (Richter, Politics of Conscience, p. 102).

[61] John Middleton Murry, God: Being an introduction to the science of metabiology (London: Jonathan Cape, 1929).

[62] Toynbee, Study III, p. 232, note 1.

creative individual; the Gospels, he considered, are replete with the '"Withdrawal-and-Return" motif'.[63]

Toynbee's inclusion of Christ in the Study, albeit as a 'creative personality' is illustrative of his movement, during the 1930s, towards a more sympathetic appreciation of Christianity. Indeed in these years his writing displayed a marked increase in his use of religious language.[64] Throughout, Bergsonian ideas of creativity mingle with Christian imagery, the latter often employed metaphorically, but suggestive of the direction that Toynbee's mind was to take in the years to come. Though still nominally agnostic, changes in his personal circumstances helped to shift him towards a re-evaluation of Christianity. In 1929, his wife Rosalind converted to Anglicanism on the way to an eventual acceptance, in 1932 or 1933, of Roman Catholicism.[65] Toynbee, for his part, remained unconvinced of the doctrines of any one Church, but by 1930, he recalled later, had come to believe in the notions of a transcendent reality and of God.[66] Both, it seems, were confirmed by a curious episode two years later. In Shanghai, as Toynbee struggled with his feelings for his travelling companion, Eileen Power, he underwent a mystical experience of his own. He recalled later (1969) that he had 'felt as if a transcendent spiritual presence, standing for righteousness beyond my reach, had come down to the rescue and had given to my inadequate human righteousness the aid without which it could not have won its desperate battle'.[67]

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[63] Ibid., p. 261.

[64] See, for example, the introduction to Toynbee, Survey 1928, especially p. 1.

[65] McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 155-157.

[66] Toynbee, 'Gulf between Modern Western Paganism and Catholic Christianity' in Peper (ed), An Historian's Conscience, p. 19.

Toynbee was affected too by the state of international affairs. McNeill has quite plausibly suggested that guilt at having avoided conscription during the Great War caused his investment of much of physical and emotional energy in the project of international reform. 'By devoting his life to that task', McNeill has written, 'Toynbee came to believe that he could atone for not having fought and died in the trenches as so many of his contemporaries had done'.[68] As this project unravelled, he turned from politics to religion, a shift that can be charted in his writings and correspondence. His 'World-Order or Downfall?' broadcast lectures (1930), for instance, proclaim a 'need for international salvation' and Bergsonian 'creative acts' to surmount the checks and frustrations of 'political interference', and end with an appeal to 'To glorify God and enjoy Him for ever'.[69] This rejection of politics was most stark in personal correspondence. The following was to Lionel Curtis, in 1934:

> ...I don't believe that Mankind is going to find its salvation in politics. I think that politics and economics are like drains. If you let them go wrong, appalling things happen; but to keep them in order is neither the object of life nor an object that is attainable by aiming at it directly. I think if people's religious relations are right, then politics and economics come right automatically and incidentally, while, if religious relations are wrong, politics and economics are past praying for.[70]

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[67] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 176. Se also. McNeill, Toynbee, p. 144. That battle, McNeill shows, was with sexual desire, namely that which he felt for Eileen Power.

[68] McNeill, 'Toynbee Revisited', p. 179.

[69] Toynbee, 'The Question Mark Confronting Us', The Listener 4:94, 12 November 1930, p. 775; 'Economics versus Politics', The Listener 4:95, 19 November 1930, p. 824; 'The Great Society', The Listener 4:99, 17 December 1930, p. 1017.

[70] Toynbee to Lionel Curtis, 24 March 1934, Curtis MSS 112/23-25. This letter reprised Toynbee to Lionel Curtis, 21 December 1932, Curtis MSS 6/99.

Toynbee confessed even more to his fellow historian G. N. Clark. As he noted, in 1936, reflecting upon his growing religiosity and his personal life:

> ...bringing up children is what has had the greatest effect on me, because...as I have found in my particular circumstances - it is such a hard and ungrateful job, and the results that one produces are so disproportionately small compared to the efforts that one makes (compared, for instance, with the profit-and-loss account of one's intellectual work) that no utilitarian philosophy can make it tolerable, and yet one feels a categorical imperative to go on doing one's best at it.[71]

Despite this soul-searching, and a close friendship forged, from 1936, with Columba Cary-Elwes,[72] a Dominican friar of Ampleforth, Toynbee did not return to the Church of England, and nor did he convert, as Columba, Rosalind and Clark desired, to Catholicism.[73] He came closest in 1939-40, as McNeill suggests, in part as a consequence of personal misfortune and international crisis.[74] The deaths of his mother (in February 1939) and his son (March 1939) affected him deeply and prompted Toynbee to turn more fully to faith. The second of his mystical experiences recalled in Experiences may also

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[71] Toynbee to G. N. 'James' Clark, 3 October 1936, Clark MSS 213/1.

[72] Peper, 'Introduction' to his edited An Historian's Conscience, p. xii.

[73] In December 1936, to Clark, Toynbee described himself as 'a sort of hermit crab, living like a lodger in a shell discovered by Rosalind'. He was unable to move from this position. See Toynbee to G. N. 'James' Clark, 9 December 1936, Clark MSS 213/2. In frustration at Toynbee's inaction, Columba broke off contact with him in September of 1944, only to resume it again in 1946. See Toynbee to Cary-Elwes, 20 September 1944, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, pp. 171-175.

[74] It is worth noting, however, that Toynbee was espousing, according to his father-in-law 'a belief in the divinity of Jesus, the Virgin Birth, and Lord knows what other bizarre and speculative beliefs' prior to the death of his mother. In Murray's eyes, Toynbee had come to accept the central tenets of Roman Catholicism before the personal calamities of 1939. See Gilbert Murray to Lionel Curtis, 10 February 1939, Curtis MSS 13/128.

have pushed him in this direction.[75] International events played their part too. In response to the coming of war, in common with so many of his contemporaries, Toynbee turned to St Augustine and his City of God.[76] Despite a *faux*-modest disclaimer, in the preface of volume IV of the Study, published in 1939, he drew a parallel not merely with Alaric's sack of Rome in 410 and impending war with Hitler, but also between the two works.[77] In 1940, while at Oxford with the FRPS, he 'began a regular program of contemplation and devotional reading' with Augustine's Confessions at its core.[78]

Toynbee's 'Augustinian moment' was brief. During the late 1940s, he was involved in a number of Christian projects, including the 'Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches', but his Augustinianism had already ebbed away.[79] In 1942, his marriage with Rosalind had deteriorated to the point of a permanent separation, which occurred in November, and McNeill suggests that this 'checked Toynbee's approach to Catholicism'.[80] The collapse of his marriage greatly depressed Toynbee, but brought him into contact with an alternative source of spiritual solace. By 1944, he was undergoing intensive psycho-analysis, fearing that, as he put it, he was 'lying paralysed and waiting for either insanity or suicide to swoop on me'.[81]

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[75] This experience was an encounter with a divine entity at his dying son's bedside. See Toynbee, Experiences, p. 176; McNeill, Toynbee, p. 144; Toynbee to Columba, 19 March 1939, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 33.

[76] In 1938, he told Lionel Curtis that 'with great affection and respect towards you and your Civitas [Dei]' he was more willing to 'put my own treasures in St Augustine's – which, I fancy, might seem to you to be in come inaccessible place beyond the horizon' (Toynbee to Curtis, 24 May 1938 Curtis MSS 142-3).

[77] Toynbee, Study, iv, p. ix.

[78] McIntire, 'Toynbee's Philosophy of History: His Christian Period', in McIntire & Perry, Toynbee Reappraisals, p. 72.

[79] Ibid., p. 77.

[80] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 189.

[81] Toynbee to Columba, 14 July 1944, in Peper (ed.), Historian's Conscience, p. 169.

Though he continued to correspond with Columba Cary-Elwes, Toynbee moved further away from the conversion that the latter desired would come, and instead embarked upon the study of Jungian psychology, the influence of which is clearly evident in volume VII of the Study.[82]

Toynbee's mature religious beliefs mixed Jungian notions of psychological types with the Bergsonian mysticism and low-Church hostilities of his youth. As Martin Wight recognised, Toynbee never dismissed ideas old or new, he merely assimilated them into a framework already decided upon.[83] Indeed, what is also remarkable, given his shifts from agnosticism to quasi-Roman Catholicism and then to syncretism, is the consistency of the central ideas of his beliefs, not least his conception of God. In 1934, he wrote to Lionel Curtis asking after the notion of God that was present in the latter's Civitas Dei:

> I can't make out whether you...regard God himself as a metaphor for that infinite sense of obligation of each human being to others which is – I profoundly agree – the only possible basis for a good human society.[84]

Toynbee's concern was that Curtis' God stood in 'a relation of authority' as against human beings, and this he could not accept. His God was that of Love, and in this conception there are strong echoes of Idealist philosophy and Bergsonian mysticism. In Two Sources and elsewhere, the latter argued that 'love is not a divine attribute, it is God himself', and it was to this idea that Toynbee became wedded.[85] It is most clear in his (highly controversial) writings on Judaism, where he insisted that the assertion that 'God

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[82] See especially Toynbee, Study VII, pp. 716-736.

[83] Wight, 'Arnold Toynbee: An Appreciation', p. 12.

[84] Toynbee to Curtis, 24 March 1934, Curtis MSS 112/23-25.

[85] Kolakowski, Bergson, p. 82 & p. 83. Cf. Bergson, Two Sources, p. 252.

is Love' represented the key to Christianity's break with Judaism, replacing a 'Jealous Yahweh' with a benevolent King in Heaven.[86]

At the same time, Toynbee refused to accept any form of authority in religion. In 1938 and again in 1944, he explained to Columba that he could not embrace the 'central point of Catholic doctrine: the Real Presence and the powers of the Priest', and for this reason would not convert.[87] But Toynbee's objections went further. All doctrine, he implied in one letter, is merely 'silt and flotsam...accidentally picked up' by the 'pure water' of the Church.[88] On this point, he saw himself simply as a theological 'Modernist', though Bergsonian and Jungian notions seem to lurk in the shadows. To Columba Toynbee protested at the Catholic Church's tendency, as he perceived it, to test 'argument and disagreement sharply and uncompromisingly in doctrinal terms', and condemned its 'Pharisaism'.[89] But his distaste for doctrine rested also in his Bergsonian conviction that adherence to doctrine, ritual or tradition in religion made it 'static' rather than 'dynamic'.

He found theology similarly objectionable. In volume VII of the Study and elsewhere, theology was cast as 'reason's misguided attempt to state intuitive truth in terms of intellectual truth'. 'Reason', moreover, was 'a heartless pedant who has purchased a miraculous but superfluous command over Nature at the sinful price of betraying the Soul by allowing her primordial vision of God to fade into the lights of

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[86] Toynbee, Study VII, p. 439.

[87] Toynbee to Columba, 14 July 1944, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 168. See also in the same volume Toynbee, 'Gulf between the Modern Western Paganism and Catholic Christianity', p. 20.

[88] Toynbee to Columba, 10 April 1941, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 87.

[89] Toynbee to Columba, 20 September 1944 & Toynbee to Columba, 17 January 1944, both in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 173 & p. 155.

common day'.[90] Modern psychology, Toynbee maintained, had exposed the 'error of intellectualism' that underpinned theology and made it incapable of expressing religious truth.[91] This distaste for theology was reflected in the Study: the work as a whole contains one mention of Karl Barth, and the attack on theology, in volume VII, mentions only St Ambrose and (in a footnote) William Temple.[92] In his other foray into this area, An Historian's Approach to Religion, even Temple could not be found a place. Nor, indeed, do Barth, Brunner, Niebuhr or Hoskyns, some of the most important theologians of the century. Wight's comment that Toynbee was 'theologically naïve' – and sometimes wilfully so – seems more than justified.[93]

For Toynbee, religious truth could only be apprehended through the 'unconscious element in the psyche' which finds expression in poetry, prophecy and myth.[94] Neither institutional Churches, with their rituals and doctrines, nor the intellectual endeavour of theology sufficed compared to such insight. At the same time, however, mystical communion with otherworldly truths was not, Toynbee maintained, open to all. The endurance of suffering was the key that opened the door to enlightenment. Suffering, he argued:

> ...offered opportunities for spiritual truths to gain access to human minds and for divine commandments and precepts to gain a hold on human hearts because...hearts and minds have been opened for the entry of the Holy Spirit by their bitter

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[90] Toynbee, Study, VII, p. 502.

[91] Toynbee, 'Poetical truth and scientific truth in the light of history', International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 20:3 (1949), p. 146. (Toynbee MSS 3).

[92] Toynbee, Study VII, pp. 495-506.

[93] Quoted in Kedourie, 'Religion and Politics', p. 8. The quotation is taken from Wight's talk for Radio Baden-Baden, 'Arnold Toynbee at Eighty', Wight MSS 47, p. 9. In full, it reads: 'Toynbee's Biblical culture, is must be said, is purely literary, and he is theologically naïve'.

[94] Toynbee, 'Poetical truth and scientific truth', p. 150.

> disillusionment over the collapse of mundane institutions whose appearance of durability and grandeur had moved their human makers, beneficiaries and servants to put their trust in them and to devote their lives to their service.[95]

His mature position, then, was that only through suffering might one reorient one's concerns from the earthly to the divine. As history unfolded, the suffering of humanity increased, but so too did the chances for reorientation. Marvin Perry has noted, in the last four volumes of the Study history thus became 'a theodicy in which progress is measured by man's awareness of God'.[96]

For Toynbee, human progress was only to be achieved through the recognition that what he called the four 'higher religions' – Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism – held the same central message. Perry summarises the argument thus: 'the higher religions have taught that man is not God, that human power is limited, that love is the greatest good, that man should never deify a human being or a human institution'.[97] Though his argument was expounded most fully in the post-war years, it helped to underpin his resistance to conversion in the late 1930s and early 1940s, and was expressed thus to Columba in 1938:

> It seems....likely that, if the light from the Other World does irradiate this world, it floods in along an infinite number of beams, and that, if these beams are unequal with one

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[95] Toynbee, 'The Christian Understanding of History', in D. M. MacKinnon (ed.), Christian Faith and Communist Faith: A Series of Studies by Members of the Anglican Communion (London: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 205-206.

[96] Perry, Arnold Toynbee and the Crisis of the West, p. 22.

[97] Ibid., p. 24. Interestingly, Wight also called the Study a 'great sub-Christian theodicy' in 'Arnold Toynbee at Eighty', Radio Baden-Baden talk, September 1969, Wight MSS 47, p. 9) Toynbee comes closest to outlining such a project in the Study, VII, pp. 425-444 & pp. 716-736, and in Historian's Approach, pp. 74-88.

> another in brightness, this difference of luminosity is not clear-cut...[T]he difference between Christianity and the Mahayanian Buddhism would appear to be one of degree and not one of kind; and the spiritual insight and experience that have been won by Syrian prophets and Indian saints have not been beyond the ken of Greek philosophers and Chinese sages.[98]

This Symmachan agnosticism – or 'Platonism' as he later described it,[99] confusing the issue further – grounded the syncretism of the later volumes of the Study, bolstered by Toynbee's exploration of Jungian psychological types.[100] The idea that religious truth would not be reached, as he put it, by one road only, was 'an article in my creed which neither my hand nor my heart will allow me to abandon'.[101] It was the essence of his mature religious beliefs, which, despite later flirtations with varieties of Buddhism,[102] prevented his acceptance of any one religion. Each was flawed, Toynbee argued, by their 'hybris', 'blasphemy' or 'idolatry'; he could follow none to the exclusion of the others.[103] This last failing lay at the heart of his diagnosis of international crisis. Its examination, however, must be reserved for chapter five.

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[98] Toynbee, 'Gulf between the Modern Western Paganism and Catholic Christianity', p. 20.

[99] Toynbee, Study XII, p. 314.

[100] Symmachus was a Roman politician who argued, after Rome's conversion to Christianity, for the restoration of the goddess of victory to the temples of the city. Toynbee describes himself as a Symmachan 'disciple' of Jung in the Study VII, p. 443. See also the reference to Symmachus in Toynbee to Columba, 13 April 1949, in Peper (ed.), Historian's Conscience, p. 242.

[101] Toynbee, Study VII, pp. 428-429, note 2.

[102] These flirtations are most evident in Arnold Toynbee & Daisaku Ikeda, Choose Life: A Dialogue (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).

[103] Toynbee, Study VII, p. 428. On idolatry, see Historian's Approach, pp. 27-73.

Wight and Eschatology

> We sometimes forget that in his last talk with the disciples before the Passion, Christ unrolled a very different prospect of the future [to that of progress]. He foretold wars and catastrophes, nations rising against nations, the appearance of false prophets and the falling away of the faithful - he described, in apocalyptic language, something resembling the priod [*sic*] we have lived through since 1914. The picture of human history this suggests is of mankind, not marching steadily up out of the shadow into broad sunshine, but always going on through the murk and obscurity produced by man's misuse of his moral freedom...[104]

Despite his admiration for Toynbee, Wight was not persuaded by his 'Symmachan' syncretism. His reply to the assertion of the 'spiritual equivalence of the four higher religions' was unyielding, and took the form of a quotation from Hebrews I: 1-2:

> God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past...by the Prophets [and by pagan precursors], hath in these last days spoken to us by His Son'.[105]

Born into the Church of England, Wight remained throughout his life 'a devout Anglican, sacrementalist and no evangelical',[106] despite his mother's conversion to Catholicism.[107] In

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[104] Martin Wight, 'Christian Commentary', BBC radio talk, 29 October 1948, p. 4.

[105] Wight in Toynbee, Study VII, p. 462, note 1. The amendment to the quotation is Wight's.

[106] Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

[107] On his mother, see the (recycled) draft letter from Wight to Perham, 29 November 1942, on the reverse of p. 28 of 'Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS 42. Late in his life Wight described himself in a talk to the Newman Society in Tunbridge Wells as an 'Anglican heretic' or

his early 20s, Wight became a Christian pacifist. During and after the war, he aired an uncompromising eschatological vision of the world in print, radio talks and sermons. In the 1950s, he seems to have mellowed, as Bull has suggested.[108] He ceased publishing statements on religious issues and his apocalypticism faded perceptibly, though not completely. Throughout his life, however, the central tenets of his faith remained solid, informing both his work and his position on social issues, which surfaced occasionally in letters to The Times.[109] His move, in 1971, to become a patron of 'The Responsible Society', a group that campaigned on moral issues such as pre-marital sex, obscenity and pornography, is reflective of the strength of these convictions.[110] Wight had, as his friend Harry Pitt noted after his death, a 'rock-like faith in his fundamental beliefs...a tougher faith in the truths of Christianity than anyone I have ever met'.[111]

While the fundamentals were secure, there are clear shifts of emphasis in Wight's beliefs, linked closely to his experience of international politics. The first occurred as the impotence of the League of Nations became apparent, in the midst of the Abyssinnian crisis in the winter of 1935 and 1936. Wight turned away both from his early support for the League, and from orthodox Anglicanism, to embrace pacifism. He came, as an undergraduate friend put it, 'under the influence' of the Christian pacifist 'Dick' Sheppard.[112] Whether at this time Wight knew Sheppard personally – as he almost certainly did by 1937 – is unclear; he may simply have been attracted to his books or his

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'schismatic'. See his 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 42, p. 8. The lecture was given on February 2nd, 1971.

[108] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 14.

[109] Pitt to Bull, 4 May 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

[110] On 'The Responsible Society', see the collected papers in Wight MSS 21.

[111] Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9. See also Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, 'Christianity, Statecraft and Chatham House: Lionel Curtis and World Order', Diplomacy and Statecraft 6:2 (July 1995), p. 475.

[112] Bull to Butterfield, 19 March 1976, Butterfield MSS 531(i)/B191.

charismatic preaching.[113] Unlike many converts to the PPU, which was deliberately ecumenical, and included many non-religious pacifists, Wight was convinced by Sheppard's religious arguments. For him, war was not to be condemned, as it was by Erasmus,[114] as a waste – an argument similar to that of 'utilitarian pacifism' – or, as it was by the Quakers, as a breaking of oaths. Rather, the waging of war contravened both the letter of God's Commandments and the spirit of Christ's teachings. The latter, as Sheppard admitted, was difficult to discern: Christ, he noted, 'expressed Himself plainly' on 'marriage...swearing... [and] revenge', but 'said nothing about war'.[115]

Wight's own ideas, expressed in an article published in 1936, followed Sheppard's lead in developing a justification for Christian pacifism. His argument was clear and penetrating:

> The core of pacifism is the belief that it is never right to take human life. It is nothing to do with quietism in the sense of immoral apathy and passivity. It is not the organisation of mass-cowardice. It does not condemn all use of force. It does not assert that there is nothing worth fighting for. It does not make an unconditional surrender to evil. It does not believe in peace for any price. Its basis is not utilitarian.[116]

At the 'core', was the injunction 'Thou shalt not kill'. Violence short of killing, he admitted, could be legitimate, provided that force is directed towards redemption. Just as there can be a 'consecrated use of sex' for procreation, so too can there be 'consecrated

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[113] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 3. Sheppard himself died in October 1937.

[114] Desiderius Erasmus, 'Dulce Bellum Inexpertis' in Brown et al., International Relations in Political Thought, pp. 221-231.

[115] Roberts, 'Sheppard', p. 335.

[116] Wight, 'Pacifism', Theology 33:193 (July 1936), p. 13.

force', which 'like surgery, aims at healing and renewing not at destroying its object'.[117] But war can never be consecrated or Christian, for it contravenes a Commandment and the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount.

This argument, as MacKinnon recognised in his Martin Wight memorial lecture, rests upon a 'radical critique of historical Christianity'.[118] Wight himself was well aware of this. He recognised that pacifism involved the condemnation of 'the Roman Church and the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas'. Augustine's 'splendid compromise' in the City of God may well have preserved the 'civilisation of Rome' through the identification of the 'divine plan' with the 'Pax Romana', but, Wight maintained, it 'obscured the supra-cultural character of the Church and the perpetual validity of the Sermon on the Mount'. The 'standards' of the Gospel were thereby lowered. Augustine's was 'a lawyer's doctrine', which 'like all legalities...is concerned more with particular conditions than with eternal truths', replaced a Christian duty of universal validity.[119] He continued:

> ...being incompatible with the Sermon on the Mount, [this doctrine]...is in the long run unworkable...it tries to erect a moral compromise into a law, which is the shortest way to discredit all morality. To demand perfection will always evoke a response from the divine in man, while the demand for a standard that makes concessions to human frailty has already undermined its own authority. Our Lord's demands were absolute, the Church's have too often been qualified. This is the essence of pharisaism, the legalisation of the second-best, the low morality that becomes a cloak for the sins it condemns.[120]

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[117] Ibid., p. 15.

[118] MacKinnon, 'Power Politics and Religious Faith', p. 104.

[119] Wight, 'Pacifism', p. 16.

[120] Ibid., p. 17.

The failings of the Church, however, are much wider. Catholicism, Wight wrote, capitulated to 'political necessity' in the Crusades; the Eastern Orthodox and Protestant Churches merely provide a 'religious façade for the state', and justify the Marxist charge that Christianity is a 'middle-class ideology'.[121]

The article was also, in part at least, an attempt to call the Church back to the principles held in the catacombs, prior to the Constantinian settlement – a theme to which Wight would return in his post-war writing. What is absent from 'Pacifism', however, is any clear indication of the eschatological obsession that dominates some of his later work. While Wight acknowledged that 'refusal to fight will not obliterate the doctrines of Mein Kampf nor change the state of mind of its author', there is no hint that he interpreted, as he did later, the challenge of Nazism in an apocalyptic light.[122] Indeed, there are elements of progressivism, even Christian Socialism, in 'Pacifism'; its *telos* is the 'sanctification of the state', an aim to be achieved simply through the 'organised application of the principles of the Sermon on the Mount'.[123] Wight calls for the abolition of means testing and for the clearance of urban slums, as well as for reform in the Empire, informed by a sub-Marxist critique, probably that of Lenin.[124] He argues, for instance, that 'military and political warfare is the result....of the continual economic and financial warfare which is the dynamic of bourgeois society...'.[125] He goes on to assert that the Christian 'shares the ideals of the Communist', though is critical of his violent methods.[126] Such sympathy for

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[121] Ibid., pp. 18-19.

[122] Ibid., p. 19, p. 13 & p. 20.

[123] Ibid., p. 20 & p. 21.

[124] Harry Pitt observed that, at Haileybury, Wight had two heroes: Lenin and T. E. Lawrence. He seems to have considered the latter a 'secular saint' for most his life, but his ardour for Lenin cooled as he got older (Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9).

[125] Wight, 'Pacifism', p. 20.

[126] Ibid.

Marxist thought or practice is absent from his post-war writings,[127] and is replaced by a stark apocalypticism.

By 1948, Wight had come to the view that 'the revival of the eschatological...[had] been one of the major achievements of the theologians' of the twentieth century.[128] In published and unpublished work of the time, he explored the ideas that this renaissance had produced. In 'Progress or Eschatology' (1951), for instance, Wight contrasted the 'optimism lurking under Toynbee's system' to the conventional eschatological positions of Butterfield, C. H. Dodd, Reinhold Niebuhr and Edwyn Hoskyns, as well as to the 'extreme apocalypticism' of Edwyn Bevan.[129] His knowledge, moreover, was not confined to Anglo-American thought, nor to just contemporary theology. In the 1942 drafts of an article on 'Historic Antichrists', in 'Progress or Eschatology' and elsewhere, the thought of Nicholas Berdyaev, Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Jacques Maritain is discussed.[130] His contributions to volume VII of Toynbee's Study demonstrate an even greater range. Aside from the array of Scriptural quotations that Wight bantered with Toynbee,[131] there are discussions of the Emperor Julian's neoplatonist apostasy,[132] Justin Martyr,[133] Hinduism,[134] Buddhism,[135] canon

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[127] Wight does discuss – and dismiss – a possible Marxist critique of the Church in Toynbee's Study, VII, pp. 456-457, note 3.

[128] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 43.

[129] Wight, 'Progress or Eschatology', pp. 18-19.

[130] See 'Some Reflections on the Historic Antichrist', p. 4; 'Progress or Eschatology', pp. 18-19; 'Antichrist' (1971), p. 27.

[131] See, for example, note 2 on page 505 of Toynbee's Study VII.

[132] Ibid., p. 474, note 1.

[133] Ibid., p. 464, note 1.

[134] Ibid., p. 728, note 2 and p. 750, note 3.

[135] Ibid., p. 728, note 2.

law,[136] and mysticism,[137] amongst many other topics. As Harry Pitt commented after his death, 'with Martin, to be devout meant to be intellectual'.[138]

Wight's eschatological speculations draw heavily on the work of Barth, though his work was rarely cited and nowhere – in published or available unpublished writings – did Wight discussed his theology at any length. Common themes, however, recur. Both emphasise the imminence of the 'eschatological moment'; the notion that God, and especially Christ, is near at hand at all points in secular history.[139] For Barth, the Word of Judgement and Grace brought eternity into time;[140] for Wight, the Christian conception of History presented '...through the intrusion of a metahistorical element, Judgment and Redemption'.[141] Both, moreover, emphasised the centrality of hope to Christian belief, and offered almost identical conceptions of what hope the Christian should have. According to Doyle, Barth argued that:

> ...the Bible offers hope, not as a vacillating and pragmatic response to changing circumstances we see in pagan thought, the hoped-for fulfilment of one's own dreams, but as the sure expectation that God *will keep his promises* about salvation... . [T]he Bible makes it clear that hope is the defining characteristic of Christian existence, we exist *in* hope.[142]

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[136] Ibid., p. 697, note 2.

[137] Ibid., p. 429, note 2.

[138] Pitt added: 'He was less sloppy in his religion than any Christian I ever knew' (Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9).

[139] This phrase is taken from Robert C. Doyle's Eschatology and the Shape of Christian Belief (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1999), p. 361.

[140] Ibid.

[141] Wight, Progress or Eschatology', p. 10.

[142] Doyle, Eschatology, pp. 365-366.

This hope was not, however, to be vested in earthly things, for 'anthropocentric hopes', Barth maintained, 'cannot have the clarity and power...as hopes grounded in God...[and] are always exposed to the possibility of relapse into scepticism or ambivalent obscurity'.[143] Wight agreed. In a broadcast lecture of 1948, 'Christian Commentary', he lamented the political 'debasing and perverting' of Hope, arguing in unmistakably Barthian terms that 'the object of Hope is God'. His case is worth quoting:

> "Hope" is one of those words, like most of the Christian verbal currency, that has become gravely debased. If we are talking about the Hope that is a Christian duty...we mean something more than hope in its ordinary sense... Hope is not a political virtue: it is a theological virtue. It is a facet of the relationship between the individual soul and a Personal God.[144]

Wight's experience of contemporary events confirmed his reading of Barth, and eroded his early – albeit heavily qualified – progressivism. His application to be registered as a conscientious objector, made in May of 1940, indicates that he interpreted the outbreak of war as a 'divine judgement' for the 'corporate Sin' of apostasy committed by European civilisation.[145] Wight clearly sensed impending cataclysm. Allied victory did little to shake this conviction: his 1948 article, 'The Church, Russia and the West', talks of a deepening 'crisis' and a 'darker' 'prospect'.[146] In reaction, from about 1940, he turned to reflect on an unfashionable and quixotic aspect of Christian thought: the doctrine of Antichrist. Almost always present, but often obscured, this became a recurrent theme in his religious writings for the remainder of his life. It seems highly likely, in view of the breadth and depth of sources later quoted, that Wight began to do serious research

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[143] Ibid., p. 268.

[144] Wight, 'Christian Commentary', pp. 2-3.

[145] Quoted in Dunne, Inventing International Society, note 23, p. 65.

on the idea of Antichrist in 1940 or 1941. During 1942 and 1943, he wrote several versions of an article on the subject, initially hoping for it to be published in the journal Theology.[147]

These pieces are notable as much for their reliance on Toynbeean themes and categories as for the exploration of the place of the Antichrist in past Christian thought. Wight notes in one manuscript that the Study has 'conditioned all future attempts at the Christian interpretation of history' and proceeds with a Toynbeean analysis of the 'rhythm of the Church's history' to identify the points at which antichrists have come to the fore.[148] Tables are drawn up locating Hellenic, Western and Orthodox antichrists, their intellectual forebears and their nemeses.[149] For Wight, antichrists appeared at times of historic crises of civilisation, each stimulated by those within the Church, as an mystical and institutional body. The modern crisis was, he suggests, prompted by the Church's quiescence in the destruction of the political unity of Christendom that led to the rise of a plurality of sovereign states. The consequence was the rise first of Napoleon, and latterly of Hitler, both antichrists and precursors of the final Antichrist.[150] These, he argued, were not merely scourges in secular history, like Gengis Khan or Hannibal, but also judgements 'on the living generation' and offer 'the positive temptation of an alternative to the Church'.[151]

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[146] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 45.

[147] Vidler to Wight, 26 June 1942, Wight MSS 45. Vidler did not publish the article, judging it too long, but suggested instead that it be turned into a small book.

[148] Wight, 'Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS 42, part IV, no page number.

[149] Ibid.

[150] Ibid.

[151] Wight 'Some Reflections on the Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, p. 2.

In later writings, the Toynbeean framework receded into the background, but the concern with the doctrine of Antichrist remained. In a rhetorical question addressed to J. H. Oldham, Wight framed the problem as he viewed it from the vantage point of the San Francisco conference of 1946, where he was acting as the Observer's correspondent:

> Are these appalling judgements of war and atomic energy which hang over us an expression of the fact that for these years past we have been faced once more with the problem of Antichrist in history, and have been blind to it?[152]

This 'problem' is central – but not explicitly so – to his analysis of the relationship between 'The Church, Russia and the West' (1948). Wight does not mention the Antichrist (or antichrists) by name, but instead discusses what he later refers to as the 'seductive charm' and 'magic and miracles' of modern politics,[153] collective apostasy, and the 'demonic concentrations of power', all of which he had earlier identified as characteristic of antichrists' reigns.[154] He goes on to warn that although we 'have not really believed in the epilogue-theory at all', Scripture predicts a 'final concentration of Satanic evil within history' before the Second Coming.[155] In a sermon delivered in Cambridge in 1951, Wight again returned to the doctrine, calling antichrists those 'men of demonic personality and charismatic powers, who exalted themselves above the moral law, and offered a godless solution of human ills for their generation'.[156] Nero, Julian the Apostate, Constantine V, Frederick II, Peter the Great, Napoleon and Hitler again figured as paradigmatic antichrists.

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[152] Wight to Oldham, 27 April 1946, Wight MSS 12.

[153] Wight, 'Antichrist', 1971 lecture, pp. 3-4.

[154] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 30.

[155] Ibid., pp. 40-41. Wight makes reference here to, amongst other sources, Revelations xiii, which discusses the emergence of the Beast (note 4).

[156] Wight, 'God in History', pp. 33-34.

Wight's writings of the late 1940s and early 1950s also show a great preoccupation with the 'Little Apocalypse', in which Christ is reported as telling of a coming cataclysmic war that presages the apocalypse and Second Coming.[157] There can be little doubt that he found these short passages pertinent in the contemporary world; certainly, they were not 'discordant with the record of history or the experience of my generation'.[158] Yet this is not to say, however, that Wight thought that the End of Days itself was nigh. In his writings and lectures, he frequently noted that both the apocalypse and Second Coming are always imminent, and moreover, Christians are specifically prohibited from speculating on its timing.[159] But, on this point, there is considerable ambiguity in Wight's work. He was convinced, during the 1940s and afterwards, that apostasy had beset the West – this is most evident in 'The Church, Russia and the West' (1948)[160] – and though he makes no explicit statement to the effect, Wight's interpretation of Scripture would have suggested to him that this presaged Armageddon.[161]

How far Wight's beliefs remained so starkly apocalyptic during the latter twenty years of his life is difficult to assess. His fundamental convictions certainly remained staunch and rather uncompromising, as his involvement in 'The Responsible Society'

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[157] MacKinnon, 'Power politics', p. 88 & p. 106.

[158] Wight, 'Progress or Eschatology', Wight MSS 42, p. 22.

[159] See, for instance, the 1971 lecture 'Antichrist', p. 31 & 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 39. In the latter, Wight noted that the Second Coming would be 'sudden, catching mankind unawares'.

[160] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', pp. 25-28. In the 1971 lecture 'Antichrist', Wight argues that we have been 'worshipping Humanity rather than God...in the West since the 17th [century] or so...' (p. 29).

[161] In Matthew 24, Christ is reported as foreseeing mass apostasy prior to the End. Wight refers to this passage often (see 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 39, for example), and elsewhere wrote of lesser antichrists being judgements on apostasy (see the 1971 lecture, 'Antichrist', p. 29).

indicates. He was also keen to remind the audience of his 1971 lecture on Antichrist of the three lessons derived from the 'Little Apocalypse', the Christian duties to the present, to Providence, and to readiness for the Second Coming.[162] This lecture does however indicate a softening of Wight's views. The introduction, Gabriele Wight suggested to Hedley Bull, 'acquaints his audience with the doctrine and legend just as an intellectual exercise of some theoretical and perhaps political interest, a very different tone from the Cambridge sermon [God in history]'.[163] There is some substance to this; at times there is something approaching levity in the lecture. This may, of course, be a reflection of the different audiences to which Wight was speaking; the 'Newman Society', after all, was a collection of theologically interested individuals rather than a congregation.[164] Moreover, it is notable that Wight reiterates many of the same fears about certain political and social changes that obtrude in his earlier writings, and a concern that they suggest the re-emergence of Antichrist.

In the first of Wight's essays on the subject, he warned that the world 'is rapidly approaching political unification' and that the 'world state' might be not the 'reconstitution of Christendom' but 'instead the empire of Antichrist'. It would, he argued, be 'rationally organised' and controlled by a scientific elite offering material security and comfort.[165] The same theme appears in an undated set of lecture notes, probably from the late 1940s or early 1950s, in which Wight stated:

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[162] Wight, Antichrist', Wight MSS 42, pp. 30-31.

[163] Gabriele Wight to Hedley Bull, 1 March 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

[164] Wight suggests this in voicing his 'embarrassment at venturing on this ground [as a] layman before a group that includes some clergy' (Wight, Antichrist', Wight MSS 42, p. 8).

[165] Wight, 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, p. 36.

> ...[the] world is not on the point of abolishing suffering. [We are] Heading for 1984. Christians understand this; [We have been] expecting it all along. Antichrist.[166]

These rather obtuse observations also are voiced in more detail in the 1971 lecture on Antichrist. Asking rhetorically where the notion of Antichrist might be found in modern culture, Wight observed that they can be located not only in the theology of Barth and Maritain, but in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World and George Orwell's Nineteen-Eighty Four. We have been 'worshipping humanity rather than God', he added, since the seventeenth century.[167]

These continuities, however, should not be over-stated. The paucity of religious writings remaining in Wight's papers suggests that his eschatological anxieties lessened during the 1950s and 1960s. The greatest influence here may well have been the course of current events. As he noted in 1966, in the German radio talk on Toynbee, when speaking of those drawn to the latter's work: 'as the War receded, we learned to live with the Bomb and the Cold War and our mood became less apocalyptical'.[168] The change in Wight's own mood is demonstrated, as Gabriele Wight noted to Bull, in the greater prominence of Providence in his religious writings from the latter half of the 1950s until his death.[169] An unpublished essay on 'Christian Politics', for instance, incorporates a lengthy exposition of the idea of Providence alongside the discussion of the Last Judgement. Though largely consistent with his earlier work – Wight reflects again on the parable of the wheat and the tares and on the 'astringent realism about political experience' to be found the Bible – the

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[166] Wight, 'Does Christianity care for the World and How?', Wight MSS 1/3, no page number.

[167] Wight, 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 42, p. 27.

[168] Wight, 'Arnold Toynbee at Eighty', Wight MSS 47, p. 1.

[169] Gabriele Wight to Hedley Bull, 1 March 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

tone is subtly different, perhaps more sanguine about contemporary events.[170] In Wight's last piece on 'Antichrist', this tone may also be located. There also he refers to the Christian's 'intellectual responsibility to understand the ways of Providence', to explore the interplay of the divine and mundane in history.[171] It is this enterprise that forms the core of the next section, and will be further discussed in chapter four.

Providence: Butterfield

> In speaking of religion...I have had in mind nothing that is at all novel, but a Christianity that is ancient...a religion of the spirit, other-worldly if you like, preaching charity and humility, trusting Providence and submitting to it, and setting its heart and its treasure in heaven.[172]

The idea of Providence lay at the very centre of Butterfield's religious beliefs and of his thought. The notion of an active, near and ever-present God may be found throughout his work, implicit before 1944 and explicit afterwards, and it is this which marks Butterfield apart from so many of his contemporaries. Toynbee's conception of God as Love, for instance, is curiously impersonal, lifeless and saccharine; Wight's Barthian God is inscrutable, radically Other and wrathful. Butterfield's God is more tangible, more benign and comprehensible. He was separated from Toynbee and Wight in other ways too: Butterfield's background was Nonconformist, not Anglican. His father – whom he idolised and considered 'remarkable in his faith, his humility and his

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[170] Wight, 'Christian Politics', Wight MSS 52, pp. 4-5. This manuscript seems to have been written after 1968. On the parable of the wheat and the tares, see 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 41 and the 1971 lecture on 'Antichrist', p. 31. On 'realism', see 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 33.

[171] Wight, 'Antichrist' (1971), p. 31.

[172] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 130.

extraordinary love and charity'[173] – was a Methodist and brought up his son within that tradition.[174] His mother belonged to a small austere pacifist sect known as the Plymouth Brethren, the thought of whom, coincidentally, bears some resemblance to the Wight's early pacifism.[175]

At the age of 16, prompted by his father, Butterfield became a lay preacher in Methodist chapels in the surrounding villages in Yorkshire, and later, until 1936, around Cambridge. As he recalled later, he was at that time, '...greatly impressed by the modern movement in theology...troubled by [Albert] Ritschl but immensely stimulated by some of the writings of Adolf Harnack'. Yet for Butterfield, the appeal of these German theological liberals was fleeting: 'enthusiasm, however, quickly passed: in reality I was fascinated only for a short time and was never actually possessed by the most extreme

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[173] Butterfield, Autobiographical Material, Butterfield MSS 7, p. 37. See also McIntire, 'Introduction: Herbert Butterfield on Christianity and History', in his edited Herbert Butterfield, p. xix.

[174] In an autobiographical fragment, Butterfield wrote of that 'never ceased to regard him [his father] as a saint - indeed, he was the person on whom I always wanted to model myself, though I have never achieved the gentleness and humility in him (which I admired most)' (Butterfield MSS 269, p. 5; 7, p. 37 (1st)). His relationship with his mother appears to have been considerably more strained. According to his autobiographical writings, she was possessed of a fiery temper and was known to bully his father (see Butterfield MSS 269, p. 10).

[175] The Plymouth Brethren was a pacifist sect which first emerged in 1825 in Dublin, moving later to Plymouth. Evangelical and strongly anti-Catholic, they advocated 'radical separation from the world, which they regarded as the domain of Satan' (P. Brock, Freedom from Violence: Sectarian Nonresistance from the Middle Ages to the Great War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), p. 259). To enter into the body of the 'elect', they believed, entailed the literal observance of the strictures of Christ's Sermon on the Mount, and precluded any involvement with the practice of government, especially service in war. For the Brethren, the 'Law of Love' and the commandment 'Resist not evil' stood at the 'core of the code that the saints [i.e. themselves] must follow even if this brings them into collision with man-made laws' (p. 267).

liberal teaching that had come to us from Germany.[176] The reasons for this dissatisfaction are instructive, for they offer an insight into the stable core of Butterfield's beliefs. The liberal theologians, he wrote, were inadequate

> ...not because they were intellectually unadventurous but because they were not spiritual enough. They did not recognise even the data of the spiritual life; they were too governed by the thought and ordinary common sense of the world. They would have tied Christianity to things that happened to be fashionable in the year 1900.[177]

Convinced of the infallibility of their scholarship, in Butterfield's view, they 'did not seem to grasp the spiritual as part of the reality which they set out to discuss'. [178]

What Butterfield meant by the 'spiritual' is never made fully explicit in his work, though the reader is left in no doubt of its centrality to his faith. Religion was for him an intensely personal experience, a direct relationship of God with each 'personality' – a characteristically Butterfieldian expression, probably intended to contrast with the more liberal 'individual'.[179] Only through inward experience of God, he argued in one essay, might one come to apprehend 'those deeper truths that only come from contemplation, from a rich internal life'.[180] Outward piety or intellectual endeavour, therefore, will not bring the person to God, sustain faith nor offer salvation. Thus Butterfield wrote, probably with Toynbee's Study in mind:

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[176] Butterfield, Autobiographical Material, Butterfield MSS 7, pp. 13-14.

[177] Butterfield, 'The Prospects for Christianity' [1956], in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, pp. 250-255.

[178] Butterfield, Autobiographical Material, Butterfield MSS 7, p. 14, p. 15.

[179] Soffer, 'Conservative Historical Imagination', p. 13.

> You can learn the ups-and-downs of one state and another in one century or another, you can learn about the rise of vast empires and the growth of big organisations...and all this will not show you God in history if you have not found God in your daily life.[181]

The later Toynbee, however, as we have seen, thought he had found God mystically as well as intellectually, and in this he and Butterfield were not so distant. The latter, as McIntire observes, 'experienced God deeply and richly and very personally, almost as would a visionary', seeing Him, in one incident, in the guise of an elf lurking in the shrubbery on Trumpington Road.[182] Butterfield was aware that such notions might strike his contemporaries as fanciful, even eccentric, as he hinted in a post-war radio talk:

> I can quite understand that if men think that they have walked with God in the woods, or heard His voice in the silence, or confronted Him in prayer, somebody may bring an alternative explanation, a purely mechanical view of what is assumed to be an illustration.[183]

In more than one way, this notion of 'communion with God who is spirit' bears similarities to Toynbee's mysticism.[184]

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[180] Butterfield, 'The Challenge of the Faith' [1956], in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 222.

[181] Butterfield, 'God in History', in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 12. In a later essay, Butterfield wrote: 'it is not to be expected that...[the Christian]...will discover God's purposes for the world simply by brooding over longer and longer stretches of mundane history or putting given events under a bigger microscope' ('Does the Belief in God Validly Affect the Modern Historian', in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 146).

[182] McIntire, 'Introduction', p. xxiv.

[183] Butterfield, 'The Christian Idea of God', The Listener 44: 1134, 21 September 1950, p. 391.

[184] McIntire, 'Introduction', p. xxiv.

Where Toynbee and Butterfield differed is over the circumstances in which this mystical communion might arise. Despite Toynbee's fondness for Father Columba and the Dominican monastery of Ampleforth, there is little place in his thought for the purely contemplative; his mystical insight came unexpectedly, at times of crisis, and his religion was dynamic, not meditative. Butterfield, by contrast, considered contemplation key to the better understanding of God. Neglect of the spiritual and the contemplative, for him, lay at the heart of the predicament of the twentieth century:

> I think that we who live in a technical age and an urbanised world...have a specialised and partial experience of life on this earth, and are gravely impoverished on the contemplative side. In ages past men not less mighty in intellect than any of our modern geniuses put as much thought and industry and ingenuity into the study of human beings, human destiny and man's inner self as we today put into the study of mere things.[185]

Such a view made Butterfield sympathetic to elements of Roman Catholicism, and especially to monasticism:

> If I desired to say perhaps one thing that might be remembered for a while, I would say that sometimes I wonder at dead of night whether...Protestantism may not be at a disadvantage because a few centuries ago, it decided to get rid of monks. Since it followed that policy, a greater responsibility falls on us to give something of ourselves to contemplation and silence, and listening to the still small voice.[186]

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[185] Butterfield, 'The Christian Idea of God', p. 391. For McIntire, this emphasis on the contemplative suggests that Butterfield had the 'makings of a monk' (McIntire, 'Introduction', p. xii).

[186] Butterfield, 'Christians in the Coming Period of History' [1970], in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 268. On his appreciation for the 'spiritual values' of Roman Catholicism, which

This appreciative stance towards aspects of the Roman tradition did not, however, lead to a serious flirtation with conversion, as it had done with Toynbee. Butterfield remained a Methodist – albeit one who was an 'unconfirmed Anglican communicant' at Peterhouse.[187]

Until his early twenties, Butterfield adhered to a broadly liberal Protestantism. For his first two years at University, McIntire notes, he attended the meetings of the liberal Student Christian Movement. Though he gradually became disaffected with their 'too worldly-minded' beliefs, Butterfield did not undergo a conversion to the fundamentalism of the evangelicals.[188] Indeed, he was never reconciled to the literal interpretation of Scripture the evangelicals sought, arguing in 1956, 'whether we find it in the Bible or in the Church the word of God only comes to us through human agencies, and nobody can deny the imperfection of this'. The Bible had too many 'contradictions' and 'irreconcilable pronouncements' for it to be otherwise.[189] Whilst Butterfield 'admired...[fundamentalists'] desire to hold fast to the essentials of Christianity, and their attention to the well-being of spiritual life', he remaining appreciative of the 'originality

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was in part due to his friendship with Dom David Knowles and his study of Acton, see Watson, 'Foreword', in Coll, Wisdom of Statecraft, p. xi.

[187] Cowling, 'Butterfield, Sir Herbert', Dictionary of National Biography 1971-1980, p. 117; Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine I, p. xv & p. 201.

[188] McIntire, 'Introduction', p. xxv. According to Green, the evangelical Cambridge Intercollegiate Christian Union (CICCU), whose meetings Butterfield attended for a time in the early 1920s, were marked by 'their adhesion to the Word of God contained in the authoritative and inspired Scriptures' (Green, Religion at Oxford and Cambridge, p. 324).

[189] Butterfield, 'The Challenge of the Faith' [1956], in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 220-221. See also Thorp, Herbert Butterfield, p. 85, and Watson's note of Butterfield's belief that 'no image worship has ever led to half so much error, or half so much human suffering, as the worship of the written word' (Watson, 'Foreword' to Coll, Wisdom of Statecraft, p. xi).

and flexibility of the liberals in biblical criticism and theological thought'.[190] This position is close to that of the Cambridge theologians Sir Edwyn Hoskyns, E. C. Selwyn, and Charles Smyth, whom Cowling has argued influenced Butterfield's religious thought.[191] Though they embraced the empirical approach to doctrine and Scripture common to both liberal and Catholic modernist theology, they were highly critical, as was Butterfield, of liberal theologians' attempts at accommodation with the contemporary world.

Against the liberals, Hoskyns, Selwyn and Smyth asserted the truth of the central tenets of Christianity, arguing that they did not require further explanation. It was simply true that Jesus was divine and God's word supernatural; there was no need for the Church to compromise with modernity morally, intellectually or socially. This they felt to be the only sure foundation of a 'non-Roman Catholicism'.[192] How far Butterfield accepted this project is contentious. There are no references to Hoskyns, Selwyn or Smyth in his published writings, and there are points of considerable disagreement. He resisted, for instance, the emphasis on the role of the earthly Church. Conceiving religion as he did, 'as dependant on a direct relationship to Christ', Butterfield could not accept the notion of the Church as God's instrument.[193] As Wight noted, in his review of Christianity and History, like Niebuhr Butterfield was unable to see 'the historical role of the Church as the instrument of the Kingdom, the bearer of sacred history' nor its role in 'preparing and hastening the Second Coming'.[194] Butterfield also rejected the neo-orthodox eschatology that underlay Hoskyns' work, highlighted – and given qualified praise – by Wight.[195] Dreams of a 'messianic kingdom' in Jewish eschatology, Butterfield argued, had resulted

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[190] Ibid.

[191] Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine I,p. 199.

[192] Ibid., p. 75.

[193] Ibid., p. 240.

[194] Wight, 'History and Judgment', p. 313.

[195] See Wight, 'Progress or Eschatology', p. 19.

in a 'kind of utopianism and even to some unfortunate adventures in the political realm'. The Jews had turned 'their minds' from the 'the God of history…to a God whose great accomplishment was to be something in the future': a notion 'inimical to history' and to the idea of God established in the early books of the Old Testament.[196] Christian eschatological speculation was equally flawed: though 'sometimes disturbingly fanciful, though…sometimes deeply moving', it represented a mistaken orientation of faith.[197]

Butterfield's interpretation of the 'shock of 1940', the deliverance that followed, and the wider crisis of the West was quite distinct from the eschatological fatalism of Wight and the Augustinian pessimism of Toynbee. He was strongly critical of those who lamented 'the apostasy of Christendom' and the eschatological speculation that resulted.[198] Certainly, Butterfield emphasised the reality and universality of sin that grounded Augustine's thought and that of Augustinian realists like Reinhold Niebuhr, but he also rejected much of the Augustine's thought. He argued constantly and consistently that sin was not a sign of human depravity but rather of weakness and 'cupidity'.[199] As Thorp has argued:

> While recognising universal sin, Sir Herbert also emphasized man's ultimate potential as a divine creation. This thought was clearly not Augustinian.[200]

Similarly, Butterfield did not accept, by implication at least, predestinarian ideas. Providence provided orders; it did not constitute the working out of a divine Plan.[201]

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[196] Butterfield, 'The Originality of the New Testament', pp. 92-93.

[197] Ibid., p. 93.

[198] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 27.

[199] On 'the universal element of cupidity', see Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 35-38 & 'The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict', p. 147.

[200] Thorp, Herbert Butterfield, p. 104.

Moreover, he rejected the notion, as central to Augustine's theology as to that of Wight or Hoskyns, that the earthly Church was the instrument of man's salvation.[202]

Indeed, Butterfield was positively hostile to the notion – expressed by Wight as well as by Christopher Dawson and T. S. Eliot – that what was required in response to crisis was a rejuvenated and authoritative Church. He was convinced that those who sought a return to such a society would not further the aims of the Christian faith. He wrote in 1949:

> It is of course very nice for Churches to have a kind of world in which all currents of thought are directed by ecclasiastical authority, and all men are brought up so locked in the Christian religion that they are hardly allowed to know that any alternative view of life is even available. It is a question whether such a world could ever be produced, however, save in an intermediate stage in the history of civilisation, and after a cruel exercise of force; and it is questionable whether men in the long run would tolerate it, in view of the abuses to which it is liable and the methods to which it is bound to be committed.[203]

This, of course, also runs counter to much of Augustine's thought, not least that which condones the coercion of heretics, schismatics and pagans.[204] Butterfield's response to the apostasy of the West – what later became known as secularisation – was rather different.

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[201] See Butterfield's discussion of the idea of Providential order in Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 95-99.

[202] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 134-137.

[203] Butterfield, 'The Christian and History: I. The Christian and Academic History', Christian News-Letter 333 (supplement), 16 March 1949, p. 91. On this topic as it is discussed in Christianity and History, see John H. S. Burleigh's perceptive review in the Journal of Ecclesiastical History 2:2 (October 1951), p. 223.

Like his contemporary, fellow Methodist and Fellow of Magdalene, Bernard Lord Manning, Butterfield welcomed the decline of Church-going and belief as a return to the 'apostolic' condition of early Christianity.[205] As Butterfield urged, in 1956:

> Let us stop thinking that religion was in a better state in the old days, when certainly great numbers came to Church but so often with the result that religion was debased and became less purely spiritual. It is better that Christians should be as they were in New Testament days - humble rather than proud, poor rather than privileged, claiming no rights against society, no rights in the world save that of worshipping God in whom they believe and preaching the faith they hold.[206]

'Secularism', he conceded, was 'hostile' to organised Christianity, but that hostility was a reaction to the undeniable abuses of authority to which the Church had been prone in the past, and was not necessarily inhospitable to faith.[207]

For Butterfield, those who bewailed apostasy and the loss of clerical authority showed themselves lacking in faith and opposed to the fundamental principles of Christianity. Ever the good Nonconformist, Butterfield insisted that the 'primary demand which Christianity must make of any social order' was that of 'freedom of conscience'.[208] This theme – that 'the Christian insists on the right to choose the God whom he will serve'

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[204] Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 17.

[205] On Manning, see Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine, p. 203.

[206] Butterfield, 'The Obstruction to Belief' [1956], in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 245.

[207] Butterfield, 'The Prospects for Christianity' [1956], in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, pp. 250-251.

[208] Butterfield, 'The Christian and History: IV. The Christian and the Ecclesiastical Interpretation of History', Christian News-Letter 341 (supplement), 6 July 1949, pp. 230-231.

– was repeated throughout his work.[209] Yet throughout Butterfield was keen to assert that the opposition to this demand for religious liberty had so often come from ecclesiastical rather than political authorities.[210] It was for this reason that he opposed the kind of rejuvenation of the earthly Church that Wight, Eliot and other sought. The demand for such a move illustrated, for Butterfield, 'that they had not sufficient faith in the power of purely spiritual factors and forces - they wanted to help them out with the strong arm of the law'.[211] But above all, he believed, they displayed a lack of conviction in God's Promise and in Providence.

This idea was absolutely central to Butterfield's religious writings as they began to appear from 1940 onwards. Whilst both Toynbee and Wight offered warnings and dire predictions, at the core of his work – especially Christianity and History – was a message of reassurance. As he wrote to Wight:

> ...what was principally needed was something to help young men in their attitude to ordinary current events – the young men being so bankrupt these days, & so apt to droop into mere fatalism.[212]

And where the collapse of the inter-war international order and the experience of war drove Toynbee to the writings of St Augustine, and Wight to the 'Little Apocalypse', Butterfield looked to the Old Testament. The 'history of the ancient Hebrews', he argued, 'was fundamentally of the same texture of our own' – catastrophic and cataclysmic, but ultimately – because Judgement was always mitigated by the Promise – purgative.[213]

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[209] Butterfield, Liberty and the Modern World, p. 7.

[210] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 152.

[211] Butterfield, 'The Obstruction to Belief', in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 245.

[212] Butterfield to Wight, 14 August 1950, Wight MSS 233 1/7.

[213] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 72.

Similarly, the First World War was 'a judgement of God on certain evils of our civilization [*sic*] which could not be rooted out in any other way',[214] and the Second, a judgement upon Germany and 'the whole of our existing order and the very fabric of our civilisation'.[215]

The spectre of communism too was a judgement, perhaps even incorporating the 'anti-Christ of our time', as he put it in correspondence.[216] Certainly, it 'could outbid us in the claim to have been the most terrible instrument of Divine judgment in our generation'.[217] At times, as Thompson has complained, Butterfield 'appears to speak *for* Providence'.[218] Just as the Hebrew prophets had come to recognise that Judgement fell upon nations to chastise them, without the invalidation the Promise, so too, thought Butterfield, should the West. His use of the Old Testament view of history, however, was qualified, and perhaps even instrumental. Indeed, he lamented the fact that Christianity and History, as Wight had observed in a review:

> ...leaves an Old Testament impression rather than a New Testament one...I believe this is quite a misrepresentation of my real views, which, if they were fully laid out, would...strike most people as extravagantly on the other side.... In fact, I object structurally to that OT view of history which e.g. sees wars as 'wars for righteousness' & ranges the fight of God against evil at that particular level.[219]

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[214] Butterfield, 'God in History', p. 11.

[215] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 52.

[216] Butterfield to Watson, 25 August 1953, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W30.

[217] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 52.

[218] Thompson, Masters of International Thought, p. 14.

[219] Butterfield to Wight, 14 August 1950, Wight MSS 233 1/7.

The latter part of Christianity and History, and indeed much of his subsequent work, takes up these themes, and moved beyond the Old Testament vision.[220] There he was keen to emphasise that God's Promise was an affirmation of love, not merely of protection. As Butterfield argued in a radio talk:

> If the Bible is taken as a whole, it is remarkable to see how, from fairly crude beginnings, a theme develops which in the New Testament achieves the might and majesty of an orchestral symphony. The theme is a triple one, concerning Love, concerning Personality, and concerning God... The picture that is produced is one of God presiding over this world of tumult and violence, of cupidity and fear, of struggle and cross-purposes – presiding over it and drawing upon it like a magnet, drawing men by the cords of love.[221]

Here, of course, Butterfield comes much closer to Toynbee that to Wight. Indeed, for all his discussion – in Christianity and History especially – of the God of Christianity being the God of History, it is notable that his belief is not, as the more orthodox Wight would have it, 'that God has *done* something', but that 'God *is* something'.[222] For Butterfield as for Toynbee: 'God is love and it is always dangerous to think of the power of God without thinking of his love'.[223]

In emphasising 'personality' too Butterfield distinguished himself from both Toynbee and Wight. In Christianity and History, perhaps with the former in mind, he wrote:

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[220] See Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 137-145; Christianity, Diplomacy and War, pp. 37-48.

[221] Butterfield, 'The Christian Idea of God', p. 591.

[222] Wight, 'The Crux for the Historian brought up in the Christian Tradition', in Toynbee, Study VII, annex III, p. 737.

> If there is a meaning in history...it lies not in the systems and organisations that are built over long periods, but in something more essentially human, something in each personality considered for mundane purposes as an end in himself.[224]

To accept the notion of personality, to thus set 'high value...on human beings', inoculated the Christian against such tendencies, and that which was much worse: the view of a 'materialistic and naturalistic universe' in which humans are 'conceived merely as part of nature'.[225] Personality was something more too than simply individuality: it was variety and difference, but with an inalienable, otherworldly, spiritual element. God and human personalities, Butterfield wrote, have 'absolute existence' over and above nature and human creations.[226] This emphasis on personality implied a certain view of the ends of Christianity:

> [It] seeks to achieve [solidarity] amongst the world of free personalities by a voluntary love which, far from submerging the individual, carries personality to a still higher power.[227]

This idea of personality, together with that of Providence, coloured too his historiography and international thought, to be explored in the remaining chapters.

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[223] Butterfield, 'God in History', p. 14.

[224] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 66-67.

[225] Butterfield, Christianity in European History, p. 61. He also touched on this theme in the introduction to Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 5-8

[226] Ibid., p. 54.

[227] Ibid., pp. 62-62.

Conclusion

Despite their differences, the religious thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight bore many similarities. Most striking is their common perception of a responsibility to act as public apologists for their beliefs, to bear witness, uphold and defend. In this, of course, they were hardly alone: many other laymen and -women – from Eliot to Zimmern – did much the same during the 1930s, 40s and 50s in response to what they perceived as a crisis of civilisation. In Butterfield's case, however, and to a lesser extent in Wight's, it is nonetheless surprising that public vent was given to inner religious beliefs. As McIntire has observed, the early, pre-war Butterfield did not think highly of those who paraded their faith.[228] The move from extreme reticence to the enthusiasm of his religious writings, lectures and broadcasts of the late 1940s and 1950s is a measure of his alarm at contemporary events. While for Butterfield it was the shock of Dunkirk that first prompted this shift, for Toynbee and Wight it was the collapse of the League in the second half of the 1930s. All three were concerned too with the process of secularisation and its consequences for politics and for faith.

What is also marked in their work is a rejection of much or all of the liberal theological view that was so strong during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Yet only Wight, whose knowledge of contemporary theological developments was unequalled by Butterfield and Toynbee, came close to embracing the neo-orthodoxy that challenged the liberals. A concentration on the spiritual made Butterfield sceptical of both the liberals' ability to achieve knowledge of God through learning and their accommodations with the contemporary world. Toynbee, for his part, rejected only the

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[228] McIntire, 'Introduction', Writings on Christianity and History p. xii.

self-confidence of liberal critical scholarship, replacing it, as a means of attaining religious truths, with a quasi-Bergsonian mysticism. In advocating his Symmachan syncretism, however, Toynbee was as latitudinarian as any liberal, perhaps even more so. As Bagby observed, his thought was as 'time-bound' as any that Toynbee criticised, and while he professed to 'reject the Enlightenment, our new prophet is none the less its child and disciple'.[229]

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight sought reformed religion, and all desired its emancipation from political power. Butterfield's Christianity in European History is an extended lament for the 'alliance' with 'power' that was occasioned by Constantine's conversion, just as Toynbee's Study is an over-extended critique of 'static' religions, with their rules, doctrines and authorities. For the first, Christianity had to be a religion of the spirit, of the inner voice, not outward power; for the latter, religious truth could only be achieved mystically and personally. Wight's position was more subtle. He was nostalgic for the unity of medieval Christendom and all that entailed, but he was also highly critical of the 'unedifying political record of modern Christianity' and what he called it 'political Archaism', the tendency to ally with reaction against reform.[230] Ultimately, he believed that the 'centre' of the Church was not establishment but the 'catacombs', and it had always to return there 'to set out to conquer the world again'.[231]

The next chapter explores the other foundation of the international thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight: history. It was not only a professional concern. Butterfield was keen to remind his readers that the God of Scripture is the God of

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[229] Bagby, 'Study of Toynbee', p. 666.

[230] Wight in Toynbee, Study VII, pp. 456-457, note 3.

[231] Wight, 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, p. 39.

History,[232] and the relationship between his religious thought, his understanding of the past, and his approach to historical scholarship is close. The work of Toynbee and Wight also demonstrates this connection; both were concerned with the problem of uncovering religious meaning in secular history, the relation between the metahistorical and the mundane.

[232] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 1.

IV. History: Patterns, Method and Practice

A true politics...is above all a philosophy of history.[1]

Harold Laski

A view of the past – of its shape, of how it might best be understood, and of how its study relates to political practice – was all Laski meant by a 'philosophy of history'. Others have been less flexible. In his unfinished Idea of History, Collingwood observed that what Voltaire understood by the phrase was 'critical or scientific history, a type of historical thinking in which the historian makes up his mind for himself instead of repeating whatever stories he found in old books'.[2] For Hegel, he noted, the philosophy of history meant simply an account of the history of the world, of universal history. Late nineteenth century positivists, on the other hand, saw it as a body of laws that governed an historical 'process', and Collingwood himself offered yet another definition. The philosophy of history, he argued, was analogous to the philosophy of science: it entailed the study of the 'philosophical problems created by the existence of organized and systematized historical research'.[3] In the post-war period, the philosophy of history was thus reserved to professional philosophers, albeit with little resistance from historians.[4]

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[1] Harold Laski, 'On the Study of Politics' (1926), in his The Danger of Being a Gentleman and other essays (London: Basis Books, 1940), p. 37.

[2] Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 2.

[3] Ibid., p. 6. On the development of Collingwood's philosophy of history, see Christopher Parker, The English Idea of History from Coleridge to Collingwood (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 161-216.

[4] See W. H. Dray, Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951) and A. C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Cambridge

In the past twenty years, however, even the philosophers have abandoned the subject, and while some on the margins continued to show concern, the historians have not sought to regain the ground for themselves.[5] A residual suspicion of the 'philosophy of history', with its associations with Hegel, positivists and Collingwood, has stymied such attempts. Worse still, an obsessive concern with countering 'relativism' – and with its supposedly corrosive effect on 'historical truth' – has generated among most historians an almost pathological refusal to explore the philosophical, religious or political presuppositions on which their work rests.[6] Where they were explored, moreover, it was under a different name, as 'historiography' or the 'history of historiography'.[7] That enterprise, however, tended to focus only on an historian's interpretations of a past event or events, and sometimes on the methodological foundations of his or her work. Rarely were the political and philosophical implications of an historian's work explored, for to do so would be to acknowledge the intimacy of the political and the historical, to breach that bulwark that saves historians – in their minds – from 'relativism'.

Laski suffered few of such anxieties. He maintained that an interpretation of the past grounded all political philosophy and political practice, domestic and international, and that its exploration improved the understanding of political ideas and actions. Study

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University Press, 1965), as well as Patrick Gardiner's edited The Philosophy of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974) which contains only one essay by an historian (Quentin Skinner).

[5] Michael Stanford, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 5.

[6] The clearest and crudest refusal may be found in Richard J. Evans' In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997).

[7] Michael Bentley, Modern Historiography: An Introduction (London & New York: Routledge, 1998), p. x. Butterfield was also keen to use the latter term, see his 'The History of Historiography' in Man on his Past, pp. 1-31.

of the 'philosophy of history' that underpinned politics, he argued, could correct 'that tendency to over-estimate the originality and significance of our own ideas' and prevented 'that vicious habit of making the immediate need the eternal good'. And if nothing else, it deterred scholars from developing that 'habit of political philosophers to transform their reading of history into universal dogma'.[8] Wight, for one, agreed. Like Laski, he was insistent that the purpose of education was the acquisition of 'perspective', the 'escape from the *Zeitgeist*, from the mean, narrow, provincial spirit which is constantly assuring us that we are at the peak of human achievement,...on the edge of unprecedented prosperity or an unparalleled catastrophe'.[9] Like Laski also, he was keen to demonstrate the interdependence of politics and history: 'the historian's fundamental beliefs about politics and man', he wrote in one broadcast lecture, 'are necessarily implicit in his discussion of what he calls historical facts'.[10] Butterfield too was fascinated by the historical interpretations that informed political doctrines, whether they were those of the Whigs, Napoleon, Machiavelli, Acton or the 'modern barbarians'.[11] Toynbee, on the other hand, was keen to create a philosophy of history to underpin a politics that could meet the 'challenges' faced by Western civilisation. In the work of all three, the treatment of the past, the understanding of its patterns, their historical methods, and their conceptions of its practical uses, are intertwined with their international and political thought.

This chapter, then, explores these areas of their historical thought in turn to cast light upon their treatments of international crisis. In what remains of this introduction,

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[8] Laski, 'On the Study of Politics', p. 38. The idea that a philosophy of history lurks behind an international theory is not one that has received much attention in contemporary IR, with the exception of that of Thomas W. Smith, whose History and International Relations (London & New York: Routledge, 1999) does explore the issue.

[9] Wight, International Theory, p. 6.

[10] Wight, 'What Makes a Good Historian?', p. ??

however, I want to offer a sketch of the contexts in which the historical thought of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight developed. All three, it should be noted, perceived themselves as dissenters from the historiographical orthodoxies of their day (or, at least, of their early careers). They shared a common distaste for constitutional history, which dominated the syllabus at both Oxford and Cambridge from the creation of the History Schools in the 1870s until the 1930s.[12] At its centre was the study of the supposed development of the institutions of English government, from the *witangemots* of the early Anglo-Saxon settlers to the emergence of Parliament. Constitutional history had its merits as a subject for undergraduates, requiring technical skill, linguistic ability and great precision in the treatment of documents, but was commonly disliked. An enthralling synthesis of political and legal history in the hands of its greatest expositors, not least those of William Stubbs,[13] in the hands of college tutors the subject often became colourless, arid and unattractive to the student. Butterfield and Wight certainly found it so. 'Constitutional studies' were, for Butterfield, 'not entirely satisfying'.[14] Wight, for his

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[11] For a discussion of the 'modern barbarism', see Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 31.

[12] Christopher Parker, The English Historical Tradition since 1850 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990), p. 10. Parker suggests that constitutional history 'mostly retained and extended this position for thirty years thereafter' despite the 'scholarly reaction' against it which grew in strength from the 1890s onwards. At Oxford in the 1870s, four out of ten of the Honours papers were on political and consitutional history, two on periods of European history, two on a special subject, one on politics and economics and one on geography. In 1885, the Historical Tripos at Cambridge was deemed to include two papers on constitutional history, one each on economic history and political science and two on a special subject, with a number of other optional papers. (John Kenyon, The History Men: The Historical Profession in England since the Renaissance (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983), pp. 173-174).

[13] For a recent, sympathetic, assessment see James Campbell, 'Stubbs and the English State', in his The Anglo-Saxon State (London & New York: Hambleton, 2000), p. 247-268.

[14] Butterfield, 'Autobiographical Reflections', Butterfield MSS 7, i, p. 66. Butterfield is said to have absented himself from Z. N. Brooke's lectures on medieval constitutional history because his 'scholarship seemed dry and his delivery was unexciting' (John D. Fair, Harold Temperley:

part, complained to Toynbee of the labour and tedium of constitutional history, not least the hours of wading through Tout's studies of English administration.[15]

Toynbee's objections to contemporary historiography were more distinctive. In the Study, he attacked the increasing specialisation – 'the Industrial System "in book form" with its Division of Labour' – of the historical profession as it had developed since the 1870s.[16] He criticised its obsessive concern with the 'evidence', and the 'tendency for the potter to become the slave of his clay'.[17] He condemned, in particular, the narrowness of its vision. But by the time he made them – 1934 – Toynbee's criticisms were somewhat outdated. There had already been a widening of the syllabus at Oxford, Cambridge and elsewhere, and certainly a broadening of professional historians' concerns. As early as the 1890s, historians – not least Seeley – had complained of the insularity of constitutional history, and sought a more 'international' perspective.[18] In the aftermath of the First World War, this view gained much support, not least from the 'League of Nations Union', with men like Charles Cruttwell, later one of Wight's tutors at Hertford College, leading the way.[19] Historians played a leading role, indeed, in publicising the

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A Scholar and Romantic in the Public Realm (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), p. 170). 'Is it wise', Butterfield wrote later, 'that English constitutional history should not merely be emphasised but should outweigh – and in many respects replace – the general study of English history?' ('The Teaching of English History', Cambridge Journal 2:1 (October 1948), p. 4).

[15] Wight to Toynbee, 13 October 1954, Toynbee MSS 86.

[16] Toynbee, Study I, p. 5.

[17] Ibid., p. 7.

[18] P. B. M. Blaas, Continuity and Anachronism: Parliamentary and Constitutional Development in Whig Historiography and in the Anti-Whig Reaction Between 1890 and 1930 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 38.

[19] On the League and international history, as well as the resistance to it, see F. M. Powicke, 'History Lessons and the League', in his Modern Historians and the Study of History (London: Odhams Press, 1955), pp. 159-163.

internationalist cause in the 1920s.[20] The study of foreign policy also came of age in the inter-war years, with the work of Satow, Fisher, Nicolson, Bryce, Temperley, Webster, Toynbee, Gooch, Trevelyan and, indeed, Butterfield.[21] Others, notably William Cunningham, pushed economic history onto the curriculum and gave it scholarly respectability.[22] There was a growing interest too, not least for Trevelyan, with social history, and the growing influence of Marxism, especially amongst Cambridge undergraduates, directed further attention to economics.[23]

Unlike Butterfield and Wight, Toynbee had no direct experience of the undergraduate study of history. His mother's library, and especially The Story of Nations series was an early and profound influence, but it was the reading of classics at Winchester and Oxford that shaped his approach to the past.[24] It brought him an intimate familiarity with the great ancient historians: Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Livy and Tacitus. Toynbee also read much modern historiography, notably Gibbon and Freeman, but his tastes were not confined to history. Classicists, at least in the decade or so before the Great War, were considerably more receptive than modern historians to

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[20] See, for example, the contributions from H. W. C. Davis, G. N. Clark, G. P. Gooch and Eileen Power, among others, to F. S. Marvin's The Evolution of World Peace (London: Oxford University Press, 1921).

[21] For a survey of the early developments, see G. P. Gooch, 'The Study of Foreign Affairs', in his Studies in Modern History (London: Longmans, Green, 1931), pp. 329-330. Though no supporter of the League, Butterfield was keen to counteract what he saw as the 'nationalistic bias' in contemporary historiography. He was still complaining about the 'insular approach to history' in 1965, in his inaugural lecture as Regius Professor ('The Present State of Historical Scholarship', p. 13).

[22] Blaas, Continuity and Anachronism, p. 46.

[23] Harvey J. Kaye, The British Marxist Historians new ed. (Houndmills & London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 10.

'external', non-disciplinary influences. As McNeill has noted, Frazer's The Golden Bough (1890) – a pioneering work of cultural anthropology – continued to fascinate students of classical religion and thought, not least Gilbert Murray, until well after the war.[25] Others, notably Toynbee's friend, Alfred Zimmern, showed themselves keen, to draw upon 'newer methods of social enquiry', especially those of economics, in their classical studies.[26] As we have already seen, A. D. Lindsay, another of Toynbee's Oxford friends, was keen not only to teach classical philosophy, but also introduced his students to contemporary thinkers like Bergson. Toynbee read widely, and was encouraged to so do – his unpublished 'What the Historian Does' (1910-11), for instance, contains a carefully consideration of Hegel's philosophy of history.[27] This openness, which so contrasted with the closed world of professional, modern historians, helped to inculcate in Toynbee the eclecticism that so marks his work.

Historiography, Burrow has argued, is one of the means by which a society reveals its assumptions, beliefs and character.[28] The 'definitive' characteristic of late nineteenth century society, he observed, was 'confidence: confidence in the possession of the past...even more confidence, perhaps, in understanding the present'.[29] This mood gave shape to history, moulding an interpretation that saw the past – or, at least, the English

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[24] Toynbee, Study X, p. 219. On the influence of his mother on Toynbee's attitude to the past, see 'My View of History', in Civilization on Trial, pp. 1-2; Study of History, vol. X, p. 213; Experiences, p. 90.

[25] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 29.

[26] Alfred E. Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth: Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (Oxford: Clarendon, 1911), p. 5.

[27] Toynbee, 'What the Historian Does', Toynbee MSS 1, p. 30 & p. 24.

[28] J. W. Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 3. Wight would have agreed. As he argued: 'the best historical writing is that which is impregnated with the deepest reflections of the culture in which it is written' ('What makes a Good Historian?', p. 284).

[29] Burrow, Liberal Descent, p. 3.

past – as a story of unfolding progress. Thus Lord Acton's confidence in historical method and the power of ideas shaped the progressivism of his later years.[30] A similar confidence allowed the otherwise Conservative Bishop Stubbs to cast his constitutional history as the story of the gradual erosion of arbitrary power and the ultimate triumph of Parliament. As Von Arx has argued, even anxious late-Victorians, those like Morley, Stephen, Lecky, and Froude, who feared that the future would not be as they had envisaged in their radical youths, put forward progressivist accounts of English history.[31] Fearful of the masses, they remained confident that their intellectual abilities, historical methods and political *nous* would sustain this movement.[32]

During the inter-war years English historiography lost the triumphal tone of the pre-war period, and became more cautious as to the nation's destiny. The war itself, of course, played its part. In Germany, the popularity of Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes demonstrated the extent in which the war had broken the confidence of intellectual and proletarian alike.[33] But historical and cultural pessimism – in the work of Burckhardt or Nietzsche, for instance – was hardly unknown to Central Europeans before

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[30] On the later, liberal Acton, see Gertrude Himmelfarb, Lord Acton: A Study in Conscience and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 190-241, and Hugh Tulloch, Acton (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988), pp. 63-119.

[31] Jeffrey Paul Von Arx, Progress and Pessimism: Religion, Politics and History in Late Nineteenth Century Britain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985).

[32] Ibid., pp. 201-209. See also Michael Bentley, 'Victorian historians and the larger hope', in his edited Public and Private Doctrine: Essays in British History presented to Maurice Cowling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 127-148.

[33] Herman, Idea of Decline in Western History, pp. 221-255. See also Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West: Form and Actuality 2 vols., trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1926-28). Spengler's book was astonishingly popular in the early 1920s: as Hughes has noted, 'everyone seemed to be reading him'. Outside Germany the response was more mixed; the book 'won the admiration of the half-educated and the scorn of the judicious'

1914, and had always held much less appeal in England.[34] It is notable that it was Lewis Namier, an emigré Polish Jew, who lent Toynbee his copy of Spengler's book,[35] for the argument of Der Untergang des Abendlandes was not often congenial to English historians' minds. The professional historian, they argued, did not dabble in philosophical questions or rhetorical excess, and was all the more powerful for it. As Powicke declared in 1929: 'there can be no doubt that the study of history as history, and not as the instrument of a single conception or theory, has steadily undermined the influence of the philosophies of history'. The 'growth of knowledge', he argued, changed the 'form' of historical 'expression'; English historians need not rely upon theory or bombast to carry the argument, for the weight of evidence was behind them.[36] Not all, of course, were persuaded by such confident assertions, among them Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight.

Patterns of the Past

> Some have seen the course of...history-making as a spiral; they point for example to civilisations which seem to come in cycles; developing and decaying, each new one beginning its cycle a little higher up than the previous one. Some think of history almost as though it were a mechanistic system - interests colliding with one another, with diagrams of forces.... Others...have drawn their analogies from organisms in biology. Such symbols or patterns, however, have reference only to selected parcels of historical events, isolated from the rest of the complex fabric of historical happening. They are very dangerous, for none of them is sufficiently flexible... Those who -

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(H. Stuart Hughes, Oswald Spengler: a critical estimate revised ed. (New York: Scribner's, 1962), p. 89 & p. 1.

[34] Ibid., 76-108. The greatest nineteenth century British pessimist was, of course, not English, but a Scot: Thomas Carlyle. See Simon Heffer, Moral Desperado: A Life of Thomas Carlyle (London: Phoenix, 1996).

[35] Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 9.

[36] Powicke, 'Historical Study in Oxford', in his Modern Historians, pp. 174-175.

> thinking in pictures somewhat, or in diagrams - imagined in 1919 that history was an ascending process, or that, having taken a curve in the nineteenth century it would continue in the twentieth century...were actually handicapped in their historical knowledge, because they had run into too rigid a pattern. They did not remember what a live thing history is, and how wilfully it breaks away from the railway-lines which the prophets and pedants may have set for it.[37]
>
> Butterfield.

> Certainly, in all these movements of the forces that weave the web of human history, an element of sheer recurrence can be detected. Indeed, it stares us in the face. Yet the shuttle which shoots backwards and forwards across the loom of Time...is all this time bringing into existence a tapestry in which there is manifestly 'a progress towards an end' and not just an 'endless repetition' in the likeness of the shuttle's own action.[38]
>
> Toynbee.

> The characteristic mark of the process of secular history is peripeteia, a 'falling round', like the convolution of a descending spiral.[39]
>
> Wight.

The past has, Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight agreed, a pattern. They were keen, however, to refute the notion that that shape was that observed by pre-war historians: the past, they argued, was not a story of lineal progress. The patterns they saw were rather different, influenced both by their religious beliefs and their perception of contemporary crisis. In Butterfield's case, the shape of the past was often inscrutable, sometimes unmistakably cataclysmic, but wholly Providential. For Toynbee, the past was a catalogue of analogous events, though never truly or deterministically cyclical. Wight, at

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[37] Butterfield, Christianity and History, pp. 142-143.

[38] Toynbee, Study, III, p. 34.

times, was less equivocal, and saw in secular history, as he famously observed of International Politics, a pattern of 'recurrence and repetition'.[40] These patterns or shapes deserve treatment not only for their own sakes, but also because they ground, to varying degrees, their historical methods and their views of the relationship between history and political practice.

In print, Butterfield and Toynbee both offered explicit challenges to the linear progressivism that underpinned much late nineteenth and early twentieth century historiography. While Toynbee's challenge took the form of the Study, in all its twelve volumes, Butterfield's – The Whig Interpretation of History – was considerable more concise. In little more than an extended essay, he provided both a sketch of pre-war progressivist historiography and a fierce critique. His targets were 'Protestant, progressive, and whig, and the very model of the 19th century gentleman'.[41] They were, he asserted, complacent and arrogant determinists, judgmental and prejudiced. They organised and abridged the past to cast it as an unfolding story of progress.[42] The 'whig' method, Butterfield argued, produced 'a scheme of general history which is bound to converge beautifully on the present – all demonstrating throughout the ages the workings of an obvious principle of progress'.[43]

Butterfield's critique was neither well-directed nor wholly original. Only Hallam and Acton were named targets. The latter was taken as representative of a much wider whole; in Acton, Butterfield wrote, the 'whig historian reached his highest

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[39] Wight, 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, p. 4.

[40] Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory?', in Wight & Butterfield (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, p. 26.

[41] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, pp. 3-4.

[42] Ibid., p. 4.

[43] Ibid., p. 12.

consciousness'.[44] This still left considerable ambiguity, however, causing offence to the then Regius Professor at Cambridge, G. M. Trevelyan, and allowing The Whig Interpretation to be itself interpreted as a critique of a wide range of subjects.[45] Moreover, as Blaas has argued, the book was only one of a string of publications, stretching back to the pre-war years, attacking the anachronistic distortions and judgmental moralism of nineteenth century historiography.[46] Butterfield's former tutor Harold Temperley had played a role here, as did his erstwhile friend Michael Oakeshott and his later adversary Lewis Namier.[47] The latter attacked the whigs' interpretation of eighteenth century British politics, one of a struggle between organised and self-conscious progressive and reactionary parties, and asserted instead the fundamentally self-interested character of politicians of the period.[48] While Namier immersed himself in the sordid minutiae, Oakeshott ranged higher, musing on the nature of history and dissecting the process of abridgement necessary to all historiography.[49]

In The Whig Interpretation, against the progressivist view, Butterfield gave an alternative account of what he called the 'historical process'. The emphasis was on the contingent:

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[44] Ibid., p. 109.

[45] On Trevelyan's offended reaction, see Butterfield, 'My Literary Productions', Butterfield MSS 269/3, p. e, and also Cannadine, Trevelyan, pp. 208-209.

[46] Blaas, Continuity and Anachronism, p. xi & pp. 7-8. Blaas adds that The Whig Interpretation 'initially attracted relatively little attention' (p. 9).

[47] Niall Ferguson, 'Introduction: Virtual History: Towards a 'chaotic' theory of the past', in his edited Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals (Basingstoke: Papermac, 1997), pp. 50-52.

[48] Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1961 [1929]).

[49] Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995 [1933]).

> It is not by a line but by a labyrinthine piece of network that one would have to make the diagram of the course by which religious liberty has come down to us, for this liberty comes by devious tracks and is born of strange conjunctures, it represents purposes marred perhaps more than purposes achieved, and it owes more than we can tell to many agencies that had little to do with either religion or liberty.[50]

History, Butterfield argued, was complicated, and the whig historian over-simplified it with his anachronisms and abridgements. Events occurred as much by 'men's sins and apprehensions or what we can only call fortunate conjunctions' than by intent.[51] History showed, rather than a struggle between the forces of progress and reaction, a 'complex' process of 'mediations'.[52] Thus, for the historian, Butterfield wrote, 'the only absolute is change'.[53]

In his post-war work, he sought to express this understanding of the past more fully, implicitly and explicitly. George III, Lord North and the People is of especial importance: it serves not only as a demonstration of his methods, discussed below, but it also represents an attempt to illustrate the play of contingency in historical events. For Butterfield, the uprisings of 1780 constituted, as he wrote in the preface, the 'revolution that we escaped', and the book is devoted to showing how, with much the same circumstances in place, Britain avoided the calamity that befell France nine years later.[54] The book expanded upon a theme introduced in The Englishman and his History which had ascribed the triumph of 'liberty' in English politics to good fortune, albeit luck made by the Englishman's innate sense of the complexity of history and by – somewhat

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[50] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, p. 45.

[51] Ibid., p. 46.

[52] Ibid., p. 42 & p. 47.

[53] Ibid., p. 58.

[54] Butterfield, George III, Lord North and the People, p. vi.

perversely – bad, 'whig' historiography.[55] The concentration on the play of chance and the ubiquity of irony are features of all of Butterfield's historical works. Thus, in Christianity in European History, the triumph of Christianity in the Roman world is 'remarkable' (a word common to his work), perhaps 'anomalous', and certainly not pre-destined.[56]

Yet Butterfield was not disposed to ascribe the pattern of the past to pure contingency. His account of the 'historical process' was wholly dependent upon his religious beliefs. This became increasingly evident during the 1940s. In 'Napoleon and Hitler' (1941), he argued that the two men:

> ...use modern inventions to free themselves from the past...This is perhaps their greatest weakness, for, at some stage in the story, history reasserts itself, refusing to be tempted too far...History, in its long term results, tends to redress the balance. It returns to the banal, and, if we give it time (which is necessary), goes back to its natural allies; settling finally on the side of the sounder virtues – honesty, persistence and mediocrity.[57]

By 1944, however, and in an almost identical passage in The Englishman and his History, 'history' or the 'historical process', with its twists and turns of fate and fortune, became 'Providence'.[58] As Butterfield later explained: 'either you trace everything back in the long run to sheer blind Chance, or you trace everything to God'.[59] Where he had previously attacked the whig historians with an account of a contingent and complex past,

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[55] Butterfield, The Englishman and his History, p. 96-98 & p. 79.

[56] Butterfield, Christianity in European History, p. 10 & p. 6. Butterfield wrote: 'At the beginning of the fourth century it would hardly have seemed to the observer that Christianity was a religion destined to be associated in a special sense with the continent of Europe'.

[57] Butterfield, 'Napoleon and Hitler', Cambridge Review 63:1530, 6 June 1941, p. 475.

[58] Butterfield, The Englishman and his History, p. 99.

in his post-war work, Butterfield challenged progressivism with a Providential vision of history.

In Christianity and History and elsewhere, he criticised those – Marxists, Wellsians, Fascists and Liberals as well as optimistic Protestants and Catholics, all of whom were left unnamed – who thought 'mundane history' formed a 'self-explanatory system'.[60] We, Butterfield declared, 'have long been spoiled by a feeling of security and a dream of eternal progress, so that we have forgotten the very nature of history'.[61] He went on:

> We of the twentieth century have been particularly spoiled, for the men of the Old Testament, the ancient Greeks and all our ancestors down to the seventeenth century betray in their philosophy and their outlook a terrible awareness of the chanciness of human life, and the precarious nature of man's existence in this risky universe.[62]

The present, like the past, is, then, fundamentally complex and contingent. At times, however, he seemed to discern in both patterns and recurrences. Butterfield treated Napoleon and Hitler as historical actors of the same genus: both Machiavellians, both dictators borne of democracies, both technocrats of a sort, both hubristic in the extreme.[63] Similarly, the catastrophes of the modern era were comparable to those of the ancient

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[59] Butterfield, 'God in History' in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 8.

[60] Butterfield, 'The Christian and Academic History', Christian News-Letter 333 (supplement), 16 March 1949), p. 89.

[61] Butterfield, 'The Christian and the Biblical Interpretation of History', Christian News-Letter 336 (27 April 1949), p. 139.

[62] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 2nd ed., p. 94.

[63] See Butterfield, 'Napoleon and Hitler', pp. 474-475. On Napoleon's Machiavellism, see Napoleon, p. 124.

world.[64] Indeed, in an echo of Toynbee, he asserted that the events of the Exile were 'more *contemporary* with the moral predicament of this part of the world since 1939 or 1945 than anything in the history of the nineteenth century [italics added]'.[65]

History, for Butterfield, was both contingent and recurrently catastrophic. He complicated the issue, however, with terminological imprecision. History was 'calamitous', implying that events occur for purely contingent and fortuitous reasons, but also 'tragic', implying pre-destination of sorts.[66] This created an impression of determinism that Butterfield did not wish to promote, but which worried Isaiah Berlin and others.[67] The 'tragedy' of history was the predicament of human existence – freedom limited by circumstance – rather than some over-arching schema, let alone the cycles of hubris and nemesis of Greek tragedy. The shape of the past in Butterfield's work, by contrast, is amorphous: it is neither cyclical nor linear. There are ups and downs, some progress – moral and material – and occasional catastrophes. A definite shape, however, is not discernible. In this, Butterfield's thought contrasts sharply with that of both Wight and Toynbee.

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[64] See especially Butterfield, Christianity and History, 2nd ed., pp. 92-122.

[65] Ibid., 2nd ed., p. 97.

[66] Butterfield, Christianity and History, p. 113.

[67] See Isaiah Berlin, 'Historical Inevitability', in his Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 82-85. In correspondence, it should be noted, Berlin absolved Butterfield of being 'a determinist of any kind' and observed that Oakeshott had complained that Berlin had not got Butterfield 'right, or at least quite right' (Berlin to Butterfield, 15 May 1953, Butterfield MSS 531/B81). Butterfield's reply was uncharacteristically pompous: 'I have come to the conclusion that any man who ventures into publication must expect to be greatly misrepresented both by his enemies and by his admirers. I never want to publicly reply in such a case' (Butterfield to Berlin, 16 May 1953, Butterfield MSS 531/B82).

Of the two, Toynbee was the least keen to assert that the past displayed a particular pattern or shape, or to lay out clearly what it might be. He was consistently critical of those whose histories he considered overly deterministic, though he continued to flirt with such ideas throughout his life. His early essay, 'What the Historian does', for instance, attacked Hegel for 'clamping an iron band' around 'the mighty movement of growth' in human history. Yet while emphasising 'difference' and 'change', Toynbee did not altogether discount Hegel's progressivist teleology.[68] He came still closer, in 1921, to endorsing Spengler's biologistic account of the past. Like the Greek historian Thucydides, Spengler had argued that the rise and fall of polities was best understood by analogy to the individual.[69] Where Thucydides relied upon an account of the psychology of men,[70] however, Spengler drew a parallel with their biology. For him, the eight separate *Kulturen* were like living organisms: they were born, grew, aged, and died.[71]

Though in Civilization on Trial and elsewhere Toynbee was equivocal, even evasive, about Spengler's influence,[72] his earlier work suggests that he was impressed by

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[68] Toynbee, 'What the Historian does', Toynbee MSS 1, p. 30.

[69] For a sympathetic survey of Spengler's thought, see John Farrenkopf, Prophet of Decline: Spengler on World History and Politics (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001).

[70] For Thucydides, the fortunes of Athens were analogous to those of the hybris, egotism and irrationality of men, and prone to the vicissitudes of fortune. See especially F. M. Cornford's interpretation of the Melian dialogue: 'Athens, tempted by Fortune, deluded by Hope, and blinded by covetous Insolence, was attempting an enterprise comparable with that which it was her boast to have repulsed and broken at Salamis (F. M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (London: Edward Arnold, 1907), p. 201).

[71] For Spengler, '*Cultures are organisms*, and world-history is their collective biography' (Decline of the West, p. 104). See also the translation of this passage in Toynbee, Study III, p. 221.

[72] McNeill has pondered the question of why Toynbee was so 'sparing' in his acknowledgement of Spengler's work, and suggests: 'perhaps his spare references and belittling remarks about Spengler are to be understood as a kind of self-protection - a way of standing on his own feet, and avoiding the reduction of his own work to the status of commentary upon or dialogue with

his biological schema for the history of societies. The best evidence for this comes in Toynbee's contribution to The Legacy of Greece (1921) – an essay on 'History' – which opens with in a paragraph strongly reminiscent of Spengler:

> Ancient Greek society perished at least as long ago as the seventh century... Many historians would date its death a good many centuries earlier, and all would agree that even if there are symptoms that life still lingered in the body down to this time, its mental and physical energies had long failed, and that the change from lethargy to death was hardly perceptible when it came.[73]

Western civilisation was identified as the 'child' of Greece, with Toynbee asserting:

> This description of the relationship between Ancient Greece and the modern Western world *may be something more than a metaphor*, for societies like individuals are living creatures, and may be expected to exhibit the same phenomena... The germ of Western society first developed in the body of Greek society, like a child in the womb. The Roman Empire was a period of pregnancy during which the new life was sheltered and nurtured by the old. The 'Dark Age' was the crisis of birth, in which the child broke away from its parents and emerged as a separate, though naked and helpless, individual. The Middle Ages were the period of childhood, in which the new creature, though immature, found itself able to live and grow independently [italics added].[74]

Echoes of Der Untergang des Abendlandes seemingly abound.

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his predecessor' ('Toynbee's Life and Thought: Some Unresolved Questions', in McIntire & Perry (eds.), Toynbee Reappraisals, p. 35).

[73] Toynbee, 'History', in R. W. Livingstone (ed.), The Legacy of Greece (Oxford: Clarendon, 1921), p. 289.

[74] Ibid., p. 290.

It remains unclear, however, how far Toynbee accepted Spengler's central thesis. Many of his critics were quick to highlight Spenglerian biologism whenever they thought themselves to have found it, and Toynbee spent much effort refuting the allegations.[75] In the first three volumes of the Study, it is apparent that he was keen to distance himself from the German's thought. Only the third volume contains any sustained discussion of his arguments, almost all of it critical.[76] Toynbee wrote later that after reading Der Untergang he had quickly come to the view that it was 'most unilluminatingly dogmatic and deterministic' and that he had concluded that to remedy Spengler's errors he had to proceed with 'English empiricism'.[77] But Toynbee left many apparent signs of lingering influence for his critics to cite. The Roman Empire was the 'cradle of our Western Society', he wrote early in the Study.[78] The histories of societies are compared, as they were in the earlier essay 'History', with the 'life of human beings'. The relationships between societies, Toynbee suggests, can been seen in terms of that between parent and child.[79]

All this should not, however, be taken as proof positive of Spengler's sole influence. Toynbee did employ biological analogies in work predating his reading of Der Untergang, not least in Nationality and the War (1915).[80] The 'organic conception of

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[75] Hans Morgenthau, for instance, attributes a 'biological scheme' to Toynbee ('Toynbee and the Historical Imagination', Encounter 4:3 (March 1955), p. 74). Toynbee was 'astonished' that he should be misinterpreted thus, and addresses a range of 'guilty' critics in his Reconsiderations, Study XII, pp. 255-256.

[76] See especially Toynbee, Study III, pp. 221-222 & pp. 379-389. Spengler is also mentioned once in volume I (Study I, p. 135, note 2)

[77] Toynbee, Civilisation on Trial, p. 10.

[78] Toynbee, Study I, p. 53.

[79] Ibid., p. 44.

[80] What is required to address the 'present crisis', Toynbee wrote, was an 'international organism' that can counter the 'morbid hypertrophy of nationalism' (Nationality and the War, p. 477 & p. 488).

society' was a commonplace in late nineteenth and early twentieth century thought.[81] Organic and biological metaphors were especially evident in pre-war philosophical Idealism, a mode of thinking to which Toynbee was certainly exposed at Balliol.[82] A staple of Western political thought for centuries,[83] their popularity in late Victorian Britain was a by-product of the contemporary fascination for the notion of evolution. It was employed in support of a number of different positions. Herbert Spencer, for instance, used it to demonstrate that, in his view, social reform by the state was unnatural and threatened the life of society.[84] For Idealist thinkers like T. H. Green, on the other hand, this naturalistic position was mistaken, and 'neglected the *spiritual* nature of the social organism, which is neither mechanical nor biological'.[85] Bergson agreed. In attempting to wed the idea of evolution to his liberal Christianity, he sought to refute materialist accounts of social development. 'Life' for Bergson was more than physical being or the 'result or by-product of the vital process'.[86] This was spiritual creativity made material in social organisation; society was thus itself a 'living' entity.[87]

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[81] The quotation is taken from M. W. Taylor, Men versus the State: Herbert Spencer and Late Victorian Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), p. 131.

[82] The origins and development of Idealism, and of its hold on Balliol, are discussed in Richter's The Politics of Conscience.

[83] Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 203.

[84] Taylor, Men versus the State, p. 137. Taylor argues: 'Not only did Spencer use the analogy to demonstrate that the limitation of the functions of the State was a natural corollary of the processes of evolution, but he also used it to establish that society was a complex, natural growth which it was beyond the capacity of social reformers to transform'.

[85] David Boucher & Andrew Vincent, 'Introduction' to their edited British Idealism and Political Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), p. 11.

[86] Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. xii.

[87] As Bergson argued: 'to whatever school of philosophers you belong, you are bound to recognise that man is a living creature, that the evolution of life...has been accomplished in the direction of social life, that association is the most general form of human activity, since life is organization, and that, this being so, we pass by imperceptible transitions from the relation

Where biological or organic metaphors are employed in the Study, an odd amalgam of Idealist and Bergsonian ideas seem to underlie them, and they give shape to his interpretation of the past. For Toynbee, societies or civilisations are not organisms in a biological sense, but are rather manifestations of a spiritual life-force. They are not born, and do not age and die, as did Spengler's *Kulturen*. Rather, they are animated, like Bergson's dynamic religions, by 'Life', which manifests itself in the will to overcome the obstacles they face. This process of 'challenge-and-response', [88] central to Toynbee's thought, was drawn from a number of sources, but above all from evolutionary theory, as mediated by Jan Smuts. His Holism and Evolution (1926), a synthesis of Idealism and Bergsonian thought was especially important to Toynbee's early accounts of the development of civilisations.[89] What he derived from Smuts, with whom Toynbee had worked in 1919, was a theory of what might be described as 'punctuated progress'.[90] Social organisms could progress, but were faced at times with challenges requiring 'creative' responses that could retard or even reverse the process.

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between cells in an organism to the relation between individuals in society' (Two Sources of Morality and Religion, p. 94).

[88] Toynbee, Study I, pp. 271-298 describes the idea of 'challenge-and-response', and the second volume of the Study is devoted solely to the 'range of challenge-and-response'.

[89] Toynbee, Study III, p. 123. In Experiences, Toynbee recalled that 'at the moment when...I was setting out to write the first batch of volumes...General Smuts' *Holism* was published; and I was excited and encouraged to find that goal that at which I had been aiming had already been reached along a quite different road which I myself had not succeeded in exploring. See also J. C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution (London: Macmillan, 1926). For an example of Smut's importance to the argument, see Study I, pp. 272-273, where he is laying out the idea of 'challenge-and-response'.

[90] The allusion here is, of course, to the now common idea in evolutionary biology of 'punctuated equilibrium' which originated in Stephen Jay Gould & Niles Eldredge, 'Punctuated

Progress thus remained central to Toynbee's past. What he dispensed with was the idea that progress was linear. The 'most attractive' of the assumptions of contemporary historians was that of the 'continuity of history', or 'Unity of History' as E. A. Freeman had called it.[91] Toynbee challenged this, drawing attention to the discontinuities and what might be termed the lateral contacts between contemporary civilisations. 'The histories of all the civilisations that have now come to light', he wrote on the completion of the Study, 'cannot be arranged in a single series leading up to the present state of any one living civilisation or any one living nation'.[92] For Toynbee, this demanded a different historical approach – a subject discussed below – but it also required a shift in our understanding of the pattern of the past. He did not, however, seek a return to the cyclical model of Greek historiography and political thought. To Toynbee, it was clearly not the case, as it was for Aristotle or Thucydides, that societies rise and fall, and return to their original state. Instead of a cyclical account, he sketched a pattern of recurrence: the same society or civilisation does not rise again, but similar trajectories can be seen in others.[93]

Later volumes of the Study modified this model of recurrence. Key was Toynbee's reversal of the respective rôles of civilisations and 'universal churches'. In his Burge lecture of 1940, and in the final four parts of the Study, civilisations were no

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Equilibria: an alternative to phylectic gradualism', in T. J. M. Schopf (ed.), Models in Palaeobiology (San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co., 1972), pp. 82-115.

[91] Toynbee, Study I, p. 43 & pp. 339-346.

[92] Toynbee, 'A Study of History: What I am trying to do', p. 3. See also the contrast drawn between the 'unilinear' view of the past and Toynbee's 'pluralist' concept, in Geoffrey Hudson, 'Professor Toynbee and the West', p. 210.

[93] See Toynbee, 'Does History Repeat Itself?', in Civilization on Trial, pp. 29-41 and Gordon Graham, The Shape of the Past: A Philosophical Approach to History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 147. Wight also saw Toynbee - 'a morphologist of history' - as offering a picture of 'broad patterns and recurrent forms' ('History and Judgment', p. 301).

longer deemed the highest form of human endeavour and religions no longer vessels for the transmission of their greatest achievements to new, 'affiliated' civilisations.[94] Instead, churches - 'higher religions' - became a 'higher species of society' than either the 'primitive societies' out of which civilisation emerges, or the civilisations themselves.[95] The consequence was a shift from a pattern of recurrence to something like a spiral pattern, one moving progressively upwards through the rise and decline of civilisations with spiritual enlightenment as its goal.[96] In volumes VII-X, history possessed a *telos*: 'Man's Fellowship with the One True God', bringing the 'overcoming [of] discord' and the revelation of spiritual truth.[97] A certain 'linearity' thus returned to Toynbee's pattern of the past, as human beings move inexorably towards this communion with God and Truth, albeit through the process of civilisational birth, growth and decline.[98]

Such progressivism, even in this qualified form, was absent from Wight's mature historical thought. Implicit in his published writings and only explicit in his papers is a distinctive view, influenced by both Butterfield and Toynbee but identical to neither. He criticised the former for blurring the historical and the theological.[99] He criticised the latter for both post-war optimism and voiced a suspicion that Toynbee imposed upon the past a pattern of his own making.[100] Unlike both, Wight made a sharp Augustinian

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[94] On churches as 'chrysalises', and Toynbee's rejection of this notion, see Study VII, pp. 392-419.

[95] Toynbee, Study VII, pp. 420-525.

[96] On Toynbee's 'spiral theory', see G. Cairns, Philosophies of History (London: Peter Owen, 1962), p. 411.

[97] Toynbee, Study VII, pp. 506-514.

[98] There are similarities here with Bergson's philosophy of history which, according to Kolakowski, was 'based on the idea of discontinuous progress' (Bergson, p. 85).

[99] Wight, 'History and Judgment', p. 311.

[100] Wight, 'Arnold Toynbee at Eighty', Wight MSS 47, p. 8; Wight, 'Personal Portrait: Arnold Toynbee', Wight MSS 47, p. 4.

distinction between secular and sacred history.[101] The former, he argued, was utterly without meaning, though not always without shape. For Butterfield, the cataclysmic rhythm of history was both evidence of a divine plan and also an affirmation of meaning; for the older Toynbee, to ascertain the shape of the past was to gain enlightenment as to God's purpose. For Wight, no such relationship might be deduced: meaning and pattern were divorced.

Wight's understanding of the shape of history is first articulated in his unpublished articles on Antichrist, written in the early 1940s. These, as was noted in the previous chapter, betrayed the influence of Toynbee. According to Harry Pitt, a former student, the Study had provided a 'conceptual, or chronological, framework' for Wight's teaching at Haileybury.[102] Quite what Pitt meant by this is not made fully clear. The Antichrist articles, however, are more suggestive, pointing to an attempt by Wight to reconcile his Christianity to Toynbee's historical schema. In one, he wrote:

> Secular history is the empirical succession of events occurring within time; it is a process whose meaning cannot be found within time, for neither its beginning nor its end are empirically verifiable, and they can be stated only in myth. The tendency of

[101] Wight was highly critical of Butterfield's inability 'to keep the [religious] wine out of the [historical] water' in his review of the latter's Christianity and History ('History's Theme', The Observer, 23 October 1949, p. 7). Toynbee's post-war position was succinctly expressed in a letter to Columba Cary-Elwes: '...I think history is all really spiritual history – when you strip the rind off the kernel. It is the history of people's relations with God and, through God, with each other' (Toynbee to Columba, 24 August 1948, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 227).

[102] Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

> secular history is cyclic... The characteristic mark of the process of secular history is peripeteia, a 'falling round', like the convolution of a descending spiral.[103]

This pattern is, of course, the reverse of the later Toynbee's ascending spiral.[104] Where the latter is concerned with a movement in mundane history towards spiritual enlightenment, Wight offers a dualist account, contrasting the secular and spiritual:

> History has a double aspect: secular history is the empirical sequence of events in time, without meaning in itself; sacred history is the teleology of the sequence, the redemptive process working through the secular process, whereby its divine meaning is revealed...The tendency of secular history is cyclic; the tendency of sacred history is critical: moving forward by the alternation of judgment and redemption...[105]

With some alterations, he continued to espouse this view into the 1950s.

In 'The Church, Russia and the West' (1948), Wight distinguished again 'between history as process only and history as purpose, between history aetiological and history teleological'.[106] Secular history, he argued, is not 'an autonomous process which secretes its own meaning as it goes along, like a cosmic endocrine gland'. It is only in relation to a transcendent God – 'to what lies outside itself' – that history has any meaning at all, and that 'ultimate meaning', moreover, will only be evident at the end of

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[103] Wight, 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, p. 4. See also 'God in History', where Wight again uses the word 'peripeteia' to describe the process of secular history (p. 1).

[104] It should be noted, however, that Toynbee himself discusses the idea of 'peripeteia' in the Study. See especially volume IV, pp. 245-260 and volume X, p. 125.

[105] Wight, 'Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, p. 12. The notion that sacred history is 'critical' also arises in 'Progress or Eschatology', Wight MSS 42, p. 6.

[106] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 33.

history, the Second Coming, when divine judgement will fall.[107] This did not mean, however, that the past had no pattern. Attacking the idea that Soviet Communism should be praised for the abolition of 'feudalism and racialism' as nonsensical to the Christian, he maintained that their abolition 'can only be accounted a good in relation to what has succeeded them', continuing:

> The replacement of the old-fashioned and inefficient tyrannies in Eastern Europe by modern stream-lined efficient tyrannies does not confer meaning upon the historical process. It suggests rather the ancient meaninglessness of a cyclical process, the historical philosophy of the ancient world, by which the author of Ecclesiastes was oppressed, and from which Christianity liberated men.[108]

Thus while Wight was keen to note that Christianity 'liberated men' from the ancient – by which he presumably meant non-Judaic and pre-Christian – cyclical understandings of the past, he did not deny the possibility that patterns of recurrence might actually be found.

Recurrence and cycles, however, are different concepts. In his post-war work, Wight backed away from the assertion that secular history was cyclical in any strict sense. As he wrote in 'Progress or Eschatology' (1951): the 'Christian conception of History isn't linear as against cyclic but *critical as against linear or cyclic* [italics added]'.[109] Neither view was acceptable. A linear pattern implied progressivism; a cyclical view implied pessimism, and 'no Christian', Wight argued, 'can be an ultimate pessimist'.[110] This shift away from understanding even the secular past as cyclical was connected to his growing concern about the influence of modern social science. Like

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[107] Ibid., p. 38.

[108] Ibid., p. 37.

[109] Wight, 'Progress or Eschatology', Wight MSS 42, p. 6.

Toynbee, he feared that modern social science was linked to a revival of the ancient cyclical view of history:

> It is possible that the ascendancy of the social sciences...illustrates the reversion of post-Christian civilisation to pre-Christian cyclic conceptions of human affairs, and that causality and frequency distribution are only sophisticated versions of the ancient deities Fate and Luck.[111]

Such ideas were signs of social decay, of the 'sense of drift' symptomatic of the 'schism in the soul' that causes civilisations to disintegrate.[112] At the same time, Wight was conscious that another view of the shape of history – Progressivism – also informed modern social science:

> Secular optimism is the only religious philosophy of ordinary men. [It is] Everywhere – in ordinary conversation, in talking to students, in the vernacular of politics, in reading the newspapers.[113]

The idea, Wight observed, that the 'historical process is self-justifying and self-justified' helps to prop up the 'whole edifice of the Social Sciences'.[114]

To assert that the pattern of the secular past was neither one of linear progress nor one of closed cycles was not to deny that it had no shape at all. To Wight, secular

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[110] Ibid., p. 8.

[111] Wight, 'History and Judgment', p. 306.

[112] In 'History and Judgment' (p. 306), Wight refers to Toynbee's discussion of the 'sense of drift' in volume V of the Study (pp. 412-431).

[113] Wight, 'Progress or Eschatology', Wight MSS 42, p. 15.

[114] Ibid.

history displayed patterns of 'recurrence and repetition'.[115] His writings on history and IR were predicated on this idea. The essay on the balance of power in the Survey of International Affairs for March 1939, for example, is replete with analogies and comparisons implicitly grounded in this view.[116] The introduction to the lectures on international theory at the LSE, includes an assertion that the 'basic argument' of Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis is the 'same' as that of Hobbes' Leviathan.[117] The whole effort, Wight wrote, was an 'exploration of continuity and recurrence, a study in the uniformity of political thought; and its leading premiss [sic] is that political ideas do not change much, and the range of ideas is limited'.[118] The comparative analysis of states-systems is similarly based on the idea that the forms of organising international relations recur, and that comparing them is an intellectually valid exercise. The essay 'Triangles and Duels' is especially notable in this regard, ranging as it does from ancient Greece to contemporary US-Sino-Soviet relations.[119]

For Wight, secular history was simply a series of events displaying similar, recurrent or analogous characteristics that allowed them to be grouped or compared. In effecting a divorce between sacred history – which as Augustine had argued must be linear, because Christ can only be incarnated, crucified and resurrected once[120] – and secular history, he was not constrained to treat the past as a linear progression. Like

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[115] Wight, 'Why is there no International Theory?', in Wight & Butterfield (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, p. 26.

[116] 'The Balance of Power', in the Survey volume The World in March 1939, for instance, shows how keen Wight was to draw analogies and make comparisons across time and space. See p. 510, notes 1 & 2; p. 513, note 1, etc.

[117] Wight, International Theory, p. 6.

[118] Ibid., p. 5.

[119] Wight, 'Triangles and Duels', in his Systems of States, pp. 174-200.

[120] Augustine, The City of God trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984) XII: 14 (pp. 487-489).

Butterfield, Wight denied that history formed a 'self-explanatory system', but unlike him, he did not resort to the particularist view that asserts that all historical events are wholly unique. Indeed, he was critical of those that asserted with Butterfield that in history 'the only absolute is change'. Collingwood and Oakeshott, he noted in one essay, 'carried' this idea to 'extreme lengths', denied any form of recurrence in history and prevented historians from comparing and contrasting historical events.[121] For Wight, history refuted such a view; it was palpably the case that similar predicaments arise, and similar outcomes result. As he argued in 'Western Values', certain patterns of ideas, 'persistent and recurrent', may be 'detected' in the past;[122] the same view of the shape of the past underpinned his treatment of events.

Method

> There may be some justice in the claim that history is a "science", but if so it is a science dominated by the fact that its particular kind of truth can only be attained by imaginative self-giving in human sympathy.[123]
>
> Butterfield.

> ...'History'...does not really present the facts, all the facts, and nothing but the facts in the lives of societies of this species. Besides providing facts, it has recourse to fictions and it appeals to laws...[124]
>
> Toynbee.

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[121] Wight, 'History and the Social Sciences', Wight MSS 12, p. 5. This essay is undated, but must have been written, judging from the sources quoted, after 1949.

[122] Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', in Butterfield & Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, p. 90. See also p. 91.

[123] Butterfield, 'The Christian and Academic History', p. 94.

> The characteristic method of the historian is not comparative but critical, in the sense of documentary or historical criticism; and he is not concerned with establishing laws of human behaviour or social development, but in elucidating events and their inter-connectedness.[125]
>
> Wight.

Just as they reflected upon the patterns of the past, unlike so many of their peers, so too did Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight considered the methods by which history might best be written. These efforts require consideration because their methodological accounts cast light upon their understandings of the practical uses that historical knowledge might have. Each, it should be noted, sought to distinguish between what might be termed 'academic history' and other uses of the past.

Despite changes of emphasis and interest, Butterfield's concept of proper historical method revolved around two central poles. The first was epistemological. Butterfield remained wedded to a version of inductive empiricism, though more as methodological ideal than as a description of historiographical practice. To an extent, he sought to develop a method that would let the facts, as it were, speak for themselves. In the Whig Interpretation, he railed against those who selected their 'facts in accordance with some abstract principle'.[126] This was a major concern of Christianity and History too, where Butterfield attacked the 'militant' and 'mutually exclusive [historical] systems' of 'Marxists, Wellsians, Protestants and Catholics', each choosing particular facts to support their respective positions.[127] None of this, he argued, precluded historians from

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[124] Toynbee, 'Methods of Apprehension, Subjects of Study, and Quantities of 'Data'', in Study I, p. 442.

[125] Wight, 'History and the Social Sciences', Wight MSS 12, p. 5.

[126] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, p. 103.

[127] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 23-24.

uncovering the basic framework of historical facts: all that was required was the careful application of historical criticism as developed by Ranke and Acton in the nineteenth century.[128]

For Butterfield, the facts of an historical episode could thus be identified and established by an inductive process of examining the relevant documents, and subjecting them to rigorous criticism. Empiricism and criticism, however, were not in themselves sufficient. The second pole of his historical method concerned the faculty required to weave a bare narrative of facts into a piece of 'exposition'.[129] Butterfield did not consider this to be a 'scientific' process. Instead, it required what he termed 'imaginative sympathy'. It was linked, in the Whig Interpretation, to the necessity for abridgement:

> All abridgement is a form of impressionism...and it implies the gift of seeing the significant detail and detecting the sympathies between events...[130]

The need to abridge the facts of the past in the historical account, in other words, requires imagination of the historian; it is at this point that the science of history becomes an art.[131]

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[128] Ibid., pp. 12-13.

[129] The contrast between 'narrative' and 'exposition' is drawn by Butterfield in The Study of Modern History, p. 7.

[130] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, p. 103.

[131] This notion that history is both science and art was a common one, but Butterfield may have derived it from his work on Ranke's historical thought. On the latter, see R. Vierhaus, 'Historiography between Science and Art', in G. G. Iggers & J. M. Powell (eds.), Leopold von Ranke and the Shaping of the Historical Discipline (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), pp. 61-69. Ranke argued that the 'factual establishment of events does not yet constitute history. The historian is not a passive observer who merely records the events of the past but, rather like the poet, he actively recreates the situation. Unlike the poet, however, he is required to rely on empirical observation and is bound by the reality of the subject matter' (G. G. Iggers & K. von

This process, however, must be equally rigorous. It required a conscious effort of 'self-emptying',[132] of distancing oneself from the present to treat the past on its own terms. History, he wrote, 'can be very dangerous unless it is accompanied by severe measures of self-discipline and self-purification'.[133] This also required the absolute suspension of moral judgement:

> For the historian the only true morality is a wide catholicity; a compassion that extends to all men (once they are dead); an imaginative sympathy ever awake; and an over-riding passion to understand the forces at work behind the human drama.[134]

In any case, he argued, it was impossible to judge those we cannot 'know...from the inside';[135] to do so was to place too great a burden on the fruits of historical scholarship.

Toynbee and Wight wholly disagreed. The latter argued that the historian had the 'provisional duty of making judgments' – the Christian historian 'has the double obligation of saying that Belsen is evil, and...of explaining in charity how men could get like that'.[136] Toynbee's argument was characteristically convoluted:

> [The historian]...could avoid making moral judgements only be closing his mind to the meaning of the story; and, if making history 'scientific' were to be equated with

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Moltke, 'Introduction' to Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History trans. W. A. Iggers & K. von Moltke (New York: Irvington, 1983), p. xlii.

[132] This phrase, one scholar has noted, seems to have been a 'conscious quotation' from Paul's Epistle to the Phillipians or from the hymn 'And can it be' (Munsey-Turner, 'The Christian and the Study of History', p. 3).

[133] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 165.

[134] Butterfield, The Study of Modern History, p. 17.

[135] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 116. See also Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 17-18 and Whig Interpretation, pp. 107-132.

> treating human action as if it were non-moral, the result would in fact be to make history meaningless.[137]

For Toynbee, moreover, it was pointless for the historian to seek objectivity, even to hold it, as Butterfield did, as an ultimately unattainable ideal. As he wrote in the opening lines of the Study, 'in any age of any society the study of history, like other social activities is governed by the dominant tendencies of the time and the place'.[138] Throughout his work, Toynbee echoed Heisenberg, and emphasised the 'relativity' of the observer's perspective.[139] His 'self-emptying' thus took the form of an outpouring of *ad hominem* observations, demonstrating the influence of time and place on his own thought, and seeking to give his work authority with candour.[140]

Unlike Butterfield, whose commitment to the method was only implicit, Toynbee was also keen to advertise his 'empiricism'.[141] This helped to distance him from Spengler, which he intended,[142] but it riled his critics, who consistently condemned it as a 'sham'.[143]

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[136] Wight to Butterfield, 2 September 1950, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W180.

[137] Toynbee, 'The Writing of Contemporary History for Chatham House', International Affairs 29:2, 2 April 1953, p. 138.

[138] Toynbee, Study, I, p. 1.

[139] See, for example, Ibid., pp. 1-16; Study XII, pp. 47-102; Historian's Approach to Religion, pp. 1-15.

[140] See Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, pp. 3-15; Study X, pp. 213-241; Study XII, pp. 573-657. To Ved Mehta, Toynbee observed 'I don't really believe in objective history, so in the autobiographical volume I tried to put on the table my environment, my prejudices, and my methods' (Ved Mehta, Fly and the Fly-Bottle: Encounters with British Intellectuals (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), p. 120).

[141] Toynbee first declares the method of the Study to be empirical in volume I, p. 146. See also volume II, p. 31, etc.

[142] In Civilization on Trial, Toynbee noted his dissatisfaction with Spengler's 'arbitrary fiat' and asserted that in the Study he sought to 'see what could be done with English empiricism' (p. 10). See also Toynbee, Study XII, p. 245, note 4.

Quite what Toynbee meant by empiricism is difficult to judge. In his initial survey of societies or civilisations in the Study, as Wight recognised,[144] he identified, *a priori*, 'Hellenic' society as the model, and proceeded to include or exclude others if they bore sufficient similarity.[145] This is certainly not the kind of inductive method that Butterfield idealised. Rather, as he discussed in his Reconsiderations, what Toynbee meant by empiricism was a method in which theories or hypotheses were tested or verified by the 'relevant facts'.[146] This he maintained was 'inductive empiricism': 'so far', he wrote, 'from induction being incompatible with having an *a priori* hypothesis, it is impossible without having one'.[147]

This was all rather confused. Toynbee's method was further complicated by his employment of the 'comparative method'. He derived this approach from the work of the Victorian historian E. A. Freeman, whom he greatly admired.[148] Indeed, he seems to found

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[143] Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine, p. 20. See also Geyl Debates with Historians, pp. 118-119 & pp. 171-186. There is an extensive list of critics that levelled this charge in Toynbee, Study XII, p. 241.

[144] In his 'Personal Portrait: Arnold Toynbee', Wight noted that the Greco-Roman society was the 'great pattern which he has applied to, or imposed upon, all other civilisations' (Wight MSS 47, p. 4).

[145] Toynbee, Study I, pp. 34-35 & pp. 51-128.

[146] Toynbee, Study XII, p. 245. A brief etymological history of 'empiricism' was given to support his position (p. 243).

[147] Ibid., pp. 244-245, note 13.

[148] Enthusiastic references to Freeman may be found throughout Toynbee's work. In 'What the Historian Does', Toynbee wrote of his 'immense admiration for Professor E. A. Freeman' (p. 24, Toynbee MSS 1), and especially his essay 'Sicilian Cycles', but registered a fear that he 'emphasised unduly the recurrence of features that are superficial, to the neglect of underlying difference that remain mysterious'. In 1912, he wrote to a friend noting that Freeman's Historical Essays was 'one of the finest books in the world' (Toynbee to Darbishire, 19 August 1912, Toynbee MSS 80). Toynbee later wrote that he 'owes a greater debt that he can repay to the reading of Freeman's Historical Essays as a boy' (Study I, p. 339), and that they 'opened up

in Freeman a kindred spirit.[149] Like Toynbee, he was 'a man of...tireless energy and...enormous literary output' whose work generated 'acrimonious' controversy,[150] and who had a 'strange aversion to the employment of manuscript authorities'.[151] He was a 'an inveterate classifier and lover of parallels and analogies, and he was always drawn to grandiose schemes of universal history'.[152] He was, in other words, an 'intuitive adherent of the Comparative Method even before he articulated its rationale'.[153] In his Historical Essays (1892), Freeman attempted to sketch a theory of 'historical cycles'. In reality, it was a theory of recurrences rather than cycles, however, for 'no event in history ever repeats itself'; the concern with for those events with 'a likeness which pierces through the differences necessarily caused by the diversities of countries, times, and men's manners'.[154] The comparative method, Freeman argued, allowed for this particularity of historical events, and brought further advantages to the historian. In the study of linguistics and mythology, its application had broken down the divide between classical and 'barbarian', ancient and modern; a recognition of the 'unity of history' would follow.[155]

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to me vistas of Western and Hellenic history that led me out into the great open spaces beyond' (Study X, p. 223).

[149] On Toynbee and Freeman, see Thompson, 'Toynbee's Approach to History Reviewed', p. 289.

[150] H. A. Cronne, 'Edward Augustus Freeman, 1823-1892', History 27:1 (March 1943), p. 83 & p. 79.

[151] J. W. Thompson, A History of Historical Writing: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries II (New York: Macmillan, 1942), p. 317.

[152] J. Burrow & S. Collini, 'The clue to the maze: political science and the lessons of history' in S. Collini, D. Winch & J. Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth Century Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 220-221.

[153] Ibid., p. 220.

[154] E. A. Freeman, 'Historical Cycles', in his Historical Essays 4th series (London: Macmillan, 1892), pp. 249-250.

[155] E. S. Freeman, 'The Unity of History', in his Comparative Politics (London: Macmillan, 1873), p. 303. See also A. D. Momigliano, 'Liberal Historian and Supporter of the Holy Roman

The removal of the 'special privilege' pertaining to the study of the classics, for Freeman, allowed historians to apply themselves instead, using the comparative method, to study of the 'Aryan past' that gave England her superior laws and institutions.[156] Toynbee thought otherwise. In the Study he dismissed the notion that history concerned the search for common origins,[157] and attacked racial theories of civilisational progress.[158] He approved, however, of Freeman's holism and his comparative method. In an annex to volume I, Toynbee offered a rather free interpretation of both as a justification for the methodology of the Study. What Freeman meant by 'history', he wrote, was not the past – 'the derived objective meaning of a field of inquiry consisting of events in a time-series' – but rather 'the original subjective [i.e. Ionic] meaning of an inquiry'.[159] Toynbee thus ignored Freeman's insistence that the 'oneness' of history lay in its 'long chains of events bound together in the direct relations of cause and effect',[160] and made the 'unity of history' instead synonymous with the unity of historical method.

Toynbee went even further in reinterpreting Freeman to legitimise his own position. The latter, he argued, 'victoriously attained a perception of the truth that Hellenic and Western history are philosophically contemporary – an insight which, by implication, rules out the misconception of [historical] growth whose track is a straight line'.[161] This idea, that different societies or civilisations could be treated as

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Empire': E. A. Freeman', in his Studies in Modern Scholarship ed. G. W. Bowerstock & T. J. Cornell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), p. 206.

[156] Freeman, Comparative Politics, pp. 18-19.

[157] See, for example, his critique of 'diffusionism' in 'The Uniformity Theory and Diffusion Theory', Study I, pp. 424-440.

[158] Toynbee, Study I, pp. 207-249.

[159] Toynbee, Study I, p. 339.

[160] Freeman, 'The Unity of History', p. 333.

[161] Toynbee, Study I, p. 341.

'philosophically contemporary', was central to Toynbee's approach and justified his use of the comparative method.[162] Whether it may be found in Freeman's work, however, is more debatable. For Toynbee, the idea was to be found in a passage from 'The Unity of History': 'no portions of history are more truly "modern" than the history of the times which in mere physical distance we look upon as "ancient"'.[163] The original sentence, however, read as follows:

> ...no portions of history are more truly "modern" – that is, more full of practical lessons for our own political and social state – than the history of the times which in mere physical distance we look upon as "ancient".[164]

In taking the comparative method from Freeman, Toynbee thus dispensed with the underlying idea that 'as man is the same in all ages, the history of man is one in all ages',[165] and replaced it with another of his own making.

Where Freeman's comparative studies were justified by a conservative anthropology, Toynbee's were motivated by intuitive or mystical insight. The idea that Hellenic and Western society might be 'philosophically contemporary' was rooted in the illuminating insight, in 1914, that Thucydides had 'been over this ground before'.[166] Much of the argument of the Study rested upon similar claims. For Toynbee, the use of intuitive insights complemented his empiricism and use of the comparative method. These, he argued, were 'devised for thinking about Inanimate Nature' and were imperfect tools for studying 'living creatures' like human societies: supplementary methods were required. In

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[162] See especially Toynbee, Study I, pp. 172-181.

[163] Ibid., p. 341.

[164] Freeman, 'The Unity of History', p. 337.

[165] Ibid., p. 303.

[166] Toynbee, Civilization on Trial, p. 8.

their discovery, 'let us follow Plato's lead' and 'open our ears to the language of Mythology'.[167] The myth, for Toynbee as for Plato, communicated the highest truths that reason could not reach.[168] Indeed, myths both ordered history and suggested its meaning.[169]

This approach allowed Toynbee to develop 'principles of order', as Perry has put it,[170] which gave the Study its distinctive form: 'challenge-and-response', 'yin-and-yang', 'withdrawal-and-return' and 'schism-and palingenesia'. Each principle was derived from mythological or poetic sources that gave them their truth-value, just as Plato demonstrated the authority of an argument by having his speakers present concluding myths.[171] In both cases, the myths were presented as having universal value – in Plato's case, because they relate to a glimpsed eternal idea; in Toynbee's, because of the concept's recurrence in human experience. Thus, 'challenge-and-response', he argued, was to be found in Hebrew and Christian Bibles, the poetry of Goethe, Scandinavian epic, and Euripides, and became a 'law' when 'tested' by his 'empirical' method.[172] Laws were thus intuitively perceived, expressed in myth, and measured by 'facts'.[173] All this was

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[167] Toynbee, Study I, p. 271.

[168] Toynbee, Study X, p. 228; Study XII, p. 40 & pp. 250-252. On the use of myth in Plato, see Luc Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker trans. G. Naddaf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), especially p. 11 & p. 121.

[169] Perry, Arnold Toynbee and the Crisis of the West, p. 29. Moreover, Toynbee argued, historical writing had grown out of mythology, and historians had always had recourse to fictions where the facts are too many or too few (Toynbee, Study I, p. 442).

[170] Ibid.

[171] The Republic itself ends with a myth, that of Er, which is intended to demonstrate the moral truths of the foregoing argument (614-621). See also Brisson, Plato the Myth Maker, p. 9.

[172] Toynbee, Study I, pp. 271-272.

[173] Toynbee, Study XII, pp. 235-242.

reinforced by Toynbee's interpretation of Bergson's intuitive philosophical method,[174] and later by his reading of Jung.[175] As the Study went on, this mythological and intuitive side of Toynbee's approach came increasingly to the fore, at the expense of his empiricism. Its apotheosis was in 'The Quest for the Meaning behind the Facts of History' in volume X, where Toynbee recounted his mystical time-travelling experiences.[176]

Though Wight once noted to Toynbee that he had, on the battlefield at Hastings, also 'experienced something close to' a similar mystical encounter with the past, unlike his mentor he made little overt use of mythology or intuition in his historical writings.[177] What he did share with Toynbee was a fondness for the comparative method and dissatisfaction with professional historians. He even seems to have had a certain admiration for E. A. Freeman.[178] The contemporary historical profession, however, was considered too often guilty of 'the ultimate heresy of historians, the blindness to the historical conditioning of their own way of studying history'.[179] They were prone to other faults too, not least in the common adherence to epistemological 'positivism' – this is discussed further in what follows. But unlike Toynbee, Wight did not deprecate the

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[174] On Bergson's method, see Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism trans. H. Tomlinson & B. Habberjam (New York: Basic Books, 1991) and Judith Shklar, 'Bergson and the Politics of Intuition', in her Political Thought and Political Thinkers ed. Stanley Hoffman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 319-338.

[175] The influence of Jung is particularly marked in Historian's Approach to Religion, pp. 116-127.

[176] Toynbee, Study X, pp. 126-144.

[177] Wight to Toynbee, 13 October 1954, Toynbee MSS 86.

[178] Wight certainly read Freeman's Historical Essays, Comparative Politics (both mentioned in 'God in History', p. 8), and History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy (cited in Systems of States, p. 205, note 21). 'Western Values in International Relations' includes a reference to W. R. W. Stephens' Life and Letters of Edward A. Freeman (London: Macmillan, 1895) on p. 130.

[179] Wight to Pitt, 29 July 1964, Wight MSS 233 7/9.

rigorous use of 'documentary or historical criticism', practised by Ranke, promoted by Acton, and admired by Butterfield, that lay at the core of 'professional' historiography.[180] Probably as a consequence of undergraduate disaffection more than anything else, Wight rejected most of the rest of the historiographical orthodoxies of his contemporaries. He never made, however, a full statement of his position. What remains is contained in book reviews, radio lectures and correspondence, as well as what can be deduced from his work in the Survey, the books on colonial constitutions, and the courses that he taught at Sussex.[181]

In the midst of a heated debate with his former pupil in 1964, Wight wrote to Harry Pitt:

> The other weekend I was saying to Butterfield that I admire the versatility of Cambridge historians, and he said yes, the distinction used to be that the Oxford men knew the whole of English history and the Cambridge men knew the whole of European. What can Sussex men know the whole of?[182]

Wight had, earlier in the letter, already offered the answer to this rhetorical question. Though he recognised it as 'impossible', he argued that 'the only "obvious" thing for the historian is to study the totality of the human record from the original materials'.[183] Wight was, as he wrote to Melko, at the 'great disadvantage' of being 'content with nothing less

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[180] Wight, 'History and the Social Sciences', Wight MSS 12, p. 5.

[181] Harry Pitt believed that the latter works cured Wight of Toynbee and turned him into a 'technical historian' (Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1975, Wight MSS 233 6/9). There are, as will become clear from what follows, reasons to doubt this contention.

[182] Wight to Pitt, 29 July 1964, Wight MSS 233 7/9.

[183] Ibid.

than universal history'.[184] For this reason, he was opposed to the parcelling of history into small bundles – short periods in particular countries – as it was done at Oxford and elsewhere. At Sussex, as Professor of History, the curriculum that he helped to create included much longer periods and broader geographical scope, and the explorations of recurrent themes.[185] These innovations reflected Wight's belief that 'nothing in history makes sense short of the whole of it'.[186] It is plausible to suggest that this notion was intimately connected to the all-embracing eschatological vision outlined in the previous chapter.

What is clear is that like Toynbee, Wight saw recurrence in history, and set out to explore it, utilising the comparative method in harness with more traditional modes of historical study. It has already been observed, in the previous chapter, that the essays on 'Antichrist' are highly Toynbeean in their mode of historical argument. The essays in the Survey for March 1939, which Wight considered his 'best work',[187] show a similar approach. The Nazis are thus compared to fifth century barbarians, and Hitler to Alaric and Gaiseric, as well as to Cromwell, Lenin and Napoleon.[188] Later in the chapter, he is described as 'the [Cesare] Borgia of an age of semi-literary and popular journalism', and 'both Cesare and Machiavelli in one'.[189] These comparisons were often accompanied by Toynbeean asides, with Wight employing some of the central devices of the Study. Thus, in the midst of an account of national minorities in Eastern Europe, there is a discussion

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[184] Wight to Melko, 13 October 1967, in author's possession.

[185] Wight, 'European Studies' in David Daiches (ed.), The idea of a new university: An experiment in Sussex (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), p. 110. See the also the History curriculum pp. 231-232. The themes included the balance of power, which Wight himself taught, as well as universities and armies and politics.

[186] Wight to Pitt, 29 July 1964, Wight MSS 233 7/9.

[187] Wight to Fulton, 8 December 1960, Wight MSS 233 7/9.

[188] Wight, 'Germany', in Toynbee (ed.), The World in March 1939, p. 300, p. 303 & p. 306.

[189] Ibid., p. 320.

of 'the social anomaly of great men who are in origin peripheral to the society they dominate'.[190] Hitler becomes, 'no less than Peter the Great and Lenin,...a conspicuous example of Toynbee's principle of Withdrawal and Return'.[191]

Where Toynbee sought, with his use of the comparative method, to elucidate historical 'laws', Wight did not claim such status for the recurrences and regularities he identified. The lectures on international theory illustrate this, showing a similar 'analogical' approach to the chapters in the Survey. The lectures are stripped of Toynbeean concepts, but employ a rather Toynbeean version of the comparative method throughout. The thinkers and practitioners discussed are first corralled – realist, rationalist and revolutionist – and then compared and contrasted both within and between these categories. Wight's concern was to draw analogies between figures of dramatically different ideological and intellectual hues; the discussion of revolutionism, for example, includes the ancient Israelites, Catholic international lawyers, Kantian liberals, leading proponents of the Holy Alliance, Marxists, and Virgil.[192] The *civitas maxima* is thus considered analogous to the proletarian world-state; the *cosmopolis* to Holy Roman Empire. The aim, as it was in Toynbee's Study, was the elucidation of the broader patterns of thought in international relations, the forms that argument can take, and the ends to which they are put. The underlying assumption, of course, was that these were largely unchanging.

In his historical work, Wight utilised original source material, where available, alongside this 'analogical' history, and subjected it to the kind of documentary criticism of

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[190] Wight, 'Eastern Europe', in Toynbee (ed.), The World in March 1939, p. 217.

[191] Wight, 'Germany', p. 312, note 4.

[192] Wight, International Theory, pp. 40-48.

which Butterfield approved.[193] Where he differed from the older man, however, was over the issue of whether such methods, correctly applied and with the requisite 'self-emptying' could produce the kind of neutral narratives suggested in Christianity and History.[194] The development of historical criticism by Ranke, he argued, only offered the historian 'new tricks and equipment' – it did not make 'historiography…different in kind'.[195] Objectivity was, for Wight, an impossibility: it rested in part on the positivist fallacy of the separability of fact and interpretation to which Butterfield was prone and all too clearly failed to achieve.[196] This notion surfaced again, more explicitly, during the Toynbee-Jerrold controversy in the TLS in which Wight took part: he attacked the 'old-fashioned positivist belief in "the facts"…[are] something separable from their interpretation'.[197] As he put it less forcefully, but more elegantly, a year later:

> …the historian's fundamental beliefs about politics and man are necessarily implicit in his discussion of what he calls historical facts, and these beliefs give colour and texture to his picture of history.[198]

All this made Wight a 'nominalist', as he described himself to Butterfield, and critical of those who saw themselves as 'technical historians'.[199]

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[193] See, for example, Wight, 'Germany', p. 337, note 3.

[194] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 19.

[195] Wight to Butterfield, 2 September 1950, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W180.

[196] As Wight noted in both of his reviews of Christianity and History, Butterfield was unable to keep prophecy from seeping into the history (Wight, 'History and Judgement', p. 303; 'History's Theme', The Observer 23 October 1949, p. 7).

[197] Wight, letter on 'Counsels of Hope', Times Literary Supplement 2727, 7 May 1954, p. 297.

[198] Wight, What Makes a Good Historian?', p. 284.

[199] Wight to Butterfield, 2 September 1950, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W180.

For Wight, the writing of history was a creative and personal effort, concerning imagination as much a technique, and judgement more than objectivity:

> ...I do tend to think of the big historians rather as one thinks of artists or musicians, each his own perfection, each bringing his own outfit of moral purposes and imagination and technical virtuosity to the business of interpreting the past... It may be fanciful, but I cannot get away from the belief that history-writing in its essence is only a specialised kind of personal relationships [*sic*] like being a magistrate or a medical-practitioner, but involving relationships (and the whole range of humility, charity, sympathy, insight, forbearance: perhaps everything except tact!) with persons who happen to be dead.[200]

All this entailed, moreover, the exercise of moral judgement. For Wight, as was noted above, the historian had the twin duties of judgement and explanation: condemning the act, but explaining why it came about. 'Towards actors in history', he wrote, 'the Christian historian will try to be a reconciling mind that comprehends; concerning their deeds he cannot attempt neutrality without abdicating his status as a moral being'.[201] With this, Toynbee agreed; Butterfield did not. The reasons why were rooted, in part, in their differing conceptions of the relationship between historical study and political practice.

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[200] Ibid.

[201] Wight, 'History and Judgement', p. 312.

Conclusion: History and Practice

> History, in fact, is so dangerous a subject...that we might wonder whether it would not be better for the world to forget all of the past, better to have no memories at all, and just to face the future without ever looking back.[202]
>
> Butterfield.

> I love the facts of history, but not for their own sake.[203]
>
> Toynbee.

> [History is]...not pragmatic. History is useless. It is an activity of the mind like philosophy or mathematics, whose results may indeed be put to use by busy-bodies, but which is pursued without any such end in view on the grounds that it is self-justifying.[204]
>
> Wight.

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight disagreed on the practical uses of history. Curiously, it was the views of Toynbee and Wight that diverged most. For the former, history unearthed a treasure-trove of warnings and promptings; for the latter, it had no such uses. Butterfield, despite his insistence that the past be studied for its own sake, stood somewhere between the other two, recognising that the study of history could offer

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[202] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 171.

[203] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 90.

[204] Wight, 'What is International Relations?', Wight MSS 101, p. 5. This manuscript is undated, but was probably written in the 1950s.

aid to the political practitioner, but often recoiling from the full implications of the contention. Toynbee was more candid: all his scholarly efforts in the study of history, from Nationality and the War to Mankind and Mother Earth, were directed towards a practical end. His aim was the abolition of war, and the Surveys and Study were, Toynbee readily admitted, central to this effort.[205] Neither Butterfield nor Wight intended their historical works to have such practical import, though both, at times, sought to apply historical thinking to political ends.

The young Toynbee was convinced, in common with his fellow liberals, of the necessity of education for social and political progress. Before the Great War, he committed himself to improving the lower classes with the Workers' Educational Association; in its aftermath, to informing the electorate about international affairs from Chatham House. The Survey of International Affairs was crucial to this effort, in line with the common view at the institute that 'sound study was the indispensible basis for statesmanlike action'.[206] The original aim was to provide a digest of contemporary international developments, mainly in narrative form with occasional analytical asides.[207] Such an overview of international affairs, it was hoped, would enlighten the electorate and encourage better judgement in foreign policy. 'Professor Toynbee's mission', wrote one sympathetic reviewer, 'is not to stir up enthusiasm, but to provide political inquirers with full and exact information...in respect to which it is well that they should be

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[205] Toynbee, Experiences, pp. 81-83.

[206] Ibid., p. 61. See also Gordon Martel, 'From *Round Table* to *New Europe*: Some Intellectual Origins of the Institute of International Affairs' and Roger Morgan, '"To Advance the Sciences of International Politics...": Chatham House's Early Research', in Bosco & Navari (eds.), Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, pp. 13-39 & pp. 121-136.

[207] The form and content of the early volumes are discussed in McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 123-126.

instructed'.[208] Most importantly, Toynbee argued in his inaugural lecture at the University of London, it would sweep away the misunderstandings and misrepresentations of state-centred historiography that stimulated nationalist militarism.[209]

As the Survey developed, Toynbee departed from narrative, including alongside it didactic passages and employing analogies, often in footnotes. The introduction to the volume for 1928, with its condemnations of the 'sin' of war and its lavish praise for the Pact of Paris, is illustrative of the first.[210] The second – at least until the mid-1930s – was more widespread. The Survey of 1920-23, for instance, draws a lengthy analogy between the post-war psychology of France and that of Rome after the Second Punic War.[211] The volume for 1933 draws another between the 'Humanism' of Victorian England, Periclean Athens and France under the Medicis.[212] Each of these historical parallels, Toynbee was convinced, cast 'light on our own problems'.[213] 'Analogical' history, moreover, allowed him to express a position on contemporary political issues without making it wholly explicit. 'I believe', he wrote to a close friend in 1918, 'that one can put one's experience of the war best in parables'.[214] This view did not leave Toynbee in peacetime; indeed, it was the rationale for the Study, 'the historical background' to the Surveys.[215]

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[208] H. A. L. Fisher, review of the Survey for 1927, Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 8:5 (September 1929), p. 522.

[209] Toynbee, Untitled Inaugural Lecture as Stevenson Professor of International History, Toynbee MSS 3, p. 3.

[210] Toynbee, Survey 1928, pp. 1-10.

[211] Toynbee, Survey 1920-1923, pp. 61-64.

[212] Toynbee, Survey 1933, p. 5.

[213] Toynbee, 'Historical Parallels to Current International Problems', International Affairs 10:4 (July 1931), p. 481.

[214] Toynbee to Darbishire, 5 May 1918, Toynbee MSS 80.

[215] Toynbee to Curtis 4 March 1932, Curtis MSS 6/99.

Though Toynbee was convinced that 'intellectual work [was] a necessary basis for action', he was less clear as to the precise nature of the relationship between the study of history and the practice of politics.[216] This became even more opaque after he abandoned politics, in the mid-1930s, to pursue religion. In 1932, he wrote:

> ...I often find it useful to use the history of the ancient classical world – where the whole tale has been told and the whole picture is now in focus – as a kind of magic crystal, in which to try to see, by crystal-gazing, an image of our own world which we in our generation cannot see, steadily and whole, by the more obvious process of direct observation.[217]

By 1956, Toynbee had somewhat moderated his position. 'History cannot', he argued, 'teach us to predict the future'. But he continued:

> ...if we have a knowledge - and I think we have - of some of these comparable situations in the past, that knowledge can tell us just one of the alternative possibilities in the future. What it cannot tell us is all the alternative possibilities in the future.[218]

In the lecture, some of the possibilities were outlined: slavery was 'a bad thing', wars led to the destruction of civilisations, tolerance and patience were required in dealing with adversaries.[219] Ultimately, however, this was a 'religious question'.[220] The lesson that

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[216] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 83.

[217] Toynbee, 'A British View of World Order', lecture delivered at Williamstown, 1932, Toynbee MSS 3, p. 1.

[218] Toynbee, 'Can We Learn Lessons from History?', Toynbee MSS 2, p. 1.

[219] Ibid., p. 6, p. 7 & p. 14.

[220] Ibid., p. 15.

history taught, Toynbee argued in his post-war work, was that self-centredness had to be overcome to allow greater communion with God.[221]

With some of this Butterfield agreed. When Toynbee wrote to him interpreting the argument of 'The Tragic Element in Modern International Conflict' as a plea for 'everybody to take the historian's view about his neighbour's shortcomings', he outlined the areas of common ground.[222] 'What I chiefly mean', Butterfield replied, ' is that the historian should take this 'historian's view':

> I am not at all clear that the historian is competent to advise about policy, but he could provide the intellectual basis for the discussion of policy, and this seems to me to be the basis that we ought to take our stand on.[223]

Thus, although Butterfield had argued repeatedly that the past should be studied for its own sake, that the past should be 'our present', and that past 'life' should be seen 'with the eyes of another century than our own',[224] the rules applied only to historians. Scholarly historiography must not be present-minded or didactic, as a Toynbee or Polybius desired.[225] But this did not preclude the practical use of history, the study of the past for political or other ends, as Butterfield recognised. Indeed, he spent much scholarly effort, not least in The Statecraft of Machiavelli, in his works on Napoleon and in those

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[221] See, for example, Toynbee, Historian's Approach to Religion, pp. 1-15.

[222] Toynbee to Butterfield, 2 June 1950, Toynbee MSS 120.

[223] Butterfield to Toynbee, 7 June 1950, Toynbee MSS 120.

[224] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, p. 16.

[225] On Polybius, see Butterfield, 'Historiography', Dictionary of the History of Ideas, p. 468. Toynbee, notably, was a great admirer of The Rise of the Roman Empire (trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979)), both in terms of its didacticism and its explicitly holistic perspective. See Toynbee, Study X, p. 233.

on international relations, elucidating just how the study of history could be turned to practical purposes.

Both Machiavelli and Napoleon, Butterfield observed, utilised an 'historical method for the discovery of definite points of political technique'.[226] From the past they derived maxims for successful conduct – and successful they often were, as he admitted.[227] Butterfield, however, set out not only to examine their methods, but also to offer a critique. His most obvious point was that, as a man of the Renaissance, Machiavelli was too wedded to the imitation of classical models, and this made his approach to the past inflexible.[228] As an historian, he was afflicted with 'a certain rigidity and dogmatism', and sought not to cultivate, as Guicciardini did, an art of politics, but instead a 'science...in the sense of a body of rules upon which governments should act and should always rely'.[229] Though these rules often contained 'great prudence and wisdom', as a system they were flawed.[230] They could bring great initial success, Butterfield observed, but brought with them the seeds of eventual failure:

> The only true portrait of Machiavellism is Napoleon Bonaparte. And he is the clearest commentary on the system.[231]

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[226] Butterfield, Napoleon, p. 100. Later in the book, Butterfield observed: 'Napoleon was the dsiciple of Machiavelli who had studied the science of usurpers, of "new princes" who arise and carve out kingdoms for themselves' (p. 124).

[227] Butterfield, Statecraft of Machiavelli, pp. 81-82.

[228] Ibid., p. 28. See also Butterfield's introduction to Machiavelli, The Prince trans W. K. Marriott (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1958), pp. vi-vii.

[229] Butterfield, Statecraft of Machiavelli, p. 23 & p. 25.

[230] Ibid., p. 82.

[231] Ibid., p. 102.

This was somewhat disingenuous; the facts do not speak for themselves, and it was Butterfield offering the commentary.

Butterfield's historiographical critique implied practical lessons. In the Whig Interpretation he had been clearer:

> Perhaps the greatest of all the lessons of history is...[the]...demonstration of the complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men; and on the face of it this is a lesson that can only be learned in detail. It is a lesson that is bound to be lost in abridgement...[232]

There is an overt linkage here between the academic or scholarly study of the past and the practical realm: only the well-trained and self-emptied historian may fully appreciate the 'processes' of politics.[233] Yet throughout his work, Butterfield insisted that the 'technical historian' was not fit to intervene to be a political actor:

> The dangers of history are liable to become much greater if we imagine that the study of this subject qualifies us to be politicians or provides us with patterns which we can immediately transpose into the context of contemporary politics.[234]

This paradox was never resolved.[235] Insisting on the 'intricacy and complexity of events' and the dangers that dogmatic politics or radical change might bring, as Butterfield did in

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[232] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, pp. 21-22.

[233] Ibid., p. 21.

[234] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 273.

his post-war work, was to engage in just such practical activities.[236] As Annan noted: 'now not merely those historians who saw history in terms of progress were under fire, but all those who pinned their hopes on improving the state of society by political means'.[237] Butterfield's point was political, not historiographical.

Butterfield was less circumspect is describing another practical role for the historian: that of the 'reconciler'. It was an idea that arose first in the Whig Interpretation,[238] and it may be located throughout this work. He was highly critical, therefore, of the tone of contemporary and official historians whom he thought turned academic historiography into moralistic political polemic.[239] Good historical writing, for Butterfield, came only from independent scholars working well after the events had occurred, when all the relevant sources had become available and the passions of conflict had eased:

> In the long run, the historian will not limit himself to seeing things with the eyes of the royalist or with the eyes of the roundhead; but, taking a loftier perspective which puts him in a position to embrace both, he will reach new truths to which both sides were

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[235] In History and Human Relations, Butterfield deflected attention from this point with a well-timed anecdote about the administrative and diplomatic incompetence of Cambridge academics (pp. 174-175).

[236] Butterfield, Christianity and History, p. 38. See also The Englishman and his History.

[237] Annan, 'Revulsion to the Right', p. 214. Interestingly, the basic thrust of Annan's argument was shared by Michael Oakeshott, who summarised Butterfield thus: 'The historian's self-denial in respect of moral judgment may not only make his conversation less arrogant, but it may also extend into the field of politics and make him less wilfully confident in the contemporary ways of formulating the current conflict, more appreciative of the narrowness of the range of choice and consequently more alive to the realities of the situation' (Michael Oakeshott, 'History and Conduct', Time and Tide 1 September 1951, p. 829 [Butterfield MSS 133]).

[238] Butterfield, Whig Interpretation, p. 2.

[239] Butterfield, 'The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach', p. 411.

> blind – truths which will even enable him to see how they came to differ so much from one another.[240]

This notion was central to Butterfield's interpretation of the international crisis that he perceived in the contemporary world, and will be discussed more fully in the coming chapters. In the meantime, however, it needs to be noted that there was, in his thought, an intimate connection between the idea of the historian as reconciler and political practice. The reconciling mind warned against self-righteousness and moralism – and it helped to heal the wounds of conflict.[241]

Wight recognised and appreciated Butterfield's effort to place 'compassionate comprehension' as the first of the historian's tasks, but could not place so much weight on academic historiography.[242] History was an artistic endeavour, he implied, a 'branch of literature' which could not fulfil the functions Butterfield desired for it.[243] It could have, therefore, no direct practical utility. This was not to say that knowledge of the past could not have some practical value. Wight was, like Butterfield, acutely aware of the danger of bad history and its ability to stir and sustain political conflict.[244] At the same time, he argued that 'the argument that ignorance of history can be politically disastrous has an obvious truth'.[245] This raised for Wight an interesting question: does knowledge of the

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[240] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 13.

[241] Ibid., p. 36.

[242] Wight, 'The Tragedy of History', review of History and Human Relations in The Observer, 2 September 1951, p. 7.

[243] Wight, 'What Makes a Good Historian?', p. 283.

[244] Wight discussed the effects of Serbian ballads and Czech traditions in his essay 'Eastern Europe', Survey for March 1939, p. 222.

[245] Wight, review of Rowse, The Use of History and Collingwood, The Idea of History, International Affairs 23:4 (October 1947), p. 575.

past make, as A. L. Rowse suggested, the historian 'politically wise'? He answered as follows:

> ...historical knowledge is an ingredient of political judgment, not a substitute. It does the common man little service to sell him history now, as in the nineteenth century he was sold natural science, as a means of solving all the problems of human affairs. Historians can be as silly as anybody else... Respected historians said that Britain should sympathise with Mussolini's dictatorship because it was the Italian counterpart of the Tudor despotism...[246]

With all of this Butterfield would have agreed. In both The Englishman and his History and History and Human Relations it was asserted that historical knowledge could be an effective tool, amongst others, in the hands of men of assured political experience.[247] In his own review of Rowse, Butterfield warned too of the pitfalls of 'self-taught history' – reminding readers that the most 'spectacular and pathetic examples' could be found in 'certain passages' of Mein Kampf – and gently ridiculed contemporary historians' claims to political authority.[248]

Though there were these points of agreement, Wight also departed significantly from some of Butterfield's views. Historians could develop and display sound political judgement, he believed, without direct political experience; indeed, 'one of the tests of a

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[246] Ibid., p. 576.

[247] Butterfield, Englishman and his History, pp. 138 & History and Human Relations, pp. 173-174.

[248] Butterfield, 'The Teach Yourself History Library', History 33 (October 1948), p. 193.

historian is his judgment on contemporary affairs'.[249] He was sceptical too of the idea that technical history should be taught to counter 'bad history',[250] arguing:

> Every policy can be backed or opposed by readings of history. Why, says Mr. Rowse, did the Germans defy the lessons of history and try to unify Europe where France and Spain had failed? Because they had no historical understanding... All he means is that they too failed. They came within an inch of succeeding, and it was lack not of historical but of political sense that ruined them. The Romans succeeded; the Russians may. It depends on the length of historical view from which history's lessons are deduced, and Mr. Rowse is mainly limited to the past four centuries.[251]

Narrowness of historical vision, for Wight, held great dangers. Anthony Eden, for instance, had fallen prey to this, and become too prone to read contemporary politics as an analogue of the 1930s, seeing Nasser first as 'Mussolini to Russia's Hitler, [then as]... Hitler himself'.[252] In Wight's position, there are hints of Toynbee's argument that it is only possible to understand the history of a 'Society' or civilisation, and be able to draw its lessons, when it is viewed 'at full length'.[253] It appears to have been an idea central to his thought, cropping up throughout his letters to Melko,[254] and in public correspondence. The 'movement of history', he argued in a letter to the TLS in 1962 defending classical

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[249] Wight, review of Sir Charles Petrie, Diplomatic History 1713-1933, International Affairs 23:4 (October 1947), p. 574.

[250] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 171. See also his defence of the virtues of technical history in Christianity and History, 1st ed., pp. 9-25.

[251] Wight, review of Rowse, The Use of History and Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 576.

[252] Wight, 'Brutus in Foreign Policy', p. 304

[253] Toynbee, Study, I, p. 37.

[254] See, for example, Wight to Melko, 13 October 1967, in author's possession, which deals with a putative book on the 'balance of power'.

studies, can be seen in the ancient world, which has the great 'advantage of being completed and rounded off'.[255]

All three men saw political uses for history, even if they did not approve of the forms they assumed, or the outcomes that resulted. In the next two chapters, the manners in which Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight brought both their religious beliefs and historical learning to bear on international relations are explored. In each case, it is argued, faith and history informed their understanding of the nature of the challenge that generated the international crisis and the responses they thought might resolve it. Each diagnosis and each response was shaped by their understandings of sacred history, the patterns of the secular past, and their historical methods. It was shaped too by their perceptions of their own roles, their own positions relative to events, and by their views of other academic students of international politics. How each reacted to the new 'discipline' of International Relations, to its theories and methods, will be examined in the next two chapters alongside the main concern: their understandings of the roots of international crisis and the remedies required.

[255] Wight, 'Are they Classical?', Times Literary Supplement 3171, 7 Decamber 1962, p. 955.

V. Challenge: Idolatry, Righteousness and Apostasy

> Since 1914 the fear of war, the fear of Germany, the decay of faith in treaty obligations or collective action, the increased belief by totalitarian states in the efficacy of violence and ruthlessness on their part – all this has so grown that international politics can no longer be interpreted in terms and standards which (defective and inadequate as they were) still stood in 1914.[1]
>
> Norman Angell.

There was a widespread sense in Britain between the wars that the categories and vocabulary inherited from the antebellum years were inadequate to explain and comprehend contemporary international relations. For Angell, this sense that 'in 1914 the nations were moved and excited about entirely different things' demanded a dramatic recasting of the argument of his rather ill-timed magnum opus, The Great Illusion, for the post-war years.[2] For others, even more radical departures – the abandonment of liberalism, the embrace of Marxism, or the rigours of 'realism' – were required. Despite this intellectual restlessness, however, little agreement developed as to the causes of the international crisis that contemporaries sensed had befallen the twentieth century. Some located a particular evil, an individual or an idea; others blamed 'structures' – be they international, political, social or economic, declining, emerging or persisting. Thus Hitler, World Communism or International System would individually or collectively be the cause or causes, depending on the moment and the standpoint. Liberals felt the crisis most

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[1] Norman Angell, The Great Illusion – Now (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938), p. 38. This book was an expanded version of the original issued to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of its first publication.

[2] Ibid., p. 112.

acutely, as first their Party and then their international organisations collapsed,[3] and it was they who offered the clearest and more articulate diagnoses. Conservatives, by contrast, tended to take comfort from their prescience: had they not always warned of the dangers of continental entanglements and democratic diplomacy?[4]

The clearest sign of international crisis, for many twentieth century observers, was the imminence and destructiveness of war.[5] The lesson of the Great War, wrote Gilbert Murray in 1929, was that war had become 'incompatible with civilisation':

> War may once have acted as a safety valve, letting off superfluous energy. It is now an explosion wrecking the whole machine.[6]

In Britain, in the inter-war years and after, this view found much sympathy, not least amongst Murray's fellow liberals. This equation of crisis and war was, of course, neither necessary nor universal.[7] It was predicated upon the notion that peace was both the normal and the most desirable state of international relations, an idea not accepted by all

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[3] Three liberal reactions to these events are explored in Julia Stapleton's 'The secularisation of liberalism and political decline: R. G. Collingwood, A. D. Lindsay and T. S. Eliot', in her Political intellectuals and public identities in Britain since 1850 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 63-78.

[4] For an overview of pre-First World War Conservative thought on foreign policy, see John Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain and the Balance of Power (London: Sceptre, 1999).

[5] As Christopher Coker has observed, even during peacetime, 'war' was 'the central theme of twentieth century life' (War and the Illiberal Conscience (Boulder, Co.: Westview, 1998), p. xiv).

[6] Gilbert Murray, The Ordeal of this Generation: The War, the League and the Future (London: Allen & Unwin, 1929), p. 36. See also his 'A League of Nations: the First Experiment' (1939), in his From League to United Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 65.

[7] A number of alternative views are examined in Coker's War and the Illiberal Conscience.

that have reflected upon the subject.[8] During the short twentieth century, however, most writers on IR, at least in universities, shared this view, and saw war as the progenitor of crisis. Thus, for many, to understand the causes of war was to comprehend the roots of crisis and to have the tools with which to forge a response needed to bring it to an end.

The 'myth of militarism', that handmaiden of autocracy and mistress of imperialism, loomed large in the British mind during and after the First World War.[9] Prussian militarism was a particularly popular ogre for the public, politicians and wartime propagandists.[10] Nurtured by philosophers like Nietzsche and historians like Treitschke, it was argued, militarism had transformed Germany into an insatiable power, bent upon the destruction of the 'European comity of nations'.[11] A wider militarism, besetting autocracy and democracy alike, was detected by more radical liberals, and publicised by anti-war movements such as the 'Union for Democratic Control' (UDC),

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[8] Michael Howard has suggested, following Henry Maine, that these twin ideas were 'invented' in the modern era. See his The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (London: Profile Books, 2000), p. 1.Few modern thinkers have argued that war is the natural state of politics and international relations. One notable exception was, of course, the German jurist and political theorist Carl Schmitt, who argued that all politics was, at bottom, war, and that to argue otherwise, as liberal thinkers did, was to misunderstand the character of politics and misapprehend the ends that can be achieved by political action. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

[9] Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane, 1998), p. 1.

[10] For a treatment of the subject by one of the latter, see Gilbert Murray, The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, 1906-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1915), pp. 104-105.

[11] This phrase is Ernest Barker's, quoted in Stapledon, Englishness and the Study of Politics, p. 95. This view was shared by Liberal and Conservative alike. Arthur Balfour, for instance, also displayed a deep concern for the 'course of German thought' and the 'Psychological Climate' that had made Germany bent upon war and conquest (Jason Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The international thought of a Conservative statesman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 170).

which campaigned for open parliamentary direction of foreign policy.[12] For the UDC militarism stemmed from the machinations of unscrupulous politicians, diplomats and international arms dealers, not from the intricacies of philosophical discourse.[13] E. D. Morel saw a straightforward conspiracy, on the part of weapons manufacturers and elements of the political elite, to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses.[14] Others, like J. A. Hobson, viewed militarism as the natural outgrowth of an increasingly moribund economic system.[15]

The UDC leaders, however, did not consider militarism to be the sole cause of war. Trade tariffs and the injustices of empire, within and without Europe, were also held as potent sources of conflict.[16] It was secret diplomacy that most often aroused the ire of the UDC, uniting its members with the wider liberal elite.[17] Disquiet was to be found even in the minds of Conservatives, not least in that of Robert Cecil,[18] and fuelled a broad

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[12] On the UDC see Sally Harris, Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union for Democratic Control 1914-1918 (Hull: University of Hull Press, 1996).

[13] There was, however, a certain lack of clarity here. For E. D. Morel, a leading light of the group, militarism was at once the product of autocracy and of defective theory, especially the 'philosophy which regards nations as antagonistic units' (E. D. Morel, Truth and the War (Manchester & London: National Labour Press, 1918), p. 61).

[14] Ibid., p. 42.

[15] David Long, 'J. A Hobson and Economic Internationalism', in Long & Wilson (eds.), Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis, p. 161-188. See also Long's 'J. A. Hobson and Idealism in international relations', Review of International Studies 17 (1991), pp. 285-305.

[16] A. J. P. Taylor, The Troublemakers: Dissent over Foreign Policy 1792-1939 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985 [1957]), p. 136; H. M. Swanwick, Builders of Peace: Being Ten Years' History of the Union for Democratic Control (London: Swarthmore, 1926), p. 39 & 82-84.

[17] Michael Bentley, The Climax of Liberal Politics: British Liberalism in Theory and Practice 1868-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), pp. 121-123. Where Morel and Murray differed was in the intensity of their hostility. For the latter, a secret treaty was better than none at all (Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey, p. 56).

[18] George Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics and International Organisation, 1914-1919 (London: Scolar Press, 1979), pp. 38-39.

desire for the reform of the institutional structure of international relations, and for a regularised and open diplomatic system. Indeed, it was only when reform came that divisions of opinion emerged. While Gilbert Murray and Cecil were largely satisfied with it, radicals, including the UDC, the TUC and the Labour Party, denounced the draft Covenant of the League as the blueprint of a new 'Holy Alliance'.[19] Throughout the inter-war years, these elements remained scornful and suspicious. The League continued to be seen as an exclusive club of selfish, hypocritical Great Powers, a cabal that imposed, as Keynes memorably termed it, a 'Carthaginian Peace' on Germany and blocked the extension of self-determination to the colonies.[20]

Keynes' tirade against the 'economic consequences' of the Treaty of Versailles was, as A. J. P. Taylor observed, 'epoch-making'.[21] It shifted attention away, almost at a stroke, from supposedly intrinsic German bellicosity to supposedly malicious Anglo-French cupidity, fatally undermining the 'myth of militarism'. Turning from specific evils to general causes, many in the liberal intelligentsia, radical and moderate, began to explore alternative explanations for international crisis. One of the more popular concerned the institution of state sovereignty itself, an issue overshadowed, during the war and immediately after, by the liberal enthusiasm for national self-determination. Ernest Barker, A. F. Pollard and Gilbert Murray, to take three example, all wrote of the need to free the 'submerged nationalities' of Central Europe from 'autocratic states', and there were many more liberals, in the great tradition of Mazzini, who agreed.[22] National self-

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[19] Ibid., p. 142.

[20] J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London: Macmillan, 1920), p. 33.

[21] Taylor, Troublemakers, p. 174.

[22] Stapledon Englishness and the Study of Politics, pp. 96-97; A. F. Pollard, The League of Nations in History (London: Oxford University Press, 1918), p. 12. See also Gilbert Murray, 'Self-Determination of Nationalities', Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs 1:1 (January 1922), pp. 6-13.

determination, it was argued, was a self-evident good; it would allow the free will of free peoples – for prosperity, liberty, and of course peace – to be expressed domestically and internationally. The issue of sovereignty, however, rarely entered these discussions. Pollard assumed that the form of a League of free Nations would assume something like that of an idealised British Empire, with sovereignty merged.[23] Murray avoided the issue entirely.

In this context, the publication of Lowes Dickinson's The International Anarchy (1926) marked an important watershed.[24] As he later recalled, rather immodestly, it was 'possibly the best book on the subject, because it is the only one...which stresses the only important fact - that it is not this or that nation nor its policy, but the anarchy that causes wars'.[25] The argument was not, of course, wholly original: Thomas Hobbes was the immediate inspiration, and similar theories may be found in the work of pre-war international lawyers.[26] Lowes Dickinson did, however, outline the case more succinctly and directly, drawing a line between sovereignty, anarchy and the recent war: 'whenever and wherever the anarchy of armed states exists, war does become inevitable'.[27] This argument had a profound, and much underestimated, effect on inter-war international thought. Indeed, as late as 1950 it was still being condemned as a 'bad influence'.[28] It offered a powerful challenge to those who argued that sovereign states, properly ordered

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[23] Pollard, The League of Nations in History, pp. 11-12.

[24] Dickinson, International Anarchy. It should be noted that Lowes Dickinson had published an earlier version of this thesis under the title of The European Anarchy ten years earlier, in 1916.

[25] Quoted in E. M. Forster, Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson (London: Edward Arnold, 1934), p. 194.

[26] On the international lawyers, see Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 62-78 and Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy, pp. 77-121.

[27] Lowes Dickinson, International Anarchy, p. v.

[28] Butler to Butterfield, 11 June 1950, Butterfield MSS 531(I)/B214.

and democratic, would achieve lasting peaceful relations, and shook liberal faith in national self-determination as a panacea for international ills.[29]

The consequence was a reorientation of liberal critiques of international crisis. Nowhere is this more clear than in the work of Gilbert Murray.[30] In the immediate post-war period he had viewed the League of Nations as a forum for the self-expression of democratic, legally independent nations. By 1929, this conception of the League had undergone considerable modification: now it aimed 'straight at the heart of the international anarchy'.[31] The outbreak of war in 1914, he argued, had been 'due to [a]...flaw in the political and social organisation of Europe, a flaw perfectly definite and easily distinguishable: the belief in the independent sovereign state'.[32] This view continued to have a hold on the liberal mind throughout the 1930s, and was reconciled, albeit with some discomfort with the earlier faith in national self-determination. Thus Harold Laski was keen, at the same time, to express sympathy with 'the struggle of an oppressed people for self-expression', warn of that 'egotism in the national state which bodes ills for

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[29] There had, of course, always been liberal critics of self-determination. Alfred Zimmern, for instance, had argued in 1918 that 'self-determination to which homage is being paid by shallow minds is not a principle of liberalism, but of bolshevism' (Quoted in Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, p. 293.

[30] Other scholars influenced by Lowes Dickinson include Norman Angell. See J. D. B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War, p. 65. Echoes of International Anarchy can also be found in Lord Davies' The Problem of the Twentieth Century, p. 11, and in Curtis' World War: Its Cause and Cure 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 4.

[31] Gilbert Murray, The Ordeal of this Generation: The War, the League and the Future (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930 [1929]), p. 131.

[32] Ibid., p. 57. This argument remained central to Murray's critique of international politics until his death in 1957, and grounded his explanations for the ultimate collapse of the League.

mankind', and argue for limits to be placed on self-determination for the good of 'civilisation'.[33]

In general, however, the deterioration of international relations in the 1930s prompted a return to critiques that identified particular evils rather than systemic flaws. There remained, in these accounts, the familiar doubts about 'anarchy', but they were overlain by other, more immediate causes of crisis. The failures of League were ascribed, by liberals, radicals and conservatives alike, less to intrinsic structural weakness and more to the cravenness of statesmen, the wickedness of individual states, or the injustices of aspects of the post-war settlement. Historians, politicians and diplomats, with their preference for agency rather than structure, concentrated on issues of statecraft. Thus, in his study of the Versailles conference, Harold Nicolson sought to lay bare the spiritual and mental rigidity of President Wilson, as well as the failings the weak and fickle nature of 'democratic diplomacy', and blamed egotistic politicians, rather than egotistic states, for the threat to international order.[34] Harold Temperley on the other hand, drew historical parallels and lessons from nineteenth century diplomacy, especially from the career of Canning, as implicit critiques and explicit exemplars.[35] The most notorious diagnosis of crisis to blame individuals was, however, the pseudonymous 'Cato's' Guilty Men, published in 1940, which set the tone for a glut of wartime and post-war attacks on

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[33] Harold Laski, 'Nationalism and the Future of Civilisation', in his The Dangers of Being a Gentleman, p. 189, p. 190 & p. 194.

[34] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p. 52. See also Nicolson's Diplomacy (London: Butterworth, 1939).

[35] Fair, Harold Temperley, pp. 277-287. Temperley drew these parallels in both letters to The Times and in correspondence with Chamberlain, to whom he sent his biography of Canning.

British politicians and diplomats for appeasement and their supposed failure to prevent the resurgence of German power.[36]

At Aberystwyth, Webster and Herbert took a more 'structural' approach, seeking to locate the League's institutional weaknesses and tracing its difficulties to the American Senate's refusal to ratify the Covenant.[37] Lord Davies, on the other hand, railed in classic style about the 'land-grabbers, armaments firms, monopoly and concession hunters and the military hierarchies'.[38] Such conspiracy theories of international politics, always attractive to the Left, became increasingly popular as the 1930s progressed. Aldous Huxley's analysis of the causes of war, for instance, ranged from nationalism – 'an idolatrous religion' – to vanity, pride, glory and greed, but concluded with an indictment of the collusion of arms manufacturers, the 'merchants of death', oil magnates and press barons.[39] Huxley's argument had affinities both with the earlier ideas of the UDC and with those of the growing band of Marxists and historical materialists that gathered in the 1930s. For the latter, international conflict was a function of capitalist economic relations, either through direct competition for the means of production on the part of elites, or, as Mannheim argued, the psychological insecurity that came from economic deprivation.[40] The latter case was influential, not least upon E. H. Carr, whose Twenty Years' Crisis

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[36] Cato, Guilty Men (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1998 [1940]). The authors later revealed themselves to be Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen, then journalists on the Evening Standard. For another, slightly more reasoned example of such writing see also R. W. Seton-Watson's Munich and the Dictators (London: Methuen, 1939).

[37] C. K. Webster & S. Herbert, The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (London: Allen & Unwin, 1933).

[38] Davies, The Problem of the Twentieth Century, p. 35. He also blamed 'ultra-sovereignty' (p. 124) and the lack of any adequate mechanism for the enforcement of international law.

[39] Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means: An Enquiry into the Nature of Ideals and into the Methods employed for their Realization (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946 [1937]), pp. 89-125.

[40] Karl Mannheim, 'The Psychological Aspect', in C. A. W. Manning (ed.), Peaceful Change: An International Problem (London: Macmillan, 1937), pp. 102-132.

rests upon the notion of relative deprivation, of 'haves' and 'have-nots' in the international realm, to propound an unusual case for the extension of appeasement.[41]

Appeasement itself, of course, rested upon a certain critique of crisis. Leftist appeasers tended to point to the perceived injustices of Versailles so eloquently outlined at the time by Keynes. Conservatives instead lamented the weakness of the League, warned of the follies of imprudent action, and urged pragmatism rather than 'idealism'.[42] They feared the consequences both of entangling alliances and doctrinaire diplomacy, believing both to have contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914, and feared that war itself would precipitate the wholesale collapse of civilisation.[43] 'In war', Chamberlain declared in May 1938, 'whichever side may call itself the victor, there are no winners, but all are losers'.[44] When war came, there was something of a reversion to the theories of international crisis that prevailed during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. Thinkers as politically distinct as Churchill, Laski and Collingwood cast Nazi Germany as barbarism reborn and Great Britain as civilisation imperilled.[45] This mode of thought persisted into

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[41] Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis. On the influence of Mannheim on Carr, see Jones, E. H. Carr and International Relations, p. 121-143.

[42] See, for example, Viscount Halifax on the purpose of British foreign policy in his Speeches on Foreign Policy ed. H. H. E. Craster (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp.139-143 & pp. 174-181.

[43] It has been argued that British policy after 1931 had the simultaneous aims of warding off internal and external crises. See G. Schmidt, 'The Domestic Background to British Appeasement Policy', in W. J. Mommsen & L. Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 101-124.

[44] Neville Chamberlain, 'The Meaning of War', in his In Search of Peace: Speeches (1937-38) ed. A. Bryant (London: Hutchinson, 1939), p. 238.

[45] Churchill, 'War of the Unknown Warriors', BBC broadcast, 14 July 1940, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/speeches.html; Harold Laski, Where do we go from here? An Essay in Interpretation (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1941 [1940]), p. 11; R. G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan, or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 375-387.

the 1950s. Taylor and Namier revived yet again the 'myth of militarism', and laid the blame for war on the intrinsic bellicosity of the German nation.[46] The latter heaped scorn, like 'Cato' and Seton-Watson before him, upon the 'appeasers' for their naivety and lack of statesmanship. Others were cruder still, ascribing the war to the particular evil and genius of one individual, Hitler, as some had done to Kaiser Wilhelm some 30 years earlier.[47]

More sensitive observers located the source of crisis in the nature of contemporary politics and international relations. Of particular concern was the variety of 'power-politics' that had brought Hitler such gains, domestically and internationally, in the late 1930s. The phrase was employed, by R. W. Seton-Watson, Laski and others,[48] to describe Nazi methods before and during the war; by 1950 it had almost become synonymous with twentieth century international relations.[49] The influence of American scholars, especially Hans Morgenthau, was important here, for it was they – with the possible exception of Martin Wight – who offered the more thorough and incisive post-war analyses of 'power-politics'.[50] With the onset of the Cold War, attention became focussed too on the phenomenon of 'totalitarianism', the best work on the subject was again written in North America by Central European émigrés, most notably by Hannah

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[46] See A. J. P. Taylor, The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of Germany since 1815 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945) and Lewis Namier, Diplomatic Prelude 1938-39 (London: Macmillan, 1948).

[47] Hugh Trevor-Roper's The Last Days of Hitler (London: Macmillan, 1947) has often been cited in this regard.

[48] Seton-Watson, Britain and the Dictators, p.56; Laski, Where do we go from here?, p. 30.

[49] Influential in this regard was Schwarzenberger's magisterial Power Politics. Schwarzenberger was a Reader in International Law at University College, London, an inspirational teacher and an advocate of 'functional' solutions to international problems.

[50] See especially Morgenthau's Scientific Man versus Power Politics.

Arendt and Jacob Talmon.[51] Their ideas, however, were highly influential in Britain. In Hugh Seton-Watson's Neither War nor Peace, for instance, the idea of totalitarianism stands centre-stage, its quasi-religious fervour and revolutionary methods blamed for the longevity and intensity of the crisis that was the Cold War.[52] At the same time, as Wight recognised,[53] the spectre of 'power politics' continued to haunt Seton-Watson's book, as it did most post-war writing on the subject.

Older understandings of the causes of international crisis, however, were not wholly superseded. Charles Manning continued to argue that state sovereignty, above all, was the villain just as Lowes Dickinson had done some thirty years before.[54] A. J. P. Taylor revised his earlier view of the innate barbarism of Germans, but the academic reaction to his assault on the notion that Hitler was wholly and personally culpable for the outbreak of war revealed the extent of the hold these ideas had over many in the field.[55] There continued to be those who saw crisis as rooted in the tension between 'haves' and 'have-nots', as Carr had done, and advocated the appeasement of the latter.[56] How far

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[51] Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1951); J. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker & Warburg, 1952).

[52] Seton-Watson, Neither War nor Peace.

[53] Wight summed up the book thus: 'What is remarkable...is neither the brilliance nor profundity nor novelty of thought (though these are often present) so much as the rare combination of political clear-sightedness and fortitude – the level gaze at the struggle for power, and the knowledge that a victory for justice and freedom is not guaranteed by history' (review of Seton-Watson, Neither War nor Peace, International Affairs, 36:4 (October 1960), p. 496).

[54] See, for example, C. A. W. Manning, 'The Sins of Sovereign States', The Listener, 42:1082, 20 October 1949, pp. 655-656.

[55] For a survey of these debates, see D. C. Watt, 'Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School?', Political Quarterly 36 (1965), pp. 191-213.

[56] Wight observed this tendency in 'The Power Struggle within the United Nations', Proceedings of the Institute of World Affairs 33rd session (1956), p. 248, and also noted that the distinction

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight accepted such arguments is, in part, the subject of the remainder of this chapter. What must be noted at the outset, however, was their tendency to comprehend – and often to explain – the challenge of international crisis in religious categories. This eschewing of the secular political, economic, sociological or psychological accounts favoured by their peers marked them out, and gave their international thought its particular character. It is the religious aspect that is emphasised in the next three sections. The themes of idolatry, righteousness and apostasy, were dominant – it is argued – in the minds of Toynbee, Butterfield and Wight respectively, shaping their conceptions of the challenge of international crisis.

Toynbee and Idolatry

> As the works of God's creation are infinite, idolatry has taken a great variety of forms. One form is the worship of organised human power. This organisation of power may be local and sectional, or again it may attempt to embrace the whole of mankind; and either the local tribe or Humanity at large may be, and has been, erected into an object of idolatrous worship. Each of these two ancient idols has now been set up on its pedestal again by the new Paganism. The tribe is the idol of Fascism, Humanity is the idol of Communism.[57]

The idea of idolatry dominates almost all of Toynbee's writing, especially that on international politics. Idolatry was the ultimate 'nemesis of creativity'; it was the root cause of the 'breakdown' of civilisations.[58] It was the consequence of 'Original Sin' – the

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between 'haves' and 'have-nots' was first made by Admiral Mahan in Some Neglected Aspects of War (1907).

[57] Toynbee, 'Post-War Paganism versus Christianity', The Listener 17:419, 20 January 1937, p. 124.

[58] Toynbee, Study IV, p. 261.

reality of which Toynbee was convinced – defined as the 'sin of self-centredness'.[59] Self-centredness, he argued, led human beings to become infatuated with their present and with their creations. Progress was no longer possible in such circumstances: self-centred people are no longer able to tap the *élan vital*, or to enter that communion with God that gives the necessary 'creativity' to surmount the 'challenges' that their societies may face. In Toynbee's work, and especially in the Study, 'idolatry' was explored in many forms; indeed it is one of more protean of his central ideas. Nevertheless, it lay at the very root of the modern international crisis. What stimulated this obsessive concern for idolatry, however, remains unclear. It may well have been, as McNeill suggested, an intellectual legacy from his Uncle Harry,[60] or a product of his early study of Bergson. What is clear is its centrality to most of his international thought.

In Toynbee's earliest work, however, 'idolatry' was wholly absent. In Nationality and the War (1915), much to the concern of Brailsford,[61] Toynbee offered an account of the causes of that concentrated almost exclusively on the issue of nationalism, or rather that 'evil element in nationalism under its many names, "Chauvinism", "Jingoism", "Prussianism"'.[62] For good measure, Toynbee threw in a further, Hobbesian, point, and argued that the 'longdrawn agony of mutual fear' between states had also contributed to the coming of war.[63] He was more equivocal on the role of nationalism: it had to be 'purged' of the worst element, which led to 'militarism', but it was not intrinsically bad.

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[59] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 138.

[60] McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 7-8.

[61] H. N. Brailsford, War of Steel and Gold: A study of the armed peace (London: Bell, 1914)., p. 7. For Brailsford, 'colonial and economic issues supplied a cruder motive for the use of force'.

[62] Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. 10.

[63] Ibid., p. 63.

Indeed, the 'national state', though now clearly obsolete,[64] was to be praised, not least for its capacity to generate the 'spirit' that makes its citizens rally to arms. 'This is why', he argued, 'the national state is the most magnificent ...social achievement in existence'.[65]

This power, for Toynbee, also made the 'national state' the 'most dangerous' social institution. The 'morbid hypertrophy of nationalism' made it dangerous in Western Europe;[66] elsewhere, rapid attempts to create such states was leading to misery, dislocation, and sometimes massacre. Much of Nationality and the War was thus concerned with a plan that would secure the protection of ethnic minorities in post-war Europe, especially in the East, and it was an issue on which Toynbee continued to meditate in the early 1920s. Having experienced at first hand the horrors of inter-ethnic conflict in Anatolia, he came to formulate a more coherent argument as to the place of nationalism in contemporary politics, which he defended in The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (1922). He began with the rather prosaic observation that the Greco-Turkish war was caused by 'all-pervading national fanaticism',[67] but moved on to develop a more contentious case. Nationalism, Toynbee argued, was a specifically Western invention which the structure of modern international politics, based on the sovereign state, had forced upon the Near- and Middle East.[68] Thus, historically tolerant cultures, pressured to conform to the model of the nation-state, had rapidly become rabidly intolerant: displayed graphically, he argued, 'the two curves of atrocities and Westernization ...practically coincide'.[69]

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[64] Toynbee argued: 'This war, and the cloud of war that has weighed upon us so many years before the bursting of the storm, has brought to bankruptcy the "National State"' (Ibid., p. 7).

[65] Ibid., p. 481.

[66] Ibid., p. 480.

[67] Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, 2nd ed., p. xv.

[68] Ibid., p. 15.

[69] Ibid., p. 266-267. See also p. 16.

This was a theme on which Toynbee was to say much more, not least in the Study and Surveys,[70] and most notoriously in The World and the West.[71] His early work also introduced another idea central to his later, better-known writings: namely that violence imperils nothing less than civilisation itself. In Nationality and the War, he argued:

> The psychological devastation of the war is even more trouble than the material. War brings the savage substratum of human character to the surface, after it has swept away the strong habits that generations of civilised effort have built up.[72]

By 1923, Toynbee was convinced that war endangered more than just the lives of individuals and the welfare of the rest. The Great War, he declared, had been 'one of the great crises of our civilization', a 'conflagration lighting up the dim past and throwing it into perspective'.[73] War could not be fought, as the veterans' medals proclaimed, for civilisation; the two were inimical, as he argued in 1928:

> On the principle that every organism has its specific diseases, and every soul its besetting sins, a historian might judge that the institution of War was the deadly disease and the sin against the Holy Ghost of human societies in the process of civilization.[74]

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[70] See especially the introduction to the Survey for 1925, volume I, published in 1927, in which Toynbee further developed his account of 'The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement' (pp. 1-24).

[71] The controversy that greeted in the publication of The World and the West is outlined in chapter 2, and in McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 223-224.

[72] Toynbee, Nationality and the War, p. 3.

[73] Toynbee, 'History' in Livingstone (ed.), Legacy of Greece, p. 299.

[74] Toynbee, Survey 1928, p. 1.

War was a self-inflicted affliction, to be cured only by the patient's conscious action. In the post-war period, he divined in 1929, in the form of the League and the Pact of Paris (1928), such action had indeed come about. It was one of those 'rare moments in which Mankind became alive to the deadliness of War and revolted against an institution which it normally took for granted'.[75] Moved by 'spiritual revulsion' action had been taken to 'outlaw' war between states, provoking from Toynbee the remarkable paean to the 'vitality of Western society' with which he introduced the Survey for 1928.[76]

This optimism quickly faded. The tone of Toynbee's Montague Burton lecture and 'World-Order or Downfall?' radio talks, both given in 1930, jars painfully with that of the account of Pact of Paris, in the Survey, of just a year before. He returned to the topic of nationalism, arguing that it represented the acme of 'political perversity' in a world that was becoming ever more economically united.[77] The primary reason for this perversity, he asserted in the following talk, was the 'idolatry of nationalism', offering as he did so an unorthodox definition of nationalism. It was at once 'statism', the adherence to the political doctrine that sovereign states should be the highest authority in international relations,[78] and a 'kind of religion', 'the worship of a local sovereign state'.[79] In either way, 'Nationalism' was irrational and obsolete:

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[75] Toynbee, Survey 1928, p. 3.

[76] Ibid., p. 4 & p. 7.

[77] Toynbee, 'Economics versus Politics', The Listener, 4:95, 19 November 1930, p. 825. See also his 'Economics and Politics in International Life'.

[78] Toynbee, 'Economics or Politics', p. 825.

[79] Toynbee, 'The Idolatry of Nationalism', The Listener, 4:96, 26 November 1930,, pp. 873-874.

> The States which *we* worship are the institutions which made the Great War; the State which the early Christians were asked to worship was the institution which kept the Roman peace.[80]

Whilst 'national states' had succeeded in securing pacific relations amongst themselves in the past, whether in the ancient world or in the nineteenth century, when 'Nationalism was working in harmony with Industrialism',[81] they could do so no longer.

It was not long before this view surfaced in the supposedly neutral Survey. The volume for the 'Annus Terribilis 1931' opened with a lament for the world's inability to face the challenge of 'Local Sovereignty' as well as its 'traditional corollary the institution of War' despite the patent progress that had been made towards economic unification.[82] While Toynbee acknowledged that economic crisis and social unrest were threatening the 'Great Society', 'political nationalism and race-feeling' were the real culprits, 'making it more and more difficult to organize and ensure the universal peace which the economic world order required' Indeed, he argued:

> The crisis of 1931 might be described as a crisis in a secular struggle between oecumenicalism and parochialism, or, again, in a struggle between the implications of a new industrial technique and the habits of a pre-industrial tradition.[83]

The underlying difficulty was 'psychological' – 'a Petrine failure of faith' had caused the breakdown of the system of collective security.[84] It had become clear that, even in the face

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[80] Ibid., p. 874.

[81] Toynbee, 'Economics and Politics in International Life', p. 6.

[82] Toynbee, Survey 1931, p. 10.

[83] Ibid., p. 17.

[84] Ibid., p. 60.

of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, the 'inter-state anarchy' could not be overcome.[85] Subsequent events did not make Toynbee more sanguine. In the Surveys he returned to these themes on a number of occasions, notably in the volume for 1933, which dealt with the rise of Nazism and the Abyssinian crisis. In the first he condemned governments for becoming 'priests, as well as the creatures, of the modern Western cult of parochial sovereignty', priests bound in 'spiritual fetters' that prevented their taking the needed, internationalist action.[86] He drew again, as he has done in the 1931 Survey,[87] upon the analogy between the Hellenic and modern worlds, observing that the 'worship of parochial community' had been the downfall of Athens and Greek civilisation, and the precursor to the violent rise of Rome.[88]

As the 1930s progressed, and as it came to bear ever more weight in his arguments, Toynbee's concept of 'Nationalism' became ever more vague. A number of distinct ideas were assimilated and conflated – 'parochialism', 'anarchy', and the 'fetish of local national sovereignty' were encompassed under the broad heading of 'Nationalism'.[89] In the Study, the idea was stretched even further. The first volume opens with an account of the relationship between 'Industrialism' and 'Democracy' – the latter being defined as 'responsible parliamentary representative government in a sovereign independent national state'.[90] He went on to confuse matters further, arguing that 'Democracy' was a political reflection of the 'Christian intuition of the fraternity of all Mankind' which, when bounded by the state, produced 'Nationalism', a new form of

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[85] Ibid., p. 137.

[86] Toynbee, Survey 1933, p. 2 & p. 3.

[87] Toynbee, Survey 1931, p. 6.

[88] Toynbee, Survey 1933, p. 115.

[89] Toynbee, 'The Trend of International Affairs since the War', International Affairs 10:4 (November 1931), p. 806 & p. 808.

[90] Toynbee, Study I, p. 1.

'Tribalism'.[91] Quite what caused what was unclear. In The Western Question Toynbee had maintained that nationalism had arisen in Western Europe and been exported to the Near and Middle East by political leaders eager to Westernise their countries and constitute them as nation-states. In the Study, he was keen to observe the error of 'Nationalism' in many, not least historians, but only to identify its progenitors in vague terms. Thus while he asserted that 'every Great Power...aspired to be a substitute for Society in the sense of being self-contained and self-sufficient, not only in politics and economics but even in spiritual culture', he was less forthcoming in locating the agents, structures or processes responsible.[92]

Between 1934 and 1939, when Toynbee published the second three volumes of the Study, he offered glimpses of how this account was to be developed. The radio talk 'Post-War Paganism and Christianity' (1937) embodied the strongest hints. There Toynbee attacked Fascism and Communism as systems of idolatry, which he understood as 'a religion which either does not know, or else refuses to recognise, that there is no god but God, and which therefore worships the creature instead of worshipping the creator'.[93] Fascism he identified as the religion of the tribe, drawing parallels with 'the religion of Ishmael' and of Sparta and her enemies, and suggesting that the admirers of 'National States' were similarly misguided.[94] Until 1939, however, this was as far as Toynbee was prepared to argue in print. It was in the Study, and particularly in volume IV, that the argument was elaborated in full. In the introduction to that volume, Toynbee drew a parallel between the contemporary crisis and the episodes of civilisational 'breakdown' he was to discuss. The 'best judges among us', he lamented, 'would probably declare

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[91] Ibid., p. 9.

[92] Ibid., p. 10.

[93] Toynbee, 'Post-War Paganism', p. 124.

[94] Ibid.

unanimously that our 'Time of Troubles' has undoubtedly descended upon us in our Western World of to-day'.[95] In an effort to understand its causes, Toynbee explored a range of analogous 'breakdowns' in Egypt, Byzantium and Assyria, as well as Eire, South Carolina and Venice.[96]

'Breakdowns', he concluded, were 'failures in an audacious attempt to ascend from the level of a Primitive Humanity, living the life of a social animal, to the height of some superhuman kind of being in a Communion of Saints'.[97] These 'failures' of 'Creativity' became manifest in the passive acceptance of inherited social institutions and the 'mechanization of Life'. Toynbee called this act 'idolization' or 'idolatry', broadening the meaning of the term considerably from the sense in which he used it in 'Post-War Paganism'. He defined it thus:

> A fatuous Passivity towards the Present springs from an infatuation with the Past; and this infatuation is the sin of idolatry... Idolatry may be defined as an intellectually and morally purblind worship of the part instead of the whole, of the creature instead of the Creator, of Time instead of Eternity; ...[an] abuse of the highest faculties of the human spirit, and misdirection of its most potent energies...[98]

In what followed, Toynbee outlined the forms that idolatry had taken in past societies: the idolization of the 'ephemeral self', 'ephemeral institution' and 'ephemeral technique'. The first concerned collective selves, rather than individual, embracing (most controversially)

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[95] Toynbee, Study IV, p. 4.

[96] As this brief list shows, many of Toynbee's examples were local and particular rather than general and 'civilisational', and some were highly contentious. His treatment of Eire is a case in point: the Irish, he declares are obsessed with the 'Past' and until they find 'psychological plasticity' they will amount to little in the world (Ibid., p. 292).

[97] Ibid., p. 3.

the Jews, as well as Athens, Eire and Communism. Toynbee argued that these collectivities had undergone the 'hypnotization' their 'living self' by their 'dead self',[99] becoming obsessed with their histories and their supposed distinctiveness at the expense of the 'creativity' necessary for social progress.

The other two forms of 'idolization' concerned the worship of human creations, political and technological. In the first category Toynbee lumped the Hellenic city-state, Byzantine Empire, 'Pharonic Crown' and the 'Mother of Parliaments', the last of which he considered unlikely to be capable of 'creative metamorphosis in order to the meet the challenge of a "Post-Modern" Age'.[100] The objective throughout was the demonstration of the pitfalls that await those who idolise 'political sovereignty' and the illustration of the diagnosis of crisis made in the Surveys and elsewhere.[101] In addressing the 'idolization of...ephemeral technique', however, Toynbee widened his concept of idolatry considerably, and shifted his focus towards war. The techniques discussed are almost all military;[102] this section serves, indeed, as a preface to his account of the 'suicidalness of militarism'. It is there that Toynbee reiterated his conviction, expressed in the Survey for 1928, that war is the ultimate cause of the 'breakdown' of civilisation. Militarism was 'suicidal', he wrote in an annex, but that will 'hardly be disputed' – it is 'almost a truism'. The real question was whether 'War is intrinsically and irredeemably evil in

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[98] Ibid., p. 261.

[99] Ibid., p. 291.

[100] Ibid., p. 415.

[101] Ibid., p. 414.

[102] The section opens with some odd passages on the evolution of 'reptiles and mammals' and a brief (3 pages) treatment of industrial techniques in Manchester and Osaka; the remainder deals with military tactics and methods (Ibid., pp. 431-465).

itself'.[103] In his answer, Toynbee was characteristically obtuse, but the direction of his argument was clear.

Toynbee remained convinced for the remainder of this life that 'idolatry' lay at the root of contemporary ills, as the 'nemesis of creativity'. This thesis was expanded – but not appreciably deepened – in An Historian's Approach to Religion. The historian's task, he argued, was to 'attempt to correct self-centredness', an 'intellectual' and 'moral error, because no living creature has a right to act as if it were the centre of the universe'.[104] In this vein he again offered critiques of the idolization of 'nature', 'parochial communities' and 'oecumenical communities'. These formed the intellectual foundations for his writing on international affairs during the 1950s and 60s, for his simultaneous attacks on 'Nationalism' and 'Communism'. Nationalism, Toynbee believed, was sustaining the international system of sovereign states and thus 'threatening to lead mankind to self-destruction', while Communism was threatening to impose a world-state by force.[105] Both, however, were rooted in 'man-worship'. Thus, he declared in a lecture, 'the real danger for the human race from human nature arises when our self-centredness goes over from the singular number to the plural'.[106]

This message was put forth again and again, in Toynbee's later years, in lectures, interviews and articles, the argument put in various guises, and in books like Mankind and Mother Earth. 'The present day global set of local sovereign states', he wrote in the latter, is not capable of keeping the peace'; 'Mother Earth' can only be protected 'by overcoming the suicidal, aggressive greed that...has been the price of the Great Mother's

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[103] Ibid., p. 640.

[104] Toynbee, Historian's Approach, pp. 2-3.

[105] Toynbee, Change and Habit, p. 105.

[106] Toynbee, 'The Proper Study of Mankind is Man' (1958), Toynbee MSS 2, p. 3.

gift of life'.[107] Though somewhat tired in this formulation, Toynbee's argument – like his Study and Surveys – represented a formidable feat of assimilation. It combined Bergson's critique of 'static religion' with Lowes Dickinson's concept of 'international anarchy'. It contained an account of totalitarianism as 'political religion' that predated by some twenty years the work of Arendt and Talmon. It displayed an anxiety as to effects of capitalism on political form as much as it displayed Toynbee's shaky grasp of economics. As Thompson and Morgenthau appreciated, his work also contained astute analyses of the historical and contemporary workings of the balance of power.[108] Underlying all was a conviction – shared by almost all those who have written on the subject since 1914 – that the continuance of war threatened the continuance of 'civilisation'.

Butterfield and Righteousness

> We may wonder whether the proclamation of a 'new diplomacy' and 'simpler' types of policy in 1919 was not itself an example of the danger which some of our predecessors were dreading - in fact, a facile attempt to pander to the self-esteem of the masses. The call for a 'simpler' diplomacy envisaged a world in which there were 'good' states harassed only because they had to deal with the possible emergence of 'bad' ones and it involved just the inflexible kind of self-righteousness, and the unhistorical attitude to the past, which might be expected to characterise an age of young democracies.[109]

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[107] Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth, p. 593 & p. 596.

[108] See Thompson, Toynbee's Philosophy, pp. 45-46; Morgenthau, Politics among Nations 3rd ed., pp. 216-217 & p. 258.

[109] Butterfield, 'The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy', in Butterfield & Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations, p. 182.

Like Toynbee, Butterfield feared that his contemporaries made 'fictitious deities for themselves out of abstract nouns and concepts like the State', and observed that idolatry figured strongly in the modern 'Dark Ages'.[110] Worship of the state was particularly problematic. In the minutes of one of the earliest meetings of the British Committee, Butterfield is reported as regarding:

> ...the development of Greek political theory as the enemy, embodying the whole of man's duties to (and relations with) his fellows within a doctrine of obligation that is centred upon the individual state, this intellectual factor combining with the cumulative effect of war throughout modern history to intensify the concept of the state as an end in itself.[111]

Toynbee and Lowes Dickinson had argued that the existence of a multiplicity of states generated war and ultimately international crisis. Butterfield disagreed. The state itself was not the issue; what caused difficulties was the attitude one held towards it. Crisis was the product not of international anarchy – the absence of a world ruler – but rather of intellectual failure and 'moral anarchy, leading to moral hysteria'.[112] The incidence and intensity of war, the corruption of diplomacy, the rise of totalitarianism – each were the result of a failure to perceive the proper nature of international relations rooted in a 'superficial...idealism'.[113] The ills of the twentieth century were caused by political ignorance, by moral indignation and, above all, by self-righteousness.

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[110] Butterfield, Christianity in European History, p. 58.

[111] Butterfield in minutes of BCTIP meeting 2-12 January 1959, Butterfield Papers 336, p. 2. See also Wight's note (15 April 1961) of Butterfield's remark that '"Political theory" is the enemy' in BCTIP Papers 5.

[112] Butterfield, 'Morality and an International Order', in Porter (ed.), Aberystwyth Papers, p. 346.

Butterfield's starting point was theological, and the argument as a whole consistent with his understanding of the nature of the past and the historian's role. 'All men are sinners', he wrote in 1944; all are prone to cupidity if the circumstances allow.[114] The predicament in which they find themselves shapes their behaviour: 'Men are victims as well as agents of historical processes and we are thus faced with greater complexity in estimating degrees of guilt'.[115] On the grander scale, he argued in Christianity and History, 'we might say...that the difference between civilisation and barbarism is a revelation of what is essentially the same human nature when it works under different conditions'.[116] Butterfield continued:

> ....both within a nation and in the larger realm of a whole international order, a healthy disposition of forces can be attained for long periods which, so to speak, makes human nature better than it really is, so that with good fortune and in quiet times certain aspects of it will hardly even be put to the test.[117]

The disruption, and possible destruction, of this 'moral framework' lay at the root of the crisis of international relations.[118] War, revolution and 'barbarism' had begun to flourish as the 'rational order' that had evolved over 'two thousand years' was destroyed.[119] He placed the blame not on the warriors, revolutionaries or 'barbarians' – they were victims of cupidity – but on wilful and negligent 'utopians' and 'idealists':

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[113] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 39.

[114] Butterfield to Hayek, 31 July 1944, Butterfield MSS 1(i).

[115] Butterfield, 'Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach', p. 415.

[116] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 31.

[117] Ibid., p. 33.

[118] The phrase 'moral framework' may be found in Butterfield, 'Morality and an International Order', p. 341.

[119] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, 3rd ed., p. 20.

> The trouble is that the world has lost so many of the safeguards, and if there is an aspect of the modern tragedy which is to be regretted, because it might conceivably have been avoided, it is that the last generation suffered so much from the superficiality of its idealists and the spiritual impoverishment of its self-styled prophets.[120]

The greatest danger, however, lay in those 'false prophets who flourish by flattering and bribing human nature... [and] ...playing up to its self-righteousness in times of crisis'.[121]

'At its worst', Butterfield argued, this mode of political thinking 'brings us to that mythical messianism – that messianic hoax – of the twentieth century which comes perilously near the thesis: "Just one little war against the last remaining enemies of righteousness, and then the world will be cleansed, and we can start building Paradise"'.[122] 'Mythical' or 'false messianism' was latent in the notions of 'making the world safe for democracy' or 'the war that would end all war'.[123] This amounted, of course, to thinly veiled but damning criticism of Allied policy in both World Wars.[124] The confident self-righteousness it had represented had brought about disaster: 'we might have saved civilisation', he wrote to Toynbee in 1950, if the First World War had not been turned 'into an eschatological war'. The 'old diplomacy' had been undermined, the

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[120] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 33. On those men who 'evaded the real moral issues and who were narrower in their comprehension than so many of the statesmen of the nineteenth century', see also 'Christianity and the Status Quo', Christianity and Crisis 10 June 1957, reproduced at http://www.religion-online.org/cgi-bin/relsearch.dll/showarticle?item_id=389.

[121] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 46.

[122] Ibid., p. 41.

[123] Ibid., p. 80.

[124] Butterfield's Peace Tactics of Napoleon (1929) also included an implicit critique of British policy in the First World War. It was cast as a 'study of diplomacy in the time of war' (p. vii), emphasising the need, little recognised between 1914 and 1918, and rejected twenty years later, for diplomatic negotiation to be maintained in the midst of conflict.

'continuity' of this tradition 'was broken more than it need have been'; its faults 'might have been eliminated by a sort of gradualness' rather than rapid and radical reform. [125] The major consequence, however, was the growing legitimacy, amongst states, of 'wars for righteousness' – unrestrained wars, fought between protagonists convinced of their moral superiority and their enemies 'wickedness', demanding each others' 'utter destruction'.[126]

This division of the contemporary world into 'great systems of self-righteousness', Butterfield argued in 1953, generated 'barbarism' and gave rise to 'atrocities', threatened nuclear Armageddon and destruction of civilisation.[127] Those responsible for this predicament, however, were not so much politicians, though they often fell victim to self-righteousness, but 'preachers, teachers and prophets'.[128] Especially culpable were contemporary historians, who, whenever a dispute or conflict arose, tended to become 'locked in the combative views of his own nation, and shrieking morality of that particular kind that springs from self-righteousness'.[129] This 'moralistic approach' to international relations was rife among contemporary historians, who were beset by 'intellectual arrogance'.[130] His targets here, however, remained unnamed. Most likely, they included a fair range of his peers: from Namier and Taylor on German history

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[125] Butterfield to Toynbee, 7 June 1950, Toynbee MSS 120.

[126] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War 1st ed., p. 27.

[127] Ibid., p. 43.

[128] Butterfield, 'Morality and an International Order', in Porter (ed.) Aberystwyth Papers, p. 343. On 'preachers', see also 'Christianity and Politics', in McIntire (ed.), Herbert Butterfield, p. 37.

[129] Butterfield, 'Tragic Element', p. 155.

[130] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 169. On the 'special danger' of contemporary history, see Butterfield to Butler, 20 June 1950, Butterfield MSS 531(i)/B215, and on its 'flimsy character' and 'far-reaching degeneracy' post-1933, see Butterfield to Hayek, 31 July 1944, Butterfield MSS 1(i).

to Rowse and Toynbee on appeasement. In blaming the particular evils of the German character or Chamberlain's credulousness, it was suggested, these historians had betrayed their vocation and misapprehended the true character of international affairs. Scholars of International Relations, if anything, were worse: 'all the prejudices, passions, and wishful thinking which are involved in present-day controversies often make this more contemporary study a form of self-indulgence rather than a discipline of the mind'.[131]

For Butterfield, historians and IR scholars exercised a baleful influence over the conduct of international relations. It was they who were responsible for denigrating the old diplomacy, with difficult consequences:

> Like the Germans, we sometime allow the academic and professorial mind to have too much sway among us; and with us this has helped to give currency to the heresy that everything can be settled if men will only sit together at a table... The conference method does not get rid of the difficulty – it merely transplants the whole predicament into another place.[132]

Historians and IR scholars had helped too to propagate the view that 'the emergence of an aggressor' is 'dependent on a certain type of regime'.[133] This was not a view that Butterfield shared: 'the fact', he wrote, 'of being a revolutionary State is probably a stronger factor than the actual character of the revolutionary creed involved'.[134] By promoting the latter, contemporary historians and IR scholars had not only undermined effective diplomacy, but also contributed, by advocating the aggressive promotion of

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[131] Butterfield, 'Notes on: How far can and should the subject of International Relations be included in the curriculum for undergraduate students of History?', Butterfield MSS 130/2, p. 3.

[132] Butterfield, 'Tragic Element', p. 163.

[133] Butterfield, 'Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach', p. 413.

[134] Ibid.

democracy, to the weakening of the 'whole system of safeguards' that had evolved in modern international relations.[135]

In democracy itself lay a further problem. In the Peace Tactics of Napoleon (1929), Butterfield suggested that the subtle diplomacy of the nineteenth century, raised to high art by the Austrians, could not be 'democratised'.[136] This incompatibility was not necessarily problematic: as he acknowledged, the 'old diplomacy' had flaws. By the late 1940s, however, Butterfield had concluded that the abandonment of such methods at the same time that 'a new class' was coming to power had proved disastrous.[137] Modern democracies had, he wrote later, failed to learn their better aspects, or to exercise that 'discrimination [which] may be needed...if there are lessons of long-term experience which, once they are lost, it might be a costly matter to recover'.[138] It was not merely a question of ignorance begetting occasional blunder. From Machiavelli's Prince – which he considered but a collection of useful maxims for the potential usurper rather than a work of 'political science'[139] – Butterfield gleaned that when 'new classes' assumed power they tended in their actions towards inflexibility and even brutality.[140] 'Wars for righteousness'

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[135] Ibid., p. 419. On fighting for democracy, see also 'Tragic Element', p. 160. In a letter to Bull, Butterfield complained of the tendency – of Michael Donelan and international theorists more generally – to use the term 'humanity' in the 'moral' sense rather than the descriptive, arguing that it was 'very harmful' (Butterfield to Bull, 29 August 1978, Bull MSS 4/1)

[136] Ibid., p. 319.

[137] Butterfield voices anxieties about 'the rise of a new class not brought up in the "urbanities" of civilised life', and their possible culpability in the 'cruelties' of the contemporary world, in a letter to Watson, 2 May 1949, Butterfield Papers 531(iii)/W23

[138] Butterfield, 'The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy', p. 181.

[139] Butterfield, Statecraft of Machiavelli, p. 9. See also his Napoleon, in which he refers to Machiavelli's 'science of usurpers' (p. 124).

[140] In this light, it is difficult to consider Butterfield, as Navari does in her chapter on 'English Machiavellianism' (in her edited British Politics and the Spirit of the Age, pp. 107-137), as a 'Machiavellian'. Far from being an exemplar, Machiavelli appears in Butterfield's work rather

were just such actions: both politically imprudent and inherently barbaric, but irresistible to the collective mind of modern democracy.

'It is probably quite a dangerous thing', Butterfield argued with characteristic understatement, 'for the liberal democracies to have their people too ignorant of the subtler factors on which the order of their society depends'.[141] In part this was a failure of education – he was convinced that the 'educational system as a whole had...gone adrift'. But it was too a failure of religion: we had 'thrown overboard those things which are a training in values'.[142] Without the doctrine of the Fall and the idea of Providence, reformers were tempted to set aside those subtle restraints that helped to curb human cupidity. Without the concept of 'personality', liberty was curtailed and human life was devalued.[143] Without faith, without the ability to 'hold fast to spiritual truths',[144] moreover, human beings became inflexible and unyielding, more prone to moralism and self-righteousness. Without this proper education, technical and religious, democracies felt victim all too easily to panaceas,[145] demagoguery and moralism, not to mention the 'bad history' that often underpinned them.[146]

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as a warning, firstly against 'rigidity' (The Statecraft of Machiavelli, p. 139) in the practice of politics, and as a warning against the excesses in which usurpers – individual or collective – may indulge to secure power.

[141] Butterfield, The Universities and Education Today, p. 74.

[142] Butterfield, 'The Christian and History: I. The Christian and Academic History', p. 90.

[143] On a Christian 'political science' linking liberty with personality, see Butterfield, Liberty in the Modern World, p. 7 & p. 15.

[144] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, 1st ed., p. 3. See also Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 146.

[145] As Chadwick observed, Butterfield was 'vehemently against' panaceas and the 'purveyors of panaceas' ('Sir Herbert Butterfield', p. 8).

[146] Butterfield, History and Human Relations, p. 171.

The French Revolution and the career of Napoleon offered the best illustration of this thesis. The true 'heir of the French Revolution', the Emperor was inimical to its principles but the logical outcome of its methods.[147] Revolutionary dogmatism 'found formulas for the future enslavement of mankind', for the creation of the horrors of 'modern war', the 'age of deified Peoples', the 'intensification of modern nationalism'. Together, they heralded 'Armageddon, the giant conflict for justice and right between angered populations each of which thinks it is the righteous one'.[148] This was, of course, as much a diagnosis of present ills as past ones; Butterfield, contrary to his avowed methods, seems to have had in writing the biography at least 'one eye, so to speak, upon the present'.[149] It was evident too in 'Napoleon and Hitler' (1941), an essay that made explicit the link he drew between the plebiscitory tyrannies of the two dictators.[150] The two men, he asserted, had made use of the 'cardinal thesis' of Machiavelli 'that when free institutions are in disorder and a state lacks cohesion and a unifying spirit, only the autocratic rule of one man can discipline society again and nourish a public spirit in the nation'. Two weak democracies, 'insufficiently trained in the art of politics', 'too violent in their political ardours' and ultimately disillusioned, had thus fallen prey to political opportunism, albeit systematic and astute.[151]

Like many others of his time,[152] Butterfield admired Hitler's political virtuosity and the sheer power of revolutionary politics. This did not imply – as some critics have

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[147] Butterfield, Napoleon, p. 15.

[148] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[149] In the Whig Interpretation, Butterfield had argued that this was 'the source of all sins and sophistries in history' (p. 31).

[150] Butterfield, 'Napoleon and Hitler', p. 474.

[151] Ibid.

[152] Both Wight and A. J. P. Taylor portrayed Hitler as a brilliant political opportunist – Wight in his article on 'Germany' in the Survey for March 1939 (especially pp. 305-323) and Taylor in his The Origins of the Second World War (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964).

alleged[153] – sympathy for the ends of Nazism or – as no-one has suggested – of Soviet Communism. He supported Chamberlain and appeasement in the belief that Britain was too weak, militarily and morally, to fight Germany in 1938.[154] As he wrote in 1941, in the midst of a furore that followed the publication in the Cambridge Review of Peter Utley's 'The Lie about Munich':[155]

> The effectiveness of diplomacy – whether one's policy is of appeasement, pressure or bluff – must bear some relation to the force that lies behind it. Short of a diplomatic genius, one can roughly-speaking say that a country relatively disarmed must not expect its diplomacy to be effective – in fact whether it tries one policy or another, its diplomacy will hardly ever prove to be "right". Between 1933 and 1939 we were in that position, France was in that position, and we were all the weaker because we were not united as a nation.

'Lack of power' was thus the cause of diplomatic defeat, and Butterfield urged: 'let us...admit that the democracies in general have been out-manoeuvred by a clever man'.[156] That cleverness was not to be found in British leaders. He was critical of Churchill, on the grounds that:

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[153] Annan, Our Age, pp. 530-531; Cannadine, Trevelyan, p. 208. Thorp observes that 'in his private correspondence Butterfield regarded Hitler as a modern day, secular anti-Christ' (Thorp, Herbert Butterfield, pp. 23-24).

[154] As Butterfield told his fellow members of the British Committee: 'I was always in favour of Munich, though not able to follow Chamberlain uncritically' (Wight's notes of discussion on 'Will in Politics', 15 July 1960, BCTIP Papers 5.

[155] Utley argued that Munich represented 'the first diplomatic defeat that Hitler had incurred' (T. E. Utley, 'The Lie about Munich', Cambridge Review 63:1538, 29 November 1941, p. 117).

[156] Butterfield, letter on 'The Lie about Munich', Cambridge Review 63:1544, 21 February 1942, p. 215.

> ...when involved in a war, he thought of nothing but victory and, for too long a period, was reckless of all other consequences - too forgetful of the kind of world he was helping to make and the new dangers that he was helping to bring into existence.[157]

Prominent among these new dangers was the Soviet Union, quick to fill the Central European vacuum left by the collapse of Hitler's Germany.

Butterfield's fear of Soviet Communism was deep-seated. During the 1930s, he may well have shared the belief held by many Right-leaning Christians that Nazism, 'less directly anti-Christian in propaganda and politics' was a lesser evil than Godless Communism.[158] It is more likely, however, that Butterfield viewed Nazi Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet threat, and feared that its destruction, however desirable in itself, would bring forth a more powerful enemy. This was certainly his view in hindsight:

> During the war it was put to a British ambassador that after the destruction of Germany Russia would become a similar menace to Europe if she found herself in a position to behave over a large area with impunity. The answer given on behalf of this country was that such apprehensions were unjustified, Russia would not disappoint us, for we believed that her intentions were friendly and good. Such an attitude to morality – such

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[157] Minutes of the discussion of Michael Howard's paper 'War as an Instrument of Policy', Butterfield Papers 336. This judgement should be balanced by Butterfield's assessment of Churchill from his memorial address of 1965: 'The imagination can hardly contemplate', he wrote, 'the different turn that would have been given to world history if there had been a failure of leadership in Great Britain in a few crucial months of 1940. On this occasion, the magnificent assertion of the human will belied the view that men must measure the existing disposition of forces and then simply bow before them – it makes a mockery of some current assumptions concerning historical inevitability' (Butterfield, 'In Memoriam Winston Churchill, Cambridge Review 86:2092, 6 February 1965, p. 234).

[158] Philip Williamson, 'Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge, 1933-40', English Historical Review 462 (June 2000), p. 613.

> a neglect of a whole tradition of maxims in regard to this question – was not Christian in any sense of the word but belongs to a heresy as black as the old Manichaean heresy.[159]

To fight a war with the aim of the opponent's 'absolute surrender' was thus unwise, but also symptomatic of unwarranted self-confidence. It was representative, for Butterfield, of moral failure as much as strategic error, moral failure that persisted in the West's post-war dealings with the Soviet Union. This erstwhile friend was now itself 'diabolical', warranting destruction – a view that stemmed from a 'heresy…common to the two opposing parties'.[160] Righteousness bedevilled both, eroding the foundations of international order.

Wight and Apostasy

> …the [Second World] War is the convulsion of a civilisation that has forsaken its Christian origins, and become increasingly enslaved to secularism and materialism. It is divine judgement upon European civilisation for the corporate Sin…which is the cause of the War… [T]he method of War can do nothing towards solving this fundamental problem of spiritual apostasy: it is one of the worst symptoms of that

[159] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 47. See also Christianity, Diplomacy and War 2nd ed., p. 121, in which he argued that Central and Eastern Europe was 'bound to be under the shadow of Russia, if Russia were not checked by an equally powerful Germany'.

[160] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War 2nd ed., p. 126.

> apostasy, and is utterly opposed to the Kingdom of God as shown in the life of Christ.[161]

In common with Butterfield, Toynbee and many other contemporaries, Wight was disturbed by the incidence and ferocity of war in the contemporary world, and viewed it as a symptom of a wider malaise. In his defence of pacifism, indeed, Wight showed himself convinced of the imminence of the complete destruction of the West by war. 'Western civilisation', he declared in 1936, 'is today about to commit suicide in what the German General Staff, with such felicity of description, have christened in anticipation "the total war"'.[162] In part, this was a consequence of technological progress, of improved weapons capable of killing in the millions. The suicidal impulse, however, was a function of the emancipation of politics from moral restraint that had accompanied the dissolution of medieval Christendom:

> Through the successive stages of the Hundred Years', the Thirty Years', and the Revolutionary Wars, down to 1914 and 1935, the European groups have increased in intensity and scope their powers of destroying each other; and any relation between organised force and morals has been lost for centuries.[163]

That relation had been broken by collective 'apostasy'. The West was, Wight believed, a 'post-Christian' and 'neo-pagan Civilisation' that had abandoned the teachings of the Church.[164] Apostasy had broken the Churches' power to direct and limit political power,

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[161] Wight, 'Application to Local Tribunal by a Person Provisionally Registered in the Register of Conscientious Objectors', 11 May 1940, quoted in Dunne, Inventing International Society, p. 65, note 23.

[162] Wight, 'Pacifism', p. 19.

[163] Ibid.

[164] Wight, 'The World's Churches', The Observer, 22 August 1948, p. 4.

bringing into being not only 'anti-Christian totalitarian religions',[165] but also a wider 'technological barbarism gnawing at the values on which Western civilisation is built'.[166]

Though general, 'corporate Sin' was the root cause of crisis, during the war and afterwards Wight showed himself fascinated too by particular evils. His various writings on the Antichrist all include substantial considerations of the 'crisis of Hitler' – the *Führer* explicitly identified as a manifestation of antichrist.[167] Hitler demonstrated, for Wight, the self-love, craving for power and fatalism of antichrists.[168] Moreover, his pseudo-scientific,[169] technophilic progressivism hinted at messianism and the 'rationally organised' empire of Antichrist foretold in aspects of the Christian tradition:

> The establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth is the definition of Antichrist: in eschatology, it is the final coming of the Kingdom that calls forth Antichrist as the last complex of events within history; in empirical history, it is the attempt of men to anticipate the final coming of the Kingdom as a human possibility that has evoked his precursors.[170]

This fascination – and this sense of Hitler as a messianic antichrist figure – continued to grip Wight in the post-war years. In his Cambridge sermon 'God in History' (1951), he turned again to the subject of those 'men of demonic personality and charismatic powers,

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[165] Ibid.

[166] Wight, review of Brecht, Political Theory, International Affairs 36:4 (October 1960), p. 501.

[167] Wight, 'Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS 43, part IV; 'Some Reflections on the Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS 45, p. 18.

[168] The first two were linked: 'Antichrist has pride, and pursues power, as the expression of his love for himself: he is a substitute for God' (Ibid., p. 19).

[169] For Wight's view of Hitlerian pseudo-science, see his 'Germany', Survey March 1939, p. 319.

[170] Wight, 'Some Reflections on the Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS, p. 37.

who exalted themselves above the moral law, and offered a godless solution to human ills for their generation'. Hitler, the last of these, was, he argued, 'only explicable in theological terms'.[171]

In the Survey for March 1939, Wight struggled nevertheless to explain Hitler's rise to power in secular terms. He was one of the 'revolutionary titans'.[172] His 'virtuosity of politics... the sheer technical competence in the struggle for power' was described almost in terms of awe:

> ...though Hitler moved by intuition, and lacked anything resembling Napoleon's intellectual clarity over a wide horizon, he made power politics the object of his study; he understood the theory of it; and he has left dicta thereon as penetrating and enduring as Machiavelli's...[173]

For Wight, Mein Kampf was 'enduring monument' to its author, that diabolical combination of Machiavelli and Cesare Borgia:

> It was a landmark in political philosophy, at the point where the justification of authority was superseded by the assertion of power, where the rule of reason was impugned by philosophic irrationalism, and where the ordered processes of government were replaced by the manipulation of the masses for the purposes of destructive revolution.... Contemptible as literature, but nevertheless animated by barbaric force...it was perhaps the representative political book of the twentieth century.[174]

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[171] Wight, 'God in History', pp. 33-34.

[172] Wight, 'Germany', Survey March 1939, p. 306.

[173] Ibid., p. 317.

[174] Ibid., p. 320.

This brought the argument as close as practically possible to Wight's theological view of Hitler as antichrist, exalting himself above the 'moral law', and his belief in the 'spiritual apostasy' of the contemporary world. Consistent with his views that 'Antichrist is an empirical fact of history, as well as an apocalyptic conception', he presented in the Survey one side of these contentions: Hitler-antichrist as apotheosis of his time, the foremost exponent of 'power politics'. In the religious writings, the other aspect was offered: Hitler-antichrist as 'scourge', the divine judgement on spiritual ills.[175]

In his account of Hitler, therefore, Wight related the secular and spiritual, and, indeed, the particular and general. The wider picture is addressed in the concluding Survey essay, the bulk of which consists of an imaginary conversation – a 'three-cornered dialogue' – between the Western, Axis and Communist Powers.[176] By this means, Wight sought to convey both the underlying ideas of their policies and their form of their arguments. 'Power politics', he suggested, was not a method employed solely by Nazis, though it was they who were most consistent in their expression and application in the inter-war years.[177] By contrast, Britain and France committed themselves, at least rhetorically, to replace the 'anarchy of international relations' with the 'reign of law and order and a reasonable measure of justice'.[178] At the same time, the Communist Powers set out by rejecting both power politics and liberal internationalism, and promoting

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[175] Wight, 'Some Reflections on the Historic Antichrist', Wight MSS, p. 2.

[176] Wight, The Balance of Power', Survey March 1939, p. 516. Wight used this organising device on a number of occasions. It seems likely that it was he who contributed the passages on the 'triangular struggle' between war, nationalism and revolution in Attitude to Africa (pp. 14-15). In 'The Power Struggle within the United Nations' the idea of a 'three-cornered conflict' appears again, this time between 'Communist powers, *status quo* powers, [and] have-not powers' (p. 247). The finest example of his use of the notion, however, comes in the essay on 'Triangles and Duels' in Systems of States (pp. 174-200).

[177] Wight, 'The Balance of Power' in Survey March 1939, p. 521.

[178] Ibid., p. 516.

instead proletarian revolution.[179] Wight's theme, however, is the slow corruption of the ideals of the Western and Communist Powers, and their embrace of 'power politics'. By the end of the dialogue, the Western Powers descry the weaknesses of 'open diplomacy', while the Communists assess the 'facts' and pledge to employ 'every means that the current diplomatic and political situation may offer' to defend the Soviet Union's 'interests'.[180]

By 1945, Wight was firmly convinced that 'power politics' was now dominant in international relations. He was deeply disturbed by the first use of the atomic bomb, his 'mood of depression' revealed in a spoof news report on the (brief) course of 'World War III' penned at the time.[181] His first-hand observations, as a reporter, of the early sessions of the United Nations did little to disabuse him of the idea that 'power politics' had triumphed. In June 1946, he wrote to his friend:

> ...the ascendency of "political necessity" over the demands of public opinion was much greater in 1945 than in 1919. The balance struck between the two is represented in the Charter. The Veto is a measure of our retrogression....the Third World War is as certain as the return of Halley's Comet. A balance of power is no substitute for international order: it is inherently unstable.... It is...quite plain that governments have no intention, and are indeed by their nature virtually incapable, of accepting public law at the expense of their parochial "vital" interests[182]

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[179] Ibid., p. 518.

[180] Ibid., p. 527.

[181] Wight, Covering note for 'World War III', 7 August 1945, Wight MSS 19.

[182] Wight to Oldham [Christian Frontier], 27 June 1946, Wight MSS 12.

Wight dismissed any ideas that suggested that UN might avoid the mistakes of the League as 'dangerous fallacies'.[183] The organisation was a new 'Concert of Europe', he argued, concerned with security, not 'justice or a rule of law' as the League had been.[184] He was convinced that war would come soon, and when it did, he argued in 1948, it would be fought 'with the fullest employment of atomic weapons and what other post-atomic weapons may be thought militarily decisive, and with the smallest moral restraint'.[185] This assessment echoed Wight's summation of Hitlerian policy, of the strange brew of 'fatalism' and 'opportunism' that drove his 'power politics'. 'Power', he wrote, 'becomes opportunist in expression the more it is emancipated from morality; it becomes destructive in character in proportion as it has no purpose save its own expression'.[186]

Wight sought, like Butterfield and Toynbee, to set these developments in a wider historical context. In his Chatham House pamphlet on the topic he maintained that 'what we mean by power politics...came into existence when medieval Christendom dissolved and the modern sovereign state was born'.[187] Wight drew upon Lowes Dickinson's insights, endorsing his notion that 'international anarchy' is the fundamental cause of every war. 'The causes of war' he argued, 'are inherent in power politics'.[188] But he drew

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[183] Ibid. On Wight's understanding of the differences between the League and UN, see Power Politics (1945), pp. 60-62. He also discussed the inadequacy of the UN in reviews of John Middleton Murry's Truth or Perish and Ely Cuthbertson's Must we Fight Russia?, both in International Affairs 22:4 (October 1946), p. 542 & p. 543.

[184] Wight, Power Politics (1945), p. 62.

[185] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 31.

[186] Wight, 'Germany', Survey March 1939, p. 348.

[187] Wight, Power Politics (1946), p. 8. See also his observation that Hobbes' Leviathan is 'one of the earliest and greatest textbooks of Western post- Christendom' ('Church, Russia, and the West', p. 30, note 1).

[188] Wight, Power Politics (1946), pp. 34-35. The reference to Lowes Dickinson was cut from the expanded edition. See also his 'War and International Politics', The Listener 54:1389, 13

analogies, as Toynbee had done in the Study, with 'a similar sequence of periods...in the histories of Islam, India, China and other parts of the world'.[189] He even attempted to sketch a Toynbeean general 'law', namely that the 'Balance of Power...comes into play each time that a Dominant Power has tried to gain mastery of the world'.[190] Wight's early dependence on his erstwhile mentor was even clearer in his early lectures at the LSE. One set of notes, for an introductory lecture in IR given in 1951, utilises 'Toynbee's schematization' as the framework:

1. Growth	Society of States
2. Disintegration: Decline	International Relations
3. Torpor	Universal State

Growth stage failed because it didn't express moral and cultural unity on political plane.

International Relations stage failed because it established too small political units.

Universal state at last is comprehensive political unit corresponding with total society of states – but does so too late (on the Roman method...).[191]

Like Toynbee, Wight was convinced that power politics would be overcome by a world-state, built either on consent or – more likely, given their persistence – on force.[192]

October 1955, pp. 534-585, reprinted in the expanded edition of Power Politics (1978), pp. 136-143.

[189] Ibid. The sentence from which this quotation was taken was excised from the expanded 1978 edition.

[190] Ibid., p. 44.

[191] Wight, 'Elements of International Relations', Lecture notes, Lent Term 1951, Wight MSS 101, p. 11

[192] Wight, 'Church, Russia and the West', p. 32. See also Power Politics (1978) on the aspirations of 'dominant powers to become universal empires' (p. 53).

For Wight, the crisis that would bring about this world-state, however, were not as straightforward as Toynbee argued in the Study. The latter saw the 'universal state' as the product of a 'rally' by the 'dominant minority' in a disintegrating civilisation, a society in a 'Time of Troubles' caused by a loss of creativity.[193] Wight viewed things rather differently. In common with Toynbee, he thought 'international society' in a 'condition of stasis', but dated it from the end of the eighteenth century.[194] These terms was chosen deliberately:

> It is convenient to use this Greek word for strife within communities as distinct from strife between them, since the English equivalents (civil discord or class war) are both narrow and too flaccid. Stasis appears in the international community when, in several states, bodies of men acquire loyalties which attach them more to bodies of men in other states than to their fellow citizens.[195]

These loyalties were stimulated by 'horizontal forces' (a term borrowed from Koestler) or 'horizontal doctrines', and they acted to disrupt international society. Wight argued:

> The climax of international stasis is when a horizontal doctrine acquires a territorial foothold. The doctrine then becomes an armed doctrine, and the state where it is enthroned becomes, for its adherents abroad, an exemplar, an asylum, and perhaps a saviour. International stasis changes both the motive and the character of war. On the one hand, it approximates war to revolution; on the other, it blurs the distinction between war and peace.[196]

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[193] Toynbee, Study VII, p. 1.

[194] Wight, 'War and International Politics', p. 585.

[195] Ibid.

[196] Ibid.

Since 1792, he argued, this tension between 'horizontal doctrines' and 'vertical legitimacy' – that held by the state as the bearer of rights and obligations in international society – could be located in 'every war'.[197] Wars of gain were eclipsed by wars of fear and doctrine; the consequence was a decline in 'moral and political standards'.[198]

While anarchy was for Wight the fundamental cause of war, and shifts in the balance of power its direct root, it was doctrine, especially the 'revolutionist' doctrines that had dominated international politics since 1939,[199] which fatally weakened the limits on war's conduct. Unlike Carr, he did not see crises arising from the relative distribution of wealth and resources, the tensions between 'have' and 'have-not' powers, but rather from the *perceptions* of inequality that nourished 'revolutionist' politics. 'Perhaps', he wrote in 1956, 'the essence of the have-not power is to be found in a state of mind, a motive, in which resentment, a sense of inferiority, and self-pity are the prime ingredients'.[200] The Axis and Bandung powers, Wight argued, were united in this 'resentment' and 'passionate desire to imitate', and each used international organisations – the League, the UN – to articulate and further their agenda.[201] He went on:

> It was not contemplated in San Francisco that the United Nations should be an organisation for collective intervention in the domestic affairs of its members. Yet, as the Holy Alliance was a coalition of kings for the suppressing of revolutionary movements, so the United Nations is tending to become an instrument of the have-not and Communist powers for promoting revolutionary movements.[202]

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[197] Ibid.

[198] Wight, 'War and International Politics', p. 585.

[199] This claim is made in International Theory, p. 163.

[200] Wight, 'Power-Struggle within the United Nations', p. 249.

[201] Ibid..

[202] Ibid., p. 256.

As Wight observed in a review of Eden's memoirs, this promotion of revolutionary doctrines – from Communism to anti-colonialism and national self-determination – had deleterious effects on international society:

> There is a kind of crisis of international society more fundamental than threats to the balance of power; it is when the principle of international obligation itself deliquesces. Such a crisis has been endemic in international politics ever since 1776, with the slow fermenting of the doctrine that the only valid claim to membership of the society of nations is to have established a State expressing the popular will, and the slow exploration of the corruptions that the popular will is liable to... These doctrines have been prevalent in widening circles of the world since 1918, and have found a great organ in the United Nations... National self-determination has a gallant ring of freedom and fulfilment, but its methods are assassination and arms-running, insurrection against established governments, confiscation of foreign property, repudiation of agreements, dissolution of moral ties.[203]

'Revolutionism' in theory, as Wight often noted, tended toward 'realism' in practice.[204]

Conclusion

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight shared the anxieties of their contemporaries, and shared too the categories and vocabulary employed to diagnose the causes of their concern. Most influence of all was the notion of 'anarchy', an idea that, as Schmidt and

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[203] Wight, 'Brutus in Foreign Policy', pp. 307-308.

[204] See Wight, International Theory, p. 47, fig. 1; the assessment of inter-war Soviet policy in the Survey for March 1939, p. 527; 'An anatomy of international thought', p. 226.

others have argued, is central to the 'discipline' of International Relations.[205] All three men came to doubt the value of the sovereign state and the anarchical international system that went with it. For Butterfield, the state had come to claim dues of which it was not worthy, and demand devotions that should be directed elsewhere.[206] For Toynbee, the state was less the agent of crisis than the subject of its citizens' idolatrous worship, worship that was blind to the state's obsolescence in the modern world. For Wight too, the state and the states-system had served their purpose and were ripe for replacement by world-state or global empire.[207] All three agreed that anarchy caused wars – that without a higher Leviathan to rule armed conflict would be used to settle conflicts of interests and ideas – though they differed as to the solution to the problem.

Unlike many of their contemporaries, Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight were not prone to conspiracy theories: the causes of crisis were not to be found in the machinations of shadowy bands of aristocrats, diplomats, arms dealers and financiers as Morel, Davies and Huxley proclaimed. They feared the influence of ideas, not the corruption that money can bring. The idolatrous doctrines of nationalism and Communism, Toynbee argued, were infecting the Western and non-Western worlds alike, encouraging the worship of collective self rather than Godly other. For Butterfield and Wight, these ideas brought righteousness and revolution, substitutes for true religion that eroded the ethical and material foundations of civilised international conduct.[208] There was something ironic in this, both considered – in pursuit of high principle, practice became increasingly ruthless and uncontrolled. Butterfield was keen to observe such ironies: democracies 'seem in

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[205] Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy.

[206] On the 'claims of fictitious group-persons', see Butterfield, Christianity in European History, p. 59.

[207] Wight, International Theory, p. 415.

[208] As Wight argued: 'Nationalism and revolution have enfeebled the very conception of international order' ('The Balance of Power and International Order', p. 113).

history to be more bellicose than kings', he argued on one occasion, and 'more bellicose than aristocrats'.[209] Wight even went so far as to suggest that if Bury's Idea of Progress encapsulated the spirit of the declining age of optimism, a 'corresponding book' should be written for 'our own age, on the idea of the irony of history'.[210] He had in mind the ironies of successive revolutions.

For Toynbee, spiritual failure lay at the root of crisis; for Butterfield, that failure was moral, and for Wight it was a failure of faith. For most of their contemporaries, by contrast, the failure was political, to be resolved by practical action. A variety of these responses to crisis are explored in the introduction to the next chapter. Some drew lessons from the past; others put their trust in innovation. Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight tended more the former than the latter, seeking, in their own ways, to employ their knowledge of the past for practical ends, as a means to address the causes of the crisis each had identified.

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[209] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, p. 55.

[210] Wight, 'Fortune's Banter', Wight MSS 1/3, p. 35.

VI. Response: Study, Advocacy and Action

> My study of the world will have been barren and irresponsible if it has not equipped me and spurred me to do what I can...to help mankind to cure itself of some of the evil that...I have seen human beings inflict on each other.[1]
>
> Toynbee.

> [International Relations is]...a symptom of a disease, not a therapy...[2]
>
> Wight.

> ...if each generation (or each new class of society that moves into the ascendency) has to learn all its lessons all over again through bitter experience, the wisdom is likely always to come too late.[3]
>
> Butterfield.

The challenge of international crisis in the short twentieth century stimulated a range of 'responses', programmes of action offered by scholars no less than by practitioners. It prompted utopian dreams – democratic peace, true socialism, racial purity – and dystopian realities. General crisis and particular crises begat the 'political religions' of Nazism and Soviet Communism, parasitic on very real dire economic circumstances, and promoted by their progenitors as a political 'quick fix'.[4] In British domestic politics, the 'responses' were less dramatic, but their effects were considerable, not least the creation of a welfare state to mollify the poor, and ensure their fitness for work and war. The threat of revolution, of either colour, entailed the extension of state responsibilities and governmental involvement in the economy and society that would

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[1] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 81.

[2] Wight, 'What is International Relations?', Wight MSS 101, p. 7.

[3] Butterfield, 'New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy', p. 181.

[4] Michael Burleigh, The Third Reich: A New History (Basingstoke & London: Pan, 2001), p. 1.

have been unimaginable to most politicians before the First World War. In their international thought, the British were often no less radical in their 'responses'.

Having fought on the Western Front with the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, Harold Temperley was invalided out of the trenches in 1916 to become an officer first on the General Staff, and later in Military Intelligence.[5] By the end of the war, his talents, like those of many of his surviving academic peers, were being employed in the making of policy, not least the definition of war aims and the planning of the peace settlement to follow. In the Foreign Office, and especially in the 'Political Intelligence Department' (PID), Lewis Namier and Alfred Zimmern – as well as the young Toynbee – were engaged in the analysis of information and provision of advice, working closely with professional diplomats like Harold Nicolson, J. M. Headlam-Morley, E. H. Carr and Robert Vansittart.[6] When it came to the peace conference itself, at Versailles, academics were again prominent, with historians in particular as 'thick as bees', advising, cajoling and negotiating.[7] Those left behind at the universities, disqualified from government service because of their opposition to the war, like Lowes Dickinson, or by their field, like Gilbert Murray, played a different role, publicising and proselytising internationalism to the public. All shared a common desire for reform of the institutional structure of international relations, for some means to avoid the war they perceived to be undermining civilisation.

Few of these scholars were wholly convinced that the destruction of German 'militarism' would alone bring harmony to international politics. Their differing

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[5] Fair, Temperley, p. 115

[6] Erik Goldstein, 'The Foreign Office and Political Intelligence, 1918-1920', p. 278.

[7] C. K. Webster, The Study of International Relations (Cardiff & London: University of Wales Press Board & Oxford University Press, 1923), p. 13. It should be noted, however, that reference to historical precedents and parallels was 'banned' by the 'express wish of President Wilson' (p. 17).

judgements of the challenge faced implied a variety of different solutions. Liberal imperialists – some associated, like Lloyd George's private secretary Phillip Kerr, with the 'Round Table' group – favoured a rejuvenated 'Concert of Europe'.[8] International disputes would best be managed, they argued, in regular meetings of the Great Powers procedurally bound by a loose 'constitution'.[9] This was a proposal plainly unsatisfactory to radicals, who sought more sweeping reforms, and insufficiently robust for many moderate liberals. Both groups were united in their suspicion of the methods of 'old diplomacy', and a revived 'Concert' would hardly amount to their repudiation. Of the moderates, Zimmern was the most enthusiastic for a 'League of Nations' conceived in such terms, as a system of regular conference diplomacy, but even he sought institutionalised guarantees and sanctions that were unacceptable to Kerr and others to his political Right. The UDC, not surprisingly, rejected such compromises outright, and demanded instead a League that constituted a proper world government grounded in 'democratic diplomacy'.[10]

The moderate liberals, aided by Woodrow Wilson, triumphed at Versailles, putting forward a compromise to which all could agree. The League of Nations that was created by the conference introduced two principle innovations into international relations, the first favoured by conservatives and the second by radicals: regular conference diplomacy and institutionalised sanctions against aggression.[11] Critics were not wholly placated, especially on the Left, but most were satisfied, and there developed

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[8] John Turner & Michael Dockrill, 'Philip Kerr at Downing Street, 1916-1921', in John Turner (ed.), The Larger Idea: Lord Lothian and the Problem of National Sovereignty (London: Historians' Press, 1988), pp. 42-43.

[9] Egerton, Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations, p. 17. See also his 'Conservative Internationalism: British Approaches to International Organisation and the Creation of the League of Nations', Diplomacy and Statecraft 5:1 (March 1994), pp. 1-20.

[10] Swanwick, Builders of Peace, p. 84.

[11] On the novelty of introducing coercion into international law, see Suganami, Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals, pp. 79-93.

a consensus that the League was the best available 'response', however imperfect or temporary. Few opposed the League outright. By 1924, the UDC, despite its initial doubts, had decided to campaign for its reform rather than its abolition, seeking to make the League 'all-inclusive' and 'impartial'.[12] Conservative scepticism was equally muted. The 'facile optimism' of those at Versailles was loudly condemned, but criticism of the League itself remained circumspect.[13] In part, this was a function of its institutional flexibility: other 'responses' could be pursued simultaneously, or under its auspices: mutual disarmament, for instance, or further legal restraints on states' resort to force.[14]

Liberal faith was also placed in education, in the universities and beyond, as a means of bringing reform to international relations, bringing an end to mistrust between peoples. The 'discipline' of IR was born of this creed, at least in Britain[15] – as the wording of David Davies' bequest for the Woodrow Wilson chair at Aberystwyth illustrates.[16] Zimmern's urge to cultivate the public and 'civilize the barbarian' was widely felt,[17] even if some, like Stanley Baldwin, balked at the notion of an

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[12] Swanwick, Builders of Peace, p. 178.

[13] Earl of Birkenhead, 'New Light on President Wilson', in his Last Essays (London: Cassell & Co., 1930), p. 379.

[14] The most important disarmament conference of the period met at Geneva from the 2nd of February 1932 until late 1934 (it was never formally concluded). Germany's withdrawal, on the 14th of October 1933, had already brought the negotiations practically to a halt. The Kellogg-Briand Pact or Pact of Paris (1928) was the most ambitious attempt of the inter-war period to impose an international legal restraint on the use of force.

[15] In the United States, the 'discipline' may well have older origins. See Schmidt, Political Discourse of Anarchy.

[16] The Chair was intended to promote the 'truer understanding of civilizations other than our own' as well as 'for the study of those related problems of law and politics, of ethics and economics' (Ieuan John, Moorhead Wright & John Garnett, 'International Politics at Aberystwyth, 1919-1969', in Porter (ed.), Aberystwyth Papers, p. 86.

[17] Zimmern, 'The Study of International Relations', p. 19. See also his League of Nations, p. 28.

'international mind'.[18] Successive challenges were met with a call for better education and improved cultural understanding: Webster and Herbert though them essential for curbing nationalism;[19] Huxley to counter aggression and the desire for domination over other.[20] This was a faith that lingered long after the Second World War, as Charles Manning's exhortations at the LSE illustrate,[21] with an appeal that persists in contemporary international thought.

With the Abyssinnian crisis, in 1935-36, came a crisis in confidence in the League, and the promotion of a plethora of alternatives to 'collective security'. Outright pacifism, of the Christian or secular varieties, was one, though even with over 100,000 giving their adherence to the Sheppard's PPU, it remained a minority concern.[22] David Davies, disillusioned with the League, offered another: an international police force.[23] This too garnered relatively little public or political support. Isolationism was another alternative, one that found most enthusiasm amongst imperialist Tories who sensed – correctly as it turned out – that continental entanglements would fatally weaken the Empire.[24] It was 'appeasement', however, that became the commonest response to the deterioration of international order. In its widest sense, it amounted to a conciliatory stance towards the claims, territorial and otherwise, of Germany, and thus – as A. J. P.

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[18] Stanley Baldwin, 'Bound over to make the peace' (1933) in his The Torch of Freedom: Speeches and Addresses (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936), p. 332. Baldwin, by his own admission, was 'too stubbornly local' to believe such an idea was a good one.

[19] Webster & Herbert, League of Nations in Theory and Practice, p. 307.

[20] Huxley, Ends and Means, pp. 177-224.

[21] For one of these pleas, see C. A. W. Manning, 'The Teaching of International Relations', The Listener 51:1317 (27 May 1954), pp. 908-909.

[22] Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, p. 222.

[23] Davies, Problem of the Twentieth Century, p. vii. On Davies's wider thought, see also Michael Pugh, 'Policing the World: Lord Davies and the quest for order in the 1930s', International Relations 16:1 (April 2002), pp. 97-116.

[24] This position is described – and dismissed as 'ignorant and stupid' (p. 57) – by Bertrand Russell, in his Which Way to Peace? (London: Michael Joseph, 1936), pp. 50-59.

Taylor famously observed[25] – was consistent with British policy since Versailles, if not before.[26] More specifically, however, 'appeasement' involved first tacit, then open abrogation of Britain's commitments to collective security under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League. The reasoning behind this was clear: Britain had not the political will to confront Italy over Abyssinnia nor to resist German demands. The greatest fear, shared by Neville Chamberlain and by figures like Geoffrey Dawson at the Times, was that adherence to the strictures of the Covenant would turn Europe once again into two allied, armed blocs, and provoke another cataclysmic war.[27] Collective security would thus, rather paradoxically, bring about precisely the predicament that it was designed to avert, and, again paradoxically, its abandonment was necessary to secure the pacificist principle that underlay it.

The other face of appeasement, captured so eloquently in Carr's Twenty Years' Crisis, was redistribution.[28] Territories, populations, colonies and resources were to be given by the 'haves' to the 'have-nots' in an effort to 'satisfy' them and remedy their grievances. Many – radicals, liberals and conservatives – flirted with such ideas, including Toynbee, who in 1937 advocated, in private and the press, the redistribution of colonial territories.[29] As Taylor took such great pleasure in demonstrating,[30] the number

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[25] Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, 2nd ed., p. 75.

[26] Paul Schroeder, in 'Munich and the British Tradition', Historical Journal 19 (1976), pp. 223-243, and Paul Kennedy, in 'The tradition of appeasement in British foreign policy', British Journal of International Studies, 2:3 (October 1976), pp. 195-215, have both argued that appeasement was in line with a much older tradition of managing Central European crises.

[27] According to Cowling, Dawson had come to this conclusion as early as mid-1931. See Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy, 1933-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 132.

[28] Carr, Twenty Years' Crisis, 1st ed., pp. 264-307.

[29] See Toynbee's letter to the Times, 29 October 1937, p. 12, in which he argued 'if we refuse to let Germany into Africa by a peaceful arrangement, Germany's only means of winning her way back into Africa will be by striking a knockout blow at the heart of our Empire here'. Having met

of those consistently opposed to some form of 'appeasement' was small, and their views widely considered distasteful. In retrospect, Churchill seems to have stood alone, a 'voice in the wilderness', though he was 'never as consistent and virtuous as...The Gathering Storm tended to suggest'.[31] He did, however, bring to the debate a modified version of an older brand of power politics. After 1937, in alliance with the LNU – which became known as the movement for 'Arms and the Covenant'[32] – this traditional power political view was blended, not altogether successfully with the doctrine of 'collective security'. This was not motivated simply by expediency; rather, it reflected a broader sense amongst dissenters to appeasement that if crisis was to be averted, elements of the 'old diplomacy' were needed to reinforce the 'new'. As early as 1934 Nicolson had noted 'a tendency...to react against the unctuous inertia, the flood-lit self-righteousness, the timid imprecision, the appalling amateurishness of democratic diplomacy, in favour of the more efficient and professional methods of the old'.[33] In the 1930s, this tendency became increasingly widespread – it may found in a range of work, from the plaintive speeches of Neville Chamberlain to the sober musings of Alfred Zimmern[34] – but was not, at least at first, linked with any specific 'response'.

In his published writings, Nicolson, in common with most of his contemporaries, concentrated more on the failings of 'democratic diplomacy' than on

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and been impressed by the historical knowledge of the *Führer*, Toynbee assured readers that 'I do not believe that Herr Hitler wishes to take this path...'. See also McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 170-173.

[30] Taylor, Origins of the Second World War, p. 173.

[31] David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London: Arnold, 2001), p. 103 & p. 111.

[32] Winston S. Churchill, Arms and the Covenant (London: George Harrop, 1938).

[33] Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919-1925 – A Study in the Post-War Diplomacy (London: Constable, 1934), p. 40.

[34] Chamberlain's speeches contain numerous references to the 'realities' of international politics and condemnations of critics living in an 'unreal world' (In Search of Peace, pp. 60-61). See also Zimmern's attacks on the 'romantic and sentimental strain in public opinion', and his observation that in the mid-1930s, 'the Old Diplomacy began to reassert itself' (League of Nations, p. 327 & p. 481).

the possible remedies.[35] In his diaries, however, he mused on the notion of the 'balance of power',[36] a concept that came to dominate the minds of politicians and scholars alike in the 1940s and 1950s. While Chamberlain's contemporary critics had portrayed Munich as a 'betrayal' – a word that litters polemics like Seton-Watson's Munich and the Dictators[37] – those who came later were more concerned that appeasement had dispensed with 'valuable allies', weakening the international 'balance' and thereby also British security. This was the theme that Churchill played upon to such great effect in The Gathering Storm,[38] and which haunted British historiography and IR until the early 1960s.[39] It underlay many critiques of appeasement, such as Charles Webster's succinct counterfactual argument, made in 1961, that the British and French, together with the Czechs, could have forced Hitler to back down in 1938, and that 1939 actually offered a worse strategic prospect for Britain than the previous year.[40] Munich, he concluded, showed the 'folly of unilateralism and neutralism', the need for co-operation, 'the penalty of deserting faithful allies' and 'the special danger of negotiating under the threat of immediate war'.[41]

Such views were echoed by, amongst others, F. H. Hinsley and A. J. P. Taylor. While Hinsley disagreed (at some tedious length) with Taylor over Hitler's supposed

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[35] Nicolson's proposed responses tended to be rather vague, and centred upon better information for the public and better education for diplomats. See, for example, Curzon, pp. 382-402.

[36] The entry for 31 December 1938 reads: 'It has been a bad year. Chamberlain has destroyed the Balance of Power, and Niggs [Nigel, his son] got a Third. A foul year' (Diaries and Letters 1930-1939 ed. Nigel Nicolson (London: Collins, 1966), p. 384.

[37] Seton-Watson, Munich and the Dictators, p. 159.

[38] Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: I. The Gathering Storm (London: The Reprint Society, 1951).

[39] D. C. Watt, 'Appeasement: The Rise of a Revisionist School', Political Quarterly 36 (1965), p. 195.

[40] Sir Charles Webster, 'Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy', International Affairs 37:2 (April 1961), pp. 149-153.

[41] Ibid., p. 153.

opportunism, both were united in arguing that a policy that sought to maintain the balance of power would have prevented war.[42] Lewis Namier also agreed, in so far as such a policy was an inherent part of good 'statesmanship'.[43] These post-war historians, however, continued to mingle the principles of 'new' diplomacy with such techniques of the 'old'. Aggression was always wrong, and 'concessions to aggressors...were and are always wrong';[44] 'wars of gain' remained beyond the pale.[45] At the same time, however, they believed that Britain's paramount aim must be to secure – or aid the Americans to secure – the balance of power; alliances and secret diplomacy could thus play their part in the face of the Soviet threat. Historians' elevated position in British intellectual life, or at least the British fascination for history, meant that these ideas became public currency in a way that no post-war scholar toiling in an IR department has ever achieved.[46] That many involved themselves too in international practice, whether by campaigning for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, as did Taylor,[47] or helping to formulate, as did Webster, the initial blueprints for the United Nations,[48] merely helped to reinforce the perceived authority of their arguments.

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[42] See Hinsley's bad-tempered attack on Taylor in his Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985 [1963]), pp. 323-334. On the importance of the balance of power in Taylor's international theory, see Paul Schroeder, 'A. J. P. Taylor's International System', International History Review 23:1 (March 2001), p. 3-27.

[43] Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, p. ix.

[44] D. C. Watt, 'The Historiography of Appeasement', in C. Cook & A. Sked (eds.), Crisis and Controversy: Essays in Honour of A. J. P. Taylor (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 110.

[45] Wight, inspired by Hobbes, divides wars into those of gain, fear and doctrine in his 'War and International Politics', p. 584.

[46] Kathleen Burk notes that the TLS included Taylor's The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954) in the one hundred most influential books published since 1945 (Troublemaker: The Life and History of A. J. P. Taylor (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 277).

[47] Burk, Troublemaker, p. 282.

While the historians tended to concentrate on the 'balance of power', scholars in the burgeoning 'discipline' of IR offered a variety of more novel responses. From the late 1940s onwards, David Mitrany and Georg Schwarzenberger – who, like Namier, were both Central European émigrés – each promoted a version of 'functionalism' for international ills, a doctrine rooted in the notion that relations between states could be improved through co-operation in specific areas of mutual interest.[49] Specialised agencies should be created to deal with these areas, they argued, thus deepening inter-state co-operation. At the same time, E. H. Carr sought more thorough-going reform, putting the case forward, as he had done in a different context in the Twenty Years' Crisis, for the reorganisation of the international order along lines of greater economic efficiency.[50] Charles Manning also returned to familiar themes, not least the necessity, in his eyes, for better education to encourage internationalism and discourage nationalism, to bring about the 'emergence of a community of humankind'.[51]

The challenge of Communism also stimulated alternative, more radical responses. Revolution in the Third World, much of it promoted by the Soviet Union, prompted Geoffrey Hudson to contemplate the redistribution of wealth from the West to the Third World, or at least the application of modern technology to assure 'a tolerable minimum of decent conditions of living for everyone'.[52] Capitalist and Communist, he argued, could find common ground and 'a peaceful outlet for their energies in a co-

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[48] P. A. Reynolds & E. J. Hughes, The Historian as Diplomat: Charles Kingsley Webster and the United Nations, 1939-1946 (London: Martin Robertson, 1976).

[49] See David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization (London: RIIA, 1944) and Thompson, Masters of International Thought, pp. 202-215.

[50] E. H. Carr, The New Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

[51] Hidemi Suganami, 'C. A. W. Manning and the Study of International Relations', Review of International Studies 27:1 (January 2001), p. 103.

[52] Hudson, The Hard and Bitter Peace, p. 288.

operative economic reconstruction of the world'.[53] Seton-Watson too was an enthusiast for the increase of economic aid to 'underdeveloped countries', but for reasons more of international security than of development. He was dismissive, however, of institutional responses – to the idea, for instance, that mutual disarmament might bring peace, or that an 'international police force' was 'within the bounds of possibility'.[54] Instead he argued for flexibility in both military posture towards and political relations with the USSR, advocating careful, professional and secret diplomacy. For Seton-Watson, 'international relations were more efficiently and less painfully conducted' in the past age of secret diplomacy, the world before 1914, than they were today.[55] Such nostalgia pervaded post-war international thought, including that of Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight.

Each of these 'responses' embodied more than simply a conception of the policies and practices that each author considered would be appropriate to resolve or ameliorate international crisis. They involved too a particular – though often only tacit – understanding of the relationship between scholarship and practical politics. For many of the historians, not least Taylor,[56] the notion that 'lessons' might be drawn from the past was little short of vulgar, but nevertheless they thought themselves qualified, in some sense, to comment upon the course of contemporary international relations. At times, they went further than commentary, becoming advocates too, even practitioners in their own right. How Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight negotiated these positions in their work is the subject of the remainder of this chapter. So too is the extent to which they borrowed, modified and repudiated aspects of the 'responses' of their peers. Before

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[53] Ibid., p. 289.

[54] Seton-Watson, Neither War nor Peace, p. 443.

[55] Ibid., p. 453.

[56] For Taylor: 'the only thing we learn from history is that nothing is as black or white as it is painted' ('History in a Changing World', in his British Prime Ministers and Other Essays ed. Chris Wrigley (London: Allen Lane, 1999), p. 421).

examining the substance of their responses to crisis, however, their understanding of the relationship between study and practice is explored.

Study

Only Toynbee saw the link between scholarship and political action as unproblematic. He reflected very rarely, if at all, on this relationship, or on the effect that his work might have on the world. For him, as for most of his peers, steeped in Oxford Idealism, study was a self-evident good and an aid to practice, indeed the necessary basis for good practice.[57] Facts – even facts about contemporary international relations – should be collected, could be verified, and must be laid before rulers and ruled to educate their politics.[58] The early volumes of the Surveys reflected this view. Their aim was a 'comprehensive survey of relations between states' and nothing more, for nothing else was required in an age when democratic diplomacy needed simply to be informed of the facts.[59] The result was a series of dry narrative accounts of events. As the 1920s went on, however, the Surveys were increasingly enlivened by passionate discourses on the need for the abolition of war or international unity,[60] conventional sentiments for the time, but ideas nevertheless that prejudiced the volumes' supposed 'objectivity'. Yet even into the 1930s, as such appeals became more shrill, Toynbee continued to adhere to the notion that 'scientific study' of international relations was all that was required for reform, but without much indication of precisely what was meant by the phrase.[61]

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[57] Boucher & Vincent, 'Introduction' to their edited British Idealism and Political Theory, pp. 10-11.

[58] These objectives are implied by G. M. Gathorne-Hardy in the preface to Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923 (1927), p. vi.

[59] Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923, p. vii.

[60] See, for example, Toynbee, Survey for 1928, pp.

[61] Ibid., p. 822.

'Science' seems to have been simply a synonym for 'objective' or 'dispassionate' in much of Toynbee's work.[62]

There is little evidence, then, that Toynbee saw IR as anything more than the study of history, either of the contemporary world or the distant past, and perhaps also of economics. He wrote nothing about a 'theory' or 'philosophy' of international affairs. Certainly, he showed little interest, at that time and afterwards, in formal scientific theorising of the type practised by Kaplan and others in the 1950s.[63] Indeed Toynbee rarely referred to other works in IR, or indeed even review them,[64] and hardly ever engaged with their arguments in any depth. Instead, concepts like 'international anarchy' or 'federal union' were merely subsumed into his arguments without much attention to their provenance or to their theoretical foundations. He welcomed, by implication, the growth of academic international thought in this vague way, but preferred to remain an 'historian',[65] which allowed him – purportedly for reasons of modesty – to duck when necessary methodological or philosophical questions pertinent in IR. Without ever examining in any depth the claims that he was seeking to make for 'history', he remained convinced of both the practical worth of historical studies and of his 'political task'.[66] Toynbee wished, as he wrote to a friend at the age of 22, to be a 'great gigantic historian – not for fame, but because there is lots of work to be done'.[67]

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[62] Ibid., p. 825.

[63] See, for example, Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Krieger, 1975 [1957]).

[64] The closest that Toynbee got to reviewing an IR book between 1946 and 1970 was Walter Lippmann's The Public Philosophy, listed in Morton (ed.), Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee, item 1755, p. 116, or perhaps Max Beloff's The Great Powers (item 2062, p. 135).

[65] This was manifest in titles like 'An historian's view of American foreign policy' (Morton (ed.), Bibliography of Arnold J. Toynbee, item 1488, p. 97).

[66] Toynbee, 'Historical Parallels to Current International Problems', p. 809. He noted 'Our political task in our generation is to cast out the abomination [of the sovereign state] out, to cleanse the temple and to restore the worship of the divinity to whom the temple rightly belongs'.

[67] Toynbee to Darbishire, 17 May 1911, Toynbee MSS 80.

The contrast with Butterfield and Wight is stark. Both agonised over their political importance of scholarship, and their own relationships, as students of international relations, to practical realm. Both were especially sceptical about the utility of the new 'discipline' of International Relations, not to mention its educational worth. In the late 1940s, as was discussed in chapter IV, Butterfield's criticisms of 'contemporary history' were accompanied by the occasional swipe at IR. Wight's reservations about a subject that he didn't 'believe in', on the other hand, persisted throughout his tenure as Reader at the LSE, and were partly responsible for his move to Sussex, to become Professor of History, in 1961.[68] Yet like Toynbee, Butterfield and Wight frequently borrowed from IR, employing ideas and concepts developed by writers in the field in their work. At times, indeed, they were not above praising work that had emerged from the 'discipline' – Raymond Aron's Peace and War, for instance, which both men admired.[69] Their objections, however, were not to the quality or otherwise of writing in IR, but rather to the understanding of the relationship between study and practice that they believed the 'discipline' espoused, and sometimes to the colour of its politics.

Since 1914, Butterfield believed, IR had become – no less than History – overweening in its ambitions and over-arrogant in its pronouncements. Convinced of the baleful effects this new 'discipline' was having on the actual conduct of international relations, he sought in the late 1940s to lay out his charges against it. The clearest statement came at a conference, in 1949, on the university teaching of IR held at the LSE, with Charles Manning and his fledgling department in attendance. In his paper,

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[68] Wight, 'University of Sussex' (1960), Wight MSS 233 7/9.

[69] Butterfield was one of 20 attendees at a conference held in April 1968 in honour of Aron's book. See Hassner to Butterfield, 24 August 1967, Butterfield MSS 109/1. Wight called Peace

Butterfield began with a lament for diplomatic history, which he thought had 'gone somewhat out of fashion', and continued:

> The effect of all this is more unfortunate in that people nowadays do in fact talk more than ever about foreign policy and the relations between states – the most vociferous being perhaps those very people who most despise diplomatic history.[70]

He went on to argue that diplomatic history – and international law – offered 'training in a precise technique', and that to neglect these areas, as he believed IR was threatening to do, was to the run the risk of 'producing dabblers in a journalistic type of thinking'.[71] His objections to the subject 'would be still more serious if, as I imagine is the case, the study of International Relations would have strong leanings to recent history and the contemporary world – in other words, would be too immediate and direct in its utilitarian intention'.[72] The argument turned on his idea of the proper form and function of education; as he wrote, the case was dependent on whether one conceived 'academic training' as the imparting of information or the training of the mind out of 'wishful thinking' and 'partisanship'.[73]

Butterfield did not want, however, to reject IR out of hand, nor to replace it solely with traditional diplomatic history or international law. Instead, he sought to change its focus and method, and to explore the possibilities that might be offered by a 'scientific' approach. This reflected a shift in his wider thought that occurred during the 1940s, between his study of Machiavelli and The Origins of Modern Science, during

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and War 'noble, temperate and magisterial' in 'Tract for the nuclear age', The Observer, 23 April 1967, Wight MSS 14.

[70] Butterfield, 'How far and should the subject of International Relations be included in the curriculum for undergraduate students of History?', Butterfield MSS 130/2, p. 1.

[71] Ibid., p. 2.

[72] Ibid., p. 3.

which Butterfield had become interested in possibilities of 'scientific' historiography.[74] This new-found passion for 'science' in history, and especially for geometry,[75] also extended into his work on international relations. It offered him, he thought, a means of attaining that 'deeper vision' that was required in the 'international situation of the present day'.[76] Together with 'technical history' – a 'science' in itself[77] – a 'scientific approach' would allow the recognition of the 'essential geometry of the problem' and 'isolate for examination the fundamental predicament that required a solution'.[78] This method, Butterfield argued, should replace the 'moralistic' approach that he believed had dominated International Relations since 1914, correcting its most egregious faults and providing a better foundation for practice.

Butterfield's own application of the 'scientific approach' was limited, unsystematic and, at times, somewhat disingenuous. Through what was purportedly disinterested inductive empiricism he derived a number of rules of international relations – not so much 'general laws', for these were forbidden by the 'fluidity of events', but rather loose generalisations.[79] The most fundamental of these was rooted in the predicament of 'Hobbesian fear' which he argued could be understood as 'the mathematical formula – or perhaps one of the formulas – for a state of things which produces what I should call the tragic element in human conflict'.[80] The validity of this 'rule' was demonstrated by way of counterfactual reasoning rather than empirical

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[73] Ibid., p. 4.

[74] Bentley, 'Butterfield at the Millennium', p. 25.

[75] Ibid., p. 27.

[76] Butterfield, 'The Tragic Element', p. 152.

[77] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., pp. 12-21. See also Michael Hobart, 'History and Religion in the Thought of Herbert Butterfield', Journal of the History of Ideas 32:4 (1971), pp. 543-544.

[78] Butterfield, 'The Tragic Element', p. 158.

[79] Butterfield, 'The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach', p. 411.

[80] Butterfield, 'The Tragic Element', p. 154.

research,[81] except that the example used was real: 'let us suppose', he wrote in one such vein, 'that the Western powers...and Russia...have just defeated Germany and reduced that country to total surrender'.[82] Each side would compete to capture the defeated power for their cause – such was the political effect of mutual fear. Other 'rules' are 'proved' by similar means, by a combination of speculation and selective example. 'Young democracies and new nations', Butterfield observed, 'seem to be particularly prone to irredentisms or dreams of expansion or projects of military conquest', a rule illustrated by the liberal revolutions of 1848 and the French of 1789. Both showed too that 'revolutionary governments seem to continue...the very lines of territorial aggrandizement set out by the monarchial regimes that preceded them'.[83]

For Butterfield, these rules were not simply of abstract interest: they could also aid practice.[84] Such 'scientific reflection', such a 'rarefied kind of reflection upon the processes of history', he argued, had be used to great effect, and no little success, in British domestic and international politics in the eighteenth century. The result had been a 'science for the preservation of a civilised order', or, as Butterfield suggested we might call it, 'a science for preventing war from wrecking the European States-System'.[85] What was unclear from Butterfield's account of this 'scientific approach' was the question of who was to employ it. His deep suspicion, outlined in chapter IV, of what he saw as the arrogance and political commitment of both contemporary historians and scholars of IR suggests that he did not envisage, at least in the early 1950s, that they were the best agents of the method. He seems to imply instead that it is 'statesmen'

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[81] On counterfactuals and their utility, see Ferguson (ed.), Virtual History and Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in history and the social sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[82] Butterfield, 'The Tragic Element', p. 152.

[83] Butterfield, 'The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach', p. 413.

[84] Ibid., p. 416.

[85] Ibid.

themselves that must assume this task, as the Whig politicians of the early eighteenth century had done in the domestic arena.[86] By the late 1950s, however, Butterfield came to the view that some kind of academic foray into this area was necessary, the British Committee being created partly to fulfil this role.

The objectives Butterfield set for the Committee mirrored his view of the 'scientific approach'. He wanted it to study, he wrote to Desmond Williams, 'the fundamental principles behind diplomacy, e.g. the foundation in ethics, the question why countries have a foreign policy, the question how far foreign affairs are amenable to scientific treatment etc.'.[87] It had to 'go deeper in its analyses' than merely 'diplomatic history' or the 'journalistic discussion of contemporary affairs' in 'the direction of fundamental principles'.[88] But the Committee was to have another aim: the study of past diplomatic reflection that might have lasting value. For Butterfield, 'out of the experience of centuries, there ought to have arisen...a ripe kind of wisdom in regard to the conduct of foreign policy – rules or maxims possessing a permanent validity'.[89] This too might offer a response to crisis, if properly understood. After all, he argued:

> ...if predecessors of ours had particular success in the establishment of a comparative stability in their world, and at the same time saw that a genuine international order requires the maintenance of certain delicate conditions, their statements are not to be dismissed with a mere catchword about the dead past – especially by a generation which has so palpably failed in this respect.[90]

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[86] Ibid.

[87] Butterfield to Williams, 28 April 1958, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W270.

[88] Butterfield et al., 'Discussion on the objects of the Committee', 20 September 1960, RIIA MSS 5, p. 38.

[89] Butterfield, 'The New Diplomacy and Historical Diplomacy', p. 183.

[90] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War 1st ed., pp. 12-13.

In practice, this task of recovery dominated the work of the Committee,[91] and it failed to provide the 'scientific' analysis of international relations to complement the 'wisdom'. Yet throughout Butterfield remained committed to 'science', convinced of its intellectual and practical potential. As he complained in 1968:

> I have regarded myself (and certainly have been regarded) as an extreme supporter of the policy of making both history and international relations the subject of what the Americans deprecate as mere "wisdom-literature". But, having tried to study Machiavelli's attempt to make statecraft rather more scientific and then enquired into the later history of the endeavour – having also been interested in the thinking behind the balance-of-power theory of the eighteenth century – I have advocated at the same time the insertion of something more like scientific method into the analysis of history in general and international relations in particular.[92]

The 'attempt to secure a basic "geometry" of international relations...has a logical priority', he argued, whilst the '"wisdom"...comes later'.[93]

Wight shared, or at least came to share, Butterfield's scepticism about the approach to international relations that had prevailed since 1914. Indeed, as he observed, in 1960, to a correspondent: 'I have never been convinced – to Manning's grief – that

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[91] The overwhelming majority of papers presented to the Committee during the 1960s – preserved in the Butterfield MSS and RIIA MSS were on 'historical' topics. Butterfield's included 'Crowe's Memorandum of January 1, 1907' (1960) (Butterfield MSS 329), 'The Great Powers' (1964) (Butterfield MSS 330) and 'The Historic States-System' (1965) (Butterfield MSS 331). Williams contibuted papers on 'The international states system of the Middle Ages' (1964) (RIIA MSS 4) and 'Machiavellianism in 20th century diplomacy' (1960) (RIIA MSS 4). Wight's 'Western Values' and 'Why is there no International Theory?', both in Diplomatic Investigations were primarily exercises in the history of ideas.

[92] Butterfield, untitled paper given at Bellagio, April 1968, Butterfield MSS 109/2.

[93] Ibid.

International Relations, in its LSE sense, is a subject that ought to be taught to undergraduates'.[94] Wight's view was unflattering:

> It has seemed to me that the critical awareness and methodological insight that we instil into our students is equipping them with a fine set of cutlery but with nothing on their plates to eat, and by reaction I have found myself driven perhaps excessively towards educational traditionalism. My best teaching thrills have been when a student has come back from reading Thucydides or Machiavelli or Kant on Perpetual Peace, to say "This is absolutely fascinating. It's all there". But most of them get by on E. H. Carr plus the latest American textbook plus last week's *Economist*.[95]

For Wight, International Relations could be made to work – how is discussed below – but not in the manner in which it as thought of at the LSE. This position, as Hedley Bull pointed out, 'tended to isolate' Wight within the department.[96] It bound him instead to the founding members of the British Committee, especially to Butterfield and Desmond Williams.[97] Indeed, Wight's doubts over the state of contemporary political thought went further than simply the supposed shallowness of Manning's conception of IR or the ideological taint that marked 'contemporary history'.[98] Unlike Butterfield, who came to

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[94] Wight to Fulton, 8 December 1960, Wight MSS 233 7/9.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Bull, 'Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 6. Bull himself considered that 'Manning's whole concern with justifying his subject not only implies an absence of self-confidence in him and a weakness in the subject itself, but is philistine – it involves the subordination of study to something other than study; study is its own justification' (Bull to Wight 2 February 1957, Wight MSS 233 1/9).

[97] Williams, along with another Cambridge man, Maurice Cowling, had like Butterfield voiced criticisms of 'contemporary history' and IR in the later 1940s and early 1950s. See Williams, 'Some Aspects of Contemporary History', Cambridge Journal 2:12 (September 1949), pp. 733-742 and Cowling's attacks on Charles Manning in The Listener 51:1318 (3 June 1954), pp. 973-974 and 51:1325 (22 July 1954), pp. 141-142.

[98] It should be noted that Wight was considerably more sympathetic to 'contemporary history' than Butterfield or Williams. He dismissed the idea that contemporary historians lacked the

concede that some virtue was to be had in employing the 'methods...[of]...Galileo',[99] Wight was deeply mistrustful of anything that came close to a 'scientific' approach to the subject. He welcomed the demise of the idea of a 'science of peace' which had been carried, he argued in a lecture in the early 1950s, to an 'extreme' level in the 1920s. He was somewhat premature, however, in declaring that IR was 'no longer pragmatic',[100] and subsequently came to fear the rise of scientism, especially American behaviouralism, in the later 1950s.

Quite why Wight took such a dislike to the application of scientific method to the study of IR is unclear. Bull suggested that it was incomprehension.[101] Pitt, on the other hand, opined that it was mostly indifference, but hints tantalisingly at a connection with Wight's religious beliefs. 'Something so totally secular' as 'systems analysis', he argued, 'simply could not be a true explanation of the destinies of Man and the world's great events'.[102] Wight himself rarely committed his objections to paper. In his review of Aron's Peace and War, he asserted that scientific approaches were unable to give a sufficiently accurate picture of political realities: 'abstract models' were always prone to be 'falsified by the complexities and uncertainties of diplomatic action'.[103] Wight named no specific targets, however; neither authors nor theories are mentioned. It seems likely

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requisite sources for the writing of history, arguing – rightly – that 'he has better evidence on which to base his conclusions than the medievalist' ('What is International Relations?', Wight MSS 101, p. 13). Elsewhere he was more cautious, observing that contemporary history offered 'perspective' rather than the 'revealing of secrets' ('Books and People', BBC radio talk, Wight MSS 39, p. 3).

[99] Butterfield, Untitled paper given at Bellagio, April 1968, Butterfield MSS 109/2.

[100] Wight, 'What is International Relations?', Wight MSS 101, p. 7.

[101] Bull wrote that Wight 'made no serious effort to come to grips with it, or to set out the basis of his rejection of it, and his critics used to complain of his failure to do so' ('Martin Wight and the study of international relations', p. 14.

[102] Pitt to Bull, 4 May 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

[103] Wight, 'Tract for the nuclear age', review of Aron, Peace and War in the Observer, 23 April 1967, Wight MSS 14.

that his rejection of scientism was more deeply rooted. There are indications that he objected to the absence of moral considerations in political science, by contrast to what he saw as the inextricably normative nature of political philosophy. As he once wrote:

> ...the central preoccupation of Political Philosophy is Obligation – it is concerned with Authority – the justification of power, the moral bases of power, not with power nakedly, or the description and analysis of the distribution of power – this is political science.[104]

This distinction, made in a lecture from 1951, suggests a link with Wight's religious thought, not least his writings on Antichrist.

For Wight, in the late 1940s at least, a concern with power alone – divorced from ethical considerations – was the mark of the apostate politics of Antichrist. The 'emancipation of power from moral restraint' was the concern of 'The Church, Russia and the West' (1948),[105] as well as of his wartime 'Antichrist' essays, as was discussed in chapter III. Indeed, Wight made a clear linkage between 'scientific' politics and Antichrist: a world state, 'rationally organized' and directed by a technocratic elite – a 'Kingdom of God in Earth' – was the very 'definition of Antichrist'.[106] It seems likely then that Wight's objections to political science and to scientism in IR were rooted in religious belief, by the conviction that the embrace of 'behaviouralism' or some similar form of scientific theorising would further encourage the 'demonic concentrations of power' that characterised the modern age.[107] Whether this position weakened during the 1950s and 1960s is difficult to assess. In his review of Aron, he referred to Herman

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[104] Wight, 'Elements of International Relations', Lecture notes, Lent Term 1951, Wight MSS 101, p. 30.

[105] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 30.

[106] Wight, 'Some Reflections on the Historic Antichrist', pp. 36-37.

[107] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 30.

Kahn's On Thermonuclear War as 'shocking',[108] but that view was not unusual, and might not indicates anything about his view of scientism more generally. His refusal to engage with any form of scientistic theorising in reviews, lectures or articles may reflect a lasting religious objection, but in the absence of direct evidence, it is impossible to state this with any certainty.

Though they disagreed on the value of 'science' in IR, Butterfield and Wight were agreed that the subject should not be 'utilitarian'. In one lecture, given probably in the early 1950s, he argued:

> For us the occurrence of a Third World war is almost an axiom, and we are studying its causes. We know our country is running out towards 1984. We no longer want to justify ourselves on utilitarian grounds. All we aim at is understanding. What pursue is wisdom. I believe this to be a very great gain indeed.[109]

What should be sought in the study of IR, therefore, was something approximating to a 'liberal education', thus 'upholding a standard which is more fundamental to civilisation than any political solutions'.[110] It was more than just the 'study of Power', though clearly 'its subject matter is public affairs at their ugliest and worst...passion and unreason, violence and deceit'.[111] And 'do we not deal also', Wight asked, 'with considerations of morality, with certain kinds of habitual behaviour crystallised in diplomacy and with rudimentary attempts at co-operation, which are nothing, or very

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[108] Wight, 'Tract for the nuclear age', Wight MSS 14.

[109] Wight, 'What is International Relations?', Wight MSS 101, p. 8.

[110] Ibid. For Wight's wider thoughts on a 'liberal education' see 'European Studies', pp. 100-119 and 'Are they classical?', letter to TLS 3171, 7 December 1962, p. 955. In the latter, he recounted: 'I have found one of the richest remarks of a teacher of international relations in the student who came back to one after reading Thucydides, saying 'This is absolutely fantastic. *It is all here*.'

[111] Wight 'What is International Relations?', Wight MSS 101, p. 21.

little to do with Power'.[112] IR could be the vehicle, moreover, for the consideration of the political classics of the West, their ethical claims and political programmes, for the attainment of 'perspective'. As Wight wrote in one review, 'the branch of political studies that now goes by the name of international relations in many ways touches more profound issues than politics proper'.[113] He disagreed, however, with the notion that IR might be a means, as Manning had suggested, of fostering internationalism in students. He was wary too of the idea that academics should dictate or even suggest international practice. Though he credited Toynbee with the 'power of foresight' and an 'intuitive grasp of the logic of historical situations' that allowed him to predict events, he argued that neither justified his 'postwar [sic] role as prophet'.[114] This issue of advocacy – of contact with the world of practice – is the subject of the next section.

Advocacy

Despite some doubts and scepticism, all three men involved themselves in the practical realm, propounding their views and persuading others to act. This advocacy took many different forms, from the young passionate and public defence of 'Pacifism' to Toynbee's private audience, in 1936, with Hitler, designed to discover his demands so that they might be sated.[115] Even Butterfield, who spurned 'campaign and pressure groups' and thought 'demonstrations do harm',[116] acted at times to publicise arguments and persuade practitioners. The methods that they employed in these efforts are

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[112] Ibid., p. 17.

[113] Wight, review of Eric Voegelin's The New Science of Politics, International Affairs 31:3 (July 1955), p. 337. Wight also recognised that IR allowed him much 'more freedom to do what I want' (Wight, 'University of Sussex', Wight MSS 233 7/9).

[114] Wight, 'Arnold Toynbee: An Appreciation', p. 12.

[115] On the latter, see McNeill, Toynbee, p. 172.

[116] Butterfield to Southall, 30 November 1961, Butterfield MSS 425; Butterfield to Aitken, 1 May 1964, Butterfield MSS 425. Both letters were in reply to requests to involve himself in the anti-nuclear movement.

suggestive of their understandings of their own relationships, as scholars, with the practical world, and of their preferred responses to international crisis.

The modes of advocacy employed by Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight fall into three broad categories: published writing, private persuasion and practical action. Only Toynbee, employed in government during both World Wars, engaged to any extent in the latter. With first Lord Bryce, then the PID, the British Delegation at Versailles, and finally the FRPS, he was able to frame and implement policy, albeit in strictly delimited areas. These positions also brought him access to politicians and civil servants, and both formal and informal opportunities to persuade. Though the extent of Toynbee's influence in these situations was again limited, and he was frequently disappointed that his advice was not taken,[117] it was not negligible. He was, after all, believed by Nazi propagandists to be, as McNeill observed, 'a suitably influential shaper of British opinion' for the private interview with Hitler,[118] an episode that illustrated in microcosm the costs as well as the benefits to scholars of government service. Toynbee's memorandum detailing the meeting was seen as sufficiently important to be passed on to its intended recipients, Eden and Baldwin,[119] but not so important as to take it entirely seriously. One Foreign Office official noted, in the margins, 'knowing Mr Toynbee personally, I have great respect for his learning, but none for his judgment'.[120]

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[117] Nicolson suggests that at Versailles Toynbee's ideas were often overlooked. See his Peacemaking 1919, p. 113, where he argued that 'the future of both European and Asiatic Turkey...should certainly have been left in the more scientific hands of Arnold Toynbee'. For other glimpses of Toynbee at work at Versailles, see p. 234 & pp. 312-313.

[118] McNeill, Toynbee, p. 172.

[119] Acknowledgement of the memorandum's receipt from Eden survives, as McNeill observed (Ibid.).

[120] James Joll, review of McNeill, Toynbee, Journal of Modern History 63:2 (June 1991), p. 363.

As Director of the FRPS, Toynbee found himself similarly frustrated. Though he was glad not 'to do propaganda' again,[121] as he had during the last war, he did not enjoy or acquit himself well at administration, management or departmental politics, that 'great ocean of sewage' as he memorably described it.[122] There is little evidence from his papers – or those of his colleagues – that the FRPS had any great success in shaping the nature of British war aims or that of the post-war settlement, though it did bring Toynbee and others into direct contact with senior political figures. In 1942, for instance, it briefed Lord Halifax, then Ambassador to Washington, and later the British representative at the San Francisco conference, on the form that a post-war international organisation might take.[123] Whether such meetings were any more influential on policy than peacetime gatherings at Chatham House is difficult to judge. Both offered an important forum for the exchange of ideas, a place where Toynbee could air his views, even propound his desired policies, to practitioners.

Convinced, like many inter-war liberals, that the education of the newly enfranchised *demos* was a necessary prerequisite for international reform, Toynbee's frustration with government and officialdom probably augmented his desire to appeal to a wider audience. In the 1930s, in radio talks for the BBC and in journalism, he showed himself most willing to address those beyond academia, Whitehall and Chatham

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[121] Toynbee to Columba Cary-Elwes, 3 September 1939, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 37.

[122] Toynbee to Columba Cary-Elwes, 5 December 1940, in Peper (ed.), An Historian's Conscience, p. 81.

[123] 'Report of a Discussion at a Meeting held at Balliol College, Oxford, on the 13th of July, 1942', Clark MSS 157. A taste of Halifax's own international thought of the time, which does bear some relation to the ideas of the FRPS, may be found in Andrew Roberts, 'The Holy Fox': The Life of Lord Halifax (London: Phoenix, 1991), pp. 294-295.

House.[124] His pursuit of fame in the post-war years was not only motivated by the promise of fortune – though his earnings from writing and lecturing were considerable, as McNeill shows[125] – but was also attempt to promulgate his message to the masses. Toynbee wished to proselytise as well as study, as his assent to the Somerville abridgement of the Study demonstrated. His highly controversial Reith lectures for 1952, The World and the West, was perhaps the most ambitious effort in this regard, with Toynbee in effect summarising, in an uncharacteristically clear and concise manner, the conclusions he had reached in the Study.[126] His retirement was spent writing ever more 'popular' works, autobiography, interviews and travel writing, which could carry his message further than scholarly articles or lectures, or indeed government service.

Like Toynbee, Wight too was a regular participant at meetings at Chatham House; indeed, he served as a member of its Council from the early 1950s until his death. His involvement may simply have reflected his conviction, expressed in his international theory lectures, that understanding the actions of 'statesmen' was 'to be obtained by cultivating...[their]...acquaintance'.[127] Such is the character of conversation, however, it is difficult to believe that Wight did not at times argue with or seek to persuade 'statesmen' over issues of policy. Certainly, during the 1950s and 1960s, Wight did so in less formal surroundings, most notably at meetings of the 'Speakeasy' dining club, of which he was a prominent member, that met monthly in London. This group brought together scholars, journalists and diplomats – the latter group included Duncan Wilson, Denis Wright, Paul Gore-Booth, Adam Watson and

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[124] Toynbee gave a series of radio talks on 'World Order or Downfall?' in 1930, contributed to another on 'The Growth of the Modern World Order' in 1932, and another on 'Church, Community and State' in 1937. The full details of each are listed in the bibliography.

[125] Toynbee earned $30,000 in three and a half months on one trip to the USA in 1957-58 (McNeill, Toynbee, pp. 243).

[126] The title itself was intended to convey one of the main messages of the Study, that the history of West was not the history of the world (Toynbee, The World and the West, p. 1).

Peter Ramsbotham – to discuss foreign affairs. According to Peter Calvocoressi, who ran the club, Wight brought historical colour for the discussions that 'proved notably valuable in probing the future'.[128]

The ability to bring historical knowledge to bear on contemporary events had earlier brought Wight his employment as special correspondent for the Observer at the San Francisco conference of 1945, and as a campaigner on David Astor's African crusade in the early 1950s. Both placed him in an enviable position to influence public opinion, not least that of the liberal intelligentsia. Indeed, according to Astor's biographer, Attitude to Africa, the book Wight co-authored with Legum, Scott and Lewis, became no less that 'the manifesto of the liberal Africanist'.[129] He may well, as Pitt suggested, have rarely talked of Africa and been disinclined to go there,[130] but this should not distract attention from the practical importance Attitude to Africa and his wartime work on colonial constitutions.[131] Much the same, indeed, might be said of Wight's BBC radio lectures, on the 'good historian' and war in international politics, and his book reviews for the Observer, for which he continued to write, off and on, until the late 1960s. While these occasional pieces hardly brought him the status of a 'public intellectual', they showed him willing – as he had been with 'Pacifism' in his youth – to write for an audience beyond academe, to the public and to practitioners.

Wight was careful, however, not to be too overtly political in his more public writings. Unlike Toynbee, who took it upon himself to campaign for international

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[127] Wight, International Theory, p. 258.

[128] Calvocoressi, Threading my Way, p. 153.

[129] Cockett, David Astor and the Observer, p. 187.

[130] Pitt to Bull, 2 April 1974, Wight MSS 6/9.

[131] Kenneth Wheare called Wight's British Colonial Constitutions 'a most profound analysis of constitutional development which will be of permanent value to historians, lawyers, politicians and political scientists' (Times Literary Supplement 2678, 29 May 1953, p. 346).

improvement, Wight was generally coy in articulating his preferred response. This may have reflected a broad disillusionment with politics, which can be detected in his correspondence. As he wrote to Melko in 1964:

> Less and less do I think of politics as altering anything, even for the worse; more and more do I regard it as an enjoyable and absorbing spectacle, rich with historical echoes and half-glimpsed general laws.[132]

For Wight, as indeed for Toynbee, politics alone would not suffice to respond to crisis. There was, therefore, no reason for him to make appeals either to public opinion or to politicians, as neither had the capacity to act effectively.

Butterfield's relations with the world of practice were not as distant. Lasting friendships with former students, especially with the intelligence officer and diplomat Adam Watson, was one means by which they were sustained. The correspondence between Butterfield and Watson ranged far wider than the personal: discussions of political or diplomatic importance were common, with Butterfield often offering advice on general issues or specific problems. One such question arose in 1949, over Watson's involvement in the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office. Created, in February 1948, to 'get rid of the Good Old Uncle Joe myth' about Stalin that had emerged during the war, the IRD distributed anti-Soviet propaganda to the Press and to scholars.[133] Watson became its deputy director, and wrote to Butterfield to discuss its efficacy and ethics. His reply, while encompassing general musings on 'ideological diplomacy' and the causes of the 'modern barbarism', was practical to a fault.[134] Cognisant of the IRD's purpose and believing in its necessity, Butterfield wrote: 'I

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[132] Wight to Melko, 15 December 1964, in author's possession courtesy of Professor Melko.

[133] On the IRD and Watson, see Frances Stoner Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London: Granta, 2000), pp. 58-60.

think...that if we get only one-sided [ie. pro-Soviet] evidence about Russia from free journalism, you in the F.O. would be foolish not to supplement this'.[135] Such advice was given rarely, but it was given when requested.

Butterfield's contact with practitioners, was extended with the creation of the British Committee. He thought initially that it might not be 'proper' to involve officials, but quickly dissuaded himself of this idea, not least because he was keen to include Adam Watson in its discussions.[136] As the Committee evolved, a number of other diplomats and civil servants, some of them very senior figures, were invited to attend. Robert Wade-Gery, for instance, served later as Ambassador to the USSR and High Commissioner to Delhi,[137] while Sir Michael Palliser was soon to become Permanent Under-Secretary at the F.C.O.,[138] and William Armstrong, Head of the Home Civil Service.[139] Their contributions to the Committee were limited in terms of papers – none survive in the archives – but their attendance suggests a desire, on Butterfield's part, at least to engage in a conversation with practice, if not to offer it advice.

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[134] Butterfield to Watson, 2 May 1949, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W23.

[135] Butterfield to Watson, 2 May 1949, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W23.

[136] Butterfield to Williams, 28 April 1958, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W270. Williams replied 'I personally would favour the inclusion of Foreign Office officials, provided the committee never sought, or allowed itself to receive, confidential information' (Williams to Butterfield, 2 May 1958, Butterfield MSS 531(iii)/W272).

[137] Wade-Gery (1929-) read *literae humaniores* at New College, Oxford and served as a member of the Diplomatic Service from 1951 to 1987.

[138] Palliser (1921-) was educated at Marlborough and Merton College, Oxford, entered the Diplomatic Service in 1946, spent the war with the Coldstream Guards, and later became Head of the Diplomatic Service (1975-82).

[139] Armstrong (1915-1980) read *literae humaniores* at Exeter College, Oxford, entered the Civil Service in 1938 and rose – mainly through the Treasury – to become head of the Home Civil Service in 1968. See his entry (written by Edward Heath) in the Dictionary of National Biography 1971-1980, pp. 18-20.

In general, Butterfield was keen to counsel against speaking 'truth to power' – an occupation doomed to failure, for power was too strong, too wilful, and too 'seamy' to be mitigated by the subtleties of scholarship.[140] Partly, this was a reflection of his religious beliefs, of the idea that the 'strongest thing Christians can do', he argued, 'is just to testify; bearing witness faithfully and leaving Providence to do the rest'.[141] His own testimony, however, sometimes shaded into advocacy, despite his conviction that the historians commonly had a tendency to become 'too pontifical'.[142] In the post-war years, Butterfield felt compelled to comment on practice, not to counsel practitioners, but to educate the wider public. Christianity and History, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, and International Conflict were 'wisdom-literature',[143] all aimed at a popular market, or at least at the educated general reader, rather than an academic audience. Even if they were not designed directly to influence practice, these works were aimed at public opinion. Butterfield took it upon himself to correct that failure of education that he argued had bedevilled twentieth century international relations, and implied that historical study – and perhaps even IR – could serve as the means to that end.

Butterfield conceived of his project, such as it was, as the transmission of wisdom rather than the imparting of knowledge. He was deeply concerned by 'discontinuities';[144] indeed, he argued that modern 'barbarism' was the consequence of a 'hiatus in the transmission of values'.[145] The universities had a role to play here, he

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[140] This view is suggested by a remark made a letter to Alan Taylor: 'I am as an historian against all governments, or rather I believe that something oblique is going on behind all governments, giving them a seamy side' (Butterfield to Taylor, 2 August 1949, Butterfield MSS 130/4).

[141] Butterfield, 'Just War' (hand-written draft, no page numbers), Butterfield MSS 275.

[142] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 9.

[143] This term was employed by Butterfield's critics, as he observed in a paper given at Bellagio, April 1968, Butterfield MSS 109/2.

[144] See especially Butterfield's 1971 Rede Lecture, The Discontinuities between the Generations in History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[145] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War, p. 48.

urged, for 'we must not make the mistake of imagining that there is nothing of wisdom to be communicated to the young – no wisdom or experience worth passing on to another generation'.[146] This was especially important in political practice. He wondered whether 'permanent damage' had been 'done to our world (as well as Britain's position on the globe) by the assumption so blithely made after the First World War, that we could turn our backs on older ideas of diplomacy and international relations'.[147] His work, both in terms of his books and the British Committee, which he intended to be 'concerned to make past history continuous with present experience',[148] was conceived as an effort to revive and reconsider the doctrines and maxims of past international thought, to re-present them to the contemporary world. The next section examines the substance of these ideas, alongside the practical responses to international crisis favoured by Toynbee and Wight.

Action

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight were much clearer in their diagnoses of international crisis than in articulating their desired responses. Of the three, as has been discussed, Wight was the most reticent, generally seeking to avoid any public pronouncements on particular policies or international events. He was also the most uncertain; airing different responses, with varying degrees of commitment, at different times. Butterfield was a little more forthcoming, but habitually couched his arguments in Christian terminology or in generalities, frequently rendering them somewhat opaque. While Toynbee considered it his duty to propound, recommend and exhort, his ideas too were often vague and usually expressed in a rather obfuscating religious – rather than a

[146] Butterfield, The Universities and Education Today (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 70.

[147] Ibid., p. 76.

[148] Butterfield in the minutes of 'Discussion on the objects the Committee', RIIA MSS 5, p. 38.

strictly political – idiom. Yet despite these difficulties with their modes of expression, each man had firm conceptions of what they wished to see happen, what action needed to be taken to resolve the international crisis.

In elucidating his 'response', Wight insisted – in contrast to both Butterfield and Toynbee – upon a necessary distance between religion and politics. He rejected wholeheartedly the notion that there could be a 'religious politics', let alone a 'Christian politics' – 'Christianity', he wrote, 'is not a political religion, and teaches no political theory'. Instead, he noted:

> ...we see a wealth of statesmen, policies, institutions, revolution, reform, each with a claim to be authentically Christian. Empire and national particularism, communism and free enterprise, crusades and pacifism, absolute monarchy and democracy, have all in term been expressions of Christian principles.[149]

Though common elements might be found – Wight argued a sense of the 'necessity but secondariness of politics', compassion, justice and a belief in Providence were among them – a Christian political doctrine, therefore, could not be constructed. There was, however, a certain ambiguity latent in his position. As has been discussed, in 'Pacifism', the Antichrist essays, 'The Church, Russia and the West' and other articles, Wight had showed himself convinced that secularisation had emancipated modern politics from 'moral restraint', and brought about the rise of 'power politics' with all its attendant horrors. This implied, to take one of his own phrases, 'that the upholding of moral standards will in itself tend to strengthen the fabric of political life'.[150]

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[149] Wight, 'Christian Politics', Wight MSS 52, p. 1.

[150] Wight, 'Western Values in International Relations', pp. 130-131.

In some writings, indeed, Wight seems to suggest that nothing short of a religious revival was required to limit war and its destructive force, and strengthen international order. He urged that only repentance 'may in God's mercy' bring understanding between peoples.[151] No secular means could, for Wight, bring the world out of crisis; only 'submission to God's will' could bring about the chance of such earthly redemption.[152] In the age of ideologies, this would not be without its problems, for though there should be no 'submission to Leviathan', Wight acknowledged that the modern totalitarian state, with its 'new kind of persecution', perhaps made 'martyrdom...no longer possible'. Such predicaments, he argued, must be faced with an attitude of 'astringent realism':[153]

> It is the duty of Christians to analyse the secular situation with ruthless realism, and without the timidity, distaste and self-deception that Communists attribute to bourgeois culture in decline. The Church was enjoined to cultivate the wisdom of the serpent as well as the simplicity of the dove, and the Pharisees were condemned for not being able to discern the signs of the times.[154]

This reading of Matthew's gospel did not imply that 'realism' should be taken as a guide to action; as was argued in the previous chapter, its 'power politics' were, for Wight, those of Antichrist, and were thus hardly appropriate for the Christian.[155]

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[151] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 45.

[152] Wight, 'God in History', p. 5.

[153] Wight, review of Dawson, Understanding Europe in International Affairs 29:3 (July 1953), p. 341.

[154] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 33. Wight's own effort to analyse the secular situation was, of course, contained in Power Politics.

[155] This marks Wight apart from 'Christian realists' like Reinhold Niebuhr, who sought to ground their international political doctrines in Augustinian principles. For an expression of this position, see Niebuhr's 'Augustine's Political Realism', in his Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 114-139.

Despite the quietist implications of his argument, in the late 1940s Wight was contemplating a range of secular, political solutions to crisis. To Oldham, editor of the Frontier, he mused of the possibility of establishing a 'balance of power which will last as long as thirty years', though he believed that ultimately it would end in cataclysmic war. If governments only accepted 'public law', he argued, such an eventuality could be averted.[156] Quite what this meant in practice is obscure. In 1947, Wight argued that a world federal union was 'common sense', but this wasn't quite the same thing as universally accepted legal order, and neither, he admitted, could it prevent war.[157] By 1953, Wight's position appears to have become more indulgent to the methods of the 'old diplomacy', even perhaps of 'power politics'. 'Particular wars', he argued, could be 'avoided' with 'wisdom', 'the intelligent refinement of the motive of fear' and 'magnanimity, justice, patience, long-suffering'.[158]

In the post-war years, Wight's other major concern was the fate of empire. He was supportive of devolved imperial governance, along the lines first sketched by Lugard and Perham,[159] and subsequently highly critical of the swift de-colonisation of African territories that occurred during the 1960s. His wartime work had led him to conclude that the cultural, racial and tribal 'cleavages' within these colonies precluded effective, functioning, democratic statehood.[160] Only communal representation could offer good governance, while only a prolonged period of colonial rule and development could generate the social unity required for properly democratic institutions to thrive.[161]

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[156] Wight to Oldham, 27 June 1946, Wight MSS 12.

[157] Wight, review of Joad, Conditions of Survival in International Affairs 23: 1 (January 1947), p. 81.

[158] Wight, 'War and International Politics', p. ??

[159] Toynbee to Curtis, 29 December 1941, Curtis MSS 24/197-198.

[160] Margery Perham, 'Introduction' to Wight's Development of the Legislative Council, p. 10.

[161] Wight, Development of the Legislative Council, p. 86; British Colonial Constitutions, p. 25.

The 'frustration' of anti-colonial nationalists was 'understandable', but their demands were to be resisted, not least because their did not comprehend the 'complexity' of the 'game' of politics.[162] As Wight and his co-authors wrote in Attitude to Africa, 'the...British responsibility is to hold firmly on to the reins of government until such time as the races are more nearly equal, educationally and economically'.[163] This view seems to have remained unchanged as the reins began to slip, and as they were lost forever. In de-colonising with such indecent haste, Wight considered that the colonial powers had reneged on their moral responsibilities, and weakened international order.[164]

His views on the broader questions of contemporary international relations are difficult to establish with any precision. It is commonly assumed that Wight took up a 'realist' position in the 1940s, and that it softened into 'Grotian rationalism' during the 1950s.[165] Given his religious views, the first seems unlikely; the second is brought into question by surviving unpublished evidence. These views aired to the British Committee in 1959, and recorded the minutes, are a case in point:

> The failure of the League of Nations and the United Nations suggested that nothing short of a world government would effectively prevent war. The forms of *Verbindung* represented by these bodies and operating elsewhere in the world are not governments; and the balance of power, though it represents an admirable achievement has the defect of being inherently unstable. More serious still is the growing heterogeneity between the various parts of the system – the different races, régimes, ideologies, degrees of development and social organisations. It is question whether there even exists a single international society; for [in] different parts of the globe separate systems of

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[162] Wight, Gold Coast Legislative Council, p. 178

[163] Wight et al., Attitude to Africa, p. 57.

[164] On 'anti-colonialism' and 'dissolving standards', see Wight, 'Brutus in Foreign Policy', p. 308.

[165] See 'Reputations', chapter II.

> international law are emerging, so that South-East Asia may develop its own conception of international law. The increasing speed of political change in all parts of the world may mean that the separate parts are developing away from one another. The possibility of peace – the possibility of a workable international order – tends therefore to become more remote unless there is actually a World Government.[166]

There is little suggestion here of either statist 'realism' or 'rationalism'. Moreover, it is less than clear, when his other writings are considered, that he considered a world state practicable or desirable. A world state might end inter-state war, but was no guarantee of peace, and it might also serve as the vehicle of Antichrist. As Wight observed, in 1948, the prospect of 'an impending world state...may well be a more frightful concentration of tyrannical power than any we have yet experienced'.[167]

Locating the desired response in Wight's writings is complicated further by the practical lessons he occasionally included to practitioners of each of his three traditions. To 'revolutionists', whom he believed to be in the ascendant in the post-war world, he counselled:

> The inter-war generation concentrated its intellectual effort on the central complex of international order: security, disarmament, and peaceful change. The post-war generation has chosen decolonization, economic development, race relations, and population control, in the belief that these matters contain the causes of future international disorder, and that international order is for the time being given.... International order, however, is given only by the balance between the two dominant Powers. [168]

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[166] Wight reported by Butterfield, Minutes of BCTIP meeting 9-12 January 1959, p. 7.

[167] Wight, 'The Church, Russia and the West', p. 43.

[168] Wight, 'Balance of Power and International Order', p. 114.

Potential devotees of 'realism', on the other hand, were warned:

> A fashionable academic doctrine in International Relations today is that of the National Interest as a corrective to the legalism and moralism which flourished in the age of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact and are still not dead in the age of Eisenhower and Dulles. Sovereign states, it is contended, when their policy is healthy are guided, and at all times ought to be guided, by considerations of national interest. There has of course been much controversy about a conception so undefined and running so easily to tautology...[169]

And 'rationalists', prone to assume order to be given and lasting, were told:

> All that history authorizes us to be sure of is that the balance of power last only so long as someone is ready to take the risks to maintain it, and that international order will in the end be brought about only by those who are prepared to make sacrifices to construct and enforce it.[170]

Each 'tradition' was offered counsel, but without commitment.

Yet the impression should not be given that Wight was equivocal as to the relative merits of 'realism', 'rationalism' and 'revolutionism'. He did, as he famously commented at the end of his LSE lectures, see that they had their strengths as well as weaknesses, though his 'prejudices [were] Rationalist'.[171] However, to claim, as Wight implied with his metaphor of moving around the circle, that he found each tradition equally attractive was disingenuous, perhaps designed to spare sensitive students' feelings. He was much more highly critical of 'revolutionist' ideas than any other. In his

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[169] Wight, 'In the Commonwealth a Non-Hobbesian Institution?', pp. 128-9.

[170] Wight, 'Balance of Power and International Order', p. 115.

[171] Wight, International Theory, p. 268.

reviews, he condemned the 'political illiteracy' and 'moral incapacity' of the Left, and dismissed their paeans to the 'peace-loving Slavs or Chinese people' as 'cant'.[172] E. H. Carr's 'futurist' and 'revolutionary' spirit was compared to that of Hitler, and Wight considered that 'on the two fundamental problems of the new society, the maintenance of political standards and the restraint of power...Mr Carr really has nothing to say'.[173]

Wight's animus towards 'power politics' (on religious grounds) and 'revolution' (because it tended towards 'realism' in practice[174]) left him with the default position of 'rationalism'. This entailed the fostering of international society in a world of sovereign states,

> ...the unending patient and undramatic (*sic*) work of diplomacy; the inescapable conflicts of interests between nations; ...the perpetual strain of choosing which of the possible courses is the lesser evil and the constant moral tension lying at the heart of statecraft.[175]

Ultimately, however, it is difficult to see how Wight could be satisfied with this response. War could not be prevented by such means, merely managed, and its destructive force continued to grow apace. Power politics and revolutionism would probably not be contained without the reintroduction of moral restraints, indeed without the reinvigoration and reconstitution of Christendom. Instead, Wight seems to have

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[172] Wight, 'The Policy of Containment', review of Ward, Policy for the West in the Observer, 18 February 1951, p. 7.

[173] Wight, 'Problems of Mass Democracy', review of Carr, The New Society, 23 September 1951, p. 7.

[174] Wight made this point several times: see, for instance, 'The Balance of Power', in Toynbee & Ashton-Gwatkin (eds.), Survey of International Affairs: The World in March 1939, p. 527; 'Brutus in Foreign Policy', pp. 307-308.

[175] Wight, 'The Power Struggle in the United Nations', p. 259.

chosen 'quietism' of sorts,[176] a concentration of his efforts on religion rather than politics, putting a 'good deal of his commitment', as Pitt suggested, 'into prayer'.[177]

Like Wight's, Toynbee's favoured practical response to crisis was clear at first glance, but sustained examination reveals problems, ambiguities and inconsistencies. His declared aim throughout most of his career was straightforward: the 'abolition of war'.[178] By 1914 he had come to consider war 'neither a respectable institution nor a venial sin, but...a crime' comparable with slavery, and deserving of similar treatment.[179] Its abolition was to be achieved by the abolition of the state, or at least the modification of sovereignty. From Nationality and the War (1915) onwards, Toynbee insisted that the political form of the sovereign nation-state had to be overcome,[180] especially in those places outside Europe to which it had been transplanted.[181] His views on quite what should replace the state varied over time. In the 1920s, he embraced the League, and was largely satisfied that it, and legal instruments like the Pact of Paris, were sufficient limitations on state sovereignty.[182]

Doubts as to the ultimate efficacy, however, of the League lurked beneath the surface. In his 1930 BBC radio talks, Toynbee argued that the 'economic unification of

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[176] Wight described 'quietism' in International Theory as an attitude that declared: 'all one can do is to retire within the sphere of the personal life and personal relationships and cultivate one's garden' (p. 257). It should be noted that both Gabrielle Wight and Harry Pitt have challenged the view that Wight was a 'quietist'. See Pitt to G. Wight, 4 May 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

[177] Pitt to Bull, 4 May 1974, Wight MSS 233 6/9.

[178] Toynbee, 'The Abolition of War', The Listener 4:97, 3 December, 1930, p. 914.

[179] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 208. He recalled that for the first 25 years of this life, his attitude towards war had been more indulgent: he had felt the wars of national unification of Bismarck and Cavour were 'justified', as was Joan of Arc's war of liberation against the English (p. 209). Toynbee drew a parallel between the abolition of war and of slavery in the Study IX, p. 447.

[180] Toynbee, Nationality and the War, ppo. 479-481.

[181] Toynbee, Western Question in Greece and Turkey, p. 6.

[182] The clearest statement of this view may be found in Toynbee, Survey 1928, pp. ??

the world' required a parallel movement in politics towards international unity. He was keen, however, to qualify what he meant by this:

> I am not saying that this political sub-division of great empires into small States is a bad thing in itself. From the purely political standpoint I think it is a good thing. The more local self-government we have in the world the better, so long as government keeps within its proper sphere. And by its proper sphere I mean the sphere of public services...[183]

States, therefore, need not be abolished outright, but limits upon 'sovereignty' needed to be imposed.[184] Toynbee was largely content with a legal prohibition on states' recourse to war, progressive disarmament and the creation of 'international Police'.[185] In essence what he sought was an 'equivalent to the Roman Empire in function without [it] being identical in structure'.[186] This was a vision that went much further than the League or any other system of regular conference diplomacy between sovereign states.

The failure of the League, however, and the deepening of crisis pushed him not only towards religion, as was detailed in chapter III, but also towards the contemplation of more radical, if less specific, responses. Toynbee toyed briefly with 'appeasement', but quickly relented, believing that the appetite of Nazis could not and should not be sated.[187] He was even willing to countenance the application of the methods of 'old

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[183] Toynbee, 'Economics versus Politics', p. 825.

[184] Toynbee, 'Economics and Politics in International Life', p. 10.

[185] Toynbee, 'The Abolition of War', pp. 914-915.

[186] Toynbee, 'A British View of World Order', lecture given at Williams College, 20 August 1932, Toynbee MSS 2, p. 11.

[187] See his letter on letting the 'Germany into Africa' in The Times 28 October 1937, p. 12, and his subsequent anti-appeasement article 'The Issues in British Foreign Policy', International Affairs 17:3 (May-June 1938), pp. 307-337.

diplomacy' – political 'realism' in the language of the time.[188] In both the Surveys and the Study, as Thompson observed, he reflected at length on the workings of the 'balance of power' as an instrument of international order.[189] Indeed, as war loomed with Germany, Toynbee became a convert, albeit very briefly, to the idea that order could only be maintained by 'balance'. In the Survey for 1937 (published in 1938) he penned a remarkable paean to Churchill and to the 'traditional foreign policy' of Britain, even arguing that:

> The British Empire overseas might be regarded as a gratuity which Great Britain has received from the majority of the states of Europe for assisting them to preserve the Balance of Power against the ambition of a succession of Great Powers which had been tempted, each in its turn, to grasp at the alluring prize of an oecumenical supremacy.[190]

For Toynbee, 'arms and the covenant' were both required – power politics had to go hand-in-hand with League and its legalism. For a moment, he was convinced that Machiavelli was the 'surest guide' to international politics,[191] though he recoiled from the notion that international relations should ever be put on a 'non-moral footing'.[192]

By 1939, Toynbee had come to fear that the political unification of the world that he desired would only come about by force, just the Hellenic world had been unified, following the 'internecine fratricidal warfare' of the Punic Wars, by the 'universal state' of Rome.[193] Much of the discussion in volume IV of the Study dealing

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[188] See Toynbee's own discussion of the meaning of 'realism' in Survey for 1937, volume I, p. 24-25.

[189] Thompson, 'Toynbee and the Theory of International Politics', pp. 378-380. See also Toynbee's Study III, pp. 301-304.

[190] Toynbee, Survey 1937, I, p. 23.

[191] Thompson, 'Toynbee and the Theory of International Politics', pp. 372-373.

[192] Toynbee, 'The Issues in British Foreign Policy', p. 331.

[193] Toynbee, Study IV, p. 3.

with the 'intractability of institutions' as a cause of civilisational breakdown is devoted to a discussion of the sovereign state. The modification of the 'theory and practice of Parochial Sovereignty', he argued, returning to an earlier theme, was 'necessary in order to build our parochial states into some kind of world order'.[194] Yet it had again become unclear quite what form of 'world order' Toynbee desired. Events, he examined to Curtis in February 1939, had convinced him that the League was an attempt to 'have our cake and eat it', and that sovereignty was incompatible with international order. He toyed instead with the idea of:

> A real federation...of the democratic states of Western Europe and North America (plus Australia and New Zealand) [which] might solve the problem by establishing a power which would be so preponderant that it would be virtually a World Government in the sense that all other states would have to follow its lead.[195]

In this he followed the argument of Clarence Streit's case for federation in Union Now! (1939), believing it to be effective 'practical politics'.[196]

Toynbee's support for federalism was shallow and short-lived. In 1942, while at the FRPS, he argued merely for the creation of an 'international body' for 'economic and welfare purposes' as well as 'security', and implied that states would remain as the primary mode of political organisation.[197] His reasoning for this shift away from his earlier enthusiastic embrace of federalism was explained, four years later, to Curtis:

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[194] Ibid., p. 180.

[195] Toynbee to Curtis, 16 February 1939, Curtis MSS 13/190-1.

[196] Ibid.

[197] Toynbee, in the 'Report of the Discussion at a meeting held at Balliol College, Oxford on 13th of July, 1942', p. 2. Present at the meeting, amongst others, were Lord Halifax, George Clark, Lionel Curtis and Alfred Zimmern. Clark MSS 157.

> ...I think [it has been] historically proved that federation is not practically possible except between states that already have a great deal in common in their culture and ideals.[198]

Yet this, in Toynbee's estimation, was insufficient for 'world order' – an 'English-speaking' union, he asserted, needed continental allies, as well as friends in the Arab world and on the Pacific Rim. Only a 'world-wide association', federal or otherwise, would do.[199] He said little, however, about the form this might take. Toynbee's letters to Columba Cary-Elwes during the war years merely talk of his hopes that the US and the Soviet Union will 'manage to work in partnership to run the world in a more or less decent way'.[200]

Toynbee's growing religiosity, from the 1930s, led to a parallel diminution in his interest in political 'responses' to international crisis. When he did venture a practical proposal, moreover, it would be couched in terms that were both vague and tantalisingly elusive. He remained committed to pacifism, or at least pacificism, calling Bertrand Russell 'the only sane man in a world of lunatics' upon his imprisonment in 1961,[201] but continuing to argue into the late 1960s that 'it is justifiable, and in some cases morally obligatory, to resist aggression'.[202] His campaign against 'self-centredness' and 'self-righteousness' and for a reorientation of human concerns from man to God both implied a belief that 'tolerance' and 'patience' were required in international affairs, but what this would amount to in practice was unclear.[203] His later work offered little in the way of enlightenment. He continued into the 1970s to argue

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[198] Toynbee to Curtis, 19 November 1946, Curtis MSS 39/48-50.

[199] Toynbee to Curtis, 29 December 1941, Curtis MSS 24/197-8.

[200] Toynbee to Cary-Elwes, 16 November 1943, in Peper (ed.), Historian's Conscience, p. 146. See also Toynbee to Cary-Elwes, 19 May 1944, p. 163.

[201] Toynbee to Davies, 13 September 1961, Toynbee MSS 2.

[202] Toynbee, Experiences, p. 209.

that 'the institution of local sovereign states has failed repeatedly, during the last 5,000 years, to meet mankind's political needs', but failed himself to offer a tangible alternative.[204] Spirituality and unification of the 'Oikoumenê' was all that was suggested.

Butterfield was a little less vague. A lack of evidence, however, precludes a sustained examination of his preferred 'response' during the inter-war years. It seems clear, in view of the rejection of his application for the Woodrow Wilson chair at Aberystwyth in 1936, that he was considered by his peers to be no enthusiast for the League.[205] His Peace Tactics of Napoleon (1929) – 'a study of diplomacy in time of war'[206] – certainly showed him at odds with the prevailing tenor of international thought. He was implicitly critical of those – mainly liberals – who had portrayed the Great War as a war for 'civilisation' against barbaric militarism, drawing a parallel, early in the book, between the mood of Russia upon her entry into the war against Napoleon and that of 1914. Both, he wrote, displayed 'an electrified atmosphere, a release of the elemental things in human nature, an infectiousness and facile unanimity of mood – all turned into an exalted religious ardour and felt to be highest idealism'.[207] The unspoken suggestion was that both were crusades,[208] unlimited and barbarising – a view not widely shared by contemporaries – and that moderation should prevail over emotion. As Butterfield wrote

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[203] Toynbee, 'Can we learn lessons from history?', p. 14.

[204] Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth, p. 594.

[205] This episode is discussed in chapter I.

[206] Butterfield, Peace Tactics of Napoleon, p. vii.

[207] Ibid., p. 36. Elsewhere Butterfield observed of democracy and Austrian diplomacy: 'they knew too well that if they made war itself national and popular...they would be raising at their very doors a monster that would be more terrible to them than Napoleon himself' (p. 320).

[208] For Butterfield's later reflections on the phenomenon of the 'militant democratic crusade', see Christianity, Diplomacy and War 2nd ed., p. 116.

later, the root of the modern 'Dark Ages' was the First World War, not the atomic bomb.[209]

In Peace Tactics Butterfield praised 'flexibility' – especially Napoleon's 'supreme elasticity'[210] – and the virtuosity of nineteenth century diplomacy. The Austrian diplomats, with Metternich at their head, were 'recondite and impassive, proceeding obliquely and always on tiptoe, trusting to subtlety and pure technique'.[211] He was critical, though mildly so, of the 'grander' more 'dynamic' diplomacy of a Canning or Lloyd George (Butterfield compared the two).[212] Though his view of Napoleon's statecraft had hardened by 1939, the underlying message of Peace Tactics presaged the 'response' that he articulated more explicitly after 1945. It was grounded too in his studies of the political consequences of the 'whig interpretation' and that of Machiavelli. Both impressed upon him the virtues of the 'English gift for compromise and for the "politic" management of affairs',[213] the need for 'elasticity', and the perils of 'rigidity and dogmatism' in political practice.[214]

In his post-war work, these ideas were transposed to the international realm, as Butterfield sought to 'break up rigidities of mind in the conduct of international relations'.[215] This task concerned both intellectual – indeed, religious – and practical action. It involved the recognition that the extremes of optimism and pessimism that

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[209] Butterfield, 'Reflections on the Predicament of our Time', Cambridge Journal 1:1 (October 1947), p. 13.

[210] Butterfield, Peace Tactics of Napoleon, p. 86. See also p. 274, where Butterfield describes Napoleon's thought thus: 'he had no fixed star in his sky, no definite plan for the day after tomorrow to be an obsession in his mind, and if he had a vision of the future he purposely kept it vague and fluid and essentially contingent'.

[211] Ibid., p. 319.

[212] Ibid., p. 307.

[213] Butterfield, Englishman and his History, p. 85.

[214] Butterfield, Statecraft of Machiavelli, p. 23.

characterised the international thought of the 1940s, not least that of Toynbee and Wight, were unhelpful. Better, he argued, that we accept that 'the universe always was a risky place to live in, and only the arrogant and foolish ever doubted that at its last end all human constructions would be turned into wreckage'.[216] Better too, thought Butterfield, that we face the uncomfortable reality that 'only a training in humanism and an acquired habit of sympathetic reflection on human beings viewed internally can readjust the balance in a world where scientific ingenuity is so outrunning the rest of human development'.[217] In effect, this intellectual aspect of Butterfield's 'response' required the assumption of his religious beliefs, not least his conceptions of Providence and of the value of human 'personality'. This was most evident in Christianity and History and the Christian Newsletter essays that preceded it.

Butterfield's 'response', as embodied in these works, seemed at times to be all-encompassing and seemed, like those of both Toynbee and Wight, to require nothing less than a religious revival. He demanded the abandonment of 'self-explanatory systems' of 'mundane history', a reorientation of the 'educational system' as a whole,[218] a minor reformation in Christianity,[219] and a reborn appreciation of the 'spiritual character of man'.[220] At other times, however, this intellectual or religious aspect of his 'response' appeared to be a more limited project. He was convinced that a group of

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[215] Cowling, Religion and the Public Doctrine I, p. 245.

[216] Butterfield, 'Reflections on the Predicament of our Time', p. 7.

[217] Ibid., p. 13.

[218] Butterfield, 'The Christian and Academic History', pp. 89-90. See also Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 22

[219] Butterfield repeatedly attacked the institutional Church in his work for its repressive tendencies, and, not surprisingly, praised nonconformism. See Christianity and History, chapter 6; Christianity and European History, p. 43 (on the achievements of Methodism), p. 56 (on ecclesiastical organisation). He was also critical of the Churches' tendency to 'move along with their respective nations' in wartime (Christianity, Diplomacy and War 2nd ed., p. 126).

[220] Butterfield, 'The Christian and the Marxian Interpretation of History', p. 222. See also 'The Christian Idea of God', The Listener 44:1134, 23 November 1950, pp. 591-592.

devoted Christians – like a dedicated band of Communist revolutionaries – could 'leaven the whole lump'.[221] Indeed, this idea of a 'leavening influence' recurs rather frequently,[222] though whether Butterfield considered himself to be such a force is not revealed.

Unlike Wight or the late Toynbee, both of whom, at times, seemed to suggest that all that was required in 'response' to crisis was religion, Butterfield was keen to point to practical measures too. He urged the reconsideration of the methods and maxims of the 'old diplomacy', not least the necessity of forgiveness for former enemies, the impossibility of absolute security, the need for the acceptance of all states, regardless of the political colour of their regime, into the diplomatic system, and an absolute prohibition on crusades. The abandonment of ideological considerations in diplomacy was of especial importance. The predicament of 'Hobbesian fear', he argued, existed 'absolutely irrespective of any differences in ideology' – Russia would still be 'suspicious' and 'angry' if it were 'liberal and democratic'.[223] That state should be treated as any other Great Power, respectfully and cautiously, with due regard to her capacities and interests; in the manner, in other words, of eighteenth century '*real-politik*'.[224] Such a pattern of behaviour would safeguard international order, and perhaps even foster civilised relations, that 'precarious' and 'constructed thing'.[225]

The establishment of this order, for Butterfield, required creativity and imagination, as well as 'the genuine bonds' that came from 'the co-operation of time,

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[221] Butterfield, Christianity and History, 1st ed., p. 131.

[222] See, for example, Butterfield, 'The Christian and the Ecclesiastical Interpretation of History', pp. 230-231 and Christianity, Diplomacy and War 2nd ed., p. 17. In the latter, he argued that the 'Christian has principles which can rescue him from blind partisanship' that can allow him to fulfil 'a role of high strategic importance in the present day' (p. 13).

[223] Butterfield, 'The Tragic Element', p. 157.

[224] Butterfield, 'The Scientific versus the Moralistic Approach', p. 416.

habit, sentiment and the spirit of the club'.[226] A policy of the defence of the *status quo*, he urged, was insufficient,[227] and a conservative 'doctrine of limits not very effective'.[228] What was needed instead was the establishment of 'creative and inventive' *modus vivendi*.[229] Ideological differences needed thus to be overcome, and states habituated to the maintenance of order rather than the pursuit of dominance. The 'primary object' of peace, Butterfield argued, could only come through the exercise of 'reason' and 'reasonableness', aided by the 'healing process of Time' – by which he presumably meant Providence.[230]

This was hardly 'realism' as it is conventionally understood. Butterfield drew heavily on the maxims and methods of the 'old diplomacy', but stopped well short of endorsing 'power politics'. Indeed, he explicitly refuted the idea – central to Morgenthau's Weberian 'realism' – that politics was characterised by the existence of 'ethics of responsibility' not present in private life.[231] Butterfield's comment on this was frank and succinct: 'when I hear it asserted that there is a separate ethic for statesmen, a peculiar thing called political morality, I am not sure that I can fit this into my thinking or even understanding what it means'.[232] All were faced everyday with choices between the moral and the immoral. Politics, he considered, should not be discussed in a distinct

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[225] Butterfield, Christianity, Diplomacy and War 1st ed. p. 82.

[226] Ibid., p. 102.

[227] Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p. 113. See also 'Christianity and the Status Quo', in which he argued that inter-war internationalism 'was bound to function as a gigantic machine for the freezing of the *status quo*'.

[228] Butterfield, Minutes of discussion on MacKinnon's 'Natural Law' in British Committee, Butterfield MSS 29, p. 10.

[229] Butterfield, 'Moralism and the Scientific Approach', Butterfield MSS 31, p. 28. See also 'Discussion on Freedom and Creative Statesmanship' in British Committee, Butterfield MSS 336, in which Butterfield praised the creativity of Bismarck in his handling of the defeated Austrians, and Baldwin's treatment of Labour after the General Strike.

[230] Butterfield, 'Moralism and the Scientific Approach', p. 28 & p. 32.

[231] On Morgenthau, see Rologas, Hans Morgenthau, pp. 91-92.

category, as Morgenthau should to do, or in an 'intellectual realm which is supposed to involve principles of its own'.[233] It was not, for Butterfield, concerned simply with the pursuit of power – peace, after all, should be the 'primary object' of international relations – especially if that pursuit threatened catastrophe. For that reason he came to argue, for a brief period in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in favour of British unilateral nuclear disarmament. 'I would', he argued, 'perfer [*sic*] see the world Communist or Russian rather than fighting with those weapons'.[234]

Butterfield stood alone from most of his peers, including Toynbee and Wight, in accepting, as he put it, the 'nation states-system as given'.[235] He did not seek its abolition, its replacement with federation, or its modification by legal or institutional means, but rather its preservation. For Butterfield, state sovereignty was not the cause of war, but rather the guarantor of liberty. The states-system was one of toleration, not, as Wight believed, one of the emancipation of power from the moral. 'International affairs', he wrote, 'are happier when they are conducted from many free and autonomous centres, happiest of all when the small states are able to have an independent role'.[236] All that was required to make this system function as it should was flexibility and creativity, freedom and toleration. Butterfield's 'response' was nonconformism writ large, as Toynbee's was syncretism.

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[232] Butterfield, 'Moralism and the Scientific Approach', p. 1.

[233] Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p. 15.

[234] Butterfield, Minutes of discussion on MacKinnon's 'Natural Law' in British Committee, Butterfield MSS 29, p. 9. Thorp states that Butterfield helped to draft the World Council of Churches minority report on nuclear weapons during the early 1960s (Herbert Butterfield, p. 186).

[235] Butterfield, Untitled Paper on Wight's 'Why is there no International Theory?', Butterfield MSS 29, no page numbers.

[236] Butterfield, International Conflict in the Twentieth Century, p. 112.

Conclusion

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight shared the anxieties of their peers, and formulated often not dissimilar practical 'responses'. Toynbee's shift from enthusiasm for the League, then appeasement, then power politics, then federalism, was not unparalleled. The same route, with varying points of rest, was traversed by many liberals in the inter-war years and after. His final position, however, was less widely accepted, and more unusual than his post-war mass popularity would suggest. It was the religious character of their 'responses', no less that their diagnoses of 'challenge', that set Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight, apart from their contemporaries. So too did their common neglect of the economic dimension of international relations – glossed over by Toynbee, touched upon by Wight, and wholly absent from Butterfield's thought. The latter pair, however, were remarkable and unusual in another respect: the effort they devoted to self-reflection. Both agonised over their relationship with the practical political realm, over their responsibilities as scholars, political actors and Christians. For Toynbee these issues were straightforward, as it was for many others of his and later generations. In the post war years, indeed, the new 'discipline' of International Relations split itself into what might be termed 'activists' and 'observers',[237] but rarely analysed the predicament of scholars in field with the depth achieved by Butterfield and Wight.

[237] 'Behaviouralism', which emerged in the US in the 1950s, fell into the former category; the so-called 'English school' into the latter. An undeclared but nevertheless bitter conflict was waged between them. See, for example, the diatribe against 'behavourialism' in F. S. Northedge's The International Political System (London: Faber & Faber, 1976), p. 321.

VII. Conclusion

Chaos is a name for any order that produces confusion in our minds.[1]

Santayana.

In Europe, in the early eighteenth century, international thought underwent something of a revolution. Hitherto a certain 'fatalism', as Martin Ceadel has called it,[2] had underlain attitudes to war. The incidence of war was more or less taken for granted, condemned in broad terms by the Churches, but accepted as a perennial feature of human society. A state of perfect and eternal peace, Augustine had argued, was only to be found in the 'Heavenly City', indeed 'so truly peaceful that it should be regarded as the only peace deserving of the name'. 'Temporal peace', by contrast, was transitory and imperfect.[3] This view persisted throughout the medieval period. In the first half of the eighteenth century, however, war came to be seen by many as aberrant and indeed abhorrent. 'Fatalism' was slowly replaced, over the course of the next century, by the 'pursuit of peace'.[4] Two broad responses were formulated to the 'problem' of war: on the one hand, what Ceadel terms 'realism' or 'defencism' and, on the other, 'pacificism' or 'pacifism'. Proponents of the first maintained that 'war could be avoided for long periods provided that stability-seeking countries maintained adequate defences as a deterrent against aggression', while the second argued that war 'could be abolished' and should be abolished outright.[5] Underlying both was the conviction that war

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[1] George Santayana, Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society and Government (New York: Scribner's, 1951), p. 33.

[2] Martin Ceadel, The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730-1854 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), p. 1.

[3] Augustine, City of God 29:17, p. 878.

[4] This phrase is Hinsley's, from the title of his Power and the Pursuit of Peace. See also Howard, Invention of Peace.

[5] Ceadel, Origins of War Prevention, p. 1.

could be controlled, either by human ingenuity or by virtue, not merely accepted as an aspect of social life.

The rise of these two strategies did not, of course, displace other attitudes to war and international discord – militarists and crusaders were not entirely banished – but they did come to dominate modern international thought. They persisted, with some tenacity, throughout the twentieth century, understood by contemporaries as 'realism' and 'idealism'. The two ingredients of management and reform were combined in different quantities in a range of theories, positivist and normative, and practices. Neorealism and some 'classical' approaches, including that of the so-called 'English school' contained much of the former; neoliberalism and 'emancipatory' approaches, including critical theory and some feminists, the latter. Constructivists, with varying degrees of success, sought to mix the two in more-or-less equal measures. In international relations, similar combinations of 'defencism' and 'pacifism' may been seen in the League of Nations and the United Nations, as well as in states' practice. Management and reform, however, have repeatedly failed to fulfil the objectives that justified their application: the League could not contain the totalitarian challenge, the extirpation of Nazism did not bring about peace and security, nor did the end of the Cold War lead to a 'New World Order'.

Since its creation in the aftermath of the First World War, IR has oscillated violently between optimism and pessimism. Moments of hope about the course of international relations – the early 1920s, perhaps the mid-1940s, certainly the early 1990s – have been swiftly succeeded by anxiety and gloom as hopes are unfulfilled, 'progress' not achieved, and 'problems' identified. Throughout, there remained faith in the methods – 'defencism' or 'pacifism' or an amalgam of both – and in the underlying precepts, but there was frustration at the course of events. Repeated failure and the disappointment that resulted fed the perception of 'crisis' that became ingrained in IR in the twentieth century; indeed, informed its analyses and provided its rationale. As Wight put it, 'International Relations is the academic response

to the period of the two World Wars',[6] and one might add to the Cold War and 'Interregnum' that followed.[7] Crisis is the defining motif of IR, shaping its diagnoses of international ills as well as its prescriptions.

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight were not immune to this mood. Their international thought was informed, it has been suggested in this thesis, by a pervasive sense of insecurity and anxiety. They turned to their religious beliefs and their historical knowledge in an attempt to comprehend the 'crisis' of the international realm. The examination of these foundations, it has been argued, provides a picture of their international thought of greater colour and complexity than is normally acknowledged in International Relations. It seems the 'realist' Butterfield, for instance, believed peace to be the 'primary object' of international politics, and thought 'science' and 'wisdom' combined could offer the means of its realisation. The 'idealist' Toynbee sometimes considered 'power politics' necessary, though deeply undesirable, in a world of states, while the 'rationalist' Wight suggested, on occasion, impending apocalypse rendered all political action futile. These understandings of their thought place in doubt not only the merits of interpreting past international thought in isolation from a thinker's wider views, but the meaningfulness of the categories.

The application of the terms 'realist', 'idealist' (or 'utopian', or 'revolutionist'), and 'rationalist' all too often serve to conceal as much as they expose. The 'traditional' approach to the history of international ideas, indeed, commonly distracts attention from the arguments offered, and the beliefs and perceptions that inform them. It is not obvious, however, that 'contextualism', as the Cambridge school understands it, can offer much of an improvement. The argument that all political – including international – thought is ideological in character,

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[6] Wight, 'What is International Relations?', p. 6.

[7] On the idea of an 'interregnum', see the special issue of the Review of International Studies (25 (December 1999) entitled 'The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics, 1989-1999'.

directed constantly towards the shaping of practice,[8] is deeply problematic. It is preferable, it has been implied in this thesis, to examine what the thinkers themselves conceived of their roles and their relationship to practice. Such a task requires too an exploration of their understandings of the condition of international relations in their lifetimes, the sources of anxiety and the possibilities of ameliorating them. This is not a revolutionary notion; indeed, it is a familiar one to students of 'foreign policy analysis' used to concentrating their attention upon the 'perceptions and misperceptions' of 'actors'.[9] These 'perceptions' seem to offer a better starting point for the interpretation of texts than the exploration of what might be termed the externally given context of linguistic conventions suggested by the Cambridge 'contextualist' or that of economic circumstance promoted by the neo-Marxists.

Butterfield, Toynbee and Wight perceived that a crisis – perhaps even a terminal crisis – had befallen international relations. Their international thought – their understandings of the modern international system, its roots, structure and failings – was framed by this notion, by nagging concern that it was in peril, threatening the destruction of 'civilisation'. The struggle in which they involved themselves was existential, not simply ideological, concerning the survival of life itself, not the promotion of the 'good life'. Faced with 'a century of crisis' as one contemporary called it,[10] these diagnoses and responses blended elements of past international thought with more novel ideas. Not one of them, interestingly,

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[8] While Skinner has recognised that texts may be written 'out of a simple desire to enlighten or amuse' ('Motives, Intentions and the Interpretations of Texts', in Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, p. 73), his concentration has almost exclusively been on discerning the practical intentions of authors. As Charles Taylor has pointed out, Skinner implies that 'what a writer is striving to *do* in producing a text is reinforce or change his ideological context, strengthen or weaken rival elements of it, preserve a certain form of it intact against assault, or on the contrary gave it a new twist or direction' ('The hermeneutics of conflict', in Tully (ed.), Meaning and Context, p. 219). Michael Oakeshott suggested much the same in his review of Skinner's The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Historical Journal 23:2 (1980), p. 450.

[9] See especially Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[10] Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides of Crisis: A Primer in Foreign Relations (London: Macmillan, 1957), p. 7.

claimed to be the heir of 'timeless wisdom',[11] whether of the 'realist' or 'idealist' kind, but nor, at the same time, did any of them fully rebel against older forms of thought and practice. Indeed, their thought was marked not by a rigid adherence to a particular doctrine – in the sense of a logically coherence, all-encompassing body of precepts, axioms or principles – but rather by a flexibility that gave their thought depth and strength. Thus, Toynbee moved from support for an institutionalist approach to a religious one, Butterfield from 'old diplomacy' to, albeit only for a time, unilateralism and a form of pacificism, and Wight from pacifism to what can only be described, inelegantly, as quasi-quietism.

Underlying all, however, was a sense – sometimes fleeting in the case of Wight – that international relations could be managed or reformed, that 'crisis' could be ameliorated by practical action. Despite their religious beliefs and the range of their historical knowledge, their responses were predicated on a very modern sentiment, albeit one shared by almost all in IR in the twentieth century. Butterfield came closest, in Christianity and History, to an alternative, to a position that was accepting of 'the chanciness [*sic*]of human life, and the precarious nature of man's existence in this risky universe'.[12] In his treatment of international relations, he recoiled, however, from the full implications of this position. For Butterfield, the 'chanciness' and precariousness, it seems, had become too acute for such 'naturalism', despite the potential it might offer for an escape from the implications of the perennial perception of crisis. It is this perspective, indeed, one that transcends the cycle of optimism and pessimism born of frustration and despair, which offers perhaps the best grounding for contemporary international thought and reinvigorating a field now marked intellectual sterility.

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[11] Barry Buzan, 'The timeless wisdom of realism?', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth & Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 47-65.

[12] Butterfield, Christianity and History 1st ed., p. 69.

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